Results of a Budget Tracking Survey in the Public Primary Education Sector

Preliminary Results – First Round

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Introduction

Multiple studies have shown the importance of access to education as a means to alleviate poverty (e.g., Glick and Sahn, 2006; Ilo Program, 2003). The Government of Madagascar has therefore made education reform one of its policy priorities as for example stated in the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP).

Madagascar has low school enrollment rates, even compared to other African countries: only 60% of the urban children and 12% of the rural children complete primary school (Banque Mondiale, 2002). To improve the enrollment and completion rates as well as the quality of education, the Government of Madagascar supported by the international donor community - has substantially increased investments in the education sector in recent years. It committed itself to the Education For All (EFA) initiative and started to pay for the tuition fees¹ and school kits for all students in public primary schools. The Government also raised the districts' budgets for school material and started distributing free text books to the schools.

Despite large efforts by the Government and donors to reach the frontline service providers, little updated information is available on the effectiveness of spending in the public education sector (World Bank, 2006). This study tries to contribute to this matter by investigating the different resource flows in the financing of the public primary education sector. A schematic overview of the financing is depicted in the Appendix.

This brief is made available to let stakeholders know of the findings as they become available. The results are based on primary data collected in the first round of a nation-wide budget tracking survey at the end of 2006.² Hence, it is a preliminary analysis of the first round of data collection. More analysis is forthcoming as the second round of data is on the way.

Discrepancies in the amounts noted or declared as sent by the district facility levels and as received by the schools are referred to as leakages.³ However, we would like to emphasize that leakages could occur due to very different factors as e.g. on the one hand a lack of proper accounting rules and procedures or on the other hand false incentives at the local (district or school) level.⁴ After the second round of data collection it is planned to investigate in greater detail how the amount received compares to what official documents report each student 'should' receive.

Consistent with the new educational policies, the data confirm that there has been a positive shift in financing of the public primary education sector from the parents of the students (before 2002) to the Government of Madagascar. Nowadays, the Government is the main provider of cash and in-kind funds to the public primary schools.

However, there are important challenges ahead as the data from the first round of the survey also show:

- Significant delays in the arrival of the tuition fees at school level. During last school year, the majority of schools only received the tuition fees by the end of the first semester. Considering the current school year, only 1% of the total amount of tuition fees arrived at school level at the beginning of the year;
- Some leakage of tuition fees. Overall, the ratio of non-received funds to expected funds is 7%. Though, leakage of tuition fees is high for some schools;
- Huge delays in the arrival of school kits. A high 36% of the schools only received the school kits by the end of the school year. The findings also suggest school kit reallocation within certain districts without formal communication;
- High leakage of equipment. Twentynine percent of the schools did not receive all equipment that they were entitled to;

of local government officials.

¹ The total amount of tuition fees per public primary school is also referred to as the 'caisse école'.

 $^{^{2}\ {\}rm The \ sampling \ frame \ of \ the \ survey \ is \ discussed \ in \ the \ Appendix.}$

³ The findings discussed in this brief mainly concern results related to the previous school year 2005-2006. It is explicitly mentioned if it concerns the current school year 2006-2007.
⁴ Examples of the latter case are that the diverted funds could be used for purposes unrelated to education or for private gain

- Limited distribution of textbooks. Only two-thirds of the public primary schools received textbooks during last school year;
- Slow distribution of textbooks. Only 11% of the schools received new manuals at the beginning of current school year;
- Big delays in allowance payments for the FRAM teachers as one quarter of these teachers were not paid in time;
- Low inspection rates. Only 11% of the schools received an inspection during last school year.

1. Overview of the resource flows in the education sector

1.1. Tuition fees (caisse école)

a. The Government – through the payment of the caisse école – and FRAM are the main donors of cash contributions to public primary schools.

Table 1 and Figure 1 show that last school year 57% of the total sum of cash contributions to public primary schools was provided by the Government through the payment of the tuition fees. The parents-teachers association (FRAM) was the second main donor and contributed 37% of the total (cash) school funding.

Table 1: Donors of cash contributions to	o the	public	primary
schools for the school year 2005-2006			

Donor	% of total sum of cash
	contributions
Government - Caisse école	57
FRAM	37
Commune	1
Cisco	1
Others	4
Total	100

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

b. Early arrival of the tuition fees – preferably at the start of the new school year – is crucial, though the majority of schools only receive the tuition fees by the end of the first semester.

As the Government – through the payment of the tuition fees – is the main funding source for the public primary schools, it is important that the funds arrive at the start of the new school year. Unfortunately, compared to last school year only 1% of the total amount of tuition fees already arrived at 3% of the schools at the beginning of the new school year 2006-2007. Overall, the schools only received 20% of their cash contributions during the first months of the new school year. Most of these early contributions were paid for by the parents-teachers associations (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Donors of cash contributions to the schools



Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

Investigating the timing of arrival of the tuition fees for last school year in greater detail, Table 2 shows that the majority of schools (77%) received the 'caisse école' from December 2005 to February 2006. Only 7% of the schools received the tuition fees before December 2005. 16% received them after February 2006.

Table 2:	Arrival	time o	of tuition	fees:	2005-2006
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Year	Month	% of schools
2005	Sept. to November	7
	December	26
2006	January	27
	February	24
	March	10
	April to July	6
Total		100

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

A question was then asked on the perceived reasons of delay in the arrival of funds (Table 3) and half of the schools replied that they do not know the reasons. Approximately one quarter of the schools (23%) did not believe there was a delay. Only 7% of the schools claimed that there was a late arrival because of difficulties for the FAF members to travel to the Cisco.

Table 3: Perceived reasons of delay in the arrival of tuition fees (as stated by the director of the public primary school)

	Nr.	%
FAF members unable to travel to the Cisco	16	7
Disagreement FAF members	3	1
Lack of time of Cisco personnel	11	5
The school was only informed very late	12	5
Don't know	112	49
Other	23	10
No delay	53	23
Total	230	100

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

c. Budget execution is very slow. It takes on average three months for the Cisco's to distribute the tuition fees to all schools in their district.

Table 4 illustrates the total lead times of the 'caisse écoles' to the schools calculated as the sum of the time from the arrival of the tuition fees at district (Cisco) level to the end of the distribution of the tuition fees to all schools. On average the Cisco's need 95 days to get the tuition fees to all public primary schools in their district.

There are significant differences in the lead times of tuition fees between provinces. Especially the provinces of Mahajanga, Antananarivo, and Antsiranana show long delivery times. Overall, the districts in Mahajanga needed 1,5 month to organize and start the distribution of the tuition fees and another 3,5 months to distribute the latter to all schools in their districts.

Table 4: Lead	time of the	caisse 'caisse	école'	for the	he school	yea
2005-2006 (as	stated at Cis	sco level) ⁵			

A. Time from arrival of tuition fees at district level to start						
of distribution (in days)						
	Mean	Median				
Antananarivo	45	50				
Fianarantsoa	11	10				
Toamasina	11	10				
Mahajanga	44	18				
Toliara	28	12				
Antsiranana	55	55				
Madagascar	31	16				
B. Distribution tim	e of tuition fees fror	n district to school				
level (in days)						
	Mean	Median				
Antananarivo	54	30				
Fianarantsoa	56	50				
Toamasina	62	64				
Mahajanga	109	114				
Toliara	44	9				
Antsiranana	41	41				
Madagascar	Madagascar 64 55					
C. Total lead time from arrival of tuition fees at district level						
to arrival at school level (in days)						

	Mean	Median
Antananarivo	99	87
Fianarantsoa	67	64
Toamasina	72	80
Mahajanga	153	150
Toliara	72	71
Antsiranana	96	96
Madagascar	95	91

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

On average, one third of the total lead time was used to start the distribution of the funds, indicating that budget execution is very slow. Though, this slow start could be due to different problems at Cisco as well as at school level. Table 5 illustrates the mode of distribution of the tuition fees to the schools as stated at Cisco level for the school year 2005-2006. In general, one mode of distribution was stated per Cisco.⁶ The most common one was the collection of the tuition fees by the FAF representatives at district level. Twenty-three percent of the Cisco's distributed the tuition fees themselves.

Hence, these findings suggest that the long delivery times are due to problems at FAF level. Though, as aforementioned half of the schools reported that they do not know why there is a late arrival of the tuition fees at school level. In order to determine the exact causes of the extended lead times a more profound investigation is needed and we hope that the second round of data will clarify this matter.
 Table 5: Mode of distribution of tuition fees to the schools during the school year 2005-2006 (as stated at Cisco level)

	Nr.	%
FAF representatives collected fees at Cisco	19	61
ZAP leaders collected fees at Cisco	3	10
Cisco distributed the tuition fees to the ZAP	7	23
representatives		
Tuition fees were wired on an account of the	1	3
ZAP representatives or leaders		
Other	1	3
Total	31	100

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

d. A high 93% of the total sum of intended tuition fees reported as sent by the Cisco's arrived at school level. Still, in approximately one-fifth of the schools the amount received did not correspond with the amount declared as sent by the district facility.

As mentioned above, we refer to discrepancies in the amounts noted or declared as sent by the district facility levels and as received by the schools as leakage. After the second round of data collection it is planned to investigate in greater detail how the amount received compares to what official documents report each student 'should' receive, or what was disbursed by the national treasury.

Three percent of the schools declared not to have received any 'caisse école', though the Cisco stated to have sent one to those schools. In total, leakage of tuition fees occurred in 22% of the schools.⁷ There are significant provincial differences in performances (Table 6). The ratio of non-received funds to expected funds is the highest for the province of Mahajanga (22%) and the lowest for the province of Fianarantsoa (2%).

Table 6. Leakag	e in ti	uition fe	es: school	vear 2005-2006
Table 0. Leakag	c m u	unuon n	cs, senour	ycar 2005-2000

Province	Ratio of non-	% schools	Diff.	Diff.
	received to	with	(mean)	(median)
	expected	leakage		
	funds			
Antananarivo	6	11	56	63
Fianarantsoa	2	15	13	17
Toamasina	3	9	35	3
Mahajanga	22	59	38	33
Toliara	4	9	39	16
Antsiranana	6	47	14	23
Remoteness				
Low	6	16	39	24
Medium	7	24	27	23
High	8	24	34	15
Madagascar	7	22	32	23

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

Looking at the percentage of schools with leakage in greater detail also reveals interesting results. Leakage of the tuition fees was reported in respectively 59% and 47% of the schools in the provinces of Mahajanga and Antsiranana.

 $^{^{\}rm 5}$ The statements at Cisco level correspond to those at school level.

⁶ Only three district facility levels reported a combination of distribution modes.

⁷ In those cases where the stated discrepancy was smaller than 1 USD, we considered the deviations as reporting errors rather than leakage. In a country where 70% of the population lives below the poverty line, we believe this amount is a reasonable lower limit of leakage. Moreover, considering other lower limits of leakage (as e.g. 1%) leaded to similar results.

In addition, Table 6 shows that for the schools with leakage, on average 32% of the 'caisse école' is missing. The biggest differences are found in Antananarivo where only 11% of the schools show leakage, but on average 56% of the 'caisse école' is missing. However, taken all findings together our data suggest that leakage of tuition fees is mainly problematic in the province of Mahajanga. The second round of data collection is expected to shed more light on these preliminary findings.

At district level, 68% of the districts show leakage of the tuition fees for at least one school per district. Table 7 shows that there are discrepancies in the tuition fees reported as sent and received for at least one school in all visited districts in Mahajanga and Antsiranana. On average in the districts with leakage, there was a discrepancy in tuition fees reported as sent and received in one-third of the schools.

Table 7: Percentage of districts with leakage in tuition fees for at least one school in the district; school year 2005-2006

Province	Nr. of	% of	% of schools
	visited	districts with	with leakage in
	districts	leakage	those districts
Antananarivo	6	50	22
Fianarantsoa	7	57	26
Toamasina	4	50	18
Mahajanga	5	100	59
Toliara	4	75	13
Antsiranana	2	100	47
Madagascar	28	68	33

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

To evaluate the effect of the location of schools, districts were divided in terciles of remoteness according to a remoteness index developed by Stifel *et al.*, 2004. Table 6 illustrates that the ratio of non-received funds to expected funds increases with remoteness suggesting that more remote schools show more leakage. Although a more detailed econometric analysis of the determinants of leakage seems to be called for to confirm this.

Overall, the preliminary results are similar to the findings of the 2002-2003 budget tracking survey. The latter revealed that 90% of the cash transfers arrived at school level, but a discrepancy in school funding was found in 21% of the schools (Francken, 2003).⁸ Anecdotal evidence suggested that the diverted funds were used for purposes unrelated to education or for private gain of local bureaucrats. A more detailed analysis showed that it were mainly remote facility levels that suffered from discrepancies as they show higher top-down and bottom-up monitoring costs (Francken, Swinnen and Minten, 2005).

e. A majority of schools keeps records on the expenses of the 'caisse école' and in almost twothirds of the schools the latter are controlled by their Cisco.

According to our expectations, there is a significant negative correlation between proper accounting records of the grant received to pay for the tuition fees and leakage of this grant. Overall, 91% of the schools keeps records on the expenses of the 'caisse école' and in 63% of the schools the records are controlled by their Cisco. There are strong regional differences. In the province of Mahajanga, the tuition fee records were only controlled by the Cisco in one-third of the schools during the previous school year.

1.2. School kits

a. All allocated school kits arrived as noted in the districts' accounts in 80% of the schools. In the remaining cases it seems as the Cisco's decided to alter the allocation of school kits within their district without formal adjustment to their accounts. However, more detailed information is required to confirm this.

Table 8 shows the flow of school kits for the school year 2005-2006. Ten percent of the schools reported to have received a surplus of school kits while another remaining ten percent reported leakages.⁹ Especially the province of Toamasina was prone to discrepancies in the flows of school kits. The province of Antsiranana performed very well as there was a perfect match between the number of school kits reported as sent at district and as received at school level.

Table 8: Flow of school kits for the school year 2005-2006

Province	% of schools	% of schools	% of schools
	with correct	with leakage	with surplus
	flow		
Antananarivo	81	8	11
Fianarantsoa	84	8	8
Toamasina	68	20	12
Mahajanga	77	13	10
Toliara	82	9	9
Antsiranana	100	0	0
Madagascar	80	10	10

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

There is a significant positive correlation of surpluses and leakages within districts. On average, both discrepancies are also equal to 37% of the total amount of school kits per school. These findings suggest that the Cisco's decided to alter the allocation of school kits to the schools within their districts but that these reallocations were not recorded in their accounts. It is unclear why the Cisco's decided to alter the allocations and whether these changes were

⁸ The budget tracking survey in the public primary education sector was organized by the World Bank in April/May 2003. In total, 185 public primary schools were visited nationwide.

⁹ In those cases where the stated discrepancy was smaller than 5%, we considered the deviations as reporting errors.

agreed upon with the schools.¹⁰ We expect that the second round data will provide more information on this matter.

b. Thirty-six percent of the schools only received the school kits for 2005-2006 by the end of the school year.

Table 9 illustrates that about half of the schools received the school kits in December 2005 or January 2006. A little more than one third of the schools (36%) only received the school kits by the end of the school year (i.e. from April to August 2006). At the time of the survey, only 3% of the schools received the school kits for the new school year 2006-2007.

Table 9: Arrival time of school kits; 2005-2006

Year	Month	% of schools
2005	Sept. to November	19
	December	26
2006	January	22
	February	12
	March	4
	April	11
	May	17
	June to August	8
Total		100

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

The average lead time for the Cisco's to distribute the school kits to all schools in their districts is 100 days (Table 10). This period is mainly used to effectively distribute the school kits. The time from arrival of the school kits at district level to the start of the distribution is considerably smaller compared to those times for the tuition fees as discussed earlier.

Table 10: Lead time of the school kits for the school year 2005-2006 (as stated at Cisco level; in days)

	Mean	Median	
A. Time from arrival at district to start of distribution			
Madagascar	9	6	
B. Distribution time	e from district to al	l schools in district	
Madagascar	85	55	
C. Total lead time f	rom district to sch	ool level	
Madagascar	100	78	
Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006			

c. It are mainly FAF, FRAM or school members who collect the school kits and deliver them to the schools.

Overall, 44% of the schools received their school kits through FAF, FRAM or school members who went to collect the latter at the district facility level (Table 11). Thirty-six percent of the schools were supplied from another distribution point by FAF, FRAM or school members. Half of the schools with leakages and surpluses received their school kits from another distribution point.

Table 11: Mode of distribution of school kits to the schools during the school year 2005-2006 (as stated at school level)

	%
Supply from the Cisco to the school by ZAP	20
representative or Cisco personnel	
Supply from the Cisco to the school by	44
school/FAF/FRAM members	
Supply from another distribution point by	36
school/FAF/FRAM members	
Total	100
Source: Budget Treeking Survey 2006	

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

1.3. Indicators of school equipment

a. In 29% of the schools there was leakage of the selected school equipment.

The first round of the 2006 budget tracking survey investigated the flow from district to school level of five selected equipment items.¹¹ We constructed an indicator of equipment leakage that equals one if the total amount of at least one of the items did not arrive at school level as stated in the districts' accounts. The indicator equals zero in case of a correct flow from district to school level.

Overall, 29% of the public primary schools did not receive all equipment that they were entitled to. Table 12 shows that equipment leakage was most prevalent in the province of Toamasina as 46% of the schools declared leakage. Moreover, schools that are most remote show a higher likelihood of equipment leakage compared to schools that are less remote. On the other hand, the province of Antsiranana shows excellent performances in equipment flows – for the selected items as well as the school kits – from districts to schools.

Table 12: Schools	with equipment	leakage: 2005-2006
Table 12. Schools	with equipment	Icakage, 2005-2000

Province	% of schools
Antananarivo	31
Fianarantsoa	25
Toamasina	46
Mahajanga	25
Toliara	38
Antsiranana	0
Remoteness	
Low	24
Medium	25
High	40
Madagascar	29

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

b. In sum, only half of the public primary schools received the total amount of tuition fees, school kits and selected equipment as noted in the Cisco's accounts.

Half of the public primary schools declared a perfect flow of the total amount of tuition fees, school kits and selected equipment from district to school level (Table 13). In two districts, all public primary schools in the district received what they were entitled to according the districts'

¹⁰ We did not find any significant correlation between districts or schools with leakages in tuition fees and district or schools with leakages or surpluses in school kits.

¹¹ The five items are chalk, notebooks, school desks, steel plates, and bags of cement.

records. On the contrary, in three other districts none of the public primary schools received what they were supposed to receive. Table 13 illustrates that there are strong provincial differences and that less remote schools show more accurate resource flows and/or records.

 Table 13: Flow of the total amount of tuition fees, school kits and equipment from district to school; 2005-2006

Province	% of schools with accurate flows	
Antananarivo	57	
Fianarantsoa	62	
Toamasina	37	
Mahajanga	28	
Toliara	56	
Antsiranana	53	
Remoteness		
Low	57	
Medium	54	
High	38	
Madagascar	50	

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

1.4. Textbooks

a. Only two-thirds of the public primary schools received textbooks during last school year.

Table 14 illustrates that only 66% of the schools received new manuals¹² during the school year 2005-2006. In the province of Antsiranana less than half of the schools received new textbooks. Overall, the majority of schools (92%) solved this problem by using the books of the previous school year. The remaining part (8%) declared not to use any textbooks.

Table 14: Percentage of schools that received new textbooks during the school year 2005-2006

Province	%
Antananarivo	52
Fianarantsoa	70
Toamasina	77
Mahajanga	54
Toliara	91
Antsiranana	47
Madagascar	66

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

b. In 39% of the schools that received textbooks during last school year, not all textbooks arrived at school level as stated in the districts' accounts. We believe this mainly reflects a lack of accurate accountancy procedures.

c. There is a slow distribution of textbooks as only 11% of the schools received new manuals at the beginning of current school year.

At the time of the survey, only 11% of the schools already received new textbooks for the current school year 2006-2007. Thirty-eight percent of these schools are situated in the province of Antananarivo.

1.5. Salaries

a. FRAM teachers who were supposed to obtain an allowance from the Government/Cisco received their subsidy correctly, but a quarter of them were not paid in time.

A high 84% of the schools have one or more subsidized FRAM teachers who receive an allowance from the Government/Cisco of 55.000 Ariary per month. Nevertheless, 25% of these teachers were not paid in time (Table 15). The payment was on average delayed with 3 months during the last school year. A high 70% of the subsidized FRAM teachers in the province of Toliara were paid too late. The longest average delay in payment was found in the province of Antananarivo where FRAM teachers had to wait half a year before being paid.

Table 15: Delays in payment of the allowances for the FRAM teachers; 2005-2006

	% of FRAM teachers	Average delay
	with delay in payment	(in months)
Antananarivo	17	6
Fianarantsoa	29	2
Toamasina	8	3
Mahajanga	13	5
Toliara	70	2
Antsiranana	11	2
Madagascar	25	3

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

b. In 13% of the schools with subsidized FRAM teachers, there appears to be on average one extra FRAM teacher on the payroll at Cisco level compared to the data at school level.

Table 16 illustrates that for almost one-fifth of the schools in Toamasina and Mahajanga there is on average one extra subsidized FRAM teacher on the payroll of the respective districts compared to the data from the school visits. It mainly concerns one FRAM teacher per school. In some cases there are two such teachers. Further data analysis – and data from the second round – will examine whether this discrepancy is resulting in salary subsidy payments being made even when there is no teacher.

Table 16: % of schools with extra FRAM teachers on payroll at Cisco level compared to data at school level

Province	%
Antananarivo	14
Fianarantsoa	11
Toamasina	19
Mahajanga	18
Toliara	4
Antsiranana	10
Madagascar	13

Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

¹² This includes textbooks on the French and Malagasy language respectively and on mathematics. We did not include the FFMOM manuals as they were only sent to 4% of the schools.

2. Monitoring & evaluation of the schools

a. There is a general lack of monitoring and evaluation at school level. Only 11% of the schools received an inspection during last school year.

Better monitoring and evaluation seem necessary to increase the efficiency of public spending in the education sector in Madagascar (Francken et al., 2005). However, only one-third of the schools received a visit from the district director. A low 11% of the schools received a formal inspection during last school year (Table 17). These findings indicate that monitoring of the schools was significantly lower compared to previous years. During the 2002-2003 budget tracking survey, 32% of the public primary schools stated that they received an inspection during that same year (Francken, 2003). This number increased in 2003-2004 as a high 76% of the schools received an inspection (see Glick et al., 2004; Francken and Minten, 2005). It is unclear why the number of inspections fell dramatically during last school year. The data from the second round of the survey are expected to clarify this issue.

Table 17: % of	public schools that received an inspection

	School year	
	2003-2004*	2005-2006
Antananarivo	89	11
Fianarantsoa	68	10
Toamasina	82	20
Mahajanga	70	5
Toliara	82	12
Antsiranana	55	7
Madagascar	76	11

Source: *Commune survey, 2004; Budget Tracking Survey, 2006

b. Less than half of the schools posted the amount received for the 'caisse école'

Posting in a public place of the grant received by the Government to pay for the tuition fees is a necessary condition to receive the money. Though, it seems that the decrease in monitoring at school level had a negative impact on the incidence of posting. The number of schools posting the amount decreased from 62% in 2003-2004 (Minten *et al.*, 2005) to 42% in 2005-2006.

There is a significant negative correlation between posting and leakage of tuition fees. This could be due to two reasons. On the one hand, posting of the 'caisse école' could increase the monitoring capacity of the beneficiaries of the services and hence decrease leakage. On the other hand, government officials who are performing well will be eager to show their good incentives to the local electorate.

Finally, while this first descriptive analysis allows us to have a quick overview of the funding flow performances in the public primary education sector, more profound research is needed to accurately evaluate performances. We believe that the second round of the survey will provide us with more valuable information and insights.

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