

South African Social Attitudes 2nd Report



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Reflections on the Age of Hope

Edited by Benjamin Roberts,
Mbithi wa Kivilu & Yul Derek Davids



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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
AIC	African Independent Churches
ANC	African National Congress
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
CASASP	Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy
DA	Democratic Alliance
DoL	Department of Labour
DP	Democratic Party
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
EC	Eastern Cape
EPOP	Evaluation Public Opinion Programme
FBE	Free Basic Electricity
FBS	Free Basic Services
FBSan	Free Basic Sanitation
FBW	Free Basic Water
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
FS	Free State
GT	Gauteng
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
ID	Independent Democrats
Idasa	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IPSE	Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LP	Limpopo Province
LSM	Living Standard Measures
MF	Minority Front
MNI	Majority Necessities Index
MP	Mainline Protestant
MP	Mpumalanga
MUD	Moral Underclass Discourse
NC	Northern Cape
NMMM	Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality
NNP	New National Party
NW	North-West
OC	Other Christian
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PC	Pentecostal and Charismatic
PDI	Proportional Deprivation Index
PR	Proportional Representation
PSE	Poverty and Social Exclusion

PSU	Primary Sampling Unit
RC	Roman Catholic
RED	Redistributive Discourse
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SASAS	South African Social Attitudes Survey
SID	Social Integrationist Discourse
SRMI	Sequential Regression Multiple Imputation
Stats SA	Statistics South Africa
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WC	Western Cape
ZCC	Zionist Christian Church

Notes on terminology in this volume

During the apartheid regime, legislation divided the South African populace into four distinct groups based on racial classification. Although the notion of population groups is now legal history, it is not always possible to gauge the effects of past discriminatory practices, and the progress of policies designed to eradicate them, without reference to it. For this reason, the HSRC continues to use the terms 'African', 'coloured', 'white' and 'Indian' where it is pertinent to the analysis of data.

In discussions relating to rural environments, a distinction is made between formal and informal areas. Throughout the volume, 'rural formal' refers to commercial farms, while 'rural informal' denotes communal areas in the former homelands.

Introduction: Reflections on the Age of Hope

Benjamin Roberts, Mbithi wa Kivilu and Yul Derek Davids

We must accept finite disappointment, but we must never lose infinite hope. (King 2008: 25)

Hope is necessary in every condition. The miseries of poverty, sickness and captivity would, without this comfort, be insupportable. (Johnson 1851: 84)

Hope is where the transformation begins; without it, a society cannot take its first steps toward reconstructing its self-identity as a society of tolerance and coexistence. (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003: 126)

Shortly after South Africa entered its second decade of democracy, former President Mbeki (2006), drawing on evidence from polls and public attitudes surveys, proclaimed in his annual State of the Nation address that 'our people are firmly convinced that our country has entered its Age of Hope. They are convinced that we have created the conditions to achieve more rapid progress towards the realisation of their dreams. They are certain that we are indeed a winning nation'. This expressed public optimism about the country's future and developmental trajectory was juxtaposed with a detailed articulation of the suite of economic and social achievements that had been made since 1994. Together, these subjective and objective indicators were used to demonstrate that the government's vision of becoming a 'developmental state' was progressively being achieved, with the combination of redistributive policy measures and robust economic growth serving as the basis for making appreciable gains in fighting poverty and overcoming historical inequalities and social exclusion (Southall 2007). The discourse of hope has also been evident in the popular media. This has included highly visible marketing campaigns such as 'Proudly South African', 'Alive with Possibility', the 'Homecoming Revolution' and 'South Africa: The Good News'. More importantly, throughout the first 10 years of democracy, national policy was influenced and the public imagination captivated by a number of political narratives, including the 'Rainbow Nation', the 'African Renaissance' and the 'New Patriotism' (Chidester et al. 2003; Olivier 2007).

The preceding volume of *South African Social Attitudes* (Pillay et al. 2006) – the first in the series – affirmed the overwhelming sense of general national pride exhibited by South Africans, regardless of population group (Grossberg et al. 2006; Orkin & Jowell 2006). From a comparative perspective, the country was placed fifth in a ranking of 33 countries on general national pride (Smith & Kim 2006). On more specific aspects or domains of national pride, the responses tended to be more ambivalent but still encouraging, which suggests that the citizenry are patriotic but discerning in assessing the country's recent accomplishments. This is interpreted as a reassuring sign of the health of our democracy. Although there were notable subgroup differences in trust in a range of institutions, on

aggregate South Africans demonstrated increased levels of trust relative to the late 1990s. A sense of optimism also characterised perceptions pertaining to race relations, with approximately 90 per cent of African, coloured and Indian people and 70 per cent of white people expressing the view that race relations have improved since 1994.

Other results from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) baseline study were more textured and nuanced, and drew attention to the unresolved and manifold challenges that cast a shadow over the Age of Hope. For instance, the post-apartheid pattern of subjective well-being was characterised by a situation where white people were largely satisfied with life but possessed negative future expectations, in contrast to black people, who were largely dissatisfied with life but had positive expectations of the future (Møller & Saris 2001; Roberts 2006). The reality that poor African and coloured respondents exhibited a resilient and resolute optimism about the next five years, despite being unhappy and dissatisfied with income, housing, employment opportunities, paid leave and life in general, acts as a stark reminder of the need to ensure that the state's policy and programmatic interventions effectively reach the poorest (Roberts 2006). As the wave of public service delivery protests in recent years demonstrated, a failure to deliver substantively on electoral promises and the expectations they engender may rapidly erode the trust and hope vested by the vulnerable and socially excluded in the state to address their deprivations, only to be replaced by increased disaffection and despair.

This second *South African Social Attitudes* publication endeavours to continue the critical examination of the attitudes and values held by ordinary citizens towards a wide range of social and political issues relevant to their life in contemporary South African society, and the extent to which they reflect or refute the notion of a national season or Age of Hope. The analysis is based primarily on the findings of the 2003, 2004 and 2005 SASAS rounds. Where possible, attempts have been made to examine attitudinal change by drawing on trend data from repeat questions fielded within the survey instruments, but also by making comparisons with similar questions included in other opinion surveys conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) that pre-date the introduction of SASAS. Cross-national analysis has also been included in some instances, in order to ascertain how South African values and beliefs compare with those of developed and developing nations.

Despite references to a prevailing mood of optimism, the context in which the SASAS fieldwork rounds of late 2004 and 2005 were undertaken was one marked by uncertainty and change. This was a period in which the debate about a possible presidential successor to Thabo Mbeki began and steadily escalated. It was also a time of concerns about a 'systematisation of corruption' in government (Orkin & Jowell 2006; Southall 2007). There was the high-profile fraud and corruption trial and conviction of Schabir Shaik, the business adviser to the then deputy president, Jacob Zuma. The latter's alleged role in corruption and the subsequent release from his duties as deputy president in mid-2005 served to foster division within the African National Congress (ANC) and fuel succession debates. There were also scandals pertaining to the misappropriation of resources, such as 'Travelgate' and 'Oilgate'. Other salient events included the wave of violent demonstrations and protests over service delivery failures and over provincial boundary changes in the case of cross-border municipalities; mounting fear and frustration over crime and violence, with the credibility of official crime statistics being questioned; the deepening impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, set against international condemnation of apparent AIDS denialism and criticism of the country's AIDS programme, and increasing pressure on the delivery of health services; and concerns over South African involvement in conflict resolution in Africa.

In such a context and recognising the enormity of remaining development challenges, former President Mbeki did draw attention to the responsibility that inevitably comes with high levels of public optimism and hope. Specifically, it was noted that:

we must also focus on and pay particular attention to the implications of those high levels of optimism with regard to what we must do together to achieve the objective of a better life for all our people. We have to respond to the hopes of the people by doing everything possible to meet their expectations. (Mbeki 2006)

However, it remains to be seen how uncertainties about the future that such multifaceted events and challenges are likely to raise are reflected in attitudinal patterns.

The attitudinal series

The SASAS series was conceived in 2002 as a sustained research programme that, on the basis of a regularly conducted time-series survey, would provide long-term assessments of continuity and change in public attitudes and perceptions. The principal objective of the SASAS programme is therefore to collect, analyse and disseminate data on contemporary South African society in order to chart and explain the interaction between the country's changing institutions, its political and economic structures, and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations (Pillay 2006). The research design has been modelled on long-standing and highly influential attitudinal surveys from the United Kingdom, United States and Germany. Every August–October since 2003, a nationally representative sample of approximately 5 000 adults aged 16 and older has been interviewed and information gathered on the public's attitudes, beliefs, behaviour patterns and values. For a fuller methodological account, see Appendix 1.

The survey is divided into three components, namely: i) a replicating core module, ii) rotating topical modules, and iii) cross-national modules. The replicating core comprises a stable set of key (attitudinal and behavioural, as well as demographic) questions that are regularly asked of the full survey sample or a subsample of selected respondents. To date, the core content has constituted around half of the overall length of SASAS, and is the basis for monitoring critical aspects of social change and subgroup analysis. By contrast, rotating topical modules are special inclusions focused on particular themes that either have not been previously investigated by SASAS or expand on existing topics. These modules are designed to be included at periodic intervals rather than on an annual basis. Finally, the cross-national modules are developed by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which is a multilateral collaboration of research organisations in 45 nations that was established in 1984 and seeks to study important social and political processes from a comparative perspective. Each member state undertakes to annually field an agreed module of questions on a chosen topic area. The module is chosen for repetition at intervals to allow comparisons both between countries and over time. The ISSP modules included in SASAS thus enable us to hold up a mirror and benchmark the values held by South African society against those expressed by citizens from a league of other developed and developing nations. The ISSP modules that have been included in SASAS to date are national identity (2003), citizenship (2004), work orientation (2005), the role of government (2006), leisure time and sports (2007), religion (2008) and social inequalities (2009).

Where does SASAS fit into the domestic quantitative social science landscape? Since the demise of the apartheid regime, South Africa rapidly became an increasingly well-documented nation. A multitude of national and sub-national studies have been conducted that collectively yield a wealth of information about our characteristics as a society, and how these have evolved over time. The General Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey conducted by Statistics South Africa are two noteworthy examples of annual sources of data on the country's changing social conditions and behaviour patterns. Comparatively less is known about our character in terms of what we feel about our world and ourselves. There remains much scope for deepening our understanding of the public's values, chronicling how these have been changing, and determining the extent to which different segments of the population vary in their attitudes and beliefs.

As survey builds upon survey, SASAS will provide evidence on the speed and direction of change in underlying public values over time. SASAS thus represents a notable tool for monitoring evolving social, economic and political values among South Africans, but it also demonstrates promising utility as an anticipatory or predictive mechanism which can inform decision- and policy-making processes. This publication, and the planned attitudinal series that it is to form part of, is intended to appeal to a wide audience that is interested in research-based initiatives to inform policy-making and decision-making processes of our country. In common with many other large-scale survey-based undertakings, the emphasis is on providing a preliminary examination of findings from the survey on a select number of topics, and reporting on changes over time where trend data are available. As such, we do not aim for definitive interpretations or comprehensive analyses of all the survey content. For this, we will have to depend on secondary analysis by the social science community to provide more detailed accounts that will further engage with and enrich the observations made in this volume. To this end, the HSRC's data curation project is currently in the process of archiving and making publicly available SASAS data sets and documentation.

Voices of the people: Hopeful or despairing?

The chapters in the volume have been grouped according to the same three thematic areas that were adopted in the baseline volume of the SASAS series (Pillay et al. 2006), namely, race, class and politics; poverty, inequality and service delivery; and societal values. Following deliberations within Cabinet, the Department of Science and Technology's Ten-Year Plan (DST 2007) specifies human and social dynamics as one of five 'grand challenges' facing the country. The inclusion of this priority was based on an identified need to 'increase our ability to anticipate the complex consequences of change; to better understand the dynamics of human and social behaviour at all levels; to better understand the cognitive and social structures that create and define change; and to help people and organizations better manage profound or rapid change' (DST 2007: 23). Acknowledging the importance of this grand challenge, it is hoped that the diverse topics covered in the volume serve as a modest contribution towards an improved understanding of how the perceptions and values held by South Africa's citizens are interacting with the complex array of social issues confronting our young democracy, and how these are evolving over time.

Race, class and politics

In their contribution, Stephen Rule and Zakes Langa (Chapter 1) outline two important trends in public attitudes. The first pertains to South Africans' views about national priorities, namely, the issues which are seen to pose the most serious challenges to the country. As Smith (1980: 164) observes, 'the areas that the public worries about tell a great deal about how society perceives and interprets a given historical moment' and 'by examining changes in the cluster of problems over time we can chart the flow of history from the perspective of the participants in the ongoing process'. The analysis of South African public concerns since the late 1990s reveals that there has been both an entrenchment in the ranking of certain problems and remarkable shifts in the relative position of others. Prior to 2003, South Africans viewed unemployment, poverty and crime as the three most important concerns. Unemployment not only continued to dominate public attention between 2003 and 2005, but there has been a swift escalation in concern about this economic phenomenon, reaching a high of 80 per cent by late 2005 (a near doubling since 1999). With the mounting impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, this issue has supplanted crime as the second most commonly mentioned national priority area. Crime and poverty now occupy third and fourth places respectively. After 2004, issues of service delivery began to feature more prominently than before in public consciousness, a telling indication of the service delivery protests that ensued. Not only do these indicators convey a real sense of the state of the nation during the time of surveying, but they suggest important lessons for policy-makers about

the need for greater urgency in broadening the coverage of employment creation and service delivery interventions, the danger of unfulfilled expectations, and the need for caution and pragmatism in setting national development targets to ensure that they are not overambitious or lacking empirical foundation (such as halving unemployment by 2014).

The second examined issue pertains to levels of trust in a range of important institutions within our democracy. The 2003 SASAS survey demonstrated that there had been an improvement in institutional trust on aggregate, rising from 50 per cent in 1999 to 55 per cent in 2003 (Orkin & Jowell 2006). The 2004 SASAS data point to a further improvement, with aggregate trust rising to above the 60 per cent threshold. However, in contrast to the preceding years, the data from late 2005 show a worrisome reversal in trust in virtually all major public institutions, particularly in local government and Parliament, but also in the other two tiers of government. Whether this remains a transitory downturn or the beginning of a gradual but sustained erosion of confidence remains to be seen. Internationally, there exists mounting evidence suggesting that the performance of governments and political institutions is a critical factor to consider in explaining dwindling institutional trust (more so than social-psychological or socio-cultural factors). The reason why trust matters for a young democracy such as South Africa is that institutional trust is seen to have a bearing on political participation, support for redress policies, compliance with political authorities and interpersonal trust (Levi & Stoker 2000). Therefore, this growing scepticism matters and should be closely monitored. From an accountability perspective, it is clear that citizens expect their needs to be met, and aim to hold government and elected representatives to account.

Kevin Durrheim (Chapter 2) investigates why people support or oppose policies that are aimed at eradicating racial inequality. Using the 2004 SASAS survey data, he examines three main competing explanations emanating from previous research. The first is self-interest, the hypothesis being that people with the most to lose from the implementation of such policies will be most opposed to them. The second possible rationale contends that opposition to racial transformation policy is informed by racism, particularly more covert or 'symbolic' racism. Finally, he tests whether ideological factors, most notably political and economic conservatism, exert an influence on opposition to racial transformation policy. In order to determine the relative importance of these propositions, attitudes towards five specific policies (land reform, compensation for victims of violence, sports quotas, affirmative action in employment, and preferential trading) are analysed and combined into a composite index of redress attitudes.

In spite of reasonably high levels of support for each of the five policies of redress considered, exceeding 60 per cent in all but one instance, there emerges a stark gradient when one disaggregates the results by population group. Overwhelming support in favour of transformation policies is evident among the African population, less enthusiasm among coloured and Indian people, and very low levels among the white population. This is indicative of group self-interest as members of the population group most likely to benefit rate the policies the highest, and vice versa. Distrust of government was also shown to be a significant determinant of opposition to redress policies across all groups. The author argues that those who distrust the government are likely to oppose its racial transformation policies.

These findings point to the inherent difficulty decision-makers face in implementing a race-based programme of redress. As Bentley and Habib (2008) assert, and the SASAS results suggest, such policies may have the unintended effect of reinforcing racial consciousness and alienating a section of the population. The lingering dilemma is how to advance redress to deal with historical injustice while simultaneously promoting social cohesion and unity. Clearly, the public's sentiments reflect a tension between principles of transformation and redress on the one hand, and meritocratic values on the other. In response, Bentley and Habib advocate a class-based redress agenda, supplemented by race-based initiatives; this would place the emphasis on South Africa's poor – and serve to bring about redress to the disadvantaged while building a vibrant, non-racial society.

Marlene Roefs and Doreen Atkinson (Chapter 3) analyse public attitudes to local government, and relate these to the philosophy of 'developmental local government' that has gained currency since the publication of the 1998 White Paper on Local Government. Active participation of citizens is seen as a key tenet of the vision of developmental municipalities, and serves as the core focus of the chapter. In particular, they examine the effect that knowledge of and exposure to local government, as well as satisfaction with municipal performance, has on intended electoral behaviour.

Their analysis demonstrates that interest and participation in local governance serve to increase the likelihood of voting in local government elections. Three measures of interest and participation were used in deriving this result, namely: i) awareness of ward committees, ii) participation in integrated development planning (IDP) processes, and iii) perceived personal influence on local government decision-making. Therefore, those who know of the existence of ward committees, who are involved in the process of producing an IDP for their municipality, and who believe in their ability to personally influence local-level decision-making are significantly more inclined to vote. People holding positive views about the responsiveness of their municipalities similarly also seem to have a greater propensity to turn out on election day. Unfortunately, Roefs and Atkinson find that approximately a third of the adult population are unaware of a ward committee in their area, only 8 per cent have participated in an IDP process, and barely more than a quarter felt they shaped local government decisions. Therefore, given that public involvement in local government matters for intended electoral behaviour, it is apparent that much remains to be done to improve the reach of policies, processes and mechanisms aimed at promoting public participation.

Actual performance of municipalities was found to shape attitudes towards participating in local government elections. Some clearly wish to use their vote to voice their dissatisfaction with the delivery of services, while others seem to be driven less by experience with service delivery and more by symbolic or ideological considerations such as loyalty to the ANC or a belief in the ability of municipalities to work better and provide in the future. These results suggest that, at least to some extent, the public do recognise the power of the vote as a means of voicing their dissatisfaction with publicly provided services or rewarding perceived good municipal performance.

A broader view is taken by Derek Davids (Chapter 4) in his examination of public attitudes towards democracy. A sobering assessment is provided of perceived state performance in the country. South Africans are found to be only moderately satisfied with the 'way democracy works' in the country. In 2005, 53 per cent expressed satisfaction, with significant cleavages evident by population group, level of living standards and geographic location. For instance, 58 per cent of African respondents were satisfied with democratic performance, compared to 31 per cent of white respondents in 2005. Views on the performance of national and provincial governments follow a similar pattern, with a small majority voicing approval. However, a particularly bleak picture emerges in relation to views on the state of local governance. In 2004, only 38 per cent were satisfied with the performance of their local government or municipality, a mere 29 per cent believed local government had become more responsive to their needs in the preceding five years and, in 2005, more than half (53 per cent) complained that municipal decision-making was not transparent. Ward councillors and ward committees receive equally poor scores in terms of their level of accountability to and communication with the electorate. There are notable differences in the perceived performance in delivering specific social services. Social grants, electricity, and water and sanitation received the highest approval scores, with more than 60 per cent satisfied. A more moderate score was given to healthcare, with slightly more than half the population satisfied in 2005, though only 38 per cent positively appraised the treatment of sexually transmitted infections (including HIV/AIDS). Extreme public discontent is manifest in relation to local government efforts at creating employment (11 per cent satisfied in 2005), reducing crime (24 per cent satisfied), land reform (28 per cent satisfied) and housing (34 per cent satisfied).

In terms of citizenship and participation, the survey demonstrates that the public rates their understanding of politics as relatively low, and believes that the ability to influence government decisions at all levels is limited. Furthermore, only 35 per cent of respondents to the 2004 survey indicated that they were interested in politics, 28 per cent said they often or sometimes discussed politics with family or friends, and in 2003 and 2005, less than a fifth indicated that they often discussed politics. A more encouraging finding is the strong level of attachment to voting, with 81 per cent in 2005 expressing the belief that people have a civic duty to vote, while in the 2004 survey 61 per cent indicated that always voting in an election is a very important part of being a good citizen. Despite this deeply entrenched view on electoral participation, only small shares of the public appear to have engaged in unconventional, non-electoral forms of political behaviour such as protest politics, including signing petitions, attending peaceful demonstrations, engaging in boycotts, occupying buildings, and unlawful strike action. While 30 per cent said they had attended a political demonstration or rally before, barely more than a tenth had ever engaged in other forms of protest action. Importantly, though, between a quarter and a third of adult South Africans said they would consider engaging in such action even though they had not yet done so. With the exception of participation in religious groups, the 2003 and 2004 survey results suggest low levels of associational membership, with only small percentages specifying that they are supporters or active members of a trade union, women's organisation, youth group, community organisation or sports club.

While the survey results reaffirm the strong commitment that South Africans vest in the act of voting, there has been much speculation about the extent to which the country's youth are disconnecting from conventional politics, and are apathetic, individualistic and disinterested. Focusing largely upon 2005 SASAS data, Gerard Boyce (Chapter 5) examines the political attitudes of young people aged 16–35 years, explores their current and future outlook on life, and reflects on various social conditions that may influence the success with which they navigate the transition to adulthood. In terms of views about voting in elections, a sizeable majority of young people consider it a duty to vote and smaller but equally notable shares hold the view that voting ultimately makes a difference. In these beliefs, the observed differences between those younger and those older than 35 years were not statistically significant, a finding that applies also to satisfaction with democracy. This signifies that youth are just as likely as middle-aged and older citizens to believe in the power of the vote. Young people were also not dissimilar from older citizens in their moderate levels of trust in public institutions and dissatisfaction with government service delivery.

A noteworthy finding is that young South Africans, while sharing similar levels of national pride and life satisfaction with older cohorts, are significantly more optimistic about their future prospects and those of the country as a whole, even in the face of immense socio-economic hardship such as high levels of youth unemployment. In common with other formative research (e.g. Everatt 2000; Seekings 1996), these results pose a convincing challenge to the stereotypical representations depicting youth as 'disengaged' or 'lost'. However, underlying these general findings are significant racial differences in attitudes within the younger generation, with African youth expressing more positive attitudes or 'democratic enthusiasm' towards voting than other population groups. This reflects the diversity in the historical background and contemporary situation of young people. It also highlights the need for targeted interventions for various sub-categories of youth to encourage civic and political participation.

Poverty, inequality and service delivery

The 2003 to 2005 period was marked by a dramatic upsurge in public protest action, a trend that escalated in the lead-up to the 2006 local government elections but that ultimately came to broadly characterise the political landscape during the latter half of the 2000s. For instance, between July 2004 and May 2005, there were an estimated 20 waves of popular protest against poor service delivery,

housing, corruption, and water and electricity interruptions in Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Mpumalanga and Free State (Southall 2007). David Hemson (Chapter 6) uses SASAS 2004 and 2005 data to scrutinise the attitudes of citizens to the provision of basic municipal services such as water and sanitation, housing and electricity, as well as to the institutions responsible for delivering these services. The analysis finds that dissatisfaction with service delivery is present both among impoverished South African families who lack services as well as those who have access to higher levels of service.

Crucial differences are identified between these two groupings. Interestingly, respondents with lower incomes and levels of service (absolutely deprived) exhibit high levels of dissatisfaction with service delivery but have correspondingly low levels of distrust in local government. In other words, a sizeable number of impoverished South Africans maintain their trust in local government despite being poorly serviced and feeling aggrieved by this situation. This contradiction seems to be held together by the hope that life will eventually improve. The second group is classified as relatively deprived. These respondents differ in that they have somewhat higher levels of service, and combine dissatisfaction with service delivery with higher levels of distrust in municipal governance. This group appears to make comparisons with those with stable access to even higher service standards, and is concerned about perceived threats to achieving this access, such as problems of affordability. This relatively deprived group tended to report higher levels of dissatisfaction and possessed a greater propensity to engage in political discussion and possibilities for mobilisation, compared to those with lower levels of service.

Mbithi wa Kivilu, Mandla Diko and Ronnie Mmotlane (Chapter 7) explore attitudes to service delivery and social exclusion in a different setting, namely, the classroom. One of the core thrusts of educational policy reform since the early 1990s has been the promotion of school integration as a means of redressing inequalities and prejudices in the South African schooling system. This transformative project has endeavoured to replace the segregated and fragmented apartheid education culture with one that is predicated on inclusivity and human rights. Despite the desegregation of white, Indian and coloured schools over the last two decades, school integration is incomplete and tensions remain. Admission policies and school fees act as barriers to integration for many and, within schools, economic, racial and gender inequalities persist. School dropout and repetition rates, underqualified teachers, and poor performance and school outcomes also suggest that the constitutional right to basic education in addition to equality of opportunity has not yet been achieved. Alongside efforts at redressing historical injustices in the education sector, it is important to profile the views of the public towards the social integration agenda. The authors use data from the three SASAS rounds conducted between 2003 and 2005 to explore patterns and trends in levels of support for the integration of children of different races, language groups, economic status, religious affiliation and gender in schools.

The results reveal on aggregate that there is broad-based support for inclusivity within schools. Favourable attitudes towards racial and linguistic integration were expressed by more than 80 per cent of respondents over the three years, while between 75 per cent and 80 per cent of South African adults approved of integration along economic and gender lines. There was slightly lower support for the integration of learners with different religious affiliation, though even in this instance, approximately two-thirds reported positive views. The analysis pointed to increasing tolerance among South Africans towards school integration over the interval, with a general increase between 2003 and 2004, followed by a modest decline in 2005. Beyond the national consensus, important socio-demographic differences in attitude were observed. The most consistent support for the integration of children of different backgrounds in schools is found among more impoverished South Africans, in particular among African respondents with low income and educational attainment and residing in either informal urban settlements or rural areas. Yet, there was also a significant increase in the proportion of people who supported integration among more affluent individuals, notably white respondents in formal urban areas with a tertiary education. South Africans therefore exhibit progressive attitudes towards school integration, and while evidence suggests significant improvements since the early years of democracy,

it is clear that much still needs to be achieved in addressing inequality, tension and exclusion within the education sector.

In spite of major political and economic advances since 1994, South Africa continues to be plagued by poverty, inequality and lack of service delivery. Two specific contributions have been included in this volume that focus on the conceptualisation, definition and measurement of poverty in the country and represent valuable contributions to the understanding of poverty in the local context. Gemma Wright, Michael Noble and Wiseman Magasela (Chapter 8) use data from a specialised module included in the 2005 round of SASAS on the views of South Africans about the necessities in life to contribute to ongoing local and international debates on poverty and social exclusion. The method explored in the chapter is predicated on what is known as the consensual poverty approach, which directly asks respondents what items, activities and services they consider essential in order to be able to achieve an acceptable standard of living within current South African society. The authors contend that this is a more democratic definition of poverty that aims to identify a common set of 'socially perceived necessities', and in which the public plays an active role in the definition process as opposed to being informed exclusively by researchers' own judgements.

Of the 56 questions on possessions, activities, neighbourhood characteristics and relationships with family and friends that were contained in the module, a total of 26 items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population, and also by 50 per cent of all subgroups of respondents categorised by gender, population group, age cohort, rural–urban location and subjective poverty category. Of these items, 25 out of 26 were defined as essential by at least two-thirds of the total population. A close examination of this set of socially perceived necessities demonstrates that people do not define an acceptable standard of living simply in terms of items relating to basic survival or subsistence. Reflecting arguments concerning the multidimensional nature of poverty, the notion of 'acceptability' in South African living standards extends beyond possessing sufficient food and clothing. It includes measures relating to the ability to provide adequate care for the sick, having decent and secure housing, being able to appropriately look after the needs of children, residing in a decent neighbourhood, having supportive social relationships and religious networks, and the availability of, and access to, resources to deal with emergency situations.

The development of this democratic definition of poverty and social inclusion is important, as it underlines the fact that the public conceptualises poverty not just in terms of inadequate income to meet the basic food and non-food needs of families and households. While material deprivation in the form of lack of income and material possessions is important to such a definition, so too are aspects of service provision and infrastructure, as well as social networks. From a policy perspective, the multidimensionality of poverty and the deficiencies of poverty defined and measured purely in terms of lack of income or consumption expenditure have begun to be discussed. In particular, in response to claims that poverty has remained static or even increased in recent years (using a conventional money-metric poverty approach), the state has drawn attention to the lack of consideration of the impact of state-provided social services – or the 'social wage' – on the poor (Meth 2006). In this context, the approach articulated by the authors raises important conceptual and measurement issues that should further enrich debates and efforts focused on monitoring continued progress in the fight against poverty and the achievement of an inclusive society.

Despite a strong constitutional commitment towards children, in terms of providing for their basic needs and protecting their rights, and the ratification of international treaties on the rights of the child, available research on child poverty in South Africa suggests that this social problem is widespread and that significant progress still needs to be made in realising these obligations (Noble et al. 2007). Apart from denying children their basic rights, poverty adversely affects the experiences that children have, can cause permanent harm to their physical and mental development, and constrains opportunities

for advancement, which are likely to indelibly shape their lives as adults. Jonathan Bradshaw and John Holmes (Chapter 9) use SASAS data to perform an exploratory investigation of both the prevalence and nature of child poverty in the country over the 2003 to 2005 period. As with Chapter 8, the preferred approach is multidimensional in character, employing measures of child deprivation and social exclusion alongside the traditional child income poverty.

Using an income poverty line, the authors find that approximately two-thirds of South African children in the three survey rounds between 2003 and 2005 were classified as poor. Furthermore, an estimated 69 per cent of children were living in households deprived of two or more of nine basic material possessions in 2005, while 61 per cent were identified as socially excluded in at least two of five domains of exclusion (services, communications, housing, fear over personal safety, citizenship). Combining the income poverty, deprivation and social exclusion domains, 80 per cent of children were poor on one of the three measures, 69 per cent were poor on two of the measures, and 49 per cent were poor on all three measures. In other words, nearly half of South African children were found to be income poor, deprived and socially excluded.

Further analysis reveals that African children are significantly more likely to be poor than other population groups. Household composition and size appear to matter. Households with three or more children are more likely to be at risk of income poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. So too are households where there is a child younger than five years. If there is a pensioner in the household, then there is a higher risk of poverty. Children in one-adult families and families where there are six or more adults have the highest child poverty risk. Geographic factors also influence the odds of a child being poor. Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal all have the highest rates of poverty and social exclusion on three out of three measures. Children in the Eastern Cape have the highest income poverty rate but deprivation and social exclusion are highest in Limpopo. Children living in informal settlements are most likely to be poor in all three dimensions, while children in communal rural areas are most likely to be deprived of material possessions. The results impart a sense of how extensive child poverty is in the country. While there was no apparent significant reduction in child income poverty between 2003 and 2005, there were improvements in relation to child deprivation and social exclusion over the period, due to the increasing access to housing and related services. Therefore, in spite of a glimmer of hope about emerging trends, the analysis ultimately evokes unease at the enormity of the challenge ahead in minimising the inter-generational transmission of poverty and hardship.

Societal values

The final four chapters examine certain societal values of the South African population: attitudes towards religion, environment, the labour market and personal safety.

There exists an emerging body of research that suggests that religious affiliation and belief play an insurance role by increasing the resilience of individuals and families in the context of hardship. For instance, using cross-national European data, Clark and Lelkes (2005) find that religion provides a sizeable stress-buffering effect against adverse life events such as unemployment and marital dissolution, as measured by the impact of such events on life satisfaction. Dehejia et al. (2007) also find that, in the United States, religious participation helps offset the dampening effect that income shocks have on happiness. Several South African studies have demonstrated that religion and spirituality act as critical resilience factors that support families during and after crises, by buffering against stress but also by contributing to the family's sense of hope for the future and ability to actively problem-solve (Dass-Brailsford 2005; Der Kinderen & Greeff 2003; Greeff & Loubser 2008).

In light of these findings and recognising the physical, socio-economic and other personal vulnerabilities that many South Africans are exposed to, it is unsurprising that a strong religiosity

continues to characterise the population, with little evidence of a significant secular turn. Stephen Rule and Bongiwe Mncwango (Chapter 10) outline how approximately 80 per cent of South Africans identify themselves as Christian, dominated by the African Initiated Churches and a rising affiliation to Pentecostal/Charismatic Christianity, with 51 per cent attending religious services one or more times weekly and another quarter on a monthly basis. In terms of beliefs, they find that around three-quarters of the adult population express a resolute faith in the existence of God and claim that 'Jesus is the solution to all the world's problems'. Additionally, nine out of ten citizens believe in the power of prayer, with close to two-thirds reporting that they pray at least once daily. Further support for the idea of South Africans looking to their religion as a source of hope and coping during difficult circumstances is found in changing patterns of institutional trust documented by Rule and Langa (Chapter 1). While trust in many public institutions began to wane in 2005, most likely reflecting broader socio-political developments in our society, there remained an overwhelming and steadfast confidence in churches and religious organisations.

Over the last two decades, churches have had to respond to critical societal challenges such as reconciliation, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and widespread poverty, unemployment and deprivation. As Egan (2007) outlines, this has seen developments such as the church supporting grassroots movements and actively lobbying government in relation to matters of poverty and social justice, promoting the virtue of charity, publicly addressing prejudice such as AIDS stigma, and continuing to perform conventional roles such as advocating for and providing healthcare. Yet, many churches have also clung to a traditional sexual morality around issues such as monogamy, condom use, abortion and homosexuality. In many respects, Rule and Mncwango show that these values are reflected in public attitudes, with strong prosocial and civic-minded values coexisting with conservative, traditional views in relation to sexual permissiveness and the death penalty. Therefore, while it appears that many South Africans are relying on their religion as a source of optimism and resilience in relatively uncertain times, the findings also raise questions concerning the relationship between religious belief and moral values and behaviour.

Turning from the spiritual to the physical, even though the right to a healthy environment and the right to have the environment protected from damaging and degrading activities is enshrined in section 24 of the South African Constitution, there are signs of considerable environmental stress evident in available statistics on land degradation, water availability and quality, air pollution, loss of biodiversity and climate change (Gibson et al. 2009). As the recent round of regional and global dialogues on climate change attests, concern for the natural environment has steadily increased as a priority on the international agenda. In particular, it has brought into focus environmental limits in the pursuit of economic growth and development, and raised disquiet about the risks this phenomenon poses for current and future generations in terms of livelihoods, health and well-being. In a country such as South Africa, this implies that in pursuing the developmental state, a balance needs to be forged between fulfilling the economic aspirations of the population and respecting the limits of the natural resource base that sustains us (Kagwanja 2009). While concern with the environment and sustainable development is an increasingly common feature in the media and political discourse, relatively little is known about public attitudes towards the environment in the country. In response, Jaré Struwig (Chapter 11) undertakes an initial exploration of the intricate relationship between environmental attitudes, values and concerns.

Through the influential work of political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997, 2000, 2007), evidence has been amassed in recent decades from cross-national attitudinal surveys that lends support to the thesis that as societies prosper economically, there is generally a corresponding, progressive shift from materialist to post-materialist priorities. That is, with changing material standards, basic concerns over securing economic and physical security are replaced with new cultural values that emphasise, among other things, environmental protection. Yet, in a middle-income but highly inequitable society

where poverty, hunger and insecure living environments remain an enduring reality for a considerable segment of the population, how unified are South Africans in their view towards the environment?

Approximately half of South African adults (49 per cent) believe that economic priorities should take precedence over concern for environmental quality, which is not unexpected, given the high level of unemployment that characterises the domestic labour market. A similar share (45 per cent) are of the view that if the environment is not protected, people will always find ways to survive, indicating a belief in nature's ability to recover and the resourcefulness of people. Yet, despite this emphasis on economic need, 55 per cent of the adult population recognises that there are environmental limits to the pursuit of economic progress. From a cross-national perspective, South Africans are shown to score comparatively low in terms of the percentage that believes they can personally make a difference to the environment. More than half (55 per cent) of South Africans expressed the view that it is beyond their ability to make a positive difference in addressing environmental challenges. Yet, there is also a relatively strong belief in environmental responsibility at a more macro level. Examples of this include a resolute view that poorer countries should not be expected to make less effort in protecting the environment than richer countries, and broad support for South Africa and other nations to adopt international environmental treaties and agreements.

Struwig goes on to construct an environmental concern index that combines responses to a series of statements included in the survey. The results based on this index suggest that South Africans with a lower than average income or educational attainment, and that reside in an informal urban settlement or in Mpumalanga province, tend to exhibit lower levels of environmental concern. No significant differences were observed on the basis of sex or age. The evidence therefore indicates that social class (income and educational status) and residence are factors associated with environmental concern in the country, which generally supports the post-materialism hypothesis. Yet, at the same time, in some aspects South Africans deviate from the script by displaying a keen awareness of environmental limits to growth and the importance of national and international action to address critical environmental challenges.

As previously discussed, Chapter 1 outlines how employment creation remains the foremost national priority for the public, a concern that escalated considerably during the mid-2000s. This is likely to reflect conditions of impoverishment and the realities of the post-apartheid labour market, which has been characterised by a rate of growth in employment that has been insufficient to absorb the significantly larger growth in the labour force (Altman 2005). Although close to 3 million jobs were created between 1995 and 2005, over the same period the labour force grew by over 6 million new entrants (Bhorat & Oosthuizen 2008: 57). The consequence of this low level of labour absorption has been a substantial expansion in the number of unemployed persons. In this context, Carly Steyn (Chapter 12) provides insight into the priorities, needs and values that South Africans expect employment to fulfil, the attitudes of employees towards the nature of their work, as well as the perceptions of unemployed persons.

The results suggest that South Africans attach greater importance to material values such as job security, a high income and good opportunities for career promotion than to other dimensions of the job such as flexible working hours, interesting work content and autonomy and control, as well as the ideals that the job will help other people and contribute to society. Against a backdrop of widespread poverty and unemployment, it makes intuitive sense that job security and pay are deemed critical to the notion of a good-quality job in South Africa, for these attributes are integral to the current and future economic welfare and quality of life of many individuals and their families. In terms of actual employment experience, relatively small shares of employed South Africans feel that their income is high (25 per cent) and that they have good chances for promotion (39 per cent). More encouraging is the considerably larger proportion of workers that believe their job is secure (65 per cent), find their work interesting (62 per cent), view their job as making a societal contribution (72 per cent), and report

positive relations with management (77 per cent) and co-workers (86 per cent). In spite of concerns about remuneration and future prospects, South African workers seem generally satisfied with their employment and proud of the organisations for which they work. Importantly though, perceptions regarding the rewards derived from work, as well as overall job satisfaction, are less favourable among private sector employees, compared to those in the public sector, and for unskilled and semi-skilled workers, compared to their skilled counterparts.

Among unemployed members of the labour force, the chief reason mentioned as to why they lost their job was the expiration and non-renewal of work contracts, followed by closure of the place of employment, and dismissal. Despite government efforts at tackling the unemployment situation through interventions such as the Expanded Public Works Programme, a high level of discouragement was evident among unemployed respondents, with 60 per cent expressing the view that it was unlikely they would find future employment and demonstrating relatively low engagement in various job-seeking strategies.

Apart from the creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods, the fight against crime represents one of the five priorities for the 2009–14 term of office that was included in the ANC's 2009 *Election Manifesto* (ANC 2009). In recent years, there has been much attention devoted to the patterns, trends and credibility of official crime statistics, yet relatively little detailed examination of the nature and extent of fear of crime. As a result, there has been a tendency to rely on stereotypical portrayals of who is fearful. In response, Benjamin Roberts (Chapter 13) charts the evolution of fear of crime since the early 1990s by discerning significant demographic, social and spatial differentials in the responses to questions on fear of crime.

From a comparative perspective, South Africans emerge as significantly more fearful than people in other countries. The findings serve to dispel some of the myths about fear of crime. For instance, the level of fear of crime experienced by men has virtually matched, and in a couple of instances surpassed, that of women. This draws attention to the vulnerabilities experienced by men in our society, rather than portraying them merely as aggressors and perpetrators. The results also indicate that South African youth may be more fearful than their older counterparts and that Indian and African people have a greater fear of crime than do coloured or white people. The analysis further reveals that fear of crime is higher among middle-class households, is related to employment status, and adversely influences the overall sense of personal well-being. According to the author, despite some signs of improvement in feelings of safety and security, the study shows that deep-seated fears about personal and community safety continue to be shared by a considerable proportion of South Africans across the socio-economic and demographic spectrum.

Evidence that these fears have an effect on police confidence, the demand for public safety, social cohesion, personal well-being and, to a limited extent, satisfaction with the democratic system signifies that anxieties over personal safety are of considerable importance for policy discussion. Roberts concludes by contending that, in the face of these results, identifying, testing and evaluating strategies for reducing the fear of crime should be deemed a priority alongside existing interventions focused on reducing the incidence of crime itself.

Conclusion

Public attitudes form as much a part of social reality as behavioural patterns, social conditions and demographic characteristics (Davis & Jowell 1989: 11). The data examined in this volume draw predominantly from the first three rounds of SASAS, covering the period between late 2003 and late 2005. These years, which represent the transition point between the first and second terms of office of

former President Mbeki, are notable in that they were characterised by intensifying power struggles, mounting violent crime, the perpetuation of widespread unemployment and poverty, and an increasing tide of mass protests by impoverished citizens against food price inflation, the cost of living and poor service delivery. Yet, claims that the country was experiencing an 'age of hope' persisted in the face of these disconcerting social conditions and emerging behavioural trends. In this context of change and contestation, a key question is whether signs of a transition from an age of hope to an age of uncertainty or despair (Kagwanja 2009) are reflected in the attitudes of the public.

The ability to effectively answer this question is constrained to some extent by the relatively narrow window of time being looked at, and any conclusions would need to be further tested as additional rounds of SASAS become available and are analysed. Nonetheless, the results do provide both signs of concern and of encouragement. On the one hand, there does appear to be a distinct shift in the prevailing mood of the South African public over this interval. This is most evident in the political and governance domain, as indicated by a distinct erosion of trust in public institutions and political actors, the increasing salience of issues of unemployment, HIV/AIDS and service delivery, as well as an increasingly critical perspective on local government performance. This is compounded by evidence of significant challenges in relation to service delivery, child poverty and social exclusion, as well as widespread fear over personal safety. On a more positive note, the survey portrays the country's youth not as disengaged and apathetic, but rather as resolutely optimistic about the future and in many instances sharing views that are not dissimilar from those held by older generations of South Africans. And while there is much progress to be made in redressing educational inequality and injustice, there has emerged a robust commitment to the integration of schools. The fact that dissatisfaction with service delivery was associated with an increased willingness to vote in local government elections can also be interpreted as a favourable development, as it signals the emergence of more critical citizens who recognise the power of the vote as a means of demanding accountability and an end to unfulfilled promises.

Based on the findings from the diverse empirical research contained in this volume, it would be fair to observe that the period between late 2003 and late 2005 constitutes a major threshold in the country's recent history. It marks the passage from a time of general hopefulness about the social and economic trajectory of the country to one in which public thought and deed disclosed a mounting sense of uncertainty and anxiety about democracy and the ability to deliver on expectations. In some respects, the changing outlook emerging from the analysis seems to presage the momentous events that were to follow, such as the December 2007 ANC National Conference in Polokwane, the recalling of former President Mbeki, the splitting off of a faction of the ruling party to form the Congress of the People, the April 2009 general elections and inauguration of President Zuma, and the subsequent tensions in the tripartite alliance. This will be the subject of ongoing analysis of the survey series in order to discern period effects in social attitudes and values and contribute to the varied debates and discussions about the significance of these changes for our society, for democracy and for the new ANC administration.

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1

RACE, CLASS AND POLITICS

CHAPTER 1

South Africans' views about national priorities and the trustworthiness of institutions

Stephen Rule and Zakes Langa

Introduction

In a developing country like South Africa, there are many and varied demands on government to intervene and bring about enhancements and improvements in the lives of citizens. Particularly on the occasion of the president's State of the Nation address at the opening of Parliament in February each year, there is pressure and expectation from the citizenry that their priorities and interests will be factored into the government's programme for the year. Following up on the questions posed in the Evaluation Public Opinion Programme (EPOP) series conducted during the 1990s, the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) has continued to ask people's opinions about these issues. Additionally, they have been asked about the extent to which they trust 11 of the country's important national institutions, including the different spheres of government, the courts, the police, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, churches and business. This chapter interrogates the perceived national priorities and levels of institutional trust that exist among South Africans and explores variations by race, age, gender and geography. The time factor is also examined, to determine changing perceptions over recent years.

Why does this chapter focus on national priorities and trust in institutions? The assessment of public opinion about national priorities often provides insight into public preferences for policy (Wlezien 2005). For example, this chapter will show that unemployment has been consistently cited as the most important national priority for the last few years. It is therefore not surprising that addressing unemployment is high on the agenda of the South African government. However, what do South African citizens think about government performance in addressing unemployment and do they trust government to deal with it? Nye (1997) argued that if people believe that government is incompetent and cannot be trusted, they are less likely to pay tax and comply with the law. Furthermore, people may even be willing to participate in protest actions if they do not trust government or if they believe government officials are corrupt and only interested in their own well-being. Conversely, Mattes et al. (2000) reasoned that citizens who trust government believe that the government acts in their best interests in most instances, even when government officials are unable to seek public opinion. We have reason to believe that trust plays an important role in influencing public opinion about whether government is able to deal successfully with its national priorities.

This chapter introduces key national priorities which later chapters in this volume expand on in more detail. For instance, Chapter 2 addresses racial transformation, which is high on the South African government's agenda in order to achieve a more socially cohesive and integrated society. Chapter 6 discusses public attitudes towards service delivery, another issue high on the agenda of the democratic

government as it aims to address past discriminatory policies and laws. For instance, the apartheid government restricted the historically disadvantaged (of which poor, coloured and African groups form the majority) from accessing better employment opportunities, good-quality education and medical care. In addition, basic services such as access to water, refuse removal and electricity, although improving, are still at unacceptable levels in disadvantaged areas (Lund 2008). It is hoped that this chapter will help to further contextualise the chapters that follow.

National priorities

South Africa is now into its fourth democratic government and has witnessed unthinkable achievements such as hosting the World Conference against Racism in 2001, winning the 1995 and 2007 rugby world cups, and looking forward to hosting the sporting world's biggest event in 2010, namely, the soccer world cup. Despite these achievements and a stable political and economic environment, the country continues to be plagued by poverty and socio-economic problems such as crime and HIV/AIDS. The devastating impact of poverty and these problems on South Africa's democracy is particularly disconcerting since it is well documented that 'the prospects for sustaining a democratic government are much lower in a poor society than in a relatively wealthy one' (Mattes et al. 2002: 1).

A key question often asked is how well the South African government has done in addressing the socio-economic challenges it faces. To answer this question we examine public opinion about the most important challenges facing South Africa. Specifically, a question asked of respondents in SASAS 2003, 2004 and 2005 was: 'Please tell me what you think are the three most important challenges facing South Africa today?' Similarly, in 2000 and twice in 1999, EPOP respondents were asked to indicate the country's most important priorities. The responses in the various surveys are not directly comparable owing to different phrasing and allowing for multiple responses in some instances but not in others. Nevertheless, an unambiguous trend emerges. Responses in the successive surveys since 1999 have focused overwhelmingly on three closely linked issues, namely, unemployment, poverty and crime (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). HIV/AIDS, a dramatic addition to the list, occurred first in 2000 when it was mentioned by only 1 per cent of respondents, but by 2003 it was second most important. Though still the second most important, HIV/AIDS was mentioned by 44 per cent of respondents in 2005, slightly down from the 50 per cent in both 2003 and 2004. The SASAS results are confirmed by the Afrobarometer survey results which also found that unemployment, crime, poverty and HIV/AIDS are perceived as the most important problems that South Africans have faced over the last few years.¹

Huge proportions of the national Budget are accordingly being poured into the implementation of policies aimed at the alleviation of poverty; school level education and adult skills development; the combating of crime, and an appropriate justice system for convicted criminals; and the national health system. For example, one way to ensure that vulnerable groups such as the unemployed and disabled have money to access basic necessities is to provide social security assistance. Social security is without a doubt the most powerful poverty eradication mechanism in South Africa. For instance, the South African government created a single Social Security Agency (SASSA) to manage the financing and provision of grants.² Inevitably, opposition political parties propagate different and alternative approaches to dealing with the priorities but they all enjoy a high profile in the political and policy-making arena.


Although there was a relatively high level of consensus on national priorities, there was by no means unanimity on the relative importance of each of the top issues. The most noteworthy differences of

1 See www.afrobarometer.org.

2 Refer to the SASSA website for more information: www.sassa.gov.za.

opinion emerged between people of different levels of wealth and between those living in urban versus rural environments.

FIGURE 1.1 National priorities, 2005



Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 1.1 Perceived national priority issues, per cent responses, 1999–2005

Priority issue	3/1999 n=2207	9/1999 n=2672	2000 n=2611	2003 n=4980	2004 n=5583	2005 n=5734
Unemployment/job creation	42	42	68	79	79	80
HIV/AIDS	0	0	1	50	50	44
Crime and security	31	29	35	46	45	42
Poverty				39	42	38
Service provision/delivery	6	8		12	11	21
Affordable housing	4	7	30	11	13	15
Corruption				10	11	12
Education	6	7	22	8	9	9
Infrastructural development			47			
Inflation/economic, financial issues	4	4	12	6	4	5

Note: In all tables in this chapter, empty cells denote that the question was not asked in that year.

Sources: EPOP 1999 and 2000 surveys; SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Differences by wealth of household

Households with more material assets tended to express different priorities from those with fewer assets.³ Table 1.2 illustrates how people that prioritise corruption (3.50), crime and security (3.39) and education (3.37) tend to have a greater level of asset wealth in comparison with those who mention unemployment (2.89) and poverty (2.63). Service provision and delivery as well as affordable housing also tend to cluster as priorities for the relatively less well off. Interestingly, the HIV/AIDS challenge is highlighted by respondents with a mean level of asset wealth that is intermediate (3.05), suggesting that it is recognised across all social groups.

TABLE 1.2 Mean Asset Index of households mentioning each national priority

Priority issue	2004		2005	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Service provision/delivery	2.24	1.16	2.30	1.14
Affordable housing	2.59	1.31	2.68	1.31
Poverty	2.64	1.35	2.63	1.31
Unemployment	2.90	1.38	2.89	1.32
HIV/AIDS	3.02	1.36	3.05	1.34
Corruption	3.32	1.45	3.50	1.35
Education	3.37	1.45	3.37	1.34
Crime and security	3.48	1.35	3.39	1.32

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

Differences by race

It is not surprising that perceived national priorities differ by race, given the recent political history of South Africa (Table 1.3). Whereas by far the most frequently mentioned priority issue among Africans (83 per cent) is unemployment, this is slightly less dominant among coloured (77 per cent) and Indian (78 per cent) people and even less so among the white (58 per cent) population. Across all races, however, unemployment is either the most or the second most frequently mentioned priority issue. HIV/AIDS is second most mentioned among Africans (45 per cent), the group among which HIV-positive infections are most common (Shisana et al. 2005), but in terms of rate of mention they are followed closely by the other races (all 39 per cent and higher). Crime and security issues emerge as the top priority for the white group (68 per cent), second most mentioned among Indians (73 per cent) and coloured people (58 per cent), but only fourth among Africans (36 per cent).

Differences by environmental milieu

Unemployment emerges as the top national priority regardless of settlement type (Table 1.4). However, the dominance of this issue is most marked among residents of rural informal areas. Similarly, poverty is mentioned by a greater proportion of these residents than those in other settlement types. Poverty

³ The survey respondents were asked whether their households possessed each of 20 assets such as a washing machine, television, one or more vehicles and hot running water. An asset index with a value between 0 and 5 was thus computed.

TABLE 1.3 *National priority issues by race, 2004/05*

Priority issue	2004					2005				
	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Unemployment	83	76	75	65	79	83	77	78	58	80
HIV/AIDS	53	39	38	39	50	45	40	39	42	44
Crime and security	37	62	80	73	45	36	58	73	68	42
Poverty	46	37	34	23	42	43	34	36	21	38
Service provision/delivery	14	5	1	3	11	26	4	1	5	21
Affordable housing	14	15	3	7	13	16	18	10	9	15
Corruption	9	8	18	23	11	9	17	23	30	12
Education	8	7	14	9	9	7	11	14	16	9

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

and unemployment are thus most keenly felt among residents of the remote former homelands where levels of socio-economic development have tended to lag behind those in the urban areas.

Conversely, HIV/AIDS is more frequently mentioned as a priority in urban formal and informal areas than in rural environments, confirming statistics (Shisana et al. 2005) that indicate higher levels of incidence of HIV-positive testing in urban, and especially urban informal, settlements than elsewhere.

Crime and security are far more prioritised in urban formal areas than anywhere else. This trend reflects the much greater level of wealth and therefore vulnerability, at least to the theft aspect of crime.

TABLE 1.4 *National priority issues by environmental milieu, 2004/05*

Priority issue	2004				2005			
	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal
Unemployment	79	81	86	65	77	77	82	69
HIV/AIDS	50	50	52	44	43	44	40	35
Crime and security	55	41	32	31	56	34	28	29
Poverty	34	38	55	45	36	37	50	45
Affordable housing	13	21	9	16	13	30	15	23
Corruption	12	6	11	9	19	12	10	15
Service provision/delivery	6	13	19	14	8	24	40	20
Education	13	7	6	8	11	7	6	10

Note: Throughout this chapter, 'rural informal' denotes communal areas in the former homelands, and 'rural formal' denotes commercial farms.

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

Differences by age

In terms of age categories (Table 1.5), people in the 25–34-year group, and to some extent the 16–24-year group, are more likely to mention unemployment and HIV/AIDS as top national priorities than are people in the age groups of 35 years and older. This suggests that the need for jobs and safe sexual practices are pervasive preoccupations among the youthful component of the population. Crime and security emerge as more of a priority among older persons than their young counterparts.

TABLE 1.5 National priority issues by age, 2004/05

Priority issue	2004				2005			
	16–24 years	25–34 years	35–49 years	50+ years	16–24 years	25–34 years	35–49 years	50+ years
Unemployment	79	83	79	80	82	83	80	75
HIV/AIDS	55	57	47	40	51	46	43	35
Crime and security	46	41	47	49	39	42	42	49
Poverty	39	40	42	44	38	38	41	38
Affordable housing	13	12	13	14	14	17	15	14
Corruption	8	11	11	14	11	9	14	17
Service provision/ delivery	11	10	10	13	20	21	20	24
Education	13	8	10	8	10	8	9	8

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

Differences by level of education

People with secondary school education or less are more likely than those with more education to prioritise unemployment, poverty and service delivery as priority issues (Table 1.6). Lower education levels may serve as a proxy for less access to income and wealth. Therefore the desire of people with low levels of formal education to see government assisting them to escape poverty and unemployment could be expected. Similarly, their need for neighbourhoods that are better serviced with electricity, water, roads, clinics and garbage removal would be greater than that of better educated and wealthier people, who already live in well-serviced residential areas.

Conversely, whilst people with matric and post-matric qualifications are also concerned about unemployment, they are not as concerned about poverty as those with lower levels of education. People with post-matric and tertiary education tend to prioritise crime and safety to a greater extent than do those with lower levels of education.

TABLE 1.6 National priority issues by highest educational level, 2004/05

Priority issue	2004						2005					
	None	Prim	Sec	Matric	Post-matric	Degree	None	Prim	Sec	Matric	Post-matric	Degree
Unemployment	79	80	82	81	74	72	82	81	81	78	83	79
HIV/AIDS	40	48	47	58	53	54	30	38	45	50	50	43
Crime and security	34	36	44	53	60	55	34	36	41	46	55	58
Poverty	56	52	41	35	23	30	50	44	42	32	30	30
Affordable housing	15	15	16	8	6	7	16	20	16	13	10	5
Corruption	14	7	11	12	13	11	8	9	12	15	19	14
Service provision/delivery	14	17	11	6	6	7	37	27	22	17	12	6
Education	5	6	10	10	14	20	6	6	8	11	9	13


Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

Trust of national institutions

Trust is an important component of democratic legitimacy. If citizens trust their political institutions it will further enhance the prospects of democratic consolidation (Davids & Hadland 2008). In addition, a Constitution, well-run elections, and stable elected representative institutions are important ingredients for democratic consolidation. However, consolidated democracies also require people who are willing to support, defend and sustain democratic practices (Mattes et al. 2000). This section therefore examines whether South African citizens believe that the institutions serving them are trustworthy. More specifically, SASAS survey respondents were also questioned about the extent to which they trust some of the different national institutions. Table 1.7 and Figure 1.2 indicate that churches appear consistently to enjoy the highest level of trust across the country, with more than four out of five South Africans indicating that they either trust or strongly trust churches. In second place was the publicly funded South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), trusted by almost three-quarters, as opposed to around one-half who expressed trust in the media in general, when this question was asked in previous years.

Other institutions enjoying a high level of public trust were the national government, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the national Parliament. Whereas previously the provincial government was lower down on trust, in both 2004 and 2005 trust had improved, with three out of five South Africans indicating that they trusted provincial government. In 2004 and 2005, lower trust scores were measured for the defence force, big business and local government, all trusted by only around half of the adult population. Languishing at the bottom of the relative levels of trust among South Africans were the police, trusted or strongly trusted by less than half of the adult population. Similar and even lower levels of trust were expressed in the police's Scorpions Unit, local police stations and labour unions, in 2001 or earlier, when these institutions were included in the questionnaire.

FIGURE 1.2 *Trust in institutions, 2005*



Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 1.7 *Percentage that trust or strongly trust institutions in South Africa*

Institution	3/1999 n=2207	9/1999 n=2672	2000 n=2611	2001 n=2530	2003 n=4980	2004 n=5583	2005 N=5734
Churches	89	81	74	81	81	88	83
The SABC					71	75	73
National government	66	60	43	52	55	71	66
Independent Electoral Commission	63	54	49	63	56	71	66
Parliament					53	66	61
Provincial government	54	50	34		49	65	61
Courts	49	45	37	45	47	59	58
Defence force	59		45	49	56	58	60
Big business	60	55	39	43	50	55	54
Local government	54	48	32	38	43	56	49
The media	59	66	43	53			
SA Police Services	53	47	39	40	41	47	46
SAPS Scorpions Unit		57	40				
Local police station			39	39			
Labour unions	38	38	26	31			
Political parties	44	39	29	27			43

Sources: EPOP 1999, 2000 and 2001 surveys; SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

TABLE 1.8 *Trust or strongly trust in institutions by race, 2004/05*

Institution	2004				2005			
	African	Coloured	Indian	White	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Churches	83	86	58	80	84	87	62	82
The IEC	80	56	47	46	74	40	32	36
The SABC	79	70	68	50	77	59	70	53
National government	79	64	42	32	74	49	39	27
Parliament	74	54	37	31	68	43	38	27
Provincial government	71	59	42	32	68	43	43	31
Defence force	63	50	44	30	66	50	59	31
Courts	63	57	38	43	63	43	50	34
Local government	60	55	40	35	53	44	44	27
Big business	56	59	62	50	53	56	61	57
Police	49	49	30	34	47	49	43	37
Political parties					49	34	28	15

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

As shown in Table 1.8, in 2004, African, coloured and white respondents were unanimous in thinking that churches were the most trusted institutions. Indians were the exception, not surprisingly, since a minority of them is Christian, and tended to trust the SABC more than any other institution. In 2005, the same trend was evident. Also, among African people, trust in the IEC was much higher than was the case among the other race groups. Though slightly less pronounced in 2005, Africans still tended to trust the IEC more than did any other race group. Africans also trusted government a lot more than did any other race group, both in 2004 and 2005. It is notable that levels of trust in these institutions decline from a high level of trust among Africans, to less among coloured people and Indians, and to least among whites. This reflects the trends in political affiliation among the electorate. It is also logical that under present circumstances where government is committed to improving the lot of those that were previously marginalised, trust in government would be higher among those that think that government's developmental agenda will solve their problems.

Tables 1.9, 1.10 and 1.11 illustrate the trends in institutional trust levels in 2004 and 2005 by age, environmental milieu and gender. The most noticeable differences by age are that trust in churches is universally high but even higher among the senior age groups. In most of the other institutions, there is a generally downward trend in levels of trust as the population ages. This is especially noticeable for the SABC, the courts, the IEC and Parliament. These institutions therefore need to make an effort to counter the cynicism that exists about them among older people.

By environmental milieu, trust in institutions is higher in the rural areas than in urban environments. However, trust levels in formal rural areas declined sharply between 2004 and 2005.

Female South Africans appear to trust the national institutions marginally more than their male counterparts.

TABLE 1.9 *Trust in institutions by age, 2004/05*

Institution	2004				2005			
	16–24 years	25–34 years	35–49 years	50+ years	16–24 years	25–34 years	35–49 years	50+ years
Churches	79	83	84	84	82	82	83	85
The SABC	81	76	72	67	76	74	72	69
National government	73	73	72	68	63	70	69	63
The IEC	72	72	70	69	67	68	67	62
Parliament	68	68	67	62	61	64	59	57
Provincial government	67	66	66	59	63	63	60	55
Defence force	62	60	57	51	64	64	58	54
Courts	61	58	61	55	59	60	54	56
Big business	58	60	52	51	55	52	53	57
Local government	59	57	55	51	51	47	50	48
Police	45	48	47	48	48	41	47	49

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

TABLE 1.10 *Trust in institutions by environmental milieu, 2004/05*

Institution	2004				2005			
	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal
Churches	79	79	87	91	81	89	84	86
The SABC	72	78	77	79	69	82	77	75
National government	64	80	82	78	58	73	78	70
The IEC	65	70	80	76	61	75	77	56
Parliament	58	73	78	77	52	71	71	68
Provincial government	59	68	73	75	54	65	73	59
Defence force	51	61	67	67	57	66	65	63
Courts	56	58	63	70	52	62	66	63
Big business	56	52	53	66	54	61	53	53
Local government	52	54	62	64	45	45	59	47
Police	41	43	54	68	42	51	50	62

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

TABLE 1.11 *Trust in institutions by gender, 2004/05*

Institution	2004		2005	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Churches	79	84	80	86
The SABC	74	75	70	75
National government	72	70	66	66
The IEC	72	70	68	65
Parliament	67	66	60	61
Provincial government	65	65	58	64
Defence force	61	55	65	56
Courts	59	59	57	58
Big business	56	55	51	57
Local government	56	56	46	52
Police	47	47	45	47

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

Conclusions

More than a decade after the advent of democracy in South Africa, levels of wealth and poverty appear to play a major role in influencing the perceptions of South Africans about where government should be focusing and targeting its efforts. The materially poor majority feel that government should prioritise issues of unemployment, poverty and service delivery in order to address their most urgent needs for jobs and decent living environments. Additionally, HIV/AIDS has captured the attention of most people in the country, both wealthy and poor, motivating them to name this pandemic as being in need of government prioritisation in its programmes. To a lesser extent, the poorer sections of the population would like government to put effort into combating crime and improving the country's security. Conversely, the wealthier minority of South Africans of all races tend to express the view that crime and security, as well as unemployment and HIV/AIDS, should enjoy the most attention of government.

Levels of trust in the country's national institutions range from very high in relation to churches to extremely low in respect of the police and local government. It may be that the latter two institutions are held responsible for failure in national efforts to combat crime and service delivery respectively. Also of concern is that trust in most institutions appears to be declining, suggesting the need for them all to fulfil their particular roles and duties more effectively in order to address growing public cynicism.

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CHAPTER 2

Attitudes towards racial redress in South Africa

Kevin Durrheim

Apartheid policies in South Africa put a system of race-based exploitation and marginalisation into operation, according to which black people¹ were provided with segregated, inferior and inadequate education and healthcare, and barred from certain categories of employment, as well as from accessing recourses such as land, housing and finance. In other words, the policies of apartheid, and colonialism before them, laid the framework for an extensive system of affirmative action for whites, which left in its wake widespread race-based poverty, exclusion and inequality.

One of the most urgent aims of the new government has been to reverse these effects of apartheid. The primary vehicle of redress has been a series of policy and legal innovations by which government has sought to either compensate the victims of apartheid or to give 'designated groups', including black people, a competitive edge (Habib & Bentley 2008). Concretely, these policies have included programmes of reconstruction and development (investing in housing and schooling in historically disadvantaged areas), restitution (land reform, compensating victims of violence) and a series of affirmative action-type policies (affirmative action in education and employment, quotas in sports teams, preferential trading and procurement). The rationale for these policies is that they will increase the representation of black people in decision-making structures and in fields of endeavour, and will eventually eradicate the legacy of apartheid inequality.

These policies of redress have attracted mixed support. A number of commentators – including political parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), as well as labour organisations such as Solidarity – have voiced strong opposition to affirmative action and other similar policies, arguing that they constitute a form of reverse discrimination against whites, lead to inefficiency and a drop in standards, and re-racialise South African society. On the other hand, affirmative action and black empowerment policies are strongly favoured by the government and its supporters.

The question addressed in this chapter is why people oppose policies that are aimed at effecting transformation. Is opposition related to self-interest, racial attitudes, or some other personal or ideological factor? Who are most opposed to such policies? Is it the rich or poor, the educated or uneducated; or is it the older people who grew up under apartheid and internalised the values of the old regime?

These questions have been the focus of a great deal of research in the United States, where data from national surveys have been used to identify patterns of opposition to racial redress policies.

1 We use the term 'black people' inclusively to refer to groups that were the victims of apartheid policies, namely, African, coloured and Indian people.

Generally, research has found that opposition to such policies is not strongly associated with socio-economic and demographic variables such as education, age and income (Stoker 1996; Tuch & Hughes 1996). A review of the South African survey data shows predictable difference in opposition to racial transformation policies among black and white respondents, but research has not investigated the predictors of individual differences in racial policy attitudes (Friedman & Erasmus 2008).

An expanding body of international research has sought to determine the underlying causes of this resistance to racial policies (see Krysan 2000 for a review). Three main explanations have been advanced. First, it has been proposed that those who have most to lose by the policies will be most opposed to them. This self-interest hypothesis has received mixed support. Early research found that individual self-interest was not related to racial policy attitudes (McConahay & Hough 1976; Sears & Allen 1984), but group or collective self-interest was (Bobo 1983). In other words, opposition to policies like affirmative action was not so much influenced by the possibility of an individual being personally affected by the policy as much as by the extent to which their group as a whole was likely to be affected by the policy (see Bobo 1988). More recently, Bobo and Tuan (2006) showed that personal self-interest is correlated with policy attitudes but that its effect reduces to non-significance when collective interest variables, such as perceptions of group threat, are entered into regression equations.

A second hypothesis to be examined and debated is whether or not racial redress attitudes are underpinned by racism. Researchers have distinguished between older forms of crude racism and newer, more covert forms of racism. In particular, symbolic racism has been argued to be an important predictor of policy attitudes (Kinder & Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Sears et al. 1997). Symbolic racism is a new form of racism that is manifest in 'abstract moralistic racial resentments: that blacks are too pushy, that blacks were getting more than they're entitled to, that blacks on welfare were lazy and don't need the money, that blacks receive attention from government they don't really deserve' (Kinder 1986: 153). These opinions are argued to be not explicitly racist, but they serve as a platform for people to express anti-black hostility in acceptable ways. Research suggests that opposition to racial redress policies does have roots in racism among white populations, more strongly in symbolic racism than old-fashioned racism (Kinder 1986; Sears & Henry 2005).

The third hypothesis is that opposition to racial redress is motivated by ideological factors, most notably political and economic conservatism (Gilens et al. 1998; Sniderman & Tetlock 1986). The argument here is that people oppose policies such as affirmative action because they involve interventions by central government, whereas conservatives are ideologically committed to free-market capitalism. One of the major points of contention in this literature is whether it is conservatism, and not racism, that accounts for the association between symbolic racism measures and policy attitudes (see Sniderman & Tetlock 2001).

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the profile of opposition to racial redress policies among the South African population, using 2003 and 2004 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data. Although SASAS is a general purpose survey, it includes a number of items that allow us to provisionally test hypotheses about attitudes towards redress. The other two studies that have examined these hypotheses in South Africa have used an unrepresentative student sample (cf. Durrheim 2003) and a random telephone survey (Durrheim et al. in press). The results of these studies generally supported the findings of the international research. The SASAS data allow an examination of the generality of these findings using face-to-face interviews, and the survey allows us to examine factors that have not been studied previously, namely, political engagement and distrust of government.

Race differences in opposition to racial policies

The 2004 SASAS survey asked a set of five questions to gauge attitudes towards different racial policies (see Table 2.1). Three of the policies were framed as targeting black South Africans, one policy targeted 'victims of apartheid', and the racial quotas question did not mention any specific group as the beneficiary. Each of the items was scored on a five-point Likert scale, with response options ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'.

The 'Total' column shows high overall levels of opposition for the policies, with land redistribution enjoying least opposition, whereas almost half of the population oppose the use of quotas in sports teams.

The most striking feature of these results is the difference in levels of opposition to the policies across the race groups. Generally, the policies find widespread opposition among white respondents, moderate levels of opposition among Indian and coloured respondents, and very low levels of opposition among African respondents. White, coloured and Indian respondents were especially opposed to preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans as a means of redress. In addition, Indian and white respondents were opposed to paying money to the victims of apartheid as reparation for the history of discrimination. The African sample gave the least opposition to land redistribution and the most opposition to quotas in sports teams.

The results reported in Table 2.1 suggest that there was an element of group self-interest at play in the policy attitudes. Members of the group that had most to gain from the policies rated them most favourably, whereas members of the group that had most to lose rated the policies most negatively. In addition, the levels of support and opposition varied across the different policies in a way that suggests self-interest factors were at play. Thus, whites were most opposed to affirmative action in business and employment, where they are most likely to be affected, but were least opposed to land redistribution, which affects only a small proportion of the population. In a similar vein, among the African sample, quotas in sports teams received most opposition, whereas land redistribution and preferential hiring received least opposition. The coloured and Indian samples expressed low levels of opposition towards the policy that did not specifically target black people (racial quotas in sports teams), whereas they expressed higher levels of opposition towards a racially specific policy targeting the preferential treatment of black South Africans in hiring and business.

TABLE 2.1 *Percentage opposition to redress policies, by race**

	African n=1757	Coloured n=416	Indian n=227	White n=344	Total n=2744
Government should give preferential contracts and tax breaks to black business.	27	70	76	84	39
Government should redistribute land to black South Africans.	17	69	71	79	31
Government should pay money to the victims of apartheid as reparation for the history of discrimination.	25	66	82	82	37
There should be racial quotas in national sports teams.	38	65	68	82	46
There should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment.	20	75	75	87	35

Note: * The proportion of the sample from each race group that did not 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with the policies.
Source: SASAS (2004)

The variation in opinion among the members of all groups suggests that there are also other factors at play in addition to self-interest. For each policy, there were significant numbers of each population group that both supported and opposed the policy. The remainder of this chapter seeks to understand these individual differences.

Construction of measures

A composite index was constructed to reflect individual differences in opposition to redress. A racial redress attitude scale was constructed by summing each respondent's scores on each of the five items listed in Table 2.1.² The scores of the new measure ranged, potentially, from 0 (support for the policies) to 20 (opposition to the policies).

In addition to demographic variables – including political party support, age, income and education – the following possible predictor variables were investigated.

Distrust of government

One of the main explanations of opposition to redress proposed in the United States is ideological conservatism (Sniderman & Tetlock 2001). It is argued that opposition to redress policies has its roots in support of free market policies and opposition to government intervention. As such, this opposition should also be associated with a distrust of government.

A measure of distrust of government was constructed by summing scores on three five-point Likert scales (anchors: 'strongly trust' to 'strongly distrust') in which respondents rated their distrust of i) national government, ii) their provincial government, and iii) Parliament.³ High scores on the scale indicate high levels of distrust.

Conservatism

Conservatism is a multidimensional construct, including distinct but related dimensions of political and economic conservatism, traditional family values, and punitiveness (Durrheim & Foster 1995). Three different measures of conservatism were constructed:

- *Political conservatism.* Summed score of two items: i) The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it; ii) The government should be in control of what information is given to the public.⁴ Although agreement with the items would indicate conservatism in the American context, where liberals oppose government intervention, in the South African context, agreement indicates a progressive, left-leaning political radicalism. The responses on the two
- 2 Exploratory factor analysis showed that the items constituted a unidimensional measure. The internal consistency of the scale was adequate for the sample overall ($\alpha = .89$), as well as for the African ($\alpha = .75$), coloured ($\alpha = .86$), Indian ($\alpha = .78$) and white ($\alpha = .85$) subgroups. The distribution of scores was roughly normally distributed, although it was positively skewed.
 - 3 Exploratory factor analysis showed that the items of the distrust of government scale constituted a unidimensional measure. The internal consistency of the scale was adequate for the sample overall ($\alpha = .86$), as well as for the African ($\alpha = .79$), coloured ($\alpha = .88$), Indian ($\alpha = .82$) and white ($\alpha = .87$) subgroups.
 - 4 The two items were very strongly correlated, hence (despite being only a two-item measure) the internal consistency of the scale was adequate for the sample overall ($\alpha = .76$), as well as for the African ($\alpha = .72$), coloured ($\alpha = .83$), Indian ($\alpha = .50$) and white ($\alpha = .84$) subgroups.

scales were summed so that high scores indicate conservatism in the South African sense as being opposed to government intervention.⁵

- *Punitiveness*. Summed score of three items expressing agreement with punitive disciplinary measures at school: i) corporal punishment by the teacher in class, ii) corporal punishment by the principal only, iii) physical labour like digging holes and sweeping.⁶ High scores indicate a conservative view, in favour of harsh or punitive treatment of children.
- *Sexual conservatism*. Summed score of three items: i) Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage? ii) Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for a person to have sexual relations with someone to whom he or she is not married? iii) Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations? High scores indicate conservative views about sexuality, signifying that the respondent is more likely to believe that pre-marital sex, extra-marital sex and homosexuality are wrong.

Racial attitudes

Another prominent explanation proposed in the United States is that lingering racism underlies opposition to redress. Although many people are no longer willing to express blatant racist stereotypes, it is argued that subtler or more covert forms of racial attitudes have emerged. Although symbolic racism has been shown to be a predictor of redress policies in the United States, an earlier study in South Africa suggested that old-fashioned racism may still be an important factor (Durrheim 2003). Durrheim et al. (in press) found that outgroup prejudice was correlated with opposition to redress policies among their white but not their black sample.

The SASAS surveys did not include direct measures of outgroup prejudice but did include three items which could serve as indices of different aspects of symbolic and old-fashioned racism in a South African context: i) How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that government is handling crime in your neighbourhood? ii) How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that government is handling land reform? iii) All schools should contain children of different races.

Crime, land reform and 'forced integration' are highly racialised and charged domains of debate in post-apartheid South Africa. We believe that attitudes about crime and land reform may be symbolic ways in which white South Africans in particular may express racial prejudice. In contrast, opposition to school integration is a more direct expression of old-fashioned racism. Since these items index different kinds of racial opinion, we did not expect them to be intercorrelated. Thus, instead of summing scores on the three items, they were each used as single-item indices of racism, with high scores indicating high levels of racism.

Political interest

A further possible explanation of redress attitudes is the hypothesis that political sophistication should be related to greater support for redress among mass publics. In short, people who take more interest in politics and consume and process political information are more likely to hold more nuanced views, appreciating the context of historical injustices that make redress policies necessary.

- *Political interest*. Summed score of the following items: i) I think most people in South Africa are better informed about politics and government than I am. ii) On average, how often do you read

5 It is noteworthy that conservatism in this context means something slightly different to conservatism in the United States, where political and economic conservatism is indexed by belief in the unbridled free market, free from government interference. In this study, conservatism is indexed by support for anti-democratic initiatives by government to prevent criticism or withhold information from the public.

6 The internal consistency for the measure of punitiveness was marginal for the sample overall ($\alpha = .66$), as well as for the African ($\alpha = .69$), coloured ($\alpha = .62$), Indian ($\alpha = .65$) and white ($\alpha = .52$) subgroups.

the political content of a newspaper? iii) On average, how often do you watch political news on television? iv) On average, how often do you listen to the political news on the radio? The items were reverse scored and summed so that high scores indicate high levels of political interest.


The political interest items were only included in the 2004 SASAS survey, and thus the results involving these indices are based on a smaller sample size of N=2 744 subjects (N=1 757 African; N=416 coloured; N=227 Indian; N=344 white). All other indices are based on both the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys, with a combined sample size of N=5 512 subjects (N=3 552 African; N=825 coloured; N=469 Indian; N=666 white).

Results: Predictors of opposition to redress

Figure 2.1 confirms the results of Table 2.1. The different population groups scored significantly differently on the composite redress attitude scale ($F[3,5508]=1289.52, p<.0001; \eta^2=.41$). The effect size shows that there were big differences in the mean scores between groups as compared with the relatively small average differences in scores between individuals within groups. From the graph, it is clear that Africans ($M=4.77$) scored much lower than coloureds ($M=11.03$) and Indians ($M=12.44$), and that whites ($M=13.59$) scored the highest. Tukey's multiple comparison tests showed that each group mean was significantly different from each other group mean.

Figure 2.2 shows the mean levels of opposition to redress for supporters of the various political parties. Participants were asked who they voted for in the 2004 national elections, which took place a short time before the survey. Overall, the pattern of results confirms many expectations. Supporters of the governing party (the ANC) score low ($M=5.6$), whereas supporters of the opposition (the DA) score high ($M=13.5$). The racial differences in opposition to redress are clearly apparent here. The parties that are traditionally supported by African voters (ANC, Inkatha Freedom Party, Pan Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party [SACP]) have lower mean scores than the parties that are traditionally supported by white voters (New National Party, DA, FF+). In addition, however, there appear to be


FIGURE 2.1 Mean opposition to redress scores, by race



Note: N=5 512
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004)

7 The internal consistency of the scale was adequate for the sample overall ($\alpha = .76$), as well as for the African ($\alpha = .75$), coloured ($\alpha = .80$), Indian ($\alpha = .74$) and white ($\alpha = .84$) subgroups.

FIGURE 2.2 Mean redress attitude scores, by political party, 2004



Notes: N=3 552

See the acronym list for an explanation of political party abbreviations.

Source: SASAS (2004)

ideological factors at play. Thus, of the traditionally white parties, FF+ supporters scored higher than DA supporters, reflecting the former's conservative heritage; and SACP supporters scored lowest of all. It is noteworthy that the Independent Democrats and Minority Front supporters had very high mean scores, suggesting that these parties attract voters who are relatively opposed to redress measures.

The results reported in Table 2.2 allow us to unpack in greater detail the demographic and ideological factors that account for individual differences in redress attitudes within each of the four population groups. At first glance, the table shows both similarities and differences in the profile of predictors across the different groups. Generally, the predictors were least sensitive in detecting individual differences among the African sample (the correlation coefficients are smallest here), and most sensitive in detecting individual differences among the white sample.⁸

Generally, the demographic variables were not strong predictors of redress attitudes. It was surprising that age was not related to opposition to redress for any of the groups. It was expected that older people (especially among the white population), who had grown up under apartheid, would be less supportive of change than younger people who had spent the bulk of their adult life in a democratic situation. Income was positively correlated with redress scores among the white sample, indicating that wealthier whites were more strongly opposed to transformation policy than poorer whites. Once again, this could signal self-interest motives, as wealthier whites have more to lose in terms of affirmative action and broad-based black economic empowerment (BBEE) than poorer whites. Among

8 A possible explanation of these differences in the strength of the predictors across the population groups is the difference in variance in the redress scores within each group (African SD=3.67; coloured SD=5.35; Indian SD=4.95; white SD=5.59). There is simply less variation to be explained among the African sample.

TABLE 2.2 *Correlations between opposition to redress and predictor variables*

	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Demographics				
Age	-.011	-.023	-.058	.046
Income	-.008	.034	-.055	.272**
Education	.075**	.029	.002	.065
Racial attitude				
Crime	-.028	.045	.239**	.023
Land reform	.009	.093*	.259**	.117**
School segregation	.145**	.134**	.081	.161**
Government distrust				
Distrust of government	.096**	.202**	.328**	.279**
Conservatism				
Political	-.059**	.325**	.137**	.522**
Punitiveness	-.008	.083*	-.203**	.244**
Sex	-.004	.025	-.056	-.071
Political interest				
Political interest	-.128**	.192**	-.062	.200**

Notes: * Correlation significant at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

** Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed test).

Source: SASAS (2004)

the African sample, education was positively correlated with redress attitude scores, indicating that higher-educated Africans tended to oppose transformation policies more than their less educated counterparts. Since it is generally higher-educated individuals among the African population that have benefited and stand to benefit from affirmative action and BBE, this observation does not support the self-interest hypothesis. It is possible that education serves ideological functions, encouraging Africans to accept the status quo (Jackman 1977; Jost & Banaji 1994) and thus be less supportive of policies designed to radically alter it (cf. Dixon et al. 2007).

The three racial attitude variables were variously associated with redress scores across the four population groups. Among the African sample, individuals opposed to integration in schools were also opposed to redress. This variable was the strongest predictor of redress scores among the African sample. For the coloured and white samples, both the land reform and segregation items were positively correlated with redress scores. Individuals who were opposed to redress tended to have negative opinions about land reform and to be opposed to racial integration in schools. For the Indian sample, segregation attitudes were not related to redress scores, but crime and land reform opinions were. Individuals who were opposed to redress also tended to have negative opinions about land reform and government's handling of crime in their neighbourhoods.

These results need to be interpreted with caution since we cannot be certain that the items measure racism or symbolic racism for the different groups. For example, satisfaction with land reform likely means very different things for African and white respondents.

Nonetheless, it is plausible that prejudice against Africans influenced the opinions of the white, Indian and coloured respondents about crime, land reform and school integration, and this prejudice may also motivate opposition to redress measures that seek to advantage 'black South Africans'. However,

this would not explain the opposition to redress among African respondents who oppose school integration. Prejudice against other groups should manifest in support of redress policies for African respondents. Perhaps ideological factors explain this finding, where individuals on the left, including supporters of the SACP, support racial integration as well as racial redress.

Distrust of government scores were positively correlated with redress scores for all groups. Opposition to redress policies was strongest among individuals in all population groups who distrusted government. These correlation coefficients were relatively strong, suggesting that this is an important factor in resistance to redress policies, especially for the Indian population. Part of the reason why whites, Indians and coloureds may distrust government is because of its handling of various racial issues – including land reform, crime and desegregation. However, the relative strength of the distrust of government coefficients in comparison with the racial attitude coefficients indicates that there are aspects of governmental distrust that influence redress attitudes over and above racial attitudes.

One possible factor underlying distrust of government is ideological conservatism. The results in Table 2.2 show that conservatism was strongly – and in some instances very strongly – related to opposition to redress policies. However, the pattern of relationships is complex, including positive and negative correlations. The results confirm that conservatism is not a unidimensional construct. Conservatism regarding sexuality was not related to redress scores for any of the groups. In contrast, political conservatism and punitiveness were strongly related to redress scores. The statistics for political conservatism for the white, coloured and Indian samples are in the anticipated direction: the more conservative the respondent, the more opposed they were to redress. This suggests that opposition to redress may have a basis in a general opposition to government intervention and control. The direction of association is in exactly the opposite direction to that of the African sample: the less conservative, more radical respondents were opposed to redress. Although the data do not provide an explanation of this finding, they do confirm earlier research which shows that the underlying predictive model of redress attitudes differs for African and white groups (Durrheim et al. in press). It was surprising to see that punitiveness was associated with redress attitudes – especially strongly among the white sample. Why should people who support harsh discipline of children oppose redress? It is possible that these results reflect social-psychological dynamics associated with racial prejudice and authoritarianism, namely, the desire to see others suffer for perceived wrongdoing.

Finally, Table 2.2 also shows that political interest is related to redress attitudes: coloured and white respondents who were more interested in politics tended to be more opposed to redress than those who were less interested in politics. The opposite relationship was evident for the African sample, where respondents who were more interested in politics tended to support redress.

Overall, each population group had a different profile of predictors. Segregation attitude was the strongest predictor among the African sample, political conservatism was the strongest predictor for the white and coloured samples, and distrust of government was the strongest predictor for the Indian sample. Education was correlated with redress scores for the African sample only, and income was correlated with redress scores for the white sample only. Also, political conservatism and political interest were negatively correlated with redress scores for the African sample, but positively correlated with redress for the white sample, suggesting very different profiles of resistance to change among these groups.

Discussion

The results of this study suggest that a number of different factors and dynamics underlie opposition to redress in South Africa. Group self-interest is clearly an important factor. Groups that had most to gain from the redress policies supported them more than groups that had less or nothing to gain from them. Also, among whites, those high-income individuals who had most to lose from affirmative action and BBE policies were the most opposed to redress. Figure 2.1 indicates that the major division in attitudes towards the policies is between Africans, who strongly support the policies on average, and the other groups who oppose the policies on average. It is possible that the high levels of opposition to the policies among the coloured and Indian respondents are due to the way in which the policies were worded in the survey items, as targeting 'black South Africans'.

In addition to self-interest, ideological and psychological factors accounted for individual differences in opposition to redress within each of the population groups. The SASAS surveys did not include a direct measure of inter-group prejudice or racism, but the proxy items that were used to measure racial attitudes did indicate that opposition to redress was associated with negative attitudes towards racially charged 'symbolic' issues of crime, land reform and school integration. The fact that opposition to redress was also associated with punitiveness for the white sample supports the long tradition of research which links racism and authoritarianism among white South Africans (Duckitt 1991). These underlying personality dynamics may be exerting a continuing influence in opposition to redress in the post-apartheid context.

Distrust of government was a consistently strong predictor of opposition to redress across all groups. It stands to reason that those who distrust the government also oppose its contentious policies. Among the coloured, Indian and white populations, distrust of government was strongly supported by political conservatism in predicting opposition to redress. This opposition to government and to government intervention is prominent in the rhetoric of opposition politics in South Africa, whose supporters were found to be strongly opposed to redress policies (see Figure 2.2).

Given the role that ideological factors played in predicting opposition to redress, it was not surprising that political interest – exposure to ideological themes in news media – was correlated with redress. High levels of political interest among the coloured and white respondents were associated with opposition to redress. Presumably, coloured and white respondents who supported opposition parties were more politically interested. In contrast, high levels of political interest were associated with support for redress among the African respondents, reflecting an interest in radical politics.

Contrary to popular opinion, the results also provided an indication that the post-apartheid context is not breeding young adults who are more strongly in favour of redress. Among all population groups, young adults had similar attitudes to their older counterparts, who had lived the bulk of their lives under apartheid. However, there were class differences in redress attitudes: opposition to the policies was stronger among higher-income whites and higher-educated Africans. Perhaps these higher-class individuals are more ideologically conservative.

The results of these SASAS surveys indicate that opposition to redress in South Africa is associated with group self-interest, class, personal factors associated with racial attitudes and punitiveness, as well as ideological factors associated with distrust of government and political conservatism. Judging from the size of the correlation coefficients in Table 2.2, it appears as though ideological factors related to conservatism and distrust of government are the most important predictors of the three.

Finally, the results also showed that each of the race groups had a different profile of predictors. Although there are some common factors – distrust of government, opposition to school integration,

and political conservatism – different kinds of individuals oppose transformation policies in each of the different groups. The starkest contrast is between the African sample and the other samples. Redress attitudes were predicted by different factors among the African sample (e.g. education); and political interest and political conservatism were related to racial transformation attitudes in the opposite direction among the African sample, in contrast to the other groups. These findings echo those of Durrheim et al. (in press), who argued that the different profile and direction of predictors may arise because black and white people are differentially threatened by redress policies.

While establishing social justice is critical to future social security in South Africa, redress measures have been shown to generate conflict, which itself undermines security. From some perspectives it would appear as though such conflict is inevitable because redress measures threaten the interests of some groups more than others. Thus the SASAS data showed that opposition to redress varied by group according to whether the group stood to gain or lose from the policies. However, the data also showed that much can be done to implement redress in a way which does not produce opposition and conflict. Firstly, the acceptance of the policies depends on how they are constructed. Thus, even though coloured and Indian people are, by law, the beneficiaries of employment equity measures, in the surveys they were found to be opposed to policies that targeted 'black South Africans'. Recently, Bentley and Habib (2008) argued for a switch in emphasis in redress policies which places more emphasis on class and marginalisation, rather than on racial disadvantage. This may certainly help change the perceived threat of the policies.

The results also suggest that by cultivating trust in itself, government can do much to challenge opposition to redress. Such efforts to change perceptions of government should also result in secondary gains by reducing levels of ideological conservatism, which were measured in terms of opposition to government intervention. Opposition political parties do much to cultivate such conservatism, but measures that improve trust in government are likely to go a long way in supporting perceptions that the government should intervene by means of redress measures to secure our collective future.

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Public perceptions of local government

Marlene Roefs and Doreen Atkinson

Municipal governance in South Africa

Since the publication of the White Paper on Local Government in 1998, the concept of 'developmental local government' has gained ground in South Africa. One of the hallmarks of this concept is that local government needs to work together with local citizens and partners. Municipalities are important in assisting individuals, households and communities to understand and develop their assets and to remove blockages to the full and productive use of these.

This is a tall order and the scale of the problems faced by municipalities is increasingly understood, as was clearly indicated by former President Mbeki of South Africa in his address to the National Council of Provinces in November 2004:

Although the lives of many of our people have improved since 1994, as we know, major challenges still lie ahead. Part of these challenges is that many of our municipalities, which are central to the implementation of government policies, still do not have the necessary capacity, even where resources are available, to implement government programmes and ensure that there is sustainable delivery of basic services. (Mbeki 2004)

The 1998 White Paper suggests ways in which developmental municipalities should relate to citizens in their capacity as consumers and service users. This principle is reflected in the *Batho Pele* (People First) White Paper, issued by the Ministry for Public Service and Administration in 1997. *Batho Pele* is based on eight key principles: consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress if services are not provided, and value for money.

This chapter considers public perceptions of local governance. Implicit in the conception of developmental local government is that citizens will be enthusiastic participants in local government, and that municipal councillors and officials will be responsive to their citizenry. The White Paper on Local Government envisages that local government will engage continuously with citizens, business and community groups.

According to the White Paper, municipalities require active participation by citizens at four levels:

- As voters, to ensure maximum democratic accountability of the elected political leadership for the policies they are empowered to promote.
- As citizens who express, via different stakeholder associations, their views before, during and after the policy development process in order to ensure that policies reflect community preferences as far as possible.

- As consumers and end-users who expect value for money, affordable services and courteous and responsive service.
- As organised partners involved in the mobilisation of resources for development via for-profit businesses, non-governmental organisations and community-based institutions. (1998: s3.3)

The question this chapter tries to address is how well reality matches up to this expectation on an individual level. It concentrates on one of the most conventional forms of participation in local government, namely, voting in local government elections. We try to understand why people vote or abstain from voting. More specifically, the question addressed here is how voting relates to people's satisfaction with services and attitudes towards government.

Unpacking citizens' attitude towards government is not an easy task, and in the case of municipal government it is particularly difficult. There are several analytical difficulties:

- To what extent do citizens shape their views about local government according to the actual performance of municipalities?
- Can citizens differentiate the performance of municipalities from that of national or provincial departments? Do they know what municipalities actually do, and what their problems and constraints are?
- How involved are people in local government and do they feel they can influence local government?
- How do citizens' opinions of service delivery translate into a propensity to vote? Does voter satisfaction lead to higher or lower turnout? Does apathy indicate social trouble or does it suggest reassurance that South Africa's democracy has matured?

Unpacking these questions requires in-depth understanding of political dynamics, which may well differ from one locality to another, due to local peculiarities and personalities. General qualitative assessments (such as elections and surveys) tend to hint at underlying trends but conceal the real dynamics on the ground. Given this difficulty, we try to present systematic and statistically significant findings and to interpret them with caution, allowing for deviations from and disagreement with generalised trends. In this chapter, the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) findings are analysed in conjunction with other studies and findings, in an attempt to capture a glimpse of diverse and complex dynamics.

What follows first is a discussion of voter turnout and voting intentions over the past decade. We describe demographic differences with regards to these phenomena, with a focus on race, income and location (the 2005 SASAS survey focused particularly on race, income levels and provincial residence). The relevance of racial categorisation 10 years after the transition to democracy will be compared to other socio-economic attributes as well as to attitudinal variations.

Income levels are, arguably, an increasingly salient variable, particularly due to the growing level of inequality in South Africa. Income levels are also associated with residence in certain locations, which are characterised by the provision or the lack of municipal infrastructure.

Finally, provincial experiences are taking on an increasing importance, as political dynamics differ among provinces. The presence or absence of strong political party competition, traditional leaders as a political force, and the behaviour and resources of provincial governments, all have an influence on people's experience of politics at the local level.

The chapter also asks more substantive questions about why people do or don't vote, based on their knowledge of local government, the perceived efficacy and responsiveness of local government, people's satisfaction with service delivery, and their trust in local government.

The key questions we try to address are:

- To what extent does people's involvement with local government affect their future voting behaviour? We tried to assess familiarity and involvement with local government by focusing on knowledge of ward committees, involvement in the integrated development planning (IDP) process, and people's own perceived influence on local government.
- Do people's sentiments about the responsiveness of municipalities affect their propensity to vote?
- To what extent do citizens shape their views about local government according to the perceived performance of municipalities? In the survey, we focused on basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity. We compared this analysis with the issue of people's trust in local government. This enabled us to reflect on the role of instrumental and symbolic/ideological factors as determinants of voting behaviour.
- To what extent is voting related to racial differences irrespective of the above attitudinal variations?

Municipal elections

According to the White Paper on Local Government (1998), municipalities need to ensure that voters are constantly made aware of the need to vote and that they are able to vote easily and safely. When voter participation declines, democratic accountability is diluted. The White Paper envisages several strategies to enhance voter participation:

- Civic education programmes about the importance of voting.
- Ward-level activities to continuously connect elected leaders and their constituencies. Consequently, in the Municipal Structures Act (No. 58 of 1999), ward committees were introduced.
- Creative electoral campaigning around clear policy choices that affect the lives of citizens.
- Electoral systems that ensure that registration and voting procedures are structured in a way that enhances access and legitimacy. Consequently, municipalities are a combination of proportional representation (PR) and ward systems, so that opposition parties have a fair chance of securing representation. (1998: s3.3)

Local government elections in 1995 and 2000

The 1995 elections were, in many ways, experimental. It was the first time that all race groups participated in the same municipal elections for shared (non-racial) institutions. Nevertheless, municipalities were still partially racially structured, because white, coloured and Indian areas were guaranteed half the ward seats on the newly established Transitional Local Councils and Transitional Rural Councils (or Transitional Representative Councils). A total of 686 municipalities were elected, and 40 per cent of the seats were based on PR.

In the 1995 election, the ANC remained the dominant party, although it lost a small margin of support due to the low voter turnout. The National Party (NP) lost support to several independent candidates; the rise of independent representatives can probably be regarded as the most significant characteristic of this election. The NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) lost some support, while the Democratic Party (DP) and the Freedom Front gained slightly. The Pan Africanist Congress remained static.

By 2000, the final shape of municipal government had materialised. In the demarcation process, a significant amalgamation process took place with 843 municipalities being reduced to 284. This was intended to promote a more equitable (re)distribution of wealth and resources by amalgamating worse-off areas with better-off ones, but it also resulted in new and unknown municipalities. Henceforth, municipalities would consist of rural and urban areas. They would include PR seats and ward seats. All racial protections had fallen away.

The municipal voter turnout percentages for 1995, 2000 and 2006 per province are listed in Table 3.1. Whereas the national elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) attracted a turnout in excess of 85 per cent during the first two elections and 77 per cent during the 2004 election, in all three democratic local government elections voter turnout was less than 50 per cent. This difference is in line with most consolidated democracies. It was anticipated that turnout for the local government elections in 2006 would be higher than in the previous elections. This prediction was based on the spate of service delivery protests from February 2004 to February 2005. However, Booysen (2007) found that South Africans use both voting and protest to optimise their chances of improved service delivery. More specifically, Booysen argued that electoral support for the ANC continues to be unwavering, despite grassroots protest over poor service delivery.

Table 3.1 has several interesting features. Firstly, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape had the highest turnout in the 1995 and 2000 elections, but both showed a substantial decrease in 2006. How can this be explained? By their history of strong local government? By their relatively large coloured populations? By the influx of African people into these provinces? By the intense political competition between the ANC and the white-dominated opposition parties?¹ We will return to this question below.

A second interesting feature is that, in all the provinces – with the exception of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and North West – the voting turnout declined in 2000. Once again, there are several possible explanations for the observed difference in these three provinces: their large ‘deep rural’ populations (which, in turn, raises questions about politicisation in traditional communities); their very poor populations, with extremely poor infrastructure and possibly with high expectations; or their high levels of migration to the cities, where housing, employment and infrastructure prospects are bleak. These issues will also provide food for thought in the analyses provided below.

TABLE 3.1 Voter turnout at local government elections, by province (percentage)

Province	1995*	2000**	2006***
Western Cape	60	58	52
Northern Cape	65	58	54
Eastern Cape	55	56	56
North West	45	45	46
Free State	53	49	47
Gauteng	49	43	43
Northern Province/Limpopo	46	43	45
Mpumalanga	53	45	46
KwaZulu-Natal	46	47	51
Total	49	48	48

Sources: * <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/sou1995results1.htm>

** http://www.elections.org.za/iecweb/Other/LGE_Reports_PercPoll_ViewAll.html

*** http://www.elections.org.za/iecweb/Other/LGE_Reports_PercPoll_ViewAll.html

1 In 1995, this was the NP; by 2000, the pendulum had swung to the DP. In 2000, the DP won 13 seats in the Western Cape (compared to the ANC's 4); and in the Northern Cape, the DP won 3 seats, compared to the ANC's 23 (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2000).

The 1995 elections were marred by administrative teething problems,² as well as by political controversies about the election in KwaZulu-Natal and a marked 'apathy factor'. It was subsequently claimed that one of the possible causes of this phenomenon was insufficient media coverage of the election (*Business Day* 8 and 13 November 1995).

The 2000 municipal election also faced the problem of low voter awareness, interest and turnout. Before the election, a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) poll found that three-quarters of respondents were aware of the elections, but this ranged from a high of 88 per cent in the Western Cape to a low of 51 per cent in the North West province (Rule et al. 2000). These poll results are extremely interesting when the actual 2006 local election results indicate that the Western Cape had a voter turnout of 52 per cent and North West 46 per cent.³

While the 2000 election was much better managed than the one in 1995, it was marked with 'the same lukewarm reception that had greeted the campaigns. Many voters stayed away, the ANC won a large majority; the Independent Electoral Commission did a good job' (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2000).

Overall, anecdotal evidence suggests that turnout tends to be higher in more highly contested wards and municipalities. According to the *ANC Today* newsletter, 'in solid ANC areas, some African voters were complacent in the certainty of an ANC victory. Similarly low turnout levels are recorded in strongly IFP areas' (ANC 2001).

Voter turnout among the youth was particularly low. While voter registration for 20–30 year olds matched the 1999 levels of 77 per cent (for the national and provincial elections), less than 25 per cent of first-time voters aged 18–20 were registered to vote in 2000 (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2000). According to a report by the HSRC, 'the real battle lies in convincing youth to obtain an ID book and register' (Rule et al. 2000).

Participation in local elections is often lower among supporters of the ruling national party. In South Africa this was reflected by higher turnout among white and coloured communities than among Africans. It is argued in *ANC Today* that this is due to black South Africans' negative experiences of apartheid local government: 'Even since 1995, structural problems have hampered our efforts at transformation and delivery. Whites by contrast have a positive experience of local government, which has been able to provide a range of services and facilities that have greatly improved their quality of life' (ANC 2001). It is not clear whether this argument holds water or not. While African people's experience of apartheid local government was very negative, it is likely that African people had much higher expectations of post-apartheid local government than did white people. This should have given rise to *higher* African turnout in 1995, although subsequent disappointments may have led to a decline in African turnout by 2000. Of course, it is very difficult to track actual turnout according to racial categories, so these suggestions are merely speculative.

However, when relying on reported participation in past elections, another picture emerges. As shown in Table 3.2, according to the 2005 SASAS survey, African respondents were more likely to report that they had participated in the 2000 local elections than were coloured, Indian and white respondents.

2 Including confusion over result forms, an absence of information from returning officers on the party affiliations of victorious candidates, exhausted counting officers, infrastructural problems, a shortage of ballot papers, late arrival of voting materials, mistakes in the voters' rolls and missing ballot boxes.

3 See www.eisa.org.za.

TABLE 3.2 *Reported participation in 2000 local election, by race group (percentage)**

Participated in 2000	African	Coloured	Indian	White	All
No	26	38	49	38	30
Yes	74	62	51	62	70
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Note: * Among respondents older than 21 years.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Overall reported participation was much higher than the actual 48 per cent voter turnout. Thus there are important differences between self-reported voter turnout and official turnout, and the former is much higher. This pattern is not a surprise, as Sigelman (1982) and Shaw et al. (2000), for instance, found similar patterns of over-reporting in elections in the United States.

According to the authors of reports on the Afrobarometer survey conducted in October 2002, the implications of low voter turnout in municipal elections could be worrying:

On the one hand, low voter turnout can be seen as a natural part of the 'normalisation' of democratic politics in South Africa. On the other hand, this may indicate that the South African electorate is becoming more apathetic, and that dissatisfied voters see no legitimate political alternatives to which they can turn. A scenario where the governing party wins increasingly larger shares of the vote from smaller voter turnouts (and thus comes to depend on smaller and smaller proportions of the electorate for its support) is a worrying one. (Africa et al. 2003: 3)

Local government elections in 2006


The 2005 SASAS survey is somewhat encouraging with regard to projections of intentions to vote in the 2006 local government elections. Given that the elections were held before the release of the 2005 SASAS results, it would be interesting to compare the projections made in the survey with the actual 2006 local government results.

Generally, among those older than 17 years, African respondents were the most enthusiastic about voting in future municipal elections. Of African respondents, 89 per cent said that they would vote; this figure drops significantly to 67 per cent for whites, 62 per cent for coloureds and 54 per cent for Indians (Figure 3.1).

Voting intention is highest in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo (94 per cent and 93 per cent respectively), and lowest in the Western Cape (61 per cent). The proportion of people intending to participate in the other provinces ranged between 82 per cent and 87 per cent.

Interestingly, in the Western Cape all race groups appear to have a low intention to vote in municipal elections, and reported participation in the local elections in 2000 was also lowest in the Western Cape. This finding contrasts with the highest actual voter turnout in the Western Cape during the 2000 election (Table 3.1). How can this be explained? Is it a failure of survey instruments (i.e. surveys do not give an accurate portrayal of future voting patterns), or are respondents in the Western Cape who do vote less likely to state that they have voted in the past and/or will vote in the future? If we take into account that voter turnout is based on the registered population, one might also speculate that people in the Western Cape who are registered are more inclined to vote than registered people in other provinces. Clearly, this discrepancy between actual and reported past and future turnout calls for further investigation.

FIGURE 3.1 *Intention to vote in 2006 local elections, by race**



Note: * Among respondents 18 years and older.
Source: SASAS (2005)

Findings with regard to voting intentions and income levels show a mixed picture. Among whites, lower income is associated with less enthusiasm for voting in the local elections. However, African respondents show less enthusiasm among the middle class (households earning between R5 000 and R10 000 per month) and, though to a lesser extent, among the poorest groups (households earning less than R500 per month) than among the highest-income groups or those in between the middle and the lowest class. Less variation was observed among higher- or lower-class Indians and coloureds. Does this indicate a higher degree of political literacy among high-income groups? Or does it hint at a greater understanding of the important role of municipal government among those lacking services? It might suggest that high-income South Africans are 'growing together' in terms of their political priorities, and that class may start to outweigh race as a key variable. However, the relatively low voting intentions among middle-class Africans point to other higher priorities among this group.

Low voting intentions were found among all except African youth (18–24 years old), with only 38 per cent of coloured, 33 per cent of Indian, and 36 per cent of white youth intending to vote in 2006. Voting intentions increased with age, except among Africans, where 18–24 year olds showed higher enthusiasm than those who are older.

The combined role of socio-demographic factors in explaining voting intentions

The above findings are based on one-dimensional comparisons of voting intentions by race, income, educational level or age, whilst often these characteristics or demographics are somehow related. In an attempt to control for such possible relationships, a logistic regression analysis was performed in which these demographic variables (household income, education, age and race) were all considered.

The results shown in Table 3A.1 in the appendix to this chapter suggest that voting intentions were most significantly related to race and age. The analysis shows that – taking education, age and income variations into account – Africans tend to be more inclined to vote than whites. This tends to disprove the ANC's argument, quoted above, that election turnout among African people tends to be lower than that of coloureds and whites because of historic experiences and expectations. In fact, it could be argued that African turnout tends to be higher. This could be because elections still have a novelty factor. In addition, higher voting intention could be attributed to a relatively high propensity among the African population to participate in civil society and political activities in general, as a trend analysis

of political participation among black and white South Africans by Roefs (2003) suggests. Roefs's study also showed that political participation was higher among Africans partly because they are relatively trusting of government and expect that their participation will be effective. The latter, it could be argued, may be related to feeling part of a previously disadvantaged majority group, which still actively enjoys its recent inclusion in formal politics and democracy.

Furthermore, those aged below 35 years seem to be – taking the other demographic variations into account – less likely to vote than those aged 50 years and older. This latter finding suggests that, once we control for income, race and educational level, it is not necessarily that the youth are unwilling to vote, but rather a matter of older people being more likely to vote than others.

What do these findings tell us about alienation? While 30 per cent of respondents (older than 21 years) said that they did not vote in the 2000 municipal elections (taking over-reporting into account), only 17 per cent of the respondents (older than 17 years) said that they would not vote in the 2006 municipal elections. This suggests that voter apathy is decreasing, unless this decrease is attributable to over-reporting.

Of the 17 per cent who did not intend voting in the 2006 municipal elections, just less than half (44 per cent) said they would nevertheless vote in a future national election. This group, which amounts to about 7 per cent of the total number of respondents, represents those who are not alienated from democracy or government per se, but they might be alienated from local government. It will be important to track changes in future with regards to this category of voter, and to see if it increases over time.

Another way of testing alienation from local government is to calculate those people who voted in municipal elections in the past, but who do not intend voting in municipal elections again. A total of 6 per cent of people (older than 21 years) who said they voted in the 2000 municipal elections do not intend to vote again in municipal elections, indicating people whose interest in local government is falling away. This is particularly high among coloured and Indian respondents (8 per cent and 7 per cent respectively). Again, it will be important to analyse future trends in this regard.

The key question remains why we find significant racial, income, provincial and age differences in voting intentions. What are the underlying reasons for a higher voting intention among Africans than among whites? Why are older people more inclined to vote? Does a higher intention to vote indicate satisfaction and complacency with municipal performance? Does it relate to the belief that people have influence over the political system? Or does voting intention rather relate to knowledge of local government and familiarity with its structures and functions? These questions will be focused on in the remaining sections.

The relationship between participation in local governance and voting

In this section, three variables are used to test the relationship between participation in local government and voting: awareness of ward committees, participation in IDP processes, and perceived influence on local government (here termed 'efficacy'⁴).

Ward committees

Ward committees were created in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998), in the light of the constitutional requirement (section 152[1]) that municipalities must:

(a) Provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; and

4 Efficacy is generally regarded as a key element of voter cynicism.

(b) Encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.

In addition, section 5 of the Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) outlines citizens' rights to contribute to the decision-making process of the municipality, to submit recommendations and complaints to the municipality, and to receive prompt responses to their written or oral communications. Citizens also have a right to be informed of decisions of the council and its office-bearers.

When they function well, ward committees can play numerous important roles:

- receiving complaints;
- participating in IDPs and budget processes;
- serving as a communication channel between ward councillor and community;
- encouraging participation in local government affairs;
- resolving community issues and disputes;
- assisting with the implementation of council programmes;
- advising the council on community needs;
- participating in municipal performance management;
- monitoring development;
- reporting back to the community; and
- coordinating ward programmes (DPLG 2005).

The creation of ward committees has been patchy. In some provinces, such as Gauteng, the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and the Western Cape, almost all municipalities have created ward committees (although some of them have subsequently been dissolved). In the remaining provinces, various problems – including friction with traditional leaders – have held up the process (Hollands 2003).

Ward committees can consist of interest group representatives or geographic area representatives, or a combination of the two. In many municipalities, the election of members has posed logistical and administrative challenges that stretched the capacity of the municipalities, with the result that many members are now simply nominated by the councillors. This brings the danger of political party favouritism, the advantaging of certain interest groups, and even nepotism or cronyism (Hollands 2003). Another difficulty is political rivalry between ward committees and existing community structures.

Many ward committees remain uncertain of their functions because municipalities have failed to flesh out the details of their terms of reference and operating procedures. By-laws need to be passed to regulate ward committees because ordinary resolutions of council are often ignored. The result is that many ward committees suffer a crisis of credibility in the eyes of the community. Ward committees also have to tread a fine line between being primarily a communication tool at the beck and call of the municipality, and being a robust representative of (sometimes angry) citizens. Many of them have had little involvement with key processes such as IDPs (Hollands 2003).

But the greatest problem is that in many areas ward committees are non-functional or simply non-existent. A great deal depends on the attitude of the ward councillor and his or her willingness to make resources – such as meeting venues, stationery and administrative support – available to the ward committee.

There have been several attempts by national and provincial governments to beef up ward committees. For example, the Municipal Support Programme's Community Education Programme is a government initiative to assist municipalities to educate their citizens about municipalities. In 2003, 12 municipalities were chosen to participate in the programme. By pooling their resources, they managed to cut down on the costs of developing communication aids such as posters and a radio campaign (Afesis-Corplan 2003).

An evaluation of ward committees undertaken in late 2004 found that their performance was uneven (DPLG 2005). The study, among 96 municipalities, asked municipal representatives about the functioning of their ward committees. Some ward committees were nominated (although the interviewees did not explain who did the nominating), while others were elected by a formal public process. The turnout at such elections was said to be fairly robust (up to 75 per cent), but there are grounds for suspecting that the turnout is generally far lower, according to the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) report. In some municipalities, ward committees were elected in a rather informal process, held at community meetings. Also, if ward committee members resigned, many councillors simply nominated other people to fill the vacant positions.

Furthermore, most councils felt that ward committees were representative of the local population, whether by race (58 per cent of responses), gender (70 per cent), class (49 per cent) or interest groups (63 per cent). Yet there is some room for doubt, because council interviewees may well have overstated the representativeness of the ward committees, or simply not fully understood the meaning of the question (DPLG 2005). The report notes that democratic decentralisation may well simply 'open space for the empowerment of local elites, not for consideration of the voices and interests of the more marginalised' (DPLG 2005).

When asked about the accountability of ward committees (i.e. some mechanism to account to the local constituency for their actions), at least 23 per cent of the municipal interviewees felt that ward committees are *not* accountable. In the feedback, definitions of accountability vary from the rather bland 'regular meetings' to the more detailed 'block and street committees, mass meetings, and mayor's *imbizos*'.⁵ The largest group of respondents (26 per cent) indicated that more than half the ward committees hold regular meetings, but a significant 25 per cent of respondents said that only a minority of their councillors hold regular meetings (DPLG 2005: 28–29). Furthermore, some ward committee members found their councils to be unresponsive and disinterested in the messages that they brought to the council (DPLG 2005).


The DPLG study and previous reports provide some background for the 2005 SASAS findings, which indicate what and how the public thinks about ward committees. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, about two-thirds of residents of the Eastern Cape (68 per cent) and Limpopo (66 per cent) believe that they do have a ward committee in their neighbourhood. The provinces that performed worst were the Western Cape (where only 21 per cent were aware of ward committees) followed by the Northern Cape, Mpumalanga and Gauteng. The belief that no ward committee exists was highest in KwaZulu-Natal (33 per cent).

These provincial differences may be due to provincial governments' varying efforts to popularise the policy. However, they may also be due to racial differences, particularly if racial difference reflects difference in local political culture.

As Table 3.3 indicates, the proportion of respondents that had never heard of a ward committee was largest among coloureds, at 28 per cent (mostly residing in the Western Cape). The proportion that had never heard of a ward committee was smallest among Africans, at 8 per cent. Overall, coloureds were least aware of ward committees (59 per cent), followed by whites (45 per cent), Indians (38 per cent) and lastly by Africans (28 per cent). Fairly large proportions among coloureds (31 per cent) and whites (34 per cent) did not know whether they had a committee or not. This suggests less political interest, or that ward committees have not made much effort to include whites or coloureds as members or to report back to white or coloured neighbourhoods. The proportion that indicated that no ward committee existed in their neighbourhood was largest among Indians (37 per cent). Among Africans,

5 Consultative meetings with the community.

Figure 3.2 Awareness of ward committees, by province



Note: See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 3.3 Awareness of ward committees in respondents' neighbourhood (percentage)


	African	Coloured	Indian	White	All
Yes	51	22	25	29	45
No	21	19	37	25	22
Do not know	20	31	26	34	23
Never heard of	8	28	12	11	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SASAS (2005)

on the other hand, more than half (51 per cent) believed that there was a ward committee in their neighbourhood. Are ward committees therefore prone to being used by African councillors as political support bases?

The lower levels of awareness in the Western Cape and Gauteng (where relatively large numbers of non-Africans reside), at 58 per cent and 42 per cent respectively (see Figure 3.2), seem to relate partly to the racial differences in awareness between coloureds, whites and Indians on the one hand, and African people on the other.

FIGURE 3.3 Intention to vote, by knowledge of ward committees and race



Source: SASAS (2005)

The findings in Table 3.3 suggest that about two-thirds of respondents (45 per cent + 22 per cent = 67 per cent) seem to know what ward committees actually are, but that about a third (23 per cent + 10 per cent = 33 per cent) are not aware of a ward committee for their ward. A total of 23 per cent of the respondents say they do not know whether there is a ward committee in their neighbourhood, and 10 per cent indicate explicitly that they have never heard of a ward committee. Clearly, the ward committee policy still has some way to go to reach the whole population.

Knowledge about ward committees is quite strongly related to voting intentions. The likelihood of voting is higher among people who know about the existence of ward committees than among those who do not know about ward committees. Those people who had never heard of a ward committee, or who did not know whether there was a ward committee, or who said there was none, were significantly less inclined to vote (65 per cent, 77 per cent and 78 per cent respectively planning to vote) than those who knew about the existence of a ward committee in their area (92 per cent). As illustrated in Figure 3.3, this relation was evident among all race groups.

The relation between voting intentions and knowledge of ward committees might point to higher political interest among those who have a stronger intention to vote, or more familiarity with local politics and decision-making processes. In the following section, we try to gauge people's involvement in the IDP process and their perceived influence on local government decision-making processes.

Participation in the IDP process

Integrated development planning as a mechanism of locally driven development was introduced in the late 1990s.⁶ During the first few planning rounds, the IDP processes were primarily consultant-driven, but there appears to have been a significant improvement in the level of public involvement. In many municipalities, citizens are given an opportunity to be informed and to make comments, particularly in outlining local needs (Meiklejohn & Coetzee 2003).

6 Initially, IDPs were known as Land Development Objectives.

The key strategy for promoting public participation in local planning and policy-making is the IDP process. The IDP process is meant to be highly participatory. According to the White Paper on Local Government (DCD 1998), municipalities should develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation. The White Paper suggests various approaches to achieve this: policy forums, council committees, participatory budgeting discussions, focus groups, and support for the organisational development of community organisations.

However, participation demands highly skilled facilitation, which is lacking in many municipalities. Particularly when strategic choices are made, public participation tends to fall away. McKenzie and Pieterse (1999: 20) highlighted a number of factors that detract from people's participation in IDP processes:

- The planning process is complex and very demanding, particularly for less resourced municipalities.
- IDPs need to generate strategic choices, but often result in very inclusive wish lists.
- IDP processes tend to be overly prescriptive (in terms of IDP manuals issued by government) and to stifle local initiative.
- In many cases, consultants rather than municipalities drive the process.
- Many municipalities have struggled to find appropriate forms of participation, and tend to rely on mass meetings.
- The formal planning process is often poorly synchronised with the many informal ways in which ordinary people organise and survive.

In the 2005 SASAS survey, about 8 per cent of respondents indicated that they participated in the IDP process. This proportion seems to reflect the same type of over-reporting as we encountered with past participation in elections. However, our main interest is not in the absolute levels but rather in comparative levels and interrelationships.

Lowest levels of participation were in Gauteng, Mpumalanga and the Western Cape, with all at approximately 3 per cent. Participation was highest in KwaZulu-Natal with almost one-fifth indicating they had participated (17 per cent). The other provinces fell between these extremes, with participation levels varying from 7 per cent to 11 per cent.

Although we were not able to ask how or to what extent people participated in the IDP process, it is plausible that most people were part of the process through *imbizos* and other community meetings.


As one would expect, participation in the IDP process was very strongly related to awareness of ward committees. About 94 per cent of those who participated knew about ward committees versus 66 per cent among those who did not participate. The fact that some people (6 per cent of the survey) participated in IDPs but did not know about ward committees suggests either a degree of over-reporting regarding participation in IDPs, or that ward committees are not functional in those areas.

Furthermore, among those who participated, 96 per cent were willing to vote, versus 82 per cent among those who did not participate. Clearly, participation in IDPs is a major instrument in building civic participation and a sense of citizenship.

Efficacy

Further analysis of those who said they had participated in IDP processes and those who said they had not revealed a significant difference in terms of their perceived influence on local government, or what we call efficacy. A large majority (91 per cent) of those who participated said they felt they had 'some' to 'much' influence on local government decision-making. Among people who said they had not participated in the IDP process, this was only 28 per cent.

FIGURE 3.4 *Perceived influence on local government, by province**



Notes: * Percentage saying 'some' to 'much'.
See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.
Source: SASAS (2005)

As shown in Figure 3.4, efficacy was typically higher among people in Limpopo (57 per cent) and lower in the Western Cape (17 per cent).

Significant differences were also found between race groups, with 38 per cent of Africans believing that they have significant influence, versus 15 per cent of coloureds and 14 per cent of Indians and whites.

A large majority (93 per cent) among those who felt that they had influence on local government would vote, versus only 81 per cent of those who thought they did not. Low voting intentions of only 68 per cent, however, were observed among those who indicated that they did not know whether they could exert influence.

The role of participation, knowledge and perceived efficacy in explaining voting intentions

As with demographic differences in voting intentions, we tried to assess the relative importance of awareness of ward committees, experiences with participation in the IDP process and perceived influence on local government decisions. Again we performed a logistic regression analysis, which was controlled for demographic differences. The analysis showed that the latter three concepts are associated with a higher likelihood of voting (see Table 3A.2 in the appendix to this chapter).

Awareness of ward committees, experiences with participation in the IDP process and perceived influence on local government decisions were examined and all correlated with voting intentions.

In order to assess the relative importance of these concepts, we thus had to 'control' for each factor's relation to the other concepts in the model. The statistical significance of the variance explained by all three factors suggests that the relationship between, for instance, awareness of ward committees and voting intention is not (completely) dependent on past participation in the IDP process or on perceived influence on local government, because the latter two variables are also positively related to both awareness and voting intentions. In the same vein, the relation between voting intentions and perceived influence cannot be (completely) explained by the relation between perceived influence and participation in the IDP process, which also positively relates to voting intentions. Thus, vice versa, higher voting intentions among those who participated in the IDP process and among those who feel they are able to exert influence on local government cannot be (solely) attributed to more awareness of ward committees. In short, all three ward-related variables have an independent relationship to voting intentions.

Furthermore, racial and age differences remain significant, even when factors such as awareness of ward committees, participation in IDP and perceived influence on local government have been considered. African people are particularly likely to intend to vote. In addition, those 50 years and older appear to be more inclined to vote than the 25–34-year age group. The racial and age group differences, in other words, cannot be explained by differential exposure to and knowledge of IDP processes and ward committees.

The relationship between responsiveness and voting intentions

Another factor relevant in people's perceptions of ward committees assessed in this study was perceived responsiveness of ward committees. However, due to the small number of respondents who indicated that they do have a ward committee in their neighbourhood, this variable was excluded from the logistic regression analysis. We deal with it here separately and only focus on those who said that they do have a ward committee in their neighbourhood (45 per cent).

The issue of responsiveness can be measured in numerous ways (for studies in South Africa, see Idasa 1996; McKenzie & Pieterse 1999). In the 2005 SASAS survey, the measure of responsiveness related to people's assessment of i) the responsiveness of the ward committee, ii) the representativeness of the ward committee, and iii) communication between the ward councillor and residents of the ward. These three assessments of the ward council were combined into one indicator – responsiveness of the ward committee.⁷

The combined scores on the three questions differed between provinces but, interestingly, not between race or age groups. Perceived responsiveness was lowest in the North West and highest in the Eastern Cape (mean scores of 1.9 and 2.3 respectively on the three-point scale).

As one would expect, voting intention was indeed highest among those who were most positive about responsiveness and lowest among those who were most negative about wards' responsiveness. It is noteworthy that this relationship was stronger among Indians, coloureds and whites than among Africans. This suggests that voting was more strongly encouraged by perceptions of responsive wards among Indians, coloureds and whites than among Africans. Similarly, voting seems to be less popular among Indians, coloureds and whites with non-responsive wards than among Africans with non-responsive wards.

Overall, these findings point to the importance of knowledge, efficacy and interaction with ward committees for participation in local government elections. They all contribute to people's experiences

7 Chronbach Alpha = 0.72.

of local government. The next section focuses on two motivations people might have to interact with local government: satisfaction with services and trust in government.

Service delivery and satisfaction with local government

Having sketched the relations between voting and other aspects of participation, we now turn to what we call motivational aspects of voting, such as satisfaction with services and trust in government. The first question here is to what extent satisfaction with municipal services relates to access to services.

Officially, government has shown a great deal of progress with provision of basic infrastructure services such as water, sanitation and electricity. The government's *Towards a Ten-year Review* noted that the proportion of households with access to clean water increased from 60 per cent in 1996 to 85 per cent in 2001 (PCAS 2004: 24). This translates into around 9 million citizens or about 3.7 million additional households gaining access to water in the eight-year period between 1995 and 2003.

The proportion of households with access to sanitation also increased, though at a slower pace. In 1994, 49 per cent of households had access to sanitation, and this increased to 63 per cent in 2003. The proportion of households with electricity also increased and, by 2001, 70 per cent indicated they had access to it (PCAS 2004: 25).

In 2005, a quantitative survey of municipalities was undertaken by the DPLG to provide data on the implementation status of free basic services (FBS) nationwide and to highlight the challenges faced in providing the service. This survey also identified trends and issues to be investigated further in the qualitative interviews undertaken with pilot municipalities and stakeholders (DPLG 2005). The survey was conducted through telephonic interviews with municipal officials in 256 of the 284 municipalities. A total of 207 municipalities (81 per cent) stated that they were currently providing free basic water (FBW). The Northern Cape (100 per cent) and the Western Cape (93 per cent) reported the highest percentage and KwaZulu-Natal (63 per cent) showed the lowest percentage of municipalities providing FBW.

About two-thirds (64 per cent) of municipalities reported that they provide free basic electricity (FBE) to communities. Highest levels of delivery were reported in the Western Cape (89 per cent) and the Northern Cape (88 per cent). The North West (35 per cent) and KwaZulu-Natal (43 per cent) reported the lowest levels of delivery of FBE.

Slightly less than half (44 per cent) of municipalities reported that they were rolling out free basic sanitation (FBSan). The Northern Cape was ahead with implementation, reporting that 96 per cent of municipalities in the province were implementing FBSan, compared to Limpopo and Mpumalanga, which reported 28 per cent and 24 per cent implementation respectively.

Overall, then, the best-performing provinces seem to be the Western Cape and the Northern Cape. It is useful to compare this with the provincial profile regarding participation, discussed in the previous section. We saw that with regard to knowledge of ward committees, participation in IDPs and perceived influence on local government, the Western Cape scored relatively low. The Northern Cape scored low on ward participation. Clearly, this simplistic analysis does not provide a clear-cut relationship between service delivery and participation.

Infrastructure backlogs are impacting on the rollout of municipal services. This applies particularly to FBS, as high numbers of the targeted beneficiaries of FBS are those who have not previously been serviced, due to a lack of access to appropriate infrastructure (DPLG 2005).

Half of the municipalities (50 per cent) indicated that they did not have sufficient finances to support their planned FBS initiatives. Many of the remaining municipalities (41 per cent) confirmed that they had sufficient finances, but many of these reported that they did not have a financial plan in place. This creates a weak link between the municipality's allocation of financial resources to FBS and its view of the resources required for FBS.


The key question here is: How do people react to these service delivery problems? Infrastructure provision does not necessarily translate into a better quality of life, particularly in contexts of unemployment and low income. Furthermore, infrastructure is not necessarily always maintained, and it may collapse entirely if individuals, households and communities fail to establish effective organisational capability for maintaining infrastructure on a regular basis. There is also an important distinction between unsustainable maintenance (fixing things when they break) and sustainable maintenance (regular preventative maintenance). The latter takes much more effort and financial commitment, which individuals and households may not be prepared to make. Infrastructure does not necessarily translate into livelihoods or satisfaction with services. Moreover, satisfaction with services might not even translate into positive perceptions of local government. In sum, the mere provision of infrastructure does not necessarily translate into consumer satisfaction.

However, our findings suggest that access to basic services does relate to satisfaction with these services. For example, satisfaction with the way in which government is handling electricity supply appears to be much higher among those who have access to grid electricity than among those without access (Figure 3.5).

Similar patterns were found with regard to sources of drinking water. A large majority (77 per cent) of people with access to piped taps in their house or yard were satisfied with government service. However, dissatisfaction was high among those with access to only public services (between 64 per cent and 52 per cent) and extremely high (90 per cent) among those who, without access to water services, were dependent on natural water sources.


With regard to sanitation services, a stark difference was apparent between those with flush toilets and those without toilet facilities (Figure 3.6). Over 80 per cent of those with access to flush toilets were satisfied with the way government handles supply of sanitation facilities versus just over 20 per cent of those without access to toilet facilities.

FIGURE 3.5 *(Dis)satisfaction with the way government is handling electricity provision*



Source: SASAS (2005)

FIGURE 3.6 (Dis)satisfaction with the way government is handling sanitation provision



Source: SASAS (2005)

The positive correlation between access to services and satisfaction with services is confirmed in many recent studies of quality of life in cities (Durban, Buffalo City and Johannesburg, for example). Statistics South Africa's 2002 household survey shows the positive correlation between overall life satisfaction and access to services (Møller 2007).

Trust


There is yet another level of complexity: How does satisfaction with service delivery relate to less tangible and instrumental aspects of government, that is, to relational aspects between people and government, such as trust in government?⁸ More specifically, does satisfaction with basic services relate to trust in government? Before looking into this relationship, we briefly describe developments of trust in government over the past years.

By the late 1990s, observers noted that local government appeared to have limited success in winning public support and understanding. An Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) 1996 survey of public attitudes towards local government suggested that local government was seen as the least trustworthy level of government. A cross-sectional annual⁹ study by Klandermans et al. (2001) and other surveys by the HSRC confirmed this trend. Over the period 1999 through 2004, trust in local government was lowest, trust in national government was highest and trust in provincial government was in between.

8 See Roefs (2003) for an elaborate discussion and analysis of the relation between trust and more instrumental aspects of governance.

9 The year 2002 was not included.

FIGURE 3.7 (Dis)trust in local government



Sources: EPOP (1999, 2000, 2001); SASAS (2003, 2004)

The HSRC's SASAS surveys from 2003 to 2005 show intriguing trends in trust in government on the one hand, and satisfaction with local government performance on the other. Overall, trust in local government declined between 1999 and 2000, remained fairly stable between 2000 and 2003, and increased in 2004 (Figure 3.7). This trend might be partly explained by the national elections in 1999 and 2004, during which time campaigns and political salience increased.


Another interesting finding is that overall trust in local government seems to have been higher in 2004 than in 1999. Whether this relates to the 2000 amalgamation of municipalities is an interesting research question. This suggests that people may be becoming accustomed to the new boundaries, which are creating new kinds of geographic identities.

In addition to levels of trust in government, the HSRC studies monitored satisfaction with the way people's local areas were being governed. As reflected in Figure 3.8, satisfaction was fairly stable.

What is more relevant here is that this pattern does not clearly correspond to that of trust in local government. Analyses of the correlations between satisfaction with local governance and trust suggest that over the past years, trust has become less strongly related to satisfaction with services, from $r=0.46$ in 1999 to $r=0.25$ in 2004. There are various possible interpretations of these findings. One would be to look at trust as a form of identification with local government. In this sense, trust does not necessarily relate to satisfaction with actual delivery of services, which could be interpreted as an instrumental aspect of the relationship between citizens and government.¹⁰

10 See Roefs (2003) on instrumental versus procedural or relational concerns in perceptions of living conditions in South Africa.

FIGURE 3.8 (Dis)satisfaction with the way people's area is being governed



Sources: EPOP (1999, 2000, 2001); SASAS (2003, 2004)

Another, though strongly related, interpretation is that people have become more familiar with local government and therefore their trust in government might be less dependent on satisfaction with service delivery only. Interactions with councillors, transparency of planning and expenditures, or perceived corruption are other aspects of governance that could influence trust in government.

Even more telling is the finding that correlations between satisfaction with specific services and trust suggest that there is no relation between satisfaction with water or electricity delivery and trust in local government. Neither trust in local government nor trust in national government was related to satisfaction with these specific services.

One could argue that because of stronger identification with local government and national government among people who support the majority party (the ANC), correlations between satisfaction with services and trust in government might be less strong among ANC supporters than among others. This may be because ANC supporters vote according to symbolic and ideological identification and not actual delivery. However, even partial correlations, which were controlled for support for the ANC, did not change the above pattern.

Interestingly, though, analyses among the four race groups showed that among coloureds and whites dissatisfaction with the specific services does relate to less trust in local and national government. For whites and coloureds – many of whom do not support the ANC – trust seems to have to be ‘earned’ by ANC municipalities, through the actual delivery of services and infrastructure. This suggests that race is a better explanation than political affiliation for differences in the impact of satisfaction with services on trust in government.

The role of service delivery satisfaction and trust in government in explaining voting intentions

This section explores how satisfaction and trust translate into participation in the local government elections. It can be expected that different people perceive and react to living conditions in different ways, and views on the importance and meaning of voting differ as well. In this case, we looked for relatively simple and systematic differences in intended participation, related to satisfaction and trust. Would people refrain from participation because they are happy with their services? Would people not vote because they trust the dominant local government parties to deliver in future? Or would this optimism rather motivate people to vote in order to maintain or improve living conditions? On the other hand, people might refrain from voting because they do *not* trust the government parties, irrespective of whether they are happy with local services or not.

In earlier studies on public participation in South Africa over the 1994–2000 period, we found that participation in politics and elections was not related to satisfaction with living conditions. This is in line with the argument of South African political scientist Stephen Friedman: 'Voter preferences are, in the main, shaped by considerations other than an instrumental choice between competing technical solutions to economic and social problems' (2004: 2). Friedman continues:

identity voting also offers plusses to a democratic system – by ensuring an enthusiasm for electoral participation which persists even when calculations based solely on interest may deter voters... The primacy of identity creates an opportunity because it ensures an electorate willing to see democracy, at least in part, as a 'deliverer' of intangibles such as self-expression rather than as a purely instrumental source of material benefit.

Indeed, our 2004 SASAS study seems to corroborate this argument. The logistic regression analysis presented in Table 3A.3 in the appendix suggests that both higher levels of *dissatisfaction* with services as well as higher levels of *trust* in national government correlated with a *higher willingness to vote* in the 2006 local elections. Presumably, some people want to vote to register their dissatisfaction, whereas other people want to vote because they believe that their municipalities are likely to do a good job in future.

What is not reflected in the table is that more trust in local government does relate to a stronger intention to vote in local elections. However, after including trust in national government in the equation, trust in local government was not significant any more. This probably reflects a stronger and more salient level of attachment to government at a national level.

It is interesting to note that race is almost not significant any more when taking all these factors into account. In other words, racial differences in voting intentions are partly accounted for by racial differences that relate to dissatisfaction with services and trust in government. This suggests that part of the reason why African people tend to be more eager to vote is because they tend to have higher levels of trust and of dissatisfaction with local government service delivery. Presumably due to South Africa's social/historical background, among Africans, ideological trust and/or experience with service delivery are particularly strong factors.

Conclusion

The 2005 SASAS survey findings go some way towards answering the key questions we posed. Our first question was to what extent citizens shape their views about local government according to the actual performance of municipalities. In order to address this question we focused on basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity. Satisfaction with all of these services was higher among people who

had access to these services. However, a study by Booysen (2007: 31) found that South Africans use both voting and protest to voice their concerns over poor service delivery.

We tried to assess familiarity and involvement with local government by focusing on knowledge of ward committees, involvement in the IDP process and perceived influence on local government. Independently from demographic characteristics or perceptions of the government and satisfaction with services, knowledge of ward committees, efficacy and participation in IDPs were all positively related to voting intentions.

Perhaps the most striking finding is that both instrumental as well as more identity-related factors play a role in voting intentions. Overall, those who are dissatisfied with services and those who are more trusting of government are more likely to vote in the local elections than those who are satisfied with services and/or distrust government.

Appendix

TABLE 3A.1 *Logistic regression analysis of voting intentions*

	B ^a		SE ^b
Household income	.01		.06
Educational level	-.06		.08
Age: 18–24 years	-.53	*	.25
Age: 25–34 years	-.92	***	.24
Age: 35–49 years	-.30		.23
Race: African	1.32	***	.26
Race: Coloured	.24		.32
Race: Indian	-.49		.37
(Constant)	1.37	***	.39
-2 Log likelihood		1349.91	
Model χ^2		78.92	***
Nagelkerke R ²		.08	
DF ^c		8	
N		2040	

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. A higher significance level (that is, the greater the number of *) means a stronger relation between the variables.

^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient

^b SE = standard error

^c DF = degrees of freedom

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 3A.2 *Logistic regression analysis of voting intentions*

	B ^a		SE ^b
Household income	.02		.06
Educational level	-.12		.09
Age: 18–24 years	-.43		.25
Age: 25–34 years	-.95	***	.24
Age: 35–49 years	-.33		.23
Race: African	1.08	***	.28
Race: Coloured	.32		.32
Race: Indian	-.56		.38
Participation IDP	1.13	*	.49
Know ward	.97	***	.23
Do not know ward	.45		.25
Efficacy	.69	***	.18
(Constant)	2.50	***	.65
-2 Log likelihood		1286.70	
Model χ^2		142.13	***
Nagelkerke R ²		.14	
DF ^c		12	
N		2040	

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient

^b SE = standard error

^c DF = degrees of freedom

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 3A.3 Logistic regression analysis of voting intentions

	B ^a		SE ^b
Household income	.00		.07
Educational level	-.09		.09
Age: 18–24 years	-.43		.25
Age: 25–34 years	-.92	***	.24
Age: 35–49 years	-.31		.24
Race: African	.57	*	.28
Race: Coloured	.10		.32
Race: Indian	-.55		.38
Participation IDP	1.02	*	.49
Know ward	.97	***	.23
Do not know ward	.48		.25
Efficacy	.68	***	.19
Satisfaction	-.28	*	.11
Trust local government	.09		.10
Trust national government	-.51	***	.10
(Constant)	1.73	*	.73
-2 Log likelihood		1244.55	
Model χ^2		184.28	***
Nagelkerke R ²		.18	
DF ^c		15	
N		2040	

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient

^b SE = standard error

^c DF = degrees of freedom

Source: SASAS (2005)

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Democratic governance versus democratic citizens: What do South Africans think?

Yul Derek Davids

Introduction

South Africa's three successful and legitimate elections at all levels of government are an indication of a well-functioning Independent Electoral Commission and government institutions. In addition, South Africa's democratic Constitution is characterised by a range of independent watchdog agencies and commissions all guaranteeing citizens political and socio-economic rights. However, a Constitution, relatively well-run elections and stable elected representative institutions are not sufficient as enablers of democracy. Sustainable and consolidated democracies require people who are willing to support, defend and sustain it (Linde & Ekman 2003). Also compare Mattes and Bratton (2003), who state that a democracy has a low probability of breakdown when citizens demand democracy and when they feel leaders are following democracy's institutional rules. This chapter therefore examines whether South Africans are prepared to support, sustain and defend the institutions of popular self-government. Conversely, the chapter assesses whether citizens believe their elected leaders are conforming to the principles of good governance.

One can compare various types of evidence to determine commitment to democracy and supply of democracy. For instance, the opinions of ordinary citizens may shed some light on the overall direction of their democracy. One can also look at expert judgements based on the quality of the democracy or make use of measures that are based on the existence of formal constitutional rights. This chapter examines what ordinary citizens think about democracy, since it is argued that citizens are in the best position to assess democracy as first users of the system. The chapter is based on information about the South African public's attitudes, beliefs, behaviour patterns and values regarding democracy and governance, social identity, service delivery, access to information and other important social issues. More specifically, this chapter draws on information from the 2003, 2004 and 2005 South African Social Attitudes Surveys (SASAS).

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents the results of citizens' views on whether elected leaders respond to their demands. Specifically, the first part assesses citizens' views with regards to the performance of government and the state institutions. For example, it looks at indicators such as government responsiveness, government performance in specific policy areas, as well as views on political parties. The second part of the chapter presents the results on the extent to which citizens demand democracy. Here results are highlighted on ways in which citizens exercise their rights, exert pressure on elected leaders to listen to people like them, and participate in protest marches or demonstrations to make their voices heard. These are just a few examples of how citizens can demand good, accountable government from their elected officials (Table 4.1 lists all the question items that were used in writing this chapter). The final part of the chapter discusses the results, followed by major conclusions based on the first two parts: evaluations of the political system and democratic citizenship.

TABLE 4.1 *Outline of the variables used in this study*

Citizens' views of their political system
Satisfaction with the way democracy is working
Trust in institutions such as provincial and local government
Trust in government officials and elected representatives
General government performance
Provincial government performance
Local government performance
Responsiveness and transparency of local government
Responsiveness and interest of ward councillor and ward committee
Specific government performance
Views on political parties
Freedom of expression
Democratic citizenship
Citizens' opinions of people's rights in a democracy
Views on good citizenship
Interest and discussion in politics
Citizens' understanding of politics and government
Political competence and efficacy
Efficacy of voting and elections
Voting in local government elections
Political participation
Civic participation

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

South African citizens' views of their political system

This chapter conceptualises democracy as much more than elections. Specifically, the view is advanced that democracy is about the functioning of the entire political system and the institutions that drive and sustain it. Linz and Stephan (1996: 13), for example, indicated that 'three minimum conditions must be met before one can debate the possibility of democratic consolidation'. Firstly, a state must exist for elections to be implemented, for winners to take control of the government and for the rights of citizens to be protected. Secondly, the process of democratic transformation should be completed before one can assess the prospects for democratic consolidation. Thirdly, the political leaders must govern the country in a democratic manner.

There is no doubt that South Africa's political system fully qualifies as a legitimate democracy. From this perspective, our focus is not on whether South Africa is a democracy or not, but whether it can sustain and consolidate its fairly new-found democracy. The chapter therefore examines whether the performance of government and state institutions receives widespread support among the public at large.

Satisfaction with the way democracy is working

This section begins by reporting results on the question, 'How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy is working in South Africa?' Just more than half of the 2005 SASAS survey respondents indicated general satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the country. By contrast, a quarter (27 per cent) expressed dissatisfaction with the new system.

Comparing the 2005 results with the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys provides a different dimension and puts the 2005 figures into context. Over the three survey rounds, the proportion of South Africans who are generally satisfied with the way democracy is working has improved, though this has not happened in a linear fashion. As Table 4.2 shows, just less than half the respondents in the 2003 survey indicated they were satisfied with democracy. This went up to more than a half in the 2004 survey before declining again in 2005. Conversely, the proportion of South Africans who were dissatisfied with the way democracy is working has declined from 38 per cent in 2003 to 27 per cent in 2005.

To further understand South Africans' perceptions about satisfaction with the way democracy is working, the 2005 survey data were disaggregated by race, living standard measures (LSM) and locale. The results showed that Africans expressed the highest degree of satisfaction with democracy (58 per cent satisfied or very satisfied), followed by coloured (49 per cent), Indian (36 per cent) and white (31 per cent) people. People with the lowest LSM were generally the most excited about the way democracy is working, with growing levels of ambivalence the higher the category of LSM. It was also learned that respondents in the rural informal areas were the most enthusiastic group about democracy, trailed by urban informal dwellers (60 per cent), rural formal dwellers (54 per cent) and urban dwellers (46 per cent).

TABLE 4.2 Satisfaction with the way democracy is working in South Africa (percentage)

	2003	2004	2005
Very satisfied/satisfied	45	62	53
Very dissatisfied/dissatisfied	38	25	27
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	12	12	17

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Trust in institutions

Legitimacy comprises the belief that those in power have a right to make binding decisions, and that those decisions ought to be obeyed even if one disagrees with a specific decision. Trust is an important component of democratic legitimacy. If citizens trust their elected leaders to make decisions on their behalf, it provides the necessary legitimacy for a political system to operate more effectively. This chapter further explores trust in institutions, which was introduced in Chapter 1 by Rule and Langa and in Chapter 3 by Roefs and Atkinson.

Table 4.3 shows that levels of trust in South Africa's institutions generally went up from 2003 to 2004 and decreased marginally from 2004 to 2005. The decline in 2005 in some instances is not as marked as the rise in 2004. One can therefore conclude that, overall, trust in institutions is on the increase. However, government institutions need to be aware of the decline in 2005. For example, 53 per cent of the respondents indicated they trust Parliament in 2003, while 66 per cent was recorded in 2004. In 2005, trust in Parliament dropped to 56 per cent, although this was still higher than the 2003 level. This pattern is consistent for trust in all three levels of government, namely, national, provincial and local.

TABLE 4.3 *Trust in institutions (percentage*)*

	2003	2004	2005
Parliament/National Assembly	53	66	56
National government	56	72	61
Provincial government	47	64	55
Local government	41	56	48
Traditional leaders/authorities	–	–	45
Traditional political parties	–	–	42
Independent Electoral Commission	56	69	58
The army (defence force)	57	55	56
The police	41	46	46
Courts	47	59	53
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)	71	74	69
Big private corporations (big business)	51	55	55
The church	82	81	81

Notes: * Percentage saying 'strongly trust' and 'trust'.

Empty cells indicate that the questions were not asked in the survey year.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Next, the 2005 survey data were disaggregated to examine how people from different race groups, LSM categories and settlement areas trust the various institutions. About 62 per cent of Africans trust Parliament, compared to 42 per cent of coloureds, the next most trusting group. Similarly, 72 per cent of Africans trust the national government, compared to 48 per cent of coloureds. The most notable exception is that only 52 per cent of Africans said they trusted local government, compared to 43 per cent of coloureds, the next most trusting group in this tier. The high LSM group has the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated they trust the national government (8 per cent), compared to 29 per cent of low LSM respondents. The respondents living in rural informal areas showed the highest degree of trust in the national government in 2005 (77 per cent). Rural respondents were generally more trusting of institutions than their urban counterparts. Respondents who lived in informal urban areas were more trusting than those who lived in formal settlements in the towns and cities.

Trust in government officials and elected representatives

The 2004 SASAS survey asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that 'we can trust people in government to do what is right'. Table 4.4 indicates that just more than half (56 per cent) of the respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with this view. It was also found that more than half (54 per cent) of the respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that 'most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally'. These results suggest that large proportions of respondents have very little confidence in government officials and elected representatives.

TABLE 4.4 *Trust in government officials and elected representatives, 2004 (percentage)*

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't choose
Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right.	12.8	43.6	16.6	15.7	8.3	3.0
Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally.	22.2	31.9	20.1	15.8	4.1	5.9

Source: SASAS (2004)

Perceptions of democratic governance

This section assesses how well the current government is performing its representative role. More specifically, it gauges public opinion on the way South Africa is governed and on how well the provincial and local governments are performing. In addition, views of the South African public are tested on the responsiveness of provincial and local governments. Public opinion with regards to democratic governance is very important since it can enhance or hamper the prospects for democratic consolidation. Compare Mattes and Bratton (2003: 10), who indicate that if citizens feel their elected officials fulfil their campaign promises, they are likely to support the incumbent government as well as the overall democratic process.

General government performance

The 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys asked respondents, 'How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way South Africa is being governed at present?' The 2003 results indicate that just less than half (48 per cent) of the respondents were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the way South Africa was being governed, while 33 per cent of the respondents were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied' (Table 4.5). The 2004 results show that 60 per cent were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the way South Africa was being governed, while 22 per cent of the respondents were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'. It is clear that a bigger proportion of respondents in 2004 than in 2003 were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the way South Africa was being governed.

TABLE 4.5 *Satisfaction with the way South Africa is governed, 2003/04 (percentage)*

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way South Africa is being governed at present?	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
2003	14.0	33.9	14.3	21.1	12.0
2004	20.4	39.9	13.4	12.5	9.4

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004)

Provincial government

With regards to provincial government performance, the 2003 SASAS survey found that the proportions of respondents who were either satisfied or dissatisfied with the way their province was performing its job were more or less equal. As shown in Table 4.6, 39 per cent of the respondents said that they were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the way their province was being governed, while 40 per cent were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'. The 2004 survey, however, found a bigger proportion of respondents 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' (53 per cent) with provincial government, compared to 27 per cent who were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'.

TABLE 4.6 Satisfaction with the performance of provincial government, 2003/04 (percentage)

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your province is performing its job at present?	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
2003	8	31	16	28	12
2004	10	43	15	17	10

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004)

Satisfaction with performance and governance of local government

Local governments are very important in delivering basic services. One would therefore expect that people would be very interested in their performance and whether they listen to what ordinary citizens want or need within their local communities and neighbourhoods. Although the proportions of respondents who were either satisfied or dissatisfied with the way their local government or municipality was performing its job were more or less equal for both the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys, it is worrying that more than a third of respondents were dissatisfied (see Table 4.7). Both this chapter and Chapter 3 demonstrate that respondents generally viewed local government very negatively.

In the 2003 survey, 38 per cent of the respondents said that they were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the way their local government or municipality was performing, while 46 per cent were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'. The 2004 survey found that 38 per cent of the respondents were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the performance of their local government, compared to 38 per cent who were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'.

TABLE 4.7 Satisfaction with performance of local government, 2003/04 (percentage)

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your local government or municipality is performing its job at present?	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
2003	9	29	12	29	17
2004	7	31	17	21	17

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004)

Responsiveness and transparency of local government

Table 4.8 shows that 46 per cent of the respondents indicated that their local council had not become more efficient at responding to their needs over the past five years, while 29 per cent said that it had. A quarter (25 per cent) said they did not know if their local council had become more efficient or not.

TABLE 4.8 *Responsiveness and interest of local government, 2004 (percentage)*

	Yes	No	Don't know
Has your local council become more efficient at responding to your needs over the past five years?	29	46	25

Source: SASAS (2004)

The 2004 and 2005 surveys asked respondents whether their local council took too many decisions in secret. The results from the 2004 survey indicate that 40 per cent of the respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with this statement, compared to 53 per cent in 2005 (Table 4.9). The 2004 survey also asked respondents whether they thought 'developmental local government is the best way to ensure that the needs of people are met'. It was found that 61 per cent of the respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with this view (Table 4.10).

TABLE 4.9 *Transparency of local government, 2004/05 (percentage)*

My local council takes too many decisions in secret.	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
2004	14	26	13	14	5
2005	22	31	11	9	4

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

TABLE 4.10 *Developmental responsiveness of local government, 2004 (percentage)*

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Developmental local government is the best way to ensure that the needs of people are met.	19	42	13	4	3

Source: SASAS (2004)

Responsiveness and interest of ward councillor and ward committee

The Municipal Demarcation Board is responsible for determining or redetermining the outer boundaries of the three categories of municipality identified in the Constitution – Category A (metropolitan), Category B (local) and Category C (district) municipalities – for the whole of the territory of the Republic of South Africa.¹ Its second main function is to delimit wards. Wards are established within the boundaries of the municipalities and each ward is represented by a ward councillor.

1 See www.demarcation.org.za.

TABLE 4.11 *Responsiveness of ward, 2004 (percentage)*

	Excellent	Good	So-so	Poor	Very poor
The responsiveness of the ward councillor to the needs of your neighbourhood	2	19	19	18	12
The responsiveness of the ward committee to the needs of your neighbourhood	2	17	18	18	11

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 4.12 *Accountability and communication of the ward, 2004 (percentage)*

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
The ward councillor is accountable to residents of my ward.	11	32	15	11	7
There is good communication between the ward councillor and residents of my ward.	5	23	14	17	14

Source: SASAS (2004)

The 2004 SASAS survey assessed whether the ward councillor and the ward committee were responsive to the needs of the people in the neighbourhoods they represented. A slightly bigger proportion of the respondents (30 per cent) indicated that responsiveness of the ward councillors was 'poor' or 'very poor', compared to 21 per cent who felt it was 'excellent' or 'good' (Table 4.11).

Views with regards to the responsiveness of the ward committee were somewhat mixed. Of the respondents, 29 per cent believed that the ward committee represented the 'interests of all people in my neighbourhood', 37 per cent said that they didn't know and 35 per cent indicated that the ward committee did not represent the interests of all people. It was also found that 19 per cent of respondents rated the responsiveness of the ward committees as 'excellent' or 'good', as compared to 29 per cent that indicated it was 'poor' or 'very poor'.

Next, the 2004 survey asked whether respondents thought the ward councillor was accountable to residents of their ward and if there was good communication between the ward councillor and the residents. As Table 4.12 shows, 43 per cent of the respondents said they 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that 'the ward councillor is accountable to residents of my ward', compared to 18 per cent that 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree'. Fewer respondents (28 per cent) 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that 'there is good communication between the ward councillor and residents of my ward', compared to 31 per cent who 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree'.

Respondents were also asked if there was a ward committee in their ward and whether they knew the ward councillor in their ward. The results show that 34 per cent of the respondents said that there was a ward committee in their ward, while 26 per cent said there wasn't and 22 per cent indicated that they didn't know. A smaller proportion (45 per cent) of respondents indicated that they knew the ward councillor in their ward, compared to 56 per cent who said they didn't.

Specific government performance

The survey asked respondents a set of questions on how well government is doing in a range of policy areas. There is no common pattern surrounding general attitudes to government performance over the three SASAS surveys. As indicated in Table 4.13, perceptions would seem largely to match government success in various categories, with both significant achievements (for example, in extending basic services) and shortfalls (for instance, in housing and job provision) being recognised. The supply of water, sanitation and electricity was generally well received, with more than 60 per cent of respondents indicating they were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with progress in their neighbourhood.

Healthcare provision was also recognised as more or less positive, while housing provision, crime prevention, land reform, job creation and the handling of sexually transmitted infections all received poor ratings. Job creation was by far the weakest category, with less than 10 per cent of respondents signalling their satisfaction with progress in this regard.

The 2005 disaggregated survey data revealed that Africans were commonly the least impressed with government performance with regards to water and sanitation supply, electricity supply, refuse removal, and job or housing provision. Africans were, however, significantly more positive than other groups about the government's work in providing social grants and in its efforts to treat sexually transmitted diseases.

TABLE 4.13 *Satisfaction with government policy performance**

	2003	2004	2005
Government handling supply of water and sanitation in neighbourhood	60	62	61
Government handling provision of electricity	64	70	69
Government handling removal of refuse	53	54	53
Government handling affordable housing	32	34	34
Government handling access to healthcare	43	50	50
Government handling treatment of sexually transmitted infections	24	33	38
Government cutting crime	21	26	24
Government creating jobs	8	10	11
Government handling land reform	21	28	28
Government handling provision of social grants	–	–	63

Notes: * Percentage saying 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied'.
Empty cells indicate that the questions were not asked in the survey year.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Views on political parties

The rational choice approach explains attitudes and behaviour on the basis of the combination of available information, resources and constraints (Whitefield & Evans 1999). According to this approach, people's political attitudes and behaviour are influenced by political events and past and recent experiences. For example, political parties and media campaigns may provide people with the necessary information to make an informed decision about who to vote for in an upcoming election. Gibson (2000) also reasoned that information plays a vital role in shaping people's judgements about actions of political leaders. Information is therefore an important ingredient of democratic

TABLE 4.14 *Views on political parties, 2004 (percentage)*

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Political parties encourage people to become active in politics.	15	46	17	11	3
Political parties do not give voters real policy choices.	11	27	21	27	4

Source: SASAS (2004)

consolidation, and political parties have a vital role to play in the democratic process. But what do the public think of political parties?

In the 2004 SASAS survey, respondents were asked whether they agreed that political parties encouraged people to become active in politics. The results revealed that the majority (61 per cent) of respondents felt that 'political parties encourage people to become active in politics', while 14 per cent disagreed (see Table 4.14). The survey also established that 38 per cent of respondents said they agreed that 'political parties do not give voters real policy choices', compared to 31 per cent who disagreed with this view.

Freedom of speech and movement

For citizens to demand democracy they must feel that there is some form of political freedom that would enable them to express themselves freely. Without these civil liberties citizens will struggle to hold elected leaders accountable. The SASAS surveys therefore assessed views with regards to freedom of expression and freedom of movement. The survey results seem to indicate that a greater proportion of respondents want less government control over information as well as less government restrictions around criticism by citizens.

As Table 4.15 shows, there was a marginal but steady decline in the number of respondents that felt 'government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it'. Similarly, a decreasing number of respondents indicated that 'government should be in control of what information is given to the public'. The overwhelming majority of respondents in all three surveys indicated that 'citizens should have the right to form or join any organisation freely' and that 'mass action is acceptable for people to express their views'.

When the 2005 survey data were disaggregated, the results showed that African respondents were the most supportive of government's authority to prevent criticism and agreed most frequently that government should control the flow of information to the public. African respondents were also the group most in favour of the democratic right to mass action but were less excited about the right to form or join organisations freely, compared to the other race groups. White respondents were generally the group least in favour of government control of criticism and/or information. Residents of rural informal areas were also most supportive of government control, while respondents in formal dwellings, whether urban or rural, were less supportive.

TABLE 4.15 *Freedom of expression**

	2003	2004	2005
Government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it.	43	44	38
Citizens should have the right to form or join any organisation freely.	80	87	84
Government should be in control of what information is given to the public.	56	55	47
Mass action is acceptable for people to express their views.	66	65	67

Note: * Percentage saying 'strongly agree' and 'agree'.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

This section on South Africa's political system showed that perceptions with regards to satisfaction with the way democracy is working, trust in government institutions, government performance, responsiveness of government and freedom of speech seem to be on the decline among the South African public. It is important to note that these pessimistic perceptions about the political system may have influenced how the respondents perceived their interaction with that system.

Democratic citizenship

Do South African citizens hold their elected officials accountable? In order for citizens to demand democracy, they need to understand their rights and what it means to be a good citizen, as well as have some knowledge of politics and governance. Not only is a good understanding of politics and governance required, but also citizens' ability to express their opinions on public affairs and the current government.

Without civil liberties, citizens will struggle to hold elected leaders accountable. Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1987) examined the factors that influence the prospects for developing and maintaining democratic government. They identified associational life as a breeding ground for democratic leadership, democratic competition and accountability, as well as being a stimulus to participation in the formal political arena (Diamond et al. 1987). Mattes and Bratton (2003), in this regard, argued that participation in formal procedures like voting, attending election rallies and joining others to raise issues can increase a person's interest in politics and sense of political efficacy, and can further build support for democracy. This section therefore assesses whether ordinary South Africans believe they have the right to stand up and fight for their democracy, especially if it is under threat.

Citizens' opinions of people's rights in a democracy

This section starts by looking at people's rights in a democracy. The 2004 SASAS survey requested respondents to indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 – where 1 was 'not at all important' and 7 was 'very important' – how important it is that 'all citizens have an adequate standard of living'; Table 4.16 shows that most of the respondents (60 per cent) said that it was 'very important'. More than half (59 per cent) of the respondents also said that it was 'very important' that 'government treats everybody equally regardless of their position in society'. People were also vocal that 'politicians take into account views of citizens when making decisions' (58 per cent), as well as that 'people be given more opportunities to participate' in public decision-making (56 per cent). Of concern, though, is that a large proportion of respondents (30 per cent) felt it was 'very important' that 'citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience' when they oppose government actions.

TABLE 4.16 *Importance of people's rights in a democracy**

	2004
All citizens have an adequate standard of living.	60
Government treats everybody equally regardless of their position in society.	59
Politicians take into account views of citizens when making decisions.	58
People be given more opportunities to participate.	56
Government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities.	55
Citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience.	30

Note: * Percentage saying 'very important'.
Source: SASAS (2004)

Views on good citizenship

What do people regard as good citizenship in a democracy? To determine the extent of good citizenship, the 2004 SASAS survey asked respondents what it takes to be a good citizen. Seven statements were formulated and the respondents had to indicate their responses on a scale of 1 to 7 (the same response options were used as in the previous section on citizens' rights). The results in Table 4.17 show that 61 per cent of the respondents felt that it was 'very important' that people 'always vote in elections' and that people 'always obey the laws and regulations'. A big proportion of respondents also felt that it was 'very important' to 'help people in South Africa who are worse off than you' (51 per cent), while far fewer (41 per cent) indicated that it was 'very important' to 'help people in the world who are worse off than you'. To be 'active in social and political associations' recorded the lowest level of importance, with only 30 per cent of the respondents indicating that it was 'very important'.

TABLE 4.17 *Importance of good citizenship in a democracy**

	2004
Always vote in elections.	61
Always obey the laws and regulations.	61
Help people in South Africa who are worse off than you.	51
Never try to evade taxes.	49
Keep watch on the actions of government.	44
Help people in the world who are worse off than you.	41
Active in social and political associations.	30

Note: * Percentage saying 'very important'.
Source: SASAS (2004)

Political interest and political knowledge

Interest and discussion in politics

The 2004 SASAS survey asked respondents, 'How interested would you say you are personally in politics?' About a third (35 per cent) of the respondents indicated they were 'very interested' and 'fairly interested' in politics.

TABLE 4.18 *Participation in political discussion**

	2003**	2004*	2005**
How often do you discuss politics with friends, relatives, etc.?	–	28.3	–
How often do you try to persuade friends, relatives, etc. about politics?	–	25.3	–
How often do you talk about politics?	15.5	–	17.0

Notes: * Percentage saying 'often' and 'sometimes'.

** Percentage saying 'very often' and 'often'.

Empty cells indicate that the questions were not asked in the survey year.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Very few respondents indicated that they discuss politics with friends and family. For example, 28 per cent of the respondents in 2004 said that they 'often' or 'sometimes' discuss politics with friends and relatives. A quarter (25 per cent) of the respondents indicated that they 'often' or 'sometimes' 'try to persuade friends, relatives, etc. about politics'. The wording of the question for the 2003 and 2005 surveys was slightly different since it asked respondents, 'How often do you talk about politics?' About 16 per cent said 'often' or 'very often' in 2003 and 17 per cent was recorded in 2005.

Citizens' understanding of politics and government

The SASAS surveys also examined if people have a good understanding of politics and government. Table 4.19 indicates that more than 40 per cent of the respondents in each survey since 2003 'strongly agree' and 'agree' that 'politics is too complicated for people like me to understand'.

It is evident from these results that very few respondents believe they have the ability to understand politics and government. For example, the 2004 survey found that less than half of the respondents had a 'good understanding of political issues South Africa is facing'. Respondents were also sceptical about their ability to understand politics and government since 'most people are better informed about politics and government than me'.

The 2005 disaggregated survey data revealed that almost half of African respondents (49 per cent) agreed that politics was too complicated for them to understand, compared to 45 per cent of coloured respondents, 36 per cent of Indian respondents and 26 per cent of white respondents.

TABLE 4.19 *Understanding of politics and government**

	2003	2004	2005
Good understanding of political issues South Africa is facing.	–	47	–
Most people are better informed about politics and government than me.	–	48	–
Politics is too complicated for people like me to understand.	45	42	46

Notes: * Percentage saying 'strongly agree' and 'agree'.

Empty cells indicate that the questions were not asked in the survey year.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Political competence and efficacy

The results of the 2004 SASAS survey revealed that just more than half (54 per cent) of the respondents said they 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that 'people like me don't have any say about what the government does'. In addition, half of the respondents also felt that the government did not care what people like them thought.

The 2003 and 2004 surveys also assessed whether respondents thought it was easy or difficult to influence decisions that affect the country and their province. Table 4.20 shows that very few people (15 per cent) felt it was 'easy' or 'very easy' to influence decisions of the country. A similar proportion (14 per cent) of respondents felt that it was 'easy' or 'very easy' to influence decisions of the province. In terms of influencing municipalities, a lower proportion of respondents in 2004 (29 per cent) said that it was 'very easy' or 'easy' to influence decisions of the municipality than in 2003 (35 per cent).

TABLE 4.20 *Ability to influence decisions of the spheres of government**

	2003	2004
Influence decisions of the country	12	15
Influence decisions of the province	13	14
Influence decisions of the municipality	35	29

Note: * Percentage saying 'very easy' and 'easy'.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004)

Respondents were also asked, 'How much influence do you feel you have on local government decisions for your area?' About 7 per cent of the respondents in 2004 indicated that they had 'much influence' over local government decisions in their area, compared to 26 per cent who said 'some influence' and 15 per cent who reported that they had 'no influence'.

Efficacy of voting and elections

In a democratic country all citizens of voting age have the right to vote. By voting they give elected leaders permission to act or make decisions on their behalf. Citizens after an election therefore expect leaders to represent them and to implement their election manifestos. Unfortunately, large proportions of the respondents in the SASAS surveys were of the opinion that not all politicians represented them in the manner that they were supposed to or were expected to. For example, as indicated in Table 4.21, the surveys revealed that approximately 20 to 35 per cent of the respondents believe that 'whether I vote or not makes no difference'; that 'after being elected all parties are the same' and that voting is pointless; and that 'voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted'. In spite of these sentiments, a vast majority of respondents for all three surveys also indicated that 'it is the duty of all citizens to vote'.

When the 2005 data were disaggregated by race, the results indicated that African respondents in particular were most positive about political efficacy and about their influence over politics and government. On the other hand, coloured respondents exhibited the least faith in their own influence in an election and the highest level of disillusionment with political parties. Coloured and Indian respondents were the least interested in voting and, of all the groups, were most inclined to think that voting in elections was meaningless because politicians couldn't be trusted.

TABLE 4.21 *Participation in voting and elections, 2003–05 (percentage*)*

	2003		2004		2005	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	32	58	23	68	30	59
After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless.	31	56	20	66	28	58
It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	78	9	84	8	81	11
Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.	32	52	19	63	31	51

Note: * Percentage saying 'strongly agree/agree' and 'strongly disagree/disagree'.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

The 2005 survey data also showed that low LSM respondents were generally more ambivalent about their influence over politics and government, though they did express the strongest belief in the duty of all citizens to vote. Rural informal dwellers were most committed to voting (87 per cent) but least sure of their capacity to influence. By contrast, urban formal dwellers were least interested in the duty to vote and were most often convinced that political parties were all the same, but were also most convinced of the importance of their votes. Rural formal dwellers exhibited the lowest level of trust in politicians and a third or less of all respondents agreed that voting was meaningless because they couldn't trust politicians.

Voting in local government elections

To determine the extent of participation in elections, the 2004 SASAS survey asked respondents, 'Did you vote in the last local government election which was held in 2000?' It was established that 63 per cent of the respondents indicated that they had voted in the 2000 local government elections, while 37 per cent said they had not.

To determine whether people contact their local government representatives, the 2004 survey asked whether respondents knew the ward councillor in their ward and the proportional representation (PR) councillor in their local council.² Table 4.22 shows that 45 per cent said they 'know the ward councillor' in their ward and 17 per cent said they 'know the PR councillor' in their local council.

TABLE 4.22 *Interaction with local government, 2004 (percentage)*

	Yes	No
Did you vote in the last local government elections (2000)?	63	37
Do you plan to vote in the next local government elections?	83	18
Do you know the ward councillor in your ward?	45	55
Do you know the PR councillor in your local council?	17	83

Source: SASAS (2004)

2 In municipalities with wards, half the councillors were elected by a PR system using party lists and the other half in the wards were individual councillors (either independent or nominated by a party).

TABLE 4.23 *Importance of participation in local government elections, 2004 (percentage)*

	Very important	Important	Not important	Very unimportant
How important is participation in the election of local government representatives?	43	36	6	4

Source: SASAS (2004)

The 2004 survey also asked respondents to assess the importance of participation in the election of local government representatives. Most respondents (79 per cent) felt that it was 'important' or 'very important', while very few (10 per cent) considered it to be 'not important' or 'very unimportant' (Table 4.23).

Political participation

Political participation is another way of getting elected leaders to listen to ordinary people. By participating in community meetings and demonstrations, people can voice their opinions and demand that leaders address issues of concern. In this regard, the 2004 SASAS survey assessed whether respondents participated in politics. The results indicate that few respondents had participated in politics and that few would do it if they had a chance. Political meetings and rallies were found to be the most widely used form of participation, with very few people contacting political leaders or civil servants. Similarly, very few people considered the media as an avenue to express their views (Table 4.24).

TABLE 4.24 *Participation in collective action, 2004 (percentage)*

	Have done it in the past year	Have done it in the more distant past	Have not done it but might do it	Have not done and would never do it
Signed a petition	4	8	28	56
Boycotted/deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	3	8	23	60
Took part in demonstration	4	12	29	50
Attended a political meeting/rally	12	18	24	43
Contacted or attempted to contact a political leader or a civil servant to express views	2	5	34	54
Donated money/raised funds for a social or political activity	5	8	35	49
Contacted or appeared in the media to express views	1	2	34	58

Source: SASAS (2004)

Civic participation

The respondents were not optimistic about their ability to influence elected leaders through collective action such as trade unions and commercial organisations. As expected, the results indicate that more respondents attended church or religious meetings than they did trade unions or other organisations like women’s groups, youth groups, sports associations and community organisations. These results are consistent for both the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys (Table 4.25).

TABLE 4.25 *Civic participation, 2003/04 (percentage)*

	Supporter		Active member		None	
	2003	2004	2003	2004	2003	2004
Trade union	9	7	5	5	86	88
Church or religious organisation	27	25	43	36	30	39
Women’s organisation	11	13	6	6	83	81
Community organisation	16	15	8	6	76	78
Sports association or club	20	16	11	9	69	75
Youth group	12	13	6	7	81	80

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004)

Discussion of results

This chapter emphasised that democracy is about the functioning of the entire political system and the institutions that drive and sustain it. It acknowledged that South Africa is a fully fledged democracy with a state-of-the-art Constitution that includes an array of institutions to protect citizens’ political and socio-economic rights. Nevertheless, a Constitution, relatively well-run elections, and stable elected representative institutions are not enough to consolidate a democracy. Sustainable and consolidated democracies require elected leaders and representatives of government and state institutions to implement their mandates. In addition, to consolidate a country’s democracy requires people who are willing to support, defend and sustain it.

This chapter therefore evaluated public opinion with regards to the performance of the South African political system as well as the extent to which South Africans are democratic or prepared to enhance the prospects of democracy. Across a range of indicators on the performance of the political system, the SASAS surveys demonstrated that South Africans are becoming more apprehensive about politics in general and the political system in particular. Although more than half of the 2005 survey respondents expressed satisfaction with the way democracy is working in South Africa, it is down by almost 10 per cent from 2004. White and Indian respondents from the 2005 survey were by far the most pessimistic about the way democracy is working, while African respondents were the most optimistic. Satisfaction levels with the way democracy is working among the respondents with a high LSM were also negative, while those respondents with a low LSM were more upbeat.

In terms of trust, the surveys showed that there are areas of concern, particularly with regards to the representative institutions such as the local governments. The South African Police Service was also rated very low in terms of trust, with less than 50 per cent of respondents saying they ‘trust’ or ‘strongly trust’ them. The churches and the SABC received the highest levels of trust. There were variations among the race groups on how they perceived trust. For example, white respondents from the 2005

survey were generally least trustful of the various representative and state institutions, followed by Indian, coloured and African respondents.

Public opinion on the performance of the way South Africa is governed and on how well the provincial and local governments are performing is more positive. Available data from the SASAS surveys revealed that bigger proportions of respondents in 2004 than in 2003 were satisfied with the way South Africa is governed and with the performance of the provincial governments. The proportions of respondents who were either satisfied or dissatisfied with the way their local government or municipality was performing its job were more or less equal for both the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys. In general, survey respondents perceived local government as the worst performer, while the national government was rated much more favourably.

Satisfaction with government performance across a range of specific policy areas revealed that respondents rated government more positively in terms of the provision of basic services such as water supply and refuse removal. However, respondents were very dissatisfied with housing delivery, the combating of crime and job creation. Interestingly, government's performance in 2005 with regards to handling social grants was rated very positively. Africans in particular were positive about the government's work in providing social grants.

The survey also assessed attitudes towards freedom of speech and freedom of movement. On the whole, the respondents felt that South Africa's political system is conducive to freedom of speech and movement. For example, greater proportions of the respondents over all three surveys wanted less government control, while vast majorities also indicated that people should have the right to join any organisation or participate in protest actions. However, African respondents were the most supportive of government's authority to prevent criticism, with white respondents least in favour of this view.

The second part of this chapter reported views on democratic citizenship. As in the case of the political system, the surveys revealed that South Africans scored poorly in terms of democratic citizenship. In other words, the respondents were very negative about engaging with political systems, such as contacting elected leaders, participating in politics or simply showing an interest in politics. For example, just over a third (35.0 per cent) of the respondents indicated that they were interested in politics. Less than a third (28.3 per cent) of the 2004 survey respondents said that they discuss politics with friends and family. A big proportion of the 2003 survey respondents also indicated that politics is too complicated. Further, more than half of the respondents in the 2004 survey felt that they lack the ability to influence the decisions of government.

At the same time, large proportions of the respondents over all three surveys thought that their vote makes no difference; that after being elected all political parties are the same, and that voting is pointless; and that voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted. Nevertheless, a vast majority of respondents also indicated that it is the duty of all citizens to vote.

Participation in democratic politics is clearly on a downward trend. The survey results revealed that few respondents participated in politics and that few would do it if they had the chance. A small proportion of respondents also indicated that they have contacted political leaders or civil servants. In terms of civic participation, it was found that very few respondents were active members of trade unions, women's groups, youth groups, sports associations and community organisations.

Conclusion

The results of the surveys have illustrated that South Africans, in general, are becoming more pessimistic about their political system and their own ability or lack of ability to participate in the system. These public perceptions were consistent for all three SASAS surveys and have serious implications for democratic South Africa. It should be emphasised that the 2005 survey in particular revealed a worrisome reversal in public perception with regards to views about the political system, as well as opinions about democratic citizenship. If these negative perceptions continue to exist, particularly among the white, coloured and Indian minority groups, it may alienate them, which can be damaging to South Africa's democratic progress. On the other hand, if the majority of the public, such as people with a low LSM, continue to feel politics is too complicated and that they do not have the ability to influence government, it may force them into protest politics.

It is against this background that the chapter highlights that policy-makers and government should address citizens' concerns about the overall direction of South Africa's political system. Further, if citizens feel leaders are responding to their demands, it can only strengthen the future of South Africa's democracy. At the same time, this chapter wants to avoid the argument that any criticism aimed at South Africa's political system is a threat to its democracy. Numerous democracy scholars have indicated that a vibrant democracy is one that is characterised by a critical mass that is willing to support, defend and sustain it (Linde & Ekman 2003; Mattes & Bratton 2003). However, this chapter has demonstrated that there is lack of political and civic participation as well as lack of commitment to engaging with elected representatives. This lack of citizen commitment, coupled with high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality and HIV/AIDS, should be a cause of concern for all those committed to democracy in South Africa.

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Youth voices in South Africa: Echoes in the Age of Hope

Gerard Boyce

Introduction

Thirty years ago, the Young Lions of South Africa's townships rose up and led the vanguard against the apartheid regime. Their actions and those of the township youth of the 1980s led the charge for an end to the regime and ultimately the non-racial democracy that South Africa is today.

Yet South Africa has always had an ambiguous relationship with its youth. For instance, although lionised, the same township youth of the 1980s and early 1990s were also seen as the 'lost generation', the unskilled and unsocialised who represented a threat to traditional structures of authority (Seekings 1996).

Then, as now, it is far from clear which image of the youth predominates. There is a similar sense of expectation, of promise, in many contemporary views of the youth (National Youth Commission 2002). According to this view, the youth need to be embraced as partners so that their energy can be harnessed to address the challenges facing the country.

On the other hand, there is the popular image of a generation in crisis. According to this view, the youth are characterised by problems that need to be 'fixed' somehow (*Mail & Guardian* 9 January 2007¹; *Cape Times* 14 March 2006²). All too frequently, the youth and the problems that beset them are seen as the root of many of the social ills that befall South Africa. Be it crime, HIV/AIDS or unemployment, poor youth socialisation into traditional societal norms is blamed for these ills (Everatt 2000). For older African township youth especially, there lies the stereotype of a marginalised generation that was exposed to, and participated in, the violence that characterised the death throes of apartheid. Indeed, it is this image of the 'lost generation' of youth that still haunts a large section of the public's imagination.

Irrespective of which view is adopted, there exist important arguments for investigating youth circumstances and attitudes. For instance, Knowles and Behrman (2006) demonstrate that there are frequently sound economic reasons for investing in youth. From a policy and social point of view, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 2005) argues that the Millennium Development Goals are about youth. As such, youth will be responsible for determining whether countries achieve their goals. In addition, the reliance on youth to fulfil long-term national development priorities such as sustained economic growth and poverty reduction, and to address the long-standing socio-political divisions

1 M Krouse, 'SA's changing culture'.

2 B Mankewu, 'SA needs a youth programme of action based on mass economic empowerment'.

associated therewith, has been recognised (UNFPA 2005). In this role, the youth are potentially the key partners who will address the many problems facing South Africa in future. In South Africa there also appears to be the notion that the youth will be the vehicle by which the country fulfils the dream of a truly non-racial state (Macdonald 2005).

In light of their importance and the pride of place that they occupy in South African history, questions concerning youth attitudes, circumstances and leadership are argued to assume great significance. Given this significance, together with the effects that youth discontent and lower youth public participation rates may have on social cohesion in general and governance in particular (see, for example, Henn et al. 2002; Jeffs & Smith 1999), this chapter will investigate youth attitudes related to perceptions of life satisfaction, South African identity, attitudes towards governance or social institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. Thereafter, an attempt will be made to assess the platform from which the youth will tackle the challenges facing South Africa. This part of the analysis focuses on the skills with which the youth are endowed and their employment situation. The chapter concludes with secondary data analyses which investigate the 'digital divide' and the potential of the youth to take advantage of the opportunities that arise from globalisation.

Where possible, attempts are made to investigate whether distinctive trends are emerging among the youth and to test whether these emergent trends are distinct from those among older respondents. In addition to age effects, any inter-group differences in the youth are investigated. Given South Africa's divided racial history, this mainly consists of investigating racial differences.

When investigating youth attitudes, it is somehow inevitable that comparisons with the Class of 1976 will be made. Before doing so, it is perhaps fair to question the validity of these comparisons. For one, while the system may have changed, the tasks facing today's youth are no less daunting. Youth today are faced with a set of challenges and threats that the Young Lions were not exposed to, chief among them being HIV/AIDS and the challenges posed by a rapidly globalising world. In addition, they bear on their shoulders the weight of expectation that they will fulfil the promise of, and complete the task begun by, the Young Lions of yesteryear. Given these concerns, it is argued that the focus should instead be on determining whether the spirit of the youth of 1976, of change, is present among today's youth.

Who are the youth?

Before investigating their attitudes, circumstances and characteristics, a definition and description of who the youth in South Africa are needs to be obtained. Globally, there exists debate as to who constitutes the youth or what characterises the stage of life called 'youth'. This debate is reflected in the different definitions of youth used nationally and internationally. In terms of South Africa's National Youth Commission Act (No. 19 of 1996), a youth is defined as an individual aged between 14 and 35. This broad definition of youth closely follows that specified by the *African Youth Charter* (African Union 2006).

As pointed out in Morrow et al. (2005), there are merits associated with employing an expanded definition of youth in the South African context. Firstly, the average age of school leavers is generally higher than in developed countries, due to a variety of circumstances (Morrow et al. 2005). An expanded definition of youth allows for this late exit from the formal school environment. Further justification for employing this expanded definition in an African context is provided by Mokwena (1999), who argues that a broader definition of youth is necessary to account for the disruption apartheid wrought on young people's lives. Employing an expanded definition in contemporary South Africa serves as an allowance for the assistance youth need to become productive citizens. In light of these arguments,

this chapter follows South African policy and describes youth as those aged between 14 and 35. As the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) only sampled respondents who were aged 16 and older, however, the lower end of the youth age category is shifted to 16 for the purposes of this study.

In recognition of possible differences in attitudes between those youth who have spent the greater part of their lives in the 'new' South Africa and older youth ('young adults'), the youth category is divided into those aged between 16 and 24 and those aged between 25 and 35. Where present, these differences are identified and elaborated upon.

The demography of the youth

South Africa is widely regarded as a fairly youthful country. This is reflected in the 2005 SASAS data set, according to which there are approximately 16 850 000 respondents between the ages of 16 and 35 living in South Africa. This number is roughly equally distributed between those aged between 16 and 24 and those aged between 25 and 35, with an equal proportion of males and females.

About 6 per cent of the youth are white, 2 per cent are Indian, 7 per cent are coloured and 85 per cent are African. Africans appear to be slightly over-represented among the youth when compared to national population figures. For example, according to Statistics South Africa, 79.5 per cent of the population are classified as African (Stats SA 2006: 1). Compared to the population as a whole, youth are more likely to be urban dwellers. Sixty-five per cent of young people reside in urban areas, where approximately 9 per cent live in informal housing.

Attitudes to voting and the political process

Having described who the youth are, the following sections investigate what they think. Given the prominence devoted to exposés of youth apathy (e.g. *Mail & Guardian* 30 January 2004³), youth attitudes to voting and the political process were explored. Attitudes to voting were assessed by asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the statements presented in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1 *Attitudes to voting, by age, 2005**

	16–24 years	25–35 years	36+ years	Total
Satisfied with democracy.	55	51	55	54
Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	33	31	30	31
After being elected, all parties are the same so voting is meaningless.	28	29	27	28
It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	82	84	82	83
Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.	29	32	31	31

Note: * Percentage that 'agree' and 'strongly agree'.
Source: SASAS (2005)

3 M Mmanaledi & N Mawson, 'From young lions to young yawners'.

The results indicate that there are very small differences between age groups with respect to attitudes to voting. None of these differences is significant at standard significance testing levels. In general, respondents tended to attach a great deal of importance to voting and seemed to express confidence in the voting system, as evidenced by the low levels of agreement with the negatively framed questions in Table 5.1.

In contrast, only a slim majority of South Africans (55 per cent) expressed satisfaction with democracy in the country. Admittedly, it is unclear what this question is referring to and, by extension, what respondents are rating their satisfaction on. Due to the manner in which this question was framed ('How satisfied are you with democracy?'), it is uncertain whether it applies strictly to democratic processes or to the non-racial society – the 'new' South Africa – created after 1994.

When breaking youth responses down by race (Table 5.2), a different pattern to the conformity observed in Table 5.1 emerges.

According to Table 5.2, there exist significant differences in attitudes to voting between youth respondents of different race groups. Overall, white and African youth express the most positive or least negative attitudes to voting in South Africa. Indian and coloured youth tend to be a bit more cynical about voting and are less likely to view it as a duty of citizens.

White respondents' support for the voting process stands in sharp contrast to their very low levels of satisfaction with democracy. This suggests that there is a division between their support for the essential elements of a democracy, such as the duty of citizens to vote, and their perception of how it is applied in South Africa. This raises a number of questions. These mainly concern the reasons why young whites feel dissatisfied by the system which sustains the processes that they largely support.

The relatively high levels of youth support for the voting process seem to be reflected in their (self-reported) voting patterns in the most recent municipal elections. Overall, 32 per cent of respondents did not vote in the most recent municipal elections: 79 per cent of those aged between 16 and 24, 20 per cent of those aged between 25 and 35, and 11 per cent of those aged 36 and above. Importantly, the differences between older youth and respondents aged 36 and above are significant. That is, youth are less likely to vote, even after discounting for the age effects present in the younger youth (16–24 year olds) category.

TABLE 5.2 Youth attitudes to voting, by race, 2005*

	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Satisfied with democracy.**	55	53	38	23	53
Whether I vote or not makes no difference.**	31	47	49	30	32
After being elected, all parties are the same so voting is meaningless.**	27	48	48	22	28
It is the duty of all citizens to vote.**	85	67	68	77	83
Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.**	30	44	39	23	30

Notes: * Percentage that 'agree' and 'strongly agree'.

** Significant at 1 per cent level.

Source: SASAS (2005)

There are differences between the youth with regard to the reasons offered for not voting. Younger respondents reported being ineligible to vote as their primary reason for not voting, while youth in the 25 to 35 age category could not offer firm reasons (for example, health reasons, not interested, etc.) as to why they did not vote. Of those youth who were eligible to vote in the recent elections, but did not do so, 10 per cent reported that they were either disillusioned with the political process or not interested in politics. This figure (10 per cent) represented 7 per cent of those currently aged between 16 and 24, and 24 per cent of those currently aged between 25 and 35.

While high, these figures compare very favourably to the 46 per cent of that group of respondents aged 36 and above that did not vote (11 per cent) and who reported being uninterested or disillusioned as their reason for not doing so. As with the previous analysis, differences in responses are significant when comparing disillusionment across older youth and respondents aged 36 and above.

Therefore, although less likely to vote, the youth appear to be less cynical about the voting process than other voters. This anomaly is either cause for concern or reason for hope. Although rates of not voting are high, there is reason to believe that general dissatisfaction with the voting process may not be a significant barrier to youth participation. This raises the possibility that measures can be adopted to address this issue.

To summarise, results suggest that, to the extent that lack of interest on the part of voters is a problem in South Africa, it is a general or widespread problem rather than one that is restricted to the youth. As such, the popular portrayal of youths' non-participation in, and widespread lack of support for, the voting process may be inaccurate, or at least incomplete. Where youth reported not voting, there may be a number of underlying reasons, which are not restricted to malaise or lack of interest, for their not doing so. Arguably, these need to be explored before making generalisations about the youth.

Relationship to societal institutions


Recent reports of protests in some South African townships highlight the involvement of youth (Fuphe 2007; Hosken 2006). Reasons cited for their participation in these protests include marginalisation and frustration, due either to their employment situation or to the lack of government service delivery (Benjamin 2005). Given the media prominence attached to these events and the topicality of the underlying causes in public debate, youth attitudes to democratic institutions and their satisfaction with government service delivery were explored.

Attitudes to societal institutions were measured by levels of trust in these institutions. In order to measure trust, an index of trust (min: 0; max: 13) representing respondents' levels of trust in societal institutions was generated. Levels of trust were measured by dichotomising and summing respondents' answers to a series of questions that asked them to rate their trust in a number of public institutions (for example, courts, police, church). The index was based on responses to 13 questions. A similar method was used to create the other indexes analysed, although the underlying set of questions used to construct each index varied (see Tables 5A.1, 5A.2 and 5A.3 in the appendix to this chapter for details of the underlying questions that were used to construct the various indexes).

Figure 5.1 shows respondents' average level of trust in societal institutions. As in the previous analyses, results were investigated along age and race lines.

Results show that the youth express higher levels of trust in societal institutions, although differences between age groups are not significant. Interracial differences between the youth reveal more interesting results. There are significant race differences within the youth category. Together, these results suggest that levels of trust in societal institutions display race rather than age effects.

FIGURE 5.1 Institutional trust, by age and race, 2005



Source: SASAS (2005)

On average, Africans (8.50) exhibit a much higher degree of trust in societal institutions than whites, Indians and coloureds. In terms of the distribution of responses, whites (4.80) exhibit the lowest levels of trust in institutions. Indians and coloureds (6.10) perform marginally better.

Satisfaction with government services


In order to explore the argument that youth in particular are very frustrated with the lack of basic service delivery by government, levels of satisfaction with service delivery were measured and differences across age categories tested. Respondents' perceived satisfaction with public services was based on a series of responses to questions assessing their satisfaction with public services (such as refuse removal, electricity and sanitation) in their neighbourhoods. Responses ranged from 0 to 10, with a mean score of 4.30 for all respondents. Interestingly, approximately 6 per cent of all respondents scored a zero in the public service satisfaction index, implying that there is a sizeable minority of citizens who are very dissatisfied with public services.

Differences between average scores across race and age groups were tested using statistical tests, primarily F tests. In addition, racial differences within the youth category were investigated. Reported levels of satisfaction across groups are presented in Figure 5.2.

Results indicate that satisfaction with public service is generally low in South Africa. This holds across age groups. Additional statistical tests (F tests, not shown) further reveal that there are no differences with regard to the distribution of estimates around these means. Similarly, scores calculated by race within the youth category are fairly consistent. Likewise, these differences are not significant.

Viewed from this perspective, the labelling of the youth as being more dissatisfied than others with government and societal institutions is unwarranted. Results suggest that the level of youth dissatisfaction with government service delivery is fairly consistent with that of the public at large. In

FIGURE 5.2 Satisfaction with government services, by age and race, 2005



Source: SASAS (2005)

such a situation, addressing the underlying causes of citizens' dissatisfaction might be more productive than singling out the youth for public blame.


National pride

In media representations and corporate and sporting images, South Africa is portrayed as a country of interracial harmony where citizens are united by ties of nationalistic fervour. Given the ubiquity of this picture of national unity, attitudes towards the notion of being 'proudly South African' were explored. Presumptively, one would expect that as South Africa moves away from a society that imposed identities on its citizens, particularly racial identities, they would become more patriotic and gradually create and embrace a broader national identity. If so, this would especially be true for young people who have grown up in a non-racial, 'new' South Africa. This hypothesis certainly appears to be confirmed in recent investigations of the attitudes of younger South Africans (FutureFact 2006).

In order to test this hypothesis, respondents were asked a series of questions which explored notions of national pride and the extent to which respondents were proud of the achievements of the country. Using the same method that was used in the creation of the previous indexes, an index of national pride was estimated for different age groups and race groups among the youth. As there were five underlying questions on which this index was based, the index runs between 0 and 5. It is represented in Figure 5.3.

While the index shows no differences between respondents of different ages, there are racial differences among the youth. These differences are not significant. National pride appears to be uniformly high across age groups and among youth of different race groups.

FIGURE 5.3 National pride, by age and race, 2005



Source: SASAS (2005)

Life satisfaction and expectations

The preceding analysis paints a picture of how the youth perceive their present circumstances and the current contexts in which they find themselves. It does not describe how they feel about their lives at present or how they assess their hope for the future. In order to gauge their mood, youth assessments of their present quality of life and their expectations were investigated. By gauging youths' expectations for the future, it is hoped that insight will be gained into how they view the society which will seek out their leadership. Moreover, according to Wilson et al. (2005), youths' expectations about the future are likely to influence the choices they make today, in anticipation of tomorrow. Therefore, the analysis of youth expectations is likely to have more immediate implications for youth policy.

In order to measure life satisfaction, respondents were asked to assess how satisfied they were with their lives at present. Expectations were measured by asking respondents whether they felt that things would improve over the next five years. Respondents were asked to rate expectations separately for people like them and for the majority of South Africans. Similarly, respondents were asked to rate improvements over the past five years. Results are presented in Table 5.3, which shows the percentage of respondents who were very satisfied with their lives at present and the percentage that agreed that things had got or would get better.

Before elaborating on the results, it must be pointed out that there are caveats associated with this analysis. Firstly, 'people like you' is not defined in this question. It is, therefore, unclear whether results are comparable across groups. If persons of different groups systematically differed in the groups to which they attached (for example, race groups versus age groups), comparing responses as in the discussion below would be rendered meaningless. Support for taking groups to mean race groups, however, can be found in the data. Responses to the question 'Who do you feel most attached to?' reveal that a majority of South Africans consider themselves to be attached or slightly attached to members of their race/language group (92 per cent).

TABLE 5.3 *Life satisfaction and expectations, by age, 2005 (percentage)*

	16–24 years	25–35 years	36+ years	Total
Satisfied with life as a whole.	53	42	50	49
Past five years: Life improved for the majority of people in South Africa.	62	56	56	58
Past five years: Life improved for people like you.*	45	44	37	41
Next five years: Things will improve for most people in South Africa.**	70	67	60	65
Next five years: Things will improve for people like you.**	67	63	52	59

Notes: * Significant at 5 per cent level.

** Significant at 1 per cent level.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Overall, 49 per cent of all respondents (48 per cent of the youth) reported being satisfied with their lives as a whole. By age group, 53 per cent of those aged between 16 and 24, 42 per cent of those aged between 25 and 35, and 50 per cent of those aged 36 and above reported either being 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with their lives at present. Reported differences in satisfaction with life as a whole were only significant at the 10 per cent level. On the basis of these results, it is argued that satisfaction with life does not exhibit any age effects.

Looking at the past five years, all respondents generally agreed that life had improved for the majority of South Africans during this period. Where differences are significant, they appear to be driven by the extent to which respondents aged 36+ felt that things had actually got worse for people like them.

Expectations of the future, however, reveal a very different picture. In this case, respondents who are 36 and older are least likely to believe that things will get better, either for people like them or for the majority of South Africans. The reasons driving the significance of results vary. While older respondents' beliefs that 'things will not get better' drive differences between expectations for themselves, 25 to 35 year olds' beliefs that things will stay the same (13 per cent – not shown) drive differences between expectations for the country as a whole.

Far from being disillusioned, these results seem to indicate that the youth are fairly upbeat about their future prospects and optimistic about the future of the country. They also suggest that there are significant differences in outlook or expectations between respondents of different ages.

Assessments of life satisfaction and expectations were also broken down between youth of different races. This breakdown, illustrated in Table 5.4, reveals sharp differences among the youth.

Among the youth, white respondents were generally the most satisfied with their lives at present (74 per cent); Indians and coloureds were less so at 59 per cent and 48 per cent respectively. Differences between these three groups were not statistically significant. On the other hand, only 45 per cent of young African respondents reported that they were either 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with their lives at present. Overall differences were significant at the 5 per cent level and seem to be driven by the differences between white and African respondents. Given the past stark racial differences in socio-economic status and relative privilege of members of the white race group, the finding that they are generally more satisfied with their lives at present is unlikely to be all that surprising, as it may reflect underlying differences in the distribution of wealth and income in the country.

TABLE 5.4 *Life satisfaction and expectations, by race, 2005 (percentage)*

	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Satisfied with life as a whole.*	45	48	59	74	48
Past five years: Life improved for the majority of people in South Africa.**	66	35	21	35	61
Past five years: Life improved for people like you.**	48	31	33	26	45
Next five years: Things will improve for most people in South Africa.**	79	49	34	30	73
Next five years: Things will improve for people like you.**	72	49	50	38	68

Notes: * Significant at 5 per cent level.

** Significant at 1 per cent level.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Looking at the previous five years, African respondents were more likely to feel that life had improved over the past five years, for them as well as for others. Although African respondents were more likely to feel that things had improved, their responses reveal the greatest differences between assessments of improvement for people like them and for the majority of South Africans. This suggests that young Africans may feel that their position has not improved relative to the position of other groups. This was true of all groups except Indian respondents, whose assessment of the improvement for their group was greater than their assessment of the improvement for other groups. White youth were also more likely to believe that things had got worse for them and for the majority of South Africans (42 per cent and 34 per cent respectively – not shown) during this period.

Results suggest that African youth are generally more upbeat about the future than their white, Indian and coloured counterparts. The overwhelming majority of African respondents are optimistic about the future, theirs as well as that of all South Africans in general. This holds in spite of experiencing low levels of life satisfaction at present. In contrast, youth of other race groups are less likely to believe that life is going to improve over the next five years. By and large, expectations for people like them and for the majority of South Africans do not appear to vary too much. Once more, Indian youth show the greatest difference between expectations for people like them and those for the majority of South Africans. This suggests that they are most likely to believe that their group's position relative to others is going to improve.

To summarise, it appears as if fears of widespread cynicism among the youth are unfounded. Overall, youth are optimistic about the future, with pockets of youth expressing the belief that things are not likely to improve for people like them or for the country as a whole.

The most interesting aspect of the analysis is the apparent negative relationship between assessments of life satisfaction at present and expectations for the future. African respondents, who typically report low life satisfaction at present, express the greatest expectation for the future. This situation is reversed for white and, to a lesser extent, Indian respondents.

Admittedly, the conclusions which may be drawn from these results are limited. Most importantly, this analysis does not offer explanations for why youth feel the way they do. Even when assessments of life satisfaction and expectations are the same, different underlying reasons may be responsible for responses in youth, as compared to responses in others. In this case, even though the general

mood may be shared by all citizens, different policies may be required for youth. For example, even though youth, along with the majority of South Africans, identified unemployment and HIV/AIDS as the greatest challenges facing South Africa, results do not indicate how these factors affect the youth. By not elaborating on these reasons and the pathways through which they affect the youth, results do not offer guidance to policy-makers about the issues that youth policy needs to address.

Notwithstanding these data constraints, certain interesting questions arise. For instance, do fears of loss of relative position drive white responses? Alternatively, do hopes for changes in their present low socio-economic position drive the expectations of African youth? Based on current patterns of life satisfaction and expectations, will assessments of life satisfaction between groups necessarily converge, all else being equal?

Youth unemployment, education and the digital divide

While it is important to assess youth's optimism for the future, it does not provide an indication of what tools they have available to shape the future to their own desires. In order to supplement their attitudes, one needs to obtain a measure of what skills they will bring to bear in the nationally proclaimed Age of Hope.

This section assesses the capacity of the youth – in particular, it concentrates on educational capacity, employment status and the digital divide. The objective of this analysis is to assess how well placed the youth are to take advantage of the opportunities that are afforded in an increasingly interconnected world.

Employment status

Arguably, no discussion on the youth could be considered complete if youth unemployment were not covered. Unemployment is frequently cited as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, threats facing youth today (Morrow et al. 2005). Further, given the perception that unemployed youth have a greater propensity to engage in delinquent or deviant behaviour (UN 2005a), and the implications that this holds for governance and social stability, the investigation of unemployment among the youth takes on added importance. As South Africa is still characterised by apartheid-era structural inequality, youth unemployment is investigated along racial lines. Results are illustrated in Table 5.5.

TABLE 5.5 Youth employment, by race, 2005 (percentage)

Employment status	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Unemployed*	54 (13)	43 (15)	30 (12)	18 (25)	50 (13)
Housewife	1	3	12	4	2
Student/learner	18	14	11	39	19
Self-employed	3	5	8	13	4
Employed part time	12	5	6	7	11
Employed full time	12	30	33	19	14

Note: * Figures are based on the broad definition of unemployment and exclude those respondents who described themselves as pensioners or temporarily disabled or sick. Figures bracketed beneath the unemployment figures represent the percentage of those described as unemployed who indicated that they were not seeking work, that is, unemployed respondents who reported being discouraged from seeking work.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Overall, exactly half of youth respondents describe themselves as being unemployed. There are vast differences in the incidence of unemployment between races, with unemployment especially prevalent among African and, to a lesser extent, coloured respondents. When broken down by whether or not respondents were looking for work, racial differences appear to be insignificant, suggesting that the proportion of unemployed who are discouraged from seeking work is consistent across racial groups.

For youth as a whole, the second largest group into which they classified themselves was that of students or learners. Among whites, most respondents described themselves as students or learners. In fact, among the 16–24-year age group, the overwhelming majority of white respondents (59 per cent) described themselves as such (results not shown). Similarly, it is noteworthy that employment status reveals an element of gender as well as location effects, with unemployment marginally higher in rural areas than in urban areas (57 per cent versus 47 per cent) and considerably higher among females than among males (62 per cent versus 40 per cent). These results are not presented, as sample size considerations prevent further analysis along these lines.

Educational qualifications

Due to small sample sizes, differences in educational attainment will not be investigated along race lines. Instead, the analysis is largely descriptive and serves to highlight differences within the youth group. The education levels of those youth who identified themselves as students will not be taken into account, that is, results apply only to those youth respondents who do not consider themselves to be students. This represents 81 per cent of youth overall, 65 per cent of 16 to 24 year olds and 98 per cent of 25 to 35 year olds (see Table 5.6).

Approximately 50 per cent of youth who were not classified as learners held at least a matriculation certificate or higher. While the overall proportion of those holding some qualification is generally low, a significant percentage (35 per cent) of youth between 16 and 24 years are pursuing some form of tertiary or post-school qualification. Given this percentage, it can be confidently presumed that, in future, the proportion of 25 to 35 year olds with some form of tertiary education is likely to be much higher than at present. This is likely to hold even after taking attrition to the student population into account and assuming that those youth in the matric or equivalent category do not add to their stock of education. While this analysis does not account for quality of education received, it does suggest that the skills base of the youth is changing and that they are likely to possess greater levels of human capital in future.

Certain threats facing the youth, however, may militate against South Africa realising the full potential of youths' human resource endowments. The greatest of these threats is undoubtedly HIV/AIDS, which continues to exact a devastating toll on the youth, whom it affects disproportionately (UNAIDS 2004). Until this threat is neutralised or at least controlled, the country will continue to reap only a fraction of the benefits of the youths' educational resource endowments.

TABLE 5.6 Youth education levels, by age, 2005

Educational level	16–24 (65%)	25–35 (98%)	Total
No schooling	1	4	2
Some primary school	11	9	10
Some high school	42	36	39
Matric or equivalent	44	43	43
Tertiary education	2	8	6

Source: SASAS (2005)

The digital divide

The previous sets of analyses dealt with the circumstances and the attitudes of the youth at national level. The analysis in this section investigates how they relate internationally, to the global economy.

There are a number of reasons to investigate information and communication technology (ICT) usage among the youth. Arguably, the more connected the youth are, the more able they are to take advantage of the opportunities that arise from globalisation. In recognition of the importance of global interconnectedness, increasing ICT usage among youth in developing countries in particular was adopted as an additional issue on the World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond (UN 2005b). Moreover, according to Youniss et al. (2002), young people's notions of citizenship and participation may be changing in response to technological advances in ICT. Given this trend, investigating ICT usage may offer insights into possible future societal trends and their sources.

Furthermore, Dolby (1999) finds that youth use aspects of global culture to create and reinforce local group identities. Speculatively, to the extent that differential access to information technologies is able to influence cross-cultural identity formation, it may lead to separate identities, or notions of identity, being formed among groups that enjoy varying levels of access. Depending on the gulfs in levels of access between groups, this may impede or assist in the creation of a South African youth identity.

Interconnectedness was measured by ownership of, or ready access to, a range of ICTs such as cellular phones, computers, etc. These results are presented in Table 5.7, which shows the percentage of respondents reporting ownership of, or access to, each of the items listed in the left-hand column.

Broadly, South African youth report low rates of access to ICT. Among some groups, however, rates of connectivity are quite high. Results seem to confirm pre-existing disparities in socio-economic status between different race groups, with white respondents, and to a lesser extent Indians, enjoying much higher rates of connectivity than their coloured and African counterparts. Plausibly, this may result in a number of societal consequences. Firstly, as white respondents may be better placed to take advantage of the economic opportunities brought by globalisation, existing socio-economic disparities between white youth and those of other race groups may expand. Secondly, if youth use elements of international culture to create identities, as Dolby (1999) argues, differential access to global culture may preclude the creation of a South African youth culture. Should this assumption hold, it then becomes critical to examine more closely the role that ICT plays in identity formation among the youth in contemporary South Africa.

TABLE 5.7 *Connectivity among the youth, by race, 2005 (percentage)*

Item	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Access to a landline telephone	9	41	84	74	19
Access to a computer	13	22	28	85	21
Access to the internet	9	14	20	52	14
Own a cell phone	55	35	82	96	58

Note: All results are significant at the 1 per cent level.

Source: SASAS (2005)

In addition, there appear to be marked differences between youth in urban and rural areas. These differences tend to be in favour of urban areas. At the most basic level of connectivity, for example, 66 per cent of rural respondents reported having access to mains electricity, compared to 93 per cent of urban respondents. This difference was significant at the 1 per cent level. These differences serve to highlight the vast infrastructural and economic divisions between the urban and rural areas of South Africa. They also serve to highlight the role that disparities among the youth may play in shaping policies that focus on rural development.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate youth attitudes to the 'new' South Africa, explore their assessments of their position and optimism in it, and identify the resources which they possess to shape their future. In terms of attitudes, the analysis clearly reveals that there are no distinct differences emerging between youth and older respondents. It is also clear that the youth are not homogeneous. Where differences emerge among the youth, race still appears to be the dominant factor, especially when it comes to assessments of attitudes and questions of identity. This, it is argued, reflects the racially divided history of South Africa. These racial differences seem to fly in the face of contemporary findings – see, for example, Macdonald (2005) – that support the notion that the youth are forging a new distinct identity for themselves.

This is not to suggest that age effects are not important. For example, as this study focused mainly on differences between contemporary youth and older South Africans, it may have ignored any differences that are emerging between contemporary youth and the current generation of 'born frees', those children born into the 'new' South Africa. According to a report in the *Mail & Guardian*,⁴ this generation appears to be forging a new national identity that is independent of race. These findings suggest that the youth of the future may well be different, in terms of national consciousness and identity, to today's youth. Concentrating on the 16–35-year age band, as in this chapter, may well have overlooked this emerging dynamic.

In terms of attitudes, the general perception of disinterested and disillusioned youth seems to be incorrect and unfair in many instances. Results illustrate that it is often older respondents who are more pessimistic. Further, where youth are dissatisfied, their dissatisfaction appears to reflect wider national sentiment.

Youth optimism is reflected in their positive expectations about the future and their belief that things will improve. This seems to be broadly in line with earlier research.⁵ Their optimism exists in the face of immense socio-economic hardship, reflected for one in the high unemployment rate among youth and the difficulties that this brings. This spirit of hope, of courage in the face of immense obstacles, is the surest sign that they are worthy successors to the Young Lions of the Class of 1976.

4 K Sosibo, M Dibetle & N Tolsi, 'Tomorrow people eye SA', 28 April to 4 May 2006.

5 SA youth 'better off than parents'. Available at http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/demographics/youth-130606.htm. Accessed on 31 January 2007.

Appendix

The following tables present the original questions, and the format in which they appeared in the 2005 SASAS survey, upon which the indexes of trust in societal institutions, satisfaction with government services and national pride were drawn up.

As discussed in the text, responses were dichotomised and summed in order to create the indexes shown. By way of example, in the case of the index of satisfaction with government services, answers to each question posed in the left-hand column of Table 5A.2 were coded one (1) if respondents answered 'strongly agree' or 'agree' and zero (0) otherwise. Thereafter, answers were summed with an equal weighting of one attached to each response. As this was based on 10 underlying questions, this resulted in an index of between zero (0) and 10 for each respondent.

TABLE 5A.1 *Index of trust in societal institutions*

Indicate the extent to which you trust or distrust the following institutions in South Africa at present.

Institutions	Strongly trust	Trust	Neither trust nor distrust	Distrust	Strongly distrust	(Do not know)
National government						
Courts						
The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)						
Provincial government						
The SABC						
Parliament						
The police						
Defence force						
Big business						
Local government						
Churches						
Traditional authorities/ leaders						
Political parties						

Note: See Figure 5.1 in the text.

TABLE 5A.2 *Index of satisfaction with government services*

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood?

	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Strongly dissatisfied	(Do not know)
Supply of water and sanitation						
Providing electricity						
Removal of refuse						
Affordable housing						
Access to healthcare						
Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS						
Cutting crime						
Creating jobs						
Land reform						
Providing social grants (e.g. child support grant, old age pension, etc.)						

Note: See Figure 5.2 in the text.

TABLE 5A.3 *Index of national pride*

To what extent are the following statements true for you?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
It makes me proud to be called a South African.						
Being a South African is an important part of how I see myself.						

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world.						
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the South Africans.						
Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries.						

Note: See Figure 5.3 in the text.

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2

POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Winters of discontent? Attitudes towards service delivery

David Hemson

Introduction

In South Africa there is a growing debate about citizens' attitudes towards government, regulation of services and a renewal of political direction. In particular, the issue of access to basic services and the quality of these services has a high profile, as communities contest the level of services they currently receive. Recently, service delivery has been foregrounded by former President Mbeki's call to meet the challenge of poverty, as well as his questioning of the quality of political leadership's commitment to the priorities of the poor (Mbeki 2006a, 2006b).

The *izimbizo*¹ and other forms of intervention that have been introduced provide some voice to the poor and usually end with a refocus on the urgency of meeting their needs. At these public meetings participants often express sharp discontent, which is supported by the former president's stress that people should enjoy the rights to which they are entitled and that more decisive action is needed by local and provincial authorities. The ventilation of discontent does not, however, necessarily lead to the desired change.

The increasing levels of public discussion have followed one of the most significant developments in post-apartheid society: the rise of social movements and protest actions. The minister for safety and security has estimated that in the 2004/05 financial year there were 5 085 legal and 881 illegal protests (SAIRR 2006: 551). These were almost exclusively about a lack of service delivery or fears that changed boundaries would lead to transfer to a province with a poor record of service delivery.

These social movements have brought an increased awareness that all is not well with municipal government and service provision. Civil society organisations have provided support and endorsement to these movements, while the political establishment has questioned their social base and leadership. From a critical perspective, these movements are a confirmation of the lack of delivery brought about by government's commitment to neo-liberal policies, particularly in state finances, and of the growing gap between the technocratic and enriched elite and the mass of poor people (Ballard et al. 2006; Bond 2006). Key government personnel have made statements questioning the source of this discontent, asking whether it has arisen as an expression of rage from those who have nothing, or if it comes from those who have services but are discontent for other reasons. The minister of housing, for example, stated that the protests over housing were 'out of sync' with what was being achieved and were being caused by 'political opportunists' (*The Star* 1 June 2005²). What are the attitudes among the poor and

1 The *izimbizo* are large public meetings convened by high-level politicians, often with local politicians and officials present.

2 M Monare, 'Five years on, the people speak their minds'.

dispossessed towards housing and basic services? Are the issues raised by social movements in sync or not with the social attitudes of the poor?

There is currently an increasing movement towards replacing line departments generally and putting local government in the front line of delivery. It is hoped that this will ensure democracy at the local level as well as a system of government which is responsive to the needs of the people and which the people see as 'the deliverer' of their aspirations for a better life. This idea is captured in the notion of 'developmental local government' (DBSA 2000), which casts municipalities in the role of leading the implementation of a wide range of services.

Increasing debate about the strategy of municipalising services, the effectiveness of local government, and public participation in decision-making to improve basic services is taking place. In South Africa's current political discourse, service delivery is often referred to as the central task of government but one from which it could be distracted by leadership controversies (Mbeki 2006b). This is a view that is widely supported by various commentators (*Business Day* 6 February 2008³; *Mail & Guardian* 4 August 2006⁴).

Has national government succeeded in displacing responsibility for delivery from line departments to local municipal governments? The process of devolution and decentralisation is not only a legal and constitutional one, but also one with a socio-psychological dimension: people expect local representatives to take prime responsibility for delivery.

The sharp rise in expressed social discontent before the 2006 local government elections raises broader questions about the political effect of opposition from below. Election results indicated an increase in support for the ANC, even in those areas where there had been substantial mobilisation around the crises in service delivery in ANC-controlled municipalities. There was the pronounced anomaly that discontent among supporters of the ANC was often associated with increased majorities. The widespread discontent was not expressed to any significant degree through stay-away votes, and it appears that protests had the surprising consequence of tending to increase electoral support for the ANC. The Free State is a case in point – the overall poll was approximately 49 per cent, about the same as the 48 per cent registered five years earlier in the 2000 local government elections (Landman 2006). In this province, which experienced high levels of protest, more people were registered than previously and more of these voted for the ANC. At the same time, the ANC increased its share of the votes from 59 per cent in the 2000 local government elections to 64 per cent in the 2006 elections.

The ANC acknowledged that there were internal political divisions and branches with poor community roots and a lack of skills and managerial capacity. There was a higher level of voter registration and an expectation that dissatisfaction would be shown electorally (*Sunday Tribune* 26 February 2006⁵). Independent candidates, however, did not fare well. In the Free State there were a record 45 independent candidates, the most in the history of local government elections. Despite this, the ANC took 24 of the 25 municipalities in the Free State and gained more than 80 per cent of the votes in eight districts. Of the independents, who generally stood on the basis of improving service delivery and being closer to the people, only one gained a seat from 0.4 per cent of the vote (IEC 2006).

Since the elections were preceded by widespread discontent, these are unexpected results. How are social attitudes linked to political attitudes and electoral results? The increased ANC majority appeared to indicate that this discontent would not take a directly political form, but would rather remain

3 K Brown, 'Go-it-alone Mbeki disregards reality of change'.

4 F Haffajee, 'From Maggie to Marx'.

5 C Terreblanche et al., 'Free State's independent free-for-all'.

submerged in social resistance. The link between social attitudes and political outcomes is therefore not necessarily direct.⁶ In a review of the social movements arising from contested delivery, Atkinson (2006) concludes that the overwhelming majorities won by councillors in areas where there had been vigorous opposition demonstrates a dislocation between politics and service delivery. Elections, she concludes, do not function as 'quality control mechanisms' on service provision to the poor. This implies either a radical disjuncture between social attitudes and political loyalties, or a lack of political alternatives, or a more complex relationship between social and political attitudes.

The lack of relationship between expressed discontent and electoral choice may indicate either a lag in electoral choices behind changes in social attitudes and actions, or a more complex situation, due to the lack of concrete alternatives for poor people in what has been described as the continuing race dominance of politics.

This chapter uses the 2004 and 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data to draw out and compare social and political attitudes since 2004. In particular, the chapter examines citizens' attitudes to the provision of water and sanitation, housing and electricity, as well as to the political institutions which are responsible for these services.

Methodological approach to the chapter

The general method adopted in this chapter is to locate social attitudes within the context of household and service conditions, in order to understand the social bases that give rise to these attitudes. The chapter starts with a general review of the national mood against the backdrop of expectations of transformation in terms of established democratic government and achieved delivery to the poor. The standing of national, provincial and local governments is then measured over time from 2004 to 2005. What changes have been evident between different categories of respondents (particularly between those expressing satisfaction and those expressing dissatisfaction) over time? The chapter then moves on to a particular consideration of attitudes to local government. These attitudes are compared to discontent with services over time, as identified from the 2004 and 2005 SASAS surveys which provide the basis for the comparison.

The chapter focuses on dissatisfaction and satisfaction with the services provided by local government. Dissatisfaction, in this context, involves a combination of actual conditions (such as in level of service) and of ideas, feelings and knowledge of the social, political and local government environments. The salient features of discontent have been identified elsewhere (Hemson 2006) in the issues of, for example, disconnections, cost recovery and the implementation of free basic water (FBW).

The selection of one attitude rather than another (for example, dissatisfaction rather than satisfaction) has significance when it comes to reading the data. In assessing any attitude there are three sides which need to be taken into account: levels of dissatisfaction, levels of satisfaction, and those who place themselves in the category 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' – each has its own significance.⁷ Unfortunately, the representation of the data becomes too complex and weighty if all levels of the responses are examined in each question, and so simplifications have to be made.

6 For example, the majority view in favour of the reinstatement of the death penalty in South Africa has not led to political change in this regard.

7 A high level of 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' can, for instance, indicate uncertainty about the issue and a reluctance to arrive at a conclusion, which has its own social significance.

Dissatisfaction has been used as a guide to analyse what is and isn't working, and provides the data which can assist in answering various hypotheses about local government, social attitudes and social movements. Compound indications of dissatisfaction were created from which to examine citizens' views and their propensity for social action, such as support for mass action and engagement in political discussion. At the same time, however, it is also important to analyse the basis of satisfaction, in particular, whether there is a polarisation between a satisfied non-participatory group (the 'silent majority') and a more articulate and oppositional group (often identified as supporters of or participants in social movements).

The various interpretations of the rise in local government protests are subjected to examination within a broad framework of analysis. In the interpretation of data on social attitudes and political action, the chapter investigates the following: whether there is a high level of dissatisfaction among those with higher or lower levels of service; levels of distrust; frequency of political discussion; and notions of relative and 'absolute' deprivation.

One of the tasks of analysis is to examine the relative autonomy of politics from service delivery. To what extent are those who are dissatisfied distrustful and alienated from political representation and from the various institutions which provide for social engagement with local government? The 2005 SASAS questionnaire provides a wide selection of questions and includes sensitive probing of public participation in local government generally and in the Integrated Development Plan specifically, the latter being the foundation document for local government delivery.

The national mood

Government officials regularly explain that the national task is to unite the country, rebuild the economy, end racism and reduce poverty. For instance, the Western Cape government advocates the Western Cape as 'the home for all'. At the centre of this programme for transformation is an end to deprivation and exclusion from the life-sustaining services to which access is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Is there confidence among the majority that the task is being achieved?

The data are examined for indications of a national sense of confidence and optimism that progress is being made. In assessing the general mood, two indicators were adopted, one relating to whether life is improving and the other to whether democracy is working.

There is a considerable range of opinion about whether life has improved over the past five years, as indicated in Table 6.1. A majority (44 per cent) feel that it stayed the same and 39 per cent feel that it improved. A high proportion (57 per cent) feel that the next five years will be better, and those who feel it will stay the same declined to 23 per cent. The change is explained largely by the decrease in the proportion of respondents who feel that their lives will remain the same; there is considerable hope among this group (measured by a decline in 'life will stay the same' from 44 to 23 per cent). There is, however, not a uniform view among those who feel their lives have worsened that this will improve.

A similar view is expressed in relation to democracy. As Table 6.2 shows, 52 per cent declare themselves satisfied, while a considerable proportion (30 per cent) express greater or lesser dissatisfaction with the working of the democratic system; another 18 per cent are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied or do not know. It is important to note that this chapter builds on Chapters 1 and 4 with regards to views about democracy, local government and the ward committees.

TABLE 6.1 *Changes in life expectations, 2005 (percentage)*

	Over the last five years	In the next five years
Improved/improve	39	57
Stayed/stay the same	44	23
Got/will get worse	17	14
Don't know	0.3	5
Total	100	100

Note: Due to rounding of percentages, the totals may not add up to 100 in some tables in this chapter.
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.2 *Attitudes to democracy in South Africa, 2005*

	Frequency	%
Very satisfied	3 459 624	11
Satisfied	12 628 792	41
Neither/nor	4 920 292	16
Dissatisfied	6 373 181	21
Very dissatisfied	2 664 410	9
Don't know	622 446	2
Total	30 668 745	100

Source: SASAS (2005)

The data indicate a majority who are satisfied with the democratic system and (implicitly) with the form of governance which has grown as part of this system, but at the same time, there is also a fairly high degree of dissatisfaction or unease with the present system.

Further analysis of those who are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working indicates that the highest proportion of dissatisfied are those who could be identified as previously advantaged. While Africans have the highest level of satisfaction with democracy, the largest numbers of dissatisfied are also in this group.

The general satisfaction with the way democracy is working is possibly reflected by the relatively high levels of trust in the dominant institutions of traditional and civil society, big business and government. Table 6.3 presents the levels of trust in these institutions and provides indications of what could be interpreted as a fairly conservative view of South African society, with the highest levels of trust in the church and lower levels in big business. The lowest level of trust is in big political parties, which should be a vital link between representation and improved delivery.

If democracy is felt to be working, in what way is this reflected in attitudes towards delivery? In Table 6.4, various government services are presented against the attitude of satisfaction as an indicator reflecting the public mood. A review of responses to government's handling of different social services shows very evident differences of opinion. These range from broad endorsement shown by large majorities among the satisfied (such as in the case of electricity and social grants) to widespread disapproval where there are small minorities among the satisfied (particularly noticeable in relation to jobs, but also to housing and crime).

TABLE 6.3 *Trust in South African institutions, 2005 (percentage)*

Institution	Trust
Church	79
Big business	53
Traditional leaders	49
Police	43
Big political parties	42

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.4 *Satisfaction with social services, 2005 (percentage)*

Social service	Very satisfied or satisfied
Electricity	67
Social grants	66
Water and sanitation	56
Refuse	51
Healthcare	48
Sexually transmitted infections	39
Land reform	28
Housing	27
Crime	23
Jobs	8

Source: SASAS (2005)

Importantly, even among those services receiving broad approval there are often sharp contestations, as in the case of water and sanitation. While there is a high level of perceived satisfaction generally, there have also been bitter contests between local municipal governments and the poorest communities. Just how the fierce disputes between poor communities and municipalities are reflected in attitudes is taken up below and in the conclusion.

Does local government belong to us?

The decentralisation of public services has become a pronounced trend in public administration in the recent period. The strategy of decentralising service provision to local government has been presented as the way in which democracy will be realised, as municipalities will become directly accountable to their constituents. This strategy demands an active role from municipalities – as represented in the term ‘developmental local government’ – one in which the deprivations of apartheid will be overcome and democracy put into the hands of the people. This strategy also has profound implications for cost recovery at the local level, as treasuries increasingly place responsibility for funding on to these local authorities.

Although well established in policy, local governments are still in the process of taking over responsibility for providing well-functioning basic services. Metropolitan municipalities were largely responsible for these services in the past, but in the rural areas local governments are still being constituted. Although

the outline of intergovernmental relations has been set, working relations between local government, the line departments, provinces and national government are still being debated and the entire framework of government re-examined (*Sunday Times* 27 August 2006⁸).

The fault lines of local government are evident in the form of allegedly unqualified and incompetent municipal officials being paid excessive salaries (even above those of national officials) and, in rural municipalities and small towns, a pronounced failure to deliver. Despite this, all municipalities are being required to take over increasing responsibility for basic services.

To what extent has there been acceptance of the transition of authority from national to local government? There is increasing evidence of the perception that there is a distinction to be made between local and national politics. One of the concerns of government – as is also evident in other countries, particularly those taking a ‘third way’ in relation to public policy (see Harrison 2006) – is to place local government into a local political frame of reference; to be seen to be close to the people and the primary institution responsible for delivery. In the past, municipalities were seen as creatures of the apartheid state and as servicing only the white and the rich, and ignoring the vast majority of deprived and impoverished.

In Table 6.5, attitudes to national and local government are compared to provide some measure of the acceptance of the ‘new’ sphere of local government.

Although national government has the trust of 65 per cent of respondents (taking together ‘strongly trust’ and ‘trust’), in the case of local government, this falls to 48 per cent. There is, in addition, a higher level of distrust in local (34 per cent), as compared to national (24 per cent) government, as well as larger numbers occupying the middle ground. It is evident that national government is having difficulty in passing over responsibility to municipal governments, not so much in the mechanisms of government and financing (important as these are) but in the people expressing confidence and trust in this sphere of government.

For a number of reasons local government has been seen to be lagging behind the visible transformation of the national state, which has a high-profile leadership with international standing and respect. Over the past period, through an often painful amalgamation of bureaucracies, reconfiguration of borders and ascription of responsibilities, a municipal sphere of government emerged which is now formally committed to meeting the needs of the majority. As mentioned earlier though, the recent history of

TABLE 6.5 *Attitudes to national and local government, 2005 (percentage)*

	National government	Local government
Strongly trust	23	14
Trust	42	34
Neither/nor	10	15
Distrust	18	23
Strongly distrust	6	11
Don't know	1	3
Total	100	100

Source: SASAS (2005)

8 X Xundu, ‘Provincial system under the microscope’.

municipal government in the democratic order is also replete with accusations of excessive salaries for municipal managers, corruption in the award of tenders and political impasse.

To what extent have the dramatic changes in local government, needed to make it both more representative and capable of providing basic services to the poor, been accepted? The question on attitudes to local government reveals sizeable trust in local government among the African majority and coloured respondents, with declining levels of trust among other race groups.

Table 6.6 shows that the level of trust among African respondents is 58 per cent, declining to 32 per cent among white respondents. In contrast, the level of distrust rises from 27 per cent among African respondents to 44 per cent among white respondents.

As Table 6.7 suggests, it appears that trust in local government is highest among those in the more remote areas and lowest in those areas where local government has been most firmly established. In line with the higher levels of trust in local government among those in rural areas, analysis by level of income appears to work on a similar basis. The data on income and attitude towards local government are presented in Table 6.8. It appears that those in a more comfortable middle-class position express the greatest distrust of local government. However, although a minority among the poor and the destitute, there are also large numbers of people in the lower-income groups who distrust local government.

Those expressing the strongest trust in local government are in the lower-income groups, while distrust increases with income and is markedly higher in the income category of R7 501 and above (39 per cent). In this highest-income group, distrust and trust in local government are almost evenly divided, while in the lowest-income groups, roughly twice as many express trust, as compared to distrust.

TABLE 6.6 *Perceptions of local government, by race, 2005 (percentage)*

	Trust	Neutral	Distrust
African	58	14	27
Coloured	53	23	24
Indian	36	20	44
White	32	24	44

Note: Table ranked by 'trust'.
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.7 *Perceptions of local government, by geotype, 2005 (percentage)*

	Trust	Neutral	Distrust
Rural formal	62	18	20
Rural informal	61	13	26
Urban informal	52	17	31
Urban formal	50	18	32

Notes: Table ranked by 'trust'.
'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.8 *Perceptions of local government, by income, 2004 (percentage)*

	Trust	Neutral	Distrust
No income	57	15	28
R1–R500	60	12	28
R501–R2 000	58	15	28
R2 001–R7 500	49	23	28
R7 501+	39	22	39

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.9 *Distrust of local government, by province, 2004/05 (percentage)*

Province	2004	2005
GT	32	42
LP	15	41
NW	31	38
WC	28	37
KZN	40	37
MP	30	37
NC	26	36
FS	36	31
EC	16	19

Note: See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.
Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

TABLE 6.10 *Distrust of local government, by race, 2004/05 (percentage)*

	2004	2005
African	27	34
Coloured	24	32
Indian	44	43
White	44	45

Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

In Table 6.9, distrust of local government is presented across the provinces between 2004 and 2005. There have been important changes in attitude – in every province except for KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State there has been an increase in distrust. In Gauteng, for instance, there has been an increase in distrust from 32 per cent to 42 per cent and in Limpopo province an even more dramatic increase.

Where is the social base for this increased distrust? The data in Table 6.10 suggest that there has been a hardening of attitude towards local government in recent years. The level of distrust in local government increased from 27 per cent to 34 per cent among Africans and from 24 per cent to 32 per cent among coloureds, while it remained more or less the same among whites and Indians.

The majority expressing trust in local government across all settlements, and generally among the African and the poor, indicates that this sphere of government has become accepted. To what extent is this trust reflected in satisfaction with services and an actual or anticipated improvement in life?

Between community and municipality: the ward committees

In a maturing local government there should be forms of public participation which serve as means of communication between councillors and constituents. In policy and statute the ward committees are intended as the prime means of encouraging citizens into such public participation. Whether ward committees are functioning is a matter for debate. At *izimbizos* there are frequent allegations that they are inoperative or paralysed by local contestations, or that they are simply an extension of the friendship network of ward councillors.

The data provide a fascinating review of public participation, which is surprisingly strong where the need is greatest among the vulnerable in urban informal settlements and rural areas. Despite the often negative assessment of ward committees encountered in public discourse, public forums and personal conversations, the survey shows a surprising range of contact with these committees, particularly among poor people in less accessible settlements.

The survey question 'Do you have a ward committee in your neighbourhood?' has a voluntary element, that is, a respondent is likely to know something of ward committees where there is personal or local community involvement. The data are not of an absolute measurement but of some level of social knowledge and experience. So, although not comprehensive, the data are adequate enough to delineate the geographic spread of ward committees.

As Table 6.11 indicates, less than half of the respondents (43 per cent) are aware of a ward committee in their area, 23 per cent are unaware and the remainder (34 per cent) don't know. Those who don't know can be evenly divided between those who in fact do have a ward committee in their area (although it may not be well known) and those who do not have such a committee.

In Tables 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14, knowledge of ward committees is presented by province, by geotype and by income. The data indicate that respondents in many of the rural provinces have a high level of knowledge of ward committees (for example, more than 60 per cent of respondents in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo report knowledge), while some of the more urban provinces report less knowledge (for example, less than 40 per cent of respondents in Gauteng and the Western Cape report such knowledge).

TABLE 6.11 Knowledge of ward committee, 2005

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total
Frequency	13 108 409	6 974 074	10 474 172	30 556 655
%	43	23	34	100

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.12 *Knowledge of ward committees, by province, 2004 (percentage)*

Province	Yes
EC	66
LP	63
FS	54
KZN	42
NW	41
MP	37
GT	36
NC	34
WC	19

Notes: Ranked by knowledge of ward committees.

See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.

Figures are of proportion of respondents in each row reporting knowledge of ward committees and do not add up to 100 per cent.

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.13 *Knowledge of ward committees, by geotype, 2004 (percentage)*

Geotype	Yes
Urban informal	61
Rural informal	59
Hostels	57
Urban formal	35
Smallholdings	22
Farms	10

Note: Figures are of proportion of respondents in each row reporting knowledge of ward committees and do not add up to 100 per cent.

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.14 *Knowledge of ward committees, by income, 2004 (percentage)*

Income category	Yes
No income	51
R1–R500	47
R501–R2 000	43
R2 001–R7 500	35
R7 501+	32
Don't know/refused to answer	29

Note: Figures are of proportion of respondents in each row reporting knowledge of ward committees and do not add up to 100 per cent.

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.15 *Trust in local government and knowledge of ward committees, 2004/05 (percentage)*

	2004	2005
Trust	61	50
Neutral	13	12
Distrust	26	40
Total	100	100

Notes: Data selected for those responding 'yes' to knowledge of ward committees.
Sources: SASAS (2004, 2005)

Somewhat surprisingly, respondents in the urban and rural informal settlements indicate greater knowledge of ward committees than those in better-off settlements. Respondents in the urban informal areas report the highest level of knowledge (61 per cent), while those on farms have the lowest (10 per cent).

Similarly, those among the poorest of the poor who state they have no income have greater knowledge of ward committees (at 51 per cent) than the highest level of income (32 per cent).

Although it might appear logical that knowledge of ward committees increases trust in local government, this is not the case. The data in Table 6.15 show a sharp decline in trust in local government where there *is* a ward committee. Where ward committees are known, trust in local government declined from 61 per cent to 50 per cent in the period 2004/05, while distrust increased from 26 per cent to 40 per cent. Where there are no ward committees known to respondents (in data not presented here), there was only a small decline in trust from 37 per cent to 36 per cent. This appears to point to the fact that the ward committee system is not strengthening confidence in local government.

Attitudes and social action: Winters of discontent?

Delivery of services can happen at a multiplicity of levels, for example, the highest level of service in water would be a direct connection to the home, while the lowest would be access to a public tap. Access to services is related to the level of income of the household. An analysis of attitude and level of service shows that respondents tend to relate to local government largely in relation to their class position: poorer respondents have greater trust and richer respondents have less trust. In relation to attitudes to services, however, the position appears to be reversed.

As shown in Table 6.16, the highest levels of dissatisfaction in relation to water, electricity, housing and jobs are among the lower-income groups. Dissatisfaction decreases with each progression upwards through the income categories. Among those with no income, for instance, 45 per cent express levels of dissatisfaction with government management of water and sanitation, while among those respondents in households with R7 501 and more, only 5 per cent express dissatisfaction.

It is possible that the poorest have the highest level of affinity with the political parties administering local government and express low levels of distrust of the institution even though they express strong levels of dissatisfaction with services, which are mostly provided by local government. The richest, however, appear disengaged from and somewhat distrustful of local government, but have a very low level of dissatisfaction with municipal services. This is illustrated in Table 6.17, which shows interruptions in water supply. Those who report 'few' or 'high' levels of interruption are among the lower-income groups, while those reporting 'no' or 'few' interruptions are in the highest income bracket.

TABLE 6.16 *Dissatisfaction with local services, by monthly household income, 2005 (percentage)*

Monthly household income	Water/sanitation	Electricity	Housing	Jobs
No income	45	45	57	86
R1–R500	42	40	57	87
R501–R2 000	39	38	52	81
R2 001–R7 500	19	19	36	71
R7 501+	5	5	24	76

Note: Figures are of the proportion of respondents in each row reporting dissatisfaction with services and do not add up to 100 per cent.

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.17 *Water interruption and income, 2004 (percentage)*

	No interruption	Few interruptions	High interruption
No income	47	36	17
R1–R500	45	39	16
R501–R2 000	56	32	12
R2 001–R7 500	67	29	5
R7 501+	79	20	1

Source: SASAS (2004)

As Table 6.17 shows, the prospect of a relatively trouble-free service rises with income. For example, those with no interruption in their service rise from 47 per cent among those with no income to 79 per cent among those with a monthly income greater than R7 500. Those with high levels of interruption decline from 17 per cent among those with no income to 1 per cent among those with a monthly income greater than R7 500. All in all, it can be concluded that the rich have better access to services and can command private resources (such as telephone, fax or email) to resolve issues, while the lower-income groups have a lower level of service and have to seek political solutions to their everyday problems.

If those with higher levels of income have a better service, are those with a higher level of service more content and trusting in local government? One line of argument mentioned in the introduction to this chapter is that it is those who have access to higher levels of service who express discontent for political reasons.

As Table 6.18 suggests, it appears that trust does not result from higher levels of service. The highest levels of trust in local government are expressed by those with the lowest levels of service. Those living with the bucket system have the highest level of trust (67 per cent), followed by those with yard connections (63 per cent), no sanitation (63 per cent) and improved latrines (62 per cent). Significantly, those with the lowest levels of trust (with a substantial drop) are those with the highest level of service – flush toilet (49 per cent) and water piped to dwelling (47 per cent). The highest levels of service also have the highest levels of distrust. Curiously, there is a greater level of trust in local government from the lower levels of service and even from those without services. Trust appears not to be results based.

TABLE 6.18 *Perception of local government and levels of service, 2004 (percentage)*

	Trust	Neutral	Distrust
Bucket toilet	67	12	21
Piped to yard	63	12	25
No sanitation	63	12	25
VIP, improved latrine	62	12	26
Communal tap	60	15	25
Pit latrine	60	14	25
No piped water	58	15	28
Flush toilet	49	19	32
Piped to dwelling	47	20	34

Notes: Ranked by level of trust.

Data for respondents accessing chemical toilets have been excluded due to the small numbers involved.

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.19 *Attitudes and payment for service, 2004 (percentage)*

Payment for water service	Attitude to service		
	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied
Do not pay	45	4	52
<R20 a month	45	5	51
R21–R50	78	2	20
R51–R99	79	2	19
R100–R200	84	3	13
R201–R500	77	3	20
>R501	62	7	31

Source: SASAS (2004)


The provision of free basic services, and presumably access to higher levels of service, does not appear to bring satisfaction with water services. In Table 6.19, attitudes to service are compared to levels of payment.

As Table 6.19 shows, those who receive FBW or who for other reasons do not pay are the most dissatisfied with the service (52 per cent), while the least dissatisfied are those who pay in the range of R100–R200 a month (13 per cent). The data on satisfaction cross-referenced with payment show a J curve (see Figure 6.1). High levels of dissatisfaction are recorded from those who do not pay; levels decline among those paying R100–R200, but then rise again among those with higher levels of payment.

Without further analysis, this could be interpreted as showing some problems with FBW and the operation of services to the poor, while dissatisfaction at the higher level of payment could indicate resistance to the block tariff system, which rises steeply in proportion to the volume of water used.

What are the political loyalties of those who are dissatisfied with municipal services? In pursuit of the social bases of discontent, the author created a compound indicator of dissatisfaction to assess a hard core of dissatisfaction with municipal services. Two services were selected: water and sanitation, and

FIGURE 6.1 *Dissatisfaction with water services and payment*



Source: Produced by the author

housing – the most powerful drivers in leading people on to social action in the municipal context and the two services which have been most contested in the recent period.

Analysis of the political loyalties of respondents, selected by their expressed dissatisfaction with the chosen municipal services, indicates that they are overwhelmingly in the majority party (59 per cent), followed by those who did not vote (24 per cent), those who refused to answer (12 per cent) and, finally, those who voted for an alternative party (the Inkatha Freedom Party at 6 per cent).

Table 6.20 indicates the complexity of dissatisfaction and disillusionment in South Africa. Oppositional parties, it appears, are unable to turn dissatisfaction with service delivery into changed political loyalty. Discontent arises largely from the problems of service delivery, is manifest in increased levels of political discussion, but does not find a definite political expression.

A cross-tabulation of attitudes to mass action with trust in local government produces interesting results.

TABLE 6.20 *Dissatisfaction with water services and housing, by vote, 2005*

	Frequency	Percentage
African National Congress	4 332 330	59
Did not vote	1 743 469	24
Other/refuse to answer	833 460	12
Inkatha Freedom Party	416 711	6
Total	7 325 970	100

Source: SASAS (2005)

Table 6.21 shows a surprisingly uniform attitude towards mass action, with a strong majority supporting the legitimacy of mass action both among those who trust and those who distrust local government. Among those who trust local government, 67 per cent agree with mass action and among those who distrust local government, there is also 67 per cent agreement. This concurrence appears to be the result of a political culture of resistance in which the legitimate demands of the majority were suppressed by the apartheid government. This unexpected uniformity may indicate that the majority who trust local government may also be expected to engage in mass action.

Where dissatisfaction is identified, what basis is there for social action? As outlined in Table 6.22, further analysis of the cross-tabulation indicates that those who find mass action acceptable are mostly among those who express trust in local government (10.5 million), followed by those who distrust local government (5.7 million) and then by those who are neutral towards local government (2.5 million).

In South Africa the term 'politics' still has a somewhat different meaning to that in the political culture of a developed country – it still carries the sense of opposition to established authority or of assertion of the right to power. There is still an element of reserve or, to a lesser extent, fear in disclosing political loyalty and it is, for instance, quite difficult to establish the political affiliation of a councillor until some trust has been built. From this perspective, there may not be an easy disclosure of political involvement.

To what extent are those who are dissatisfied engaged in political discussion about their future? In Table 6.23, levels of political discussion are contrasted with levels of trust.

As Table 6.23 shows, those most distrusting of local government tend to be more engaged in political discussion than those who trust local government: 41 per cent of those who 'strongly trust' local government never discuss politics, while only 21 per cent of those who 'strongly distrust' local government fall into this category. It is evident that the greater the distrust, the higher the level of political discussion.

TABLE 6.21 Attitudes to mass action and trust in local government, 2004 (percentage)

Attitude to local government	Mass action acceptable?		
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
Trust	67	17	17
Neutral	53	29	18
Distrust	67	18	15

Note: N=18 708 068
Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.22 Trust in local government and mass action, 2004

	Mass action acceptable?			Total
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
Trust	10 492 909	2 608 793	2 649 132	15 750 834
Neutral	2 514 364	1 383 818	875 124	4 773 306
Distrust	5 700 795	1 508 560	1 299 914	8 509 269
Total	18 708 068	5 501 171	4 824 170	29 033 409

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.23 *Political discussion and trust in local government, 2004 (percentage)*

Attitude to local government	Never discuss politics
Strongly trust	41
Trust	41
Neither/nor	38
Distrust	32
Strongly distrust	21
Don't know	27

Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 6.24 *Attitudes towards electoral action by those who are dissatisfied, 2005 (percentage)*

	Voting is pointless	All citizens should vote
Strongly agree	8	46
Agree	15	38
Neither/nor	16	8
Disagree	38	6
Strongly disagree	21	2
Don't know	2	1

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 6.25 *Knowledge of a ward committee in the neighbourhood, 2004*

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	3 558 764	50
No	1 629 469	23
Don't know	1 341 837	19
Never heard of a ward committee	588 651	8
Total	7 118 721	100

Note: 'Dissatisfied' selected.

Source: SASAS (2004)

Although there are generally not high levels reported of political discussion, a low proportion of people are disengaged from political life. In Table 6.24, the views of those who are dissatisfied with the two most fundamental services (water and sanitation, and housing) are presented in relation to electoral action.

Those who are dissatisfied are found to have a high level of electoral engagement. When questioned about their attitude to voting, for instance, 59 per cent either 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with the view that voting is pointless. In addition, 84 per cent either 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement 'all citizens should vote'.

Among those who are dissatisfied, it also appears that most know about a ward committee in their neighbourhood. As indicated in Table 6.25, 50 per cent are aware of a ward committee, while 23 per

TABLE 6.26 *Dissatisfaction and life prospects, 2005*

	Dissatisfied with services	
	Frequency	Percentage
Will improve	2 977 567	41
Stay the same	3 317 507	45
Get worse	1 036 312	14
Don't know	12 130	0.2
Total	7 343 516	100

Note: Those dissatisfied with services are selected and cross-tabulated with attitudes to life.

Source: SASAS (2005)

cent are not; this leaves a considerable proportion (27 per cent) either not knowing whether a ward committee exists or not being aware of the ward committee system.

In Table 6.26, those who are dissatisfied with water services and housing are cross-tabulated with attitudes to their future.

Among those who are dissatisfied with the services they receive, a majority (45 per cent) feel that their lives will stay the same, followed by those who feel their lives will improve (41 per cent). A smaller group of respondents (14 per cent) feel their lives will get worse.

The coupling of dissatisfaction with services with a belief that life will not change seems to indicate a sense of hopelessness about the effectiveness of municipal government and other basic issues in respondents' lives. The substantial group feeling their lives will improve possibly indicates one of the bases for trust in local government; there is possibly a belief that local government will eventually provide and improve these services. The majority who feel their lives will remain the same or get worse (4.3 million) appear caught between the realisation that their lives will not improve and the hope that levels of local public participation (in the form of access to ward committees) may eventually bring some change.

Findings and discussion

In the analysis undertaken in this chapter, attitudes towards local government were placed in the context of government and other institutions. The perceptions of municipal services were compared and contrasted with levels of trust or distrust in local government. The analysis then moved to attitudes to mass action and experience of political discussion. In studies of poverty, deprivation has a significance somewhat greater than that of the simple lack of access to services, and a distinction is often made between 'absolute' and 'relative' deprivation. Even though the distinction can be made in terms of degrees of physical abuse, starvation and poverty, its range (from absolute to relative) arises with reference to comparative groups. The concept of relative deprivation is one that is social and political rather than technical. The theory states that people work with a reference group in mind against whom to compare themselves, rather than from an absolute standard (Runciman 1966). This is particularly acute in South Africa where, historically, there has been a sharp contrast between black and white and, increasingly, between the rural and urban poor and the expanding elite.

These are social distinctions made from infrastructural realities. In the SASAS surveys, comparative reference has to be assumed to be from lower to higher levels of service, income and historic advantage, in short, between rich and poor, African and white. This is, indeed, how reference is made in South African conditions.

Finally, the following findings can be made of a variety of attitudes:

High levels of distrust but low levels of dissatisfaction. There is evidence of high levels of distrust in local government (identified among those with higher income) but low levels of dissatisfaction with the municipal services they access.

Low levels of distrust but high levels of dissatisfaction. A much larger social grouping is found with low levels of distrust in local government but high levels of dissatisfaction; these are encountered particularly among those with lower levels of service or no service. Despite poor services, this group maintains trust in local government and this, in a sense, is what has been confirmed in the local government elections.

'Absolute' deprivation; dissatisfaction from low levels of access to life-sustaining services. There is considerable evidence that those who have no water service or low levels of service (such as communal taps beyond 200 metres) express dissatisfaction with government's handling of the service. This is expressed more strongly by those with low levels of water service than by those with low levels of sanitation service. There is evidence that those who are deprived of life-sustaining services ('absolute' or 'objective' deprivation) express dissatisfaction, and this can be identified as evidence of a consciousness linked directly to non-existent or low levels of service. Dissatisfaction is, however, linked to higher levels of trust in local government.

'Relative' deprivation; higher levels of distrust and dissatisfaction with municipal services. There is also evidence of 'relative' deprivation in the data of dissatisfaction among those with higher levels of service. In this group, comparisons are evidently being made with, for example, white or urban levels of service. Concerns include the experience of perceived threats to this access and the ability or inability to meet the costs of a higher level of service.

Levels of political awareness among those with higher or lower levels of service. The data provide evidence that those with higher levels of service constitute a group with higher levels of dissatisfaction than those with lower levels of service. There is evidence of a greater propensity among those with higher levels of service to engage in political discussion and possibilities for mobilisation. The issue is probably tied up with higher levels of service being associated with greater knowledge (of rights), higher levels of education and an urban environment. In a study by Habib and De Vos, knowledge of rights was closely related to income. Knowledge of the Bill of Rights, for instance, increases from 5 per cent among the poorest to 69 per cent among the richest (Habib & De Vos 2002: 157).

The 2005 SASAS survey reveals crucial differences in dissatisfaction with services. Although this is greatest among the poor, there are important distinctions between those at lower levels of service who in general trust local government and those at the higher levels of service who lack this trust. There is evidence of the existence of a relatively 'silent majority' which is dissatisfied but not politically active. This group would be included among those who support the broad democratic principles of the right to organise and to mass action, but who simultaneously have high levels of trust in local government.

The different strata are measured in this chapter by making a distinction between those dissatisfied at 'absolute' levels of deprivation and those experiencing 'relative' deprivation. The former appears easily defined by the evidence of lack of piped water, hungry people in rural areas, informal settlements,

begging in the street and large-scale street trading. For complex reasons, the majority of this group maintains a trust in local government.

Somewhat surprisingly, the group with 'absolute' deprivation appears not to be as excluded from the political system, as might be expected: a majority of those in deprived rural areas know of a ward councillor and a ward committee. In general, the number with some connection to the system of representative government (ward committees) is slightly greater than the number of respondents who state it does not exist for them or they don't know if it is available.

The second group – those who are 'relatively' deprived – appears to be found among those living in an urban setting, with somewhat higher levels of service. This group combines dissatisfaction with higher levels of distrust. Their views of themselves and political institutions appear to be in reference to those with more stable and improved levels of service. They show higher levels of distrust of local government than do those with lower levels of service.

The advantage of poor over poorer and urban over rural is certainly relative. In the South African City Network report, the core features of the post-apartheid challenges in South African cities are identified as inequality characterised by large numbers 'marginalised into under-serviced ghettos on the edges of cities'; they are 'geographically, materially and psychologically distanced from the opportunities and advantages of city life'.⁹

The perception of relative deprivation is evident when a group feels that their position in a stratification system is worse than that of others with whom they compare themselves. The term 'relative deprivation' now resonates with the more contemporary use of the concepts of exclusion and the demand for inclusion. The perception of exclusion could be considered comparable or equivalent to that of relative deprivation: that other people similar to oneself are in a better position. This distinction is reproduced in the *State of the Cities Report*: an 'acceptable level of service' – evidently greater than that of the basic level of access to piped water and (although not explicitly stated) the house connection – is mentioned as the key acceptable reference level (State of the Cities Network 2004: 78–79).

There is evidence that those with higher levels of service have a greater understanding of the nature of local government, delivery and location between different levels of service.

There are many who are caught in the contradiction of trusting local government, while feeling dissatisfied with their services. This contradiction seems to be held together by the hope that life will improve (even though this affirmation has some qualifications). Although this group feels that life will improve, they also feel it is more certain to improve for others than for people like themselves who are dissatisfied with services. In a recent discussion paper, the South African Communist Party, for instance, points to municipal interventions which, 'deliberately or unwittingly, served to demobilise working class communities' (SACP 2006). It argues that technical means (such as pre-paid meters) could lead to a decrease in social solidarity.

These distinctions also have an important political impact. Although unevenness and local conditions characterise social movements, it is certainly the case that many of these movements have occurred among those with higher levels of service. For example, the water cut-off phenomenon, the trigger for a number of established social movements, relates to direct house or yard connections. The evidence of dissatisfaction at these levels and a higher level of political discussion can help explain the rise of these social movements.

9 See www.sacities.net/2006/state_of_cities_2006.stm.

The relatively high level of trust in local government among those with the lowest level of service or no service appears to explain the conundrum about the local government elections, in which high levels of dissatisfaction did not become manifest in electoral results. Ironically, the protests in many provinces had the effect of leading to higher levels of voter registration.¹⁰ Independent candidates, even those who stood for improved service delivery, did not attract significant support, possibly due to the considerable turnover in councillors, which led to many new ANC candidates. In those areas where social movements have arisen, the choice of political abstention carries some weight. The evidence, however, is of strong loyalty to the ANC, even among those who express strong dissatisfaction with services. These factors help explain, in part, the autonomy of electoral politics from the data on service delivery.

Following the outbreak of substantial civil unrest in relation to services, there has been keen interest in locating the social origins of discontent. Dissatisfaction has been identified both in those who lack services and are poor and in those who access high levels of service. The social and political appear to be in an unstable equilibrium, as high levels of expectation of a better life meet some of the evident problems of delivery.

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10 In radio interviews with local government officials in the Free State prior to the 1 March 2006 elections, for instance, it was mentioned that the highest levels of voter registration to date were recorded.

South Africans' attitudes to social integration in schools

Mbithi wa Kivilu, Mandla Diko and Ronnie Mmotlane

Introduction and background

The aim of this chapter is to examine the changes in attitudes of South Africans towards integration in schools, using data gathered for the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) from 2003 to 2005. Data were collected on respondents' responses to questions that required them to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with statements on whether children from different backgrounds – namely, race, language, economic status, religion and gender – should be educated together in schools. The responses were compared by year of the survey and four key demographic characteristics (race, geotype or location, personal monthly income and level of education attained) of the respondents.

It is the policy of the democratic government of South Africa to integrate schoolchildren from all backgrounds (including race, language, socio-economic status, religion and gender) in both public and private schools. Nkomo, Chisholm and McKinney (2004) describe integration as making changes in schools to meet the needs of all children enrolled; fostering meaningful interaction among learners in the classroom, in the playground and in extramural activities; as well as instilling a human rights culture. Integration is about inclusivity and social cohesion, in contrast to the division and fragmentation that characterised apartheid society and education (Nkomo et al. 2004). When the apartheid government abolished segregation of white and black¹ children in state-run schools in 1991, some schools that had previously accepted only white children began to accept black children. School integration in South Africa is evidenced in the migration of children from former black schools in townships and rural areas to former white or Model C schools (Maile 2004). As more and more children migrate from one school to another, transformations in attitudes towards integration of children in schools become more evident among people of different colours, languages, socio-economic statuses, religions and genders. Nevertheless, although formal barriers to discriminatory admissions have been removed, the (discriminatory) racial values and practices of many of the communities and schools concerned still remain.

Race of the respondent and attitude towards integration

Today, significant differences exist among white and black people with regard to their attitudes towards racial integration in schools. Moletsane, Hemson and Muthukrishna (2004) have identified racism as the main attitude towards integration in educational institutions in South Africa. It is widely

1 'Black' in this context refers to African, coloured and Indian people.

believed that not many white parents feel comfortable letting their children share the same school with children of other races, particularly African children (Bawa & Preston-Whyte 1998). Access to former white schools by black children is limited through admission policies and escalating school fees; some conservative white parents have even used militant actions to challenge racial integration. This shows that despite the abolition of racial segregation in schools more than 15 years ago, there are still tensions when it comes to integrating children of different races in schools. There is evidence that different racial groups still have mixed attitudes towards integration, a factor that can be attributed to apartheid policy on racial segregation (Bawa & Preston-Whyte 1998; Hoosain 2008).

Different races in South Africa tend to give different reasons as to why there should be social integration in schools. Most Africans today prefer to send their children to better-resourced former Model C schools in white urban areas, rather than to the former township schools where they themselves were educated. White schools may accept black children because they are obliged to stay in line with the national education policy as expressed in the South African Constitution and the White Paper on Education and Training. According to the South African Schools Act (No. 84 of 1996), a product of the democratic dispensation, every public and independent school must have a governing body guided by a school constitution. All schools are given the right, and indeed have the obligation, to accept learners from any background, without racial considerations, as long as the learner can meet the school's admission requirements (Woolman 2007). Despite this constitutional requirement, there are some schools, especially those that are historically white, that have resisted racial integration (Tihanyi 2006). The National Action Plan to Combat Racism has raised some critical questions about integration policies and practices in schools. Some of these include: What are the national patterns in terms of integration? What is the meaning of integration for teachers, learners, school managers and materials developers? How do schools and teachers challenge racism?

The 2007 National Education Infrastructure Management System (NEIMS) report on public schools confirms what Chapman's (1987) report found about township schools some 20 years back. More specifically, the NEIMS report indicated that conditions of township schools were in a bad state; that is, they were dilapidated, polluted and poorly maintained, and many had been vandalised. In the case of vandalism to buildings, for example, out of 25 145 schools assessed countrywide, 8 035 schools suffered vandalism (NEIMS 2007). Most of the parents of children in these schools strongly believe that the standard of education received by children in township schools is low compared to that received by other race groups. This could be either because teachers are underqualified or because they do not do their best to improve the education of their pupils. While it is true that apartheid education provided children of different races with education systems that were separately organised, administered and funded, it may also be true that the present poor physical conditions, shortages of books and equipment, bad school ethos, underqualified staff, lack of parental support for governing bodies, and shortages of administrative expertise are forces that drive many African parents to enrol their children in the former Model C schools (Hodges et al. 2000).

Religious beliefs of the respondent and attitude towards integration

There is a widespread perception that South Africans are religious people, with the vast majority belonging to religious groups (see Chapter 10 in this volume). It is thus likely that these diverse religious groups are reflected in the schools attended by children from different backgrounds. In general, curriculum content is often defined and determined by policy-makers who themselves belong to a religious group. According to Reverend Mayson of the ANC Commission on Religious Affairs,²

2 See <http://www.anc.org.za>.

while some countries like the United States prefer not to teach religion at all in schools, others use only one faith in the instruction of children in schools to enhance the social values of that country. State guidelines and policy directives can describe what actually gets taught in schools (Coffey 2001). Though in many countries school education may be determined by national curricula that closely reflect specific knowledge bases, social values and norms, as well as a particular national ideology, in a multicultural and democratic country such as South Africa, it would be difficult to have a curriculum set for a specific group, race or religion.

According to the South African Constitution, everyone has the right to practise their religion and schools have autonomy to create their own policies, including policies on religious teaching and observance (Reschovsky 2006). Religious observance is thus determined by each school's unique policies in this respect, though they must be congruent with the constitutional demands of the South African education system. This means that a child must comply with the school policy if she or he is to be accepted into a particular school. This is in line with the South African national policy on religion and education. The policy grants citizens the right to establish religious schools, as long as these schools comply with the standards that they should avoid racial discrimination, register with the state, and maintain standards that are not inferior to comparable public institutions.³

While racial and religious issues with regard to integration in schools have attracted a lot of attention and debate in the public sector, other issues that influence attitudes towards integration and that are investigated in this chapter include language, gender and socio-economic status. The issue of language policy in South African education is extremely complex because of the powers vested in individual school governing bodies to draw up and decide on their own formal school language policy (Brown 1998; Van Wyk 2004). Although the existing general language-in-education policy and the norms and standards regarding language policy in schools act as guidelines and standards of approval by government on the policy, there is flexibility on how each individual governing body wishes to decide on the language issue. What makes the situation even more complex for social integration is the multiculturalism of South African schools. While the Constitution endeavours to protect every learner's right to schooling, schools have the power to decide on what language learners will use for learning. The education policy that allows school governing bodies to determine the language of instruction in their schools has resulted in some schools using language as a barrier to admission for children from minority groups (Woolman 2007). Thus, recent South African education policy raises questions about the influence of race and language on social integration.

The next section explores changes in attitudes towards integration in schools of children of different languages, races and genders over the three years of the survey. Attitudes towards these issues were compared by race, geotype, personal monthly income and highest education level attained.

SASAS survey results

Attitudes towards social integration in schools were assessed by asking the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statements, on a five-point scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree':

- All schools should contain children of different races.
- All schools should contain children of different languages.
- The children of the economically well off and the poor should be educated together.
- Children of different religions, or of no religion, should be educated separately.
- Girls and boys should be educated separately.

3 See http://wcpe.gov.za/documents/religion/religion_in_education-2.html.

The following research questions, drawn from the literature and the survey statements, were addressed by the analyses presented in this section:

- Are there significant differences in attitudes towards social integration between the respondents' racial group, geotype, personal total monthly income and highest education level attained?
- How have attitudes towards social integration as influenced by race, geotype, personal total monthly income and highest education level attained changed from 2003 to 2005?

Data collected annually from 2003 to 2005 were analysed and changes in attitudes assessed over the time period. Comparisons were made with respect to race, geotype, personal total monthly income and highest education level attained. In most cases there were statistically significant increases from 2003 to 2004, and a slight decrease in 2005, in the proportions of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the first three statements, namely:

- All schools should contain children of different races.
- All schools should contain children of different languages.
- The children of the economically well off and the poor should be educated together.

There was a significant increase from 2003 to 2004 and a slight drop in 2005 in the proportions of respondents who indicated 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree' with these statements:

- Children of different religions, or of no religion, should be educated separately.
- Girls and boys should be educated separately.

These results indicate that there is a general consensus among South Africans that children should be integrated in schools, irrespective of their race, language background, socio-economic status, religious affiliation or gender.

The statistical significance of the changes in attitudes was tested using the hierarchical log-linear model by comparing responses in 2003 and 2004 to those obtained in 2005. The model attempts to determine whether there is an association between responses to the statements and the years in which they were made. If there is an association, it means that some attitudes differed for the years under consideration.

Attitudes on whether schools should contain children of different languages

Overall, there was an increase in the proportion of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement that all schools should contain children of different languages, from 82 per cent in 2003 to 89 per cent in 2004, and then a decrease to 87 per cent in 2005. A chi-square test was used to test if there were statistically significant differences between time (2003–05) and in attitude towards the various issues on integration. The results showed statistically significant⁴ differences in the proportion of people who supported the idea over the three years.

Africans had the highest proportions of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement, while white respondents had the lowest proportion. However, white respondents had the highest increase of 22 per cent in their level of agreement from 2003 to 2005. Indians showed an increase of 12 per cent and coloured respondents of 6 per cent over the same period.

Tests of statistical significance, using the hierarchical log-linear model, showed that the proportions of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that schools should enrol children of different languages were significantly higher in 2004 than in 2005 among African, coloured and white respondents. On

4 Chi-square=113.37, df=8, p<0.05


the other hand, the proportion of Indians who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' to the statement was significantly higher in 2005 than in 2003. The details of these results are summarised in Figure 7.1.

Compared by geotype, the proportion of people who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that schools should have children of different languages was statistically significantly higher in 2003 and 2004 than in 2005. More specifically, urban and rural informal areas had high proportions of people who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement, while urban formal areas retained the lowest proportions over the three years. The highest increases from 2003 to 2004 were found among the rural formal, at 10 per cent, followed by the urban formal at 8 per cent. Although there was a decrease for both groups from 2004 to 2005, it was most drastic in the rural formal, at 11 per cent. Details of these results, compared by geotype, are summarised in Figure 7.2.

Results of the hierarchical log-linear model indicated that the proportion of people in rural formal areas who either 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' was significantly higher in 2003 and 2004 than in 2005. The results mean that there was a significant decrease from 2003 to 2005 among people in rural formal areas supporting integration of children of different languages in schools.


There were mixed results when comparisons were made by personal total monthly income. The proportions of people in support of integration on the basis of language seemed to decrease with an increase in income levels. The highest increase of 18 per cent from 2003 to 2005 was for people earning more than R5000 per month. Although the proportions of people in support remained high for low earners and those with no income, they showed the least increase of 7 per cent over the period.

FIGURE 7.1 All schools should contain children of different languages, by race



Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

FIGURE 7.2 All schools should contain children of different languages, by geotype



Note: 'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

In the three-year period, there was a general increase across education levels (from primary to tertiary) in the proportions of people who supported the idea that all schools should enrol children of different languages. There were significant increases among the better-educated categories from 2003 to 2004. The highest increase in support was 14 per cent among those with tertiary education, followed by those with matriculation level at 11 per cent. Although there was a decrease from 2004 to 2005 in all the levels, it is not clear why the proportion of people with no schooling who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' dropped so much – by 20 per cent from a high of 93 per cent in 2004 to a low of 73 per cent in 2005.


There seems to be a close link between patterns of responses to the issue of language with regard to integration and demographic characteristics of the respondents. It is evident that the majority of people who have consistently supported integration are the poor, as depicted by race (Africans), urban and rural informal areas, low income and low education. However, there is a significant increase in the proportion of people who supported integration on the basis of language among affluent individuals. The results identified these individuals as white people, urban formal, earning over R5000, and with tertiary education.

Attitudes on whether schools should contain children of different races

There were statistically significant differences⁵ in the proportions of people who supported ('agreed' or 'strongly agreed') that schools should contain children of different races over the three years. The proportion of Africans who were in support remained the highest, compared to that of the other races. However, white respondents showed the largest increases of 22 per cent from 2003 to 2005. Similarly, Indian and coloured respondents showed increases of 6 and 8 per cent respectively in the same period. It is evident that groups that had relatively low proportions of people supporting the idea of racial integration in 2003, namely, coloured and white, had the highest increases in 2005.


5 Chi-square=67.12, df=4, p<0.05

FIGURE 7.3 All schools should contain children of different races, by race



Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

FIGURE 7.4 All schools should contain children of different races, by geotype



Note: 'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

The hierarchical log-linear model showed that the proportion of Africans who supported schools enrolling children of different races increased significantly during the period 2003–05, while that of white people increased significantly over the time interval 2003/04 but not in 2005. Details of these results, compared by race, are shown in Figure 7.3.

As is the case with most of the results, there was a general increase in people who supported racial integration in schools from 2003 to 2004, and then a slight drop in 2005. The largest increase of 7 per cent was found among urban formal residents, while the only area that showed a decrease was the rural formal. Details of the results, compared by geotype, are provided in Figure 7.4.

The proportion of people who supported racial integration in schools remained consistently high among the low-income groups from 2003 to 2005. However, relatively high increases were found in the R1 501+ category. It is worth noting that a higher proportion of people in the high-income categories supported the integration of children of different races in 2005 than they did in previous surveys.


Support for racial integration remained high across all education categories. However, there was a drop of 14 per cent from 2004 to 2005. People with a high school senior certificate and higher qualifications registered the highest increases of up to 11 per cent over the period.

Attitudes on whether children of different religions should be educated separately

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that children of different religions should be educated separately. There were statistically significant⁶ increases from 2003 to 2005 in the proportion of people who supported the integration in schools of children of different religions.

When compared by race, only African, coloured and Indian respondents showed statistically significant increases in the proportion of those who supported integration of children of different religions. The results show that for the three-year period of the study, Indians had the highest increase of 13 per cent of respondents supporting this type of integration. Africans followed closely but there were no significant differences across the three years. Compared to other races, white respondents had the smallest proportion of people who supported the integration of children of different religions, with only 48 per cent 'disagreeing' or 'strongly disagreeing' with the statement in 2003, increasing to 57 per cent in 2004 and dropping to 52 per cent in 2005. Details of the results are presented in Figure 7.5.


FIGURE 7.5 Children of different religions must be educated separately, by race



Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

6 Chi-square=43.264, df=4, p<0.05

FIGURE 7.6 Children of different religions must be educated separately, by geotype



Note: 'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Although the proportions of respondents who supported integration of children of different religions remained moderately high (in the 60s), there were variations among people from urban and rural areas. Both rural and urban informal residents registered the highest increases of 8 and 6 per cent of people supporting religious integration. The smallest increase was registered among rural formal residents. The patterns reflect the racial composition and economic status of the residents of a given area. Details are presented in Figure 7.6.

Compared by personal total monthly income, the no-income bracket had the smallest proportion of people supporting the integration of children of different religions in 2003 but showed the highest increase of 13 per cent in 2005. The largest drop in support, of 6 per cent, was found among people in the R501–R1 500 income group. The rest of the income categories also showed a drop in support during the period, except for the R5 001 and over category, which showed a slight increase.


Compared by the highest education attained by the respondent, those with Grades 8–11 showed the highest positive change of 7 per cent in their response, rising from 62 per cent in 2003 to 69 per cent in 2005. Although those at tertiary level registered a decline from 71 per cent in 2003 to 66 per cent in 2004, there was an increase to 76 per cent in 2005. Changes in most of the levels remained relatively the same.

Attitudes on whether rich and poor children should be educated together

Economic status is critical when investigating the social integration of children from different backgrounds. There were statistically significant differences⁷ during the period 2003 to 2005 in the proportion of people who supported the idea of integrating children of the poor and the rich. The proportion of people in support increased significantly more in 2003/04 than in 2005.

⁷ Chi-square=18.956, df=4, p<0.05

FIGURE 7.7 *Children of the rich and poor should be educated together, by race*



Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Support by Indian and African respondents remained very high during the period but there was no significant change over the three-year period. White respondents gave the least support to this type of integration, compared to the other races. There were increases in support among coloured and white respondents from 2003 to 2004 but a slight drop was found from 2004 to 2005. Details of these results are provided in Figure 7.7.


The urban–rural divide was evident in responses when geotype was used for comparison. Statistically significant⁸ increases over the three years were found among urban compared to rural respondents, with both urban formal and informal areas indicating increases of 9 per cent. It is not clear why support for integration on the basis of economic background decreased in rural areas, especially in rural informal areas, where the drop was as high as 10 per cent from 2003 to 2005. Details of the results are summarised in Figure 7.8.

The proportion of those with no personal monthly income supporting the idea of integration on the basis of social economic status remained high at 79 per cent in 2003 and 2005. The proportion of people earning between R1 501 and R5 000 who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' increased most (14 per cent), compared to the other income categories.

A significant decrease in the proportion of people supporting the statement was found among those with no schooling, from a high of 83 per cent in 2003 to a low of 76 per cent in 2005. A general increase in support of the statement was evident in the movement from primary to tertiary levels of education. Although those who had no schooling had the highest proportion of people supporting integration in 2003 (83 per cent), it is not clear why the same group had the lowest proportion in 2005 (76 per cent), compared to the rest of the education levels.

8 Chi-square=17.671, df=4, p<0.05

FIGURE 7.8 Children of the rich and poor should be educated together, by geotype




Note: 'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Attitudes on whether girls and boys should be educated separately


The proportion of South Africans who supported integration of girls and boys in schools increased slightly from 75 per cent in 2003 to 78 per cent in 2005. The coloured respondents had a significantly higher increase (of 13 per cent) than the other racial groups from 2003 to 2005. However, there was a significant decrease of 7 per cent and 4 per cent among Indian and white respondents respectively. No significant change was observed among Africans. Details are provided in Figure 7.9.

FIGURE 7.9 Girls and boys should be educated separately, by race



Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

FIGURE 7.10 *Girls and boys should be educated separately, by geotype*



Note: 'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.
Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

The geotype of the respondent had mixed effects on the attitude relating to whether girls and boys should be educated separately. While the proportion of respondents who supported mixed-sex education in urban formal areas remained unchanged, there was an increase of 10 per cent among people from urban informal areas. Marginal increases in support for mixed-sex education were found among people in rural areas. Details are provided in Figure 7.10.


People in the R501–R1 500 income category showed an increase of 10 per cent in support of mixed-sex education. However, over the same period, the rest of the income categories showed a decrease.

The education levels of the respondents were found to have a significant impact on their attitudes towards the integration of girls and boys in schools. The proportion of people supporting the idea decreased with the increase in education level attained. People with tertiary education showed the highest increases in support. The largest increase of 10 per cent from 2003 (73 per cent) to 2005 (83 per cent) was among people with no schooling, followed closely by people with primary education at 9 per cent (69 per cent in 2003 to 78 per cent in 2005). There was a decrease in support from 2003 to 2005 among people with Grades 8–11 and matriculation levels of education. Although the statement did not indicate or enquire into the level of education (primary, secondary or tertiary) at which integration of girls and boys in schools should take place, it would be interesting to seek this information in future surveys.

In order to find out the type of integration that is most accepted by South Africans, the results were aggregated for each type of integration and are summarised in Figure 7.11.

It is evident that the most accepted types of integration in schools for most South Africans over the three SASAS surveys were integration of children of different races and of different languages. This does not mean that the other forms of integration were not important but the results provide an indication of the rank order of accepted types of integration.

FIGURE 7.11 Support for the different types of school integration



Notes: Race/language: 'agree' and 'strongly agree' that schools should contain children of different races/languages. Economic class: 'agree' and 'strongly agree' that rich and poor children should be educated together. Gender/religion: 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' that boys and girls/children of different religions should be educated separately. Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Conclusion

This chapter tracked changes in attitudes towards social integration in schools in South Africa, using data from the 2003, 2004 and 2005 SASAS surveys. Responses to statements about whether the respondents agreed or disagreed on whether children of different languages, races, socio-economic statuses, religions and genders should be educated together were compared by race, geotype, personal monthly income and highest educational level attained.

Although integration of children from all backgrounds in schools is the policy of the democratic government of South Africa, there are still tensions when it comes to integrating children from different backgrounds. Given South Africa's history of racial discrimination and the economic disempowerment of black communities, there is a likelihood that the pattern of attitudes towards integration of children from different backgrounds differs when compared by language, race, geotype, personal monthly income and educational level attained. The results provide empirical evidence of what has changed over the three years of the surveys with regard to South Africans' levels of tolerance of diversity in schools.

There seems to be a general increase in tolerance among South Africans of integration of children of different backgrounds in schools. There was a general increase from 2003 to 2004 and a slight decrease

in 2005 in the percentage of people who supported the integration in schools of children of different languages, races, socio-economic statuses, religions and genders. Comparisons by race, geotype, personal monthly income and education level attained provide interesting evidence of the impact of apartheid racial segregation policies on people's attitudes towards social integration in schools. The results also show the interaction between these variables in determining people's attitudes towards social integration. For example, a large proportion of African respondents from informal urban and rural areas, and with low income and low education, consistently supported integration of children from different languages, races, religions and socio-economic statuses over the three years.

It is evident that there has been an improvement in the proportion of South Africans who support the integration in schools of children of different backgrounds, although there were differences when certain groupings were considered. The groups of respondents who showed less support in the 2003 survey subsequently showed an increase in the proportion of people supporting integration, especially of children from different languages, races and socio-economic statuses. Except for those with no income or no schooling, there seems to be a decline in support for integration of children of different religions, and of boys and girls, no matter how the people are grouped.

Overall, these results concur with major findings on racial attitudes in South Africa. MacDonald and Gibson (2000) found that the majority of white South Africans oppose segregation in communities and schools, and that these increases in positive behaviour improved with time. For example, 60 per cent of white South Africans disagreed with the notion that 'racially integrated schools should not be allowed because it will make too many people angry'. When compared to attitudes towards integration in the early stages of democracy, there seems to be improvement. Though most non-African school principals and teachers, especially white, were quick to express that they were colour-blind in their duties as teachers, in more covert ways they showed negative feelings about integration (Naidoo 1996).

Stable negative attitudes towards integration of boys and girls in schools concur with Chisholm and September's (2005) idea that research and social action on gender equity in South African education still pose a major challenge to traditional and cultural practices that were designed to keep women and men in their respective roles in society.

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CHAPTER 8

Towards a democratic definition of poverty: Socially perceived necessities in South Africa

Gemma Wright, Michael Noble and Wiseman Magasela

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the theoretical debate on the conceptualisation and definition of poverty in South Africa by considering the results of a national survey of the views of South Africans about the necessities in life.¹ 'Necessities', as conceptualised in studies with similar methodological approaches to those adopted here, are activities, possessions and services that are required in order to enjoy an acceptable standard of living within current South African society. This issue can be located within the context of international debates about poverty and social exclusion. The analysis undertaken in this chapter is based on questions in a module on socially perceived necessities that formed part of the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS).²

The chapter begins by locating the study of socially perceived necessities in its academic context as part of the poverty and social exclusion debate. The Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion (IPSE) qualitative analysis that preceded the SASAS module is also briefly described. The views of South Africans about necessities are then presented. This is followed by a section that explores how the responses of different groups compare, looking at responses by sex, population group, age, area type and subjective income poverty levels. The chapter concludes with some recommendations about how these findings could be used to inform the definition and measurement of poverty in South Africa in the future.

Background

Over the last 100 years, the debate about how poverty should be measured has shifted from one that focuses solely on the minimum *resources* required for subsistence, to the minimum required, in terms of *resources and other endowments*, to participate in society with dignity as a full citizen. That is, concepts and definitions of poverty have moved from a narrow focus on absolute resource-based subsistence definitions to ones that are both relative and multidimensional.³

1 A version of this chapter which incorporates different analysis has been published as Noble et al. (2007).

2 The SASAS questions about necessities can also be set in the context of a broader piece of research called the Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion project, which considered poverty and social exclusion in terms of socially perceived necessities (see Wright 2008).

3 See Lister (2004) and Noble et al. (2004) for fuller discussions of concepts, definitions and measurement of poverty.

Seebom Rowntree, studying poverty in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century, defined what he called 'primary poverty' as having insufficient income to maintain physical efficiency. He undertook studies of the working-class population in York in the north of England (Rowntree 1901, 1941; Rowntree & Lavers 1951). Poor people were identified as those who were unable to afford to purchase a basic basket of goods which Rowntree identified as the minimum required for subsistence.

Over the course of the twentieth century the focus of researchers broadened to encompass not just basic needs but also full participation in society. The critical work in this regard was the publication of Townsend and Abel-Smith's *The Poor and the Poorest* in 1965 and Townsend's subsequent *Poverty in the United Kingdom: A Survey of Household Resources and Standards of Living* in 1979. Townsend conceptualised poverty as follows:

Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average family or individual that they are in effect excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities. (1979: 31)

Townsend's conceptualisation of poverty is referred to as relative poverty, the definition of which can vary over time and will change according to the prevailing norms of any given society (Townsend & Abel-Smith 1965).

How does the concept of social exclusion relate to relative poverty? Much of the academic discourse around social exclusion has emanated from Europe (e.g. Atkinson & Hills 1998; Burchardt 2000; Byrne 1999; Hills et al. 2002; Room 1995) and there are many competing conceptualisations of social exclusion.

In an attempt to categorise them, Levitas (1998) identified three, often coexisting, discourses: Redistributive Discourse (RED), Social Integrationist Discourse (SID) and Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD). RED underpins concepts that are concerned with inequalities and redresses these through redistribution. The SID discourse underpins concepts that emphasise social cohesion and people's capacity to function as citizens, often via entry into the labour market. The MUD discourse underpins concepts which equate the socially excluded with an 'undeserving underclass' (Murray 1995).

Burchardt et al. (2002: 230) provide a working definition of social exclusion for use in empirical work: 'An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident in a society, (b) he or she cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens in that society, and (c) he or she would like to so participate, but is prevented from doing so by factors beyond his or her control.' It can be argued that Townsend, with his emphasis on participating in the activities and having the living conditions customary in the societies to which they belong, heralded the conceptualisation of social exclusion within the RED/SID framework and that this shares many attributes with Burchardt's definition of social exclusion.

The question that emerges is how one *defines* who is poor (or socially excluded), that is, how one determines who is poor and who isn't, ensuring that the definition relates to the specific society in which people live. This is because it is necessary, referring back to Townsend, to define what is 'customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved' in the relevant society. The method for attaining such a definition can be undertaken by using an indirect measure of poverty (using income or expenditure), or by using direct measures in terms of lack of possession of items and lack of access to services which are deemed necessary for participation in society with dignity (Ringen 1988). Furthermore, both the direct and indirect approaches to measuring poverty can be expert-defined or socially determined. Thus, for

example, as far back as 1977, Goedhart et al. established an economic poverty line based on public opinion. This is described by Halleröd et al. (1997) as the first attempt to develop a consensual poverty line. The focus of the rest of this chapter, though, is on *direct* measures of poverty and social exclusion.

When defining poverty and social exclusion using direct measures, the definitional stage of the process can be broken down into two stages:

1. Constructing a list of possible necessities for full participation in society;
2. Incorporating that list of possible necessities into a survey to explore which items are defined as necessary by members of the society.

Stage 1, the construction of the list of necessities, can be undertaken either using the 'expert' opinion of academics (and this was the approach taken by Townsend in 1979), or by establishing the views of members of society, using focus groups with carefully constructed and tested non-leading questions. This distinction is important because, even though by either route the outcome of Stage 2 is a nationally representative definition of necessities, using the latter approach gives the people themselves a greater role in drawing up the list of possible items. The main focus of this chapter is on Stage 2 of the definitional process, the quantitative measurement of definitions of socially perceived necessities, though Stage 1 is briefly discussed in the section below as it was undertaken using focus groups.

Having defined the necessities for full participation in society, it is then possible to measure who possesses them. In some instances, part two of the definitional stage occurs within the same survey as the measurement stage; otherwise it is undertaken sequentially. The 2005 SASAS module analysed here focused solely on the definitional stage.

This approach to defining and measuring poverty was first undertaken in Britain in 1983 in the 'Living in Britain' survey involving 1 174 adults aged 16 and over (Mack & Lansley 1985). In that survey, views were sought about 35 items in order to obtain a definition of poverty 'in relation to the minimum living standards that the majority of people believe to be essential in Britain' (Gordon & Pantazis 1997: xx).

In the Living in Britain survey, necessities were identified as items which were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population, having weighted the sample to represent the total population. People were defined as poor if they could not afford three or more of the necessities that had been defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of people in the weighted survey. The attraction of this approach is that, as the authors state, the aim is to 'identify a minimum acceptable way of life not by reference to the views of "experts", nor by reference to observed patterns of expenditure or observed living standards, but by reference to *the views of society as a whole*' (Mack & Lansley 1985: 42, original emphasis). This method for defining the necessities, and then measuring who lacks them, was later referred to as the Majority Necessities Index (MNI) (Halleröd et al. 1997: 218).

In 1990 a further survey known as Breadline Britain in the 1990s was undertaken which involved 1 831 adults (Gordon & Pantazis 1997). In this survey, 44 possible necessities were asked about, and again necessities were identified as items that were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population. Twenty-five items were defined as necessities for adults plus seven additional items for families with children (i.e. 32 essential items in total). Those who analysed the results concluded that '[t]here is a high degree of consensus, across all divisions in society, on the necessity of a range of common possessions and activities. Society as a whole clearly does have a view on what is necessary to have a decent standard of living' (Gordon & Pantazis 1997: 96).

The original MNI of Mack and Lansley was modified by Halleröd (1994) in Sweden, and the revised methodology was also applied to the Breadline Britain project by Halleröd et al. (1997). They devised a Proportional Deprivation Index (PDI) whereby each item was given a weight according to the

proportion of the population that regarded it as necessary, taking into account variation in preferences by sex, age and family composition. The PDI was based on the number of essentials that people said they don't have, do want, but can't afford. The authors argued that the PDI 'is less sensitive to the consumer items included in the list, does not make arbitrary classifications of necessary and non-necessary consumption, decreases the sensitivity to individual preferences and takes account of significant differences in preferences between demographic and social categories' (Halleröd et al. 1997: 218). Despite a considerable overlap between the PDI and the MNI, the authors prefer the PDI because it avoids the arbitrary 50 per cent cut-off and takes into account varying views in society. This, however, goes beyond the scope of the SASAS socially perceived necessities questions as it relates to the measurement stage, but will be referred to at the end of the chapter.

In 1999 the Millennium Poverty and Social Exclusion survey, which extended the scope of the earlier surveys by asking questions specially related to children, was undertaken in Britain (Bradshaw, Gordon et al. 1998; Bradshaw, Middleton et al. 1998; Gordon et al. 2000; Pantazis, Gordon & Levitas 2006). In this survey, 1 534 households were asked about the following set of possible necessities: 39 items and five activities for households, and 23 items and seven activities for children.

Following in the Mack and Lansley tradition, the approach has been applied in many other countries across the world: Belgium (Van den Bosch 2001), Ireland (Callan et al. 1993), New Zealand (Jensen et al. 2002), Northern Ireland (Hillyard et al. 2003), Sweden (Halleröd 1994, 1995) and Vietnam (Davies & Smith 1998). It has also been used in relation to specific themes or groups, for example, in relation to housing tenure (Burrows 2003) and adults' views on necessities for children (Lloyd 2006).

However, until the 2005 SASAS survey, a direct democratic definition of poverty in the Mack and Lansley tradition had not been explored in South Africa. Given the apartheid legacy of deep structural poverty and social and economic inequality (e.g. Aliber 2001; Borat et al. 2004; May 1998; Roberts 2005; Simkins 2004; Terreblanche 2003), it is essential that a definition of poverty that reflects the aspirations of all citizens as well as the country's Constitutional mandate, is achieved in South Africa (Magasela 2005). Whilst it remains essential to meet people's basic needs, this alone may not be sufficient to tackle inequality and allow full participation in contemporary South African Society.

This chapter presents findings on the extent to which there is a common set of items, activities and services that South Africans collectively identify as necessary. Given that poverty is 'inherently a political concept – and thus inherently a contested one' (Alcock 1993: 3), the advantage of this approach is that the population at large plays an active role in defining poverty. Arguably, this sits well with former President Mbeki's reiteration of Nelson Mandela's exhortation that 'we must, constrained by and yet regardless of the accumulated effect of our historical burdens, seize the time to define for ourselves what we want to make of our shared destiny' (Mbeki 2006).

The Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion project

The IPSE project began with a series of focus groups across South Africa to explore what possessions, services and activities people regarded as essential for every person in South Africa to have, have access to, or be able to do, in order to participate fully in South African society.

The focus groups took place in six of the nine provinces; in nine of the 11 official languages; in urban and rural areas, including cities and former homelands; and in areas of formal and informal housing. They were organised so that male and female groups took place separately and the four main population groups were represented. Of the 48 focus groups that were successful, five were high income, 11 were

middle income and 32 were low income.⁴ Wherever possible, the facilitators spoke the same mother tongue as the members of the group and homogeneity of the group was prioritised (see Morgan & Kreuger 1998). The focus group schedules were officially translated into the relevant languages, and the facilitators' translated transcriptions were quality assured by an external organisation, as well as being supervised on site by a member of the research team for the actual focus group.

The focus group schedule was divided into five parts. After a warm-up question, participants were asked to list what they thought were the essential things that every South African should have, have access to and be able to do. Participants were then asked whether there were any additional things that were essential for children. After this relatively unstructured session, the groups were asked whether items on a list that had been constructed by the research team were essential or not. Focus group participants were then asked to talk about six areas of life that people take part in – health, education, the economy, personal security, family and friends, and housing and the neighbourhood – in terms of those who take part (the included) and those who, while willing, are not able to take part (the excluded). Though the whole focus group was about poverty and social exclusion, people were explicitly asked whether they thought that there are people in South Africa who are poor and, if so, what they understand this to mean. To conclude the session, people were asked an aspirational question about what aspects of life they would like to see improve for South Africans in the future.⁵

A number of important observations can be made from the qualitative stage of the project. First, the notion of an acceptable standard of living that was put forward by the focus group respondents went beyond simply meeting subsistence-level needs. 'Relative' aspects of poverty and social exclusion emerge strongly from the qualitative data. This could be seen, for example, in the importance that participants placed on 'social' goods for the home and in their views on the need for appropriate and dignified clothing. When asked why they considered a given item an essential, participants often referred to social themes such as respect or respectability, dignity and decency. The multidimensional nature of poverty was also apparent, with people raising issues beyond just income or material possessions. A strong impression emerging from the focus groups was that participants had a very clear and detailed idea of what constitutes an acceptable standard of living in South Africa at present.

Not only this, but there *appeared* to be broad agreement about what constituted necessities. The very poorest respondents had an idea of what constituted an acceptable standard of living that was similar in many respects to that which was put forward by wealthier respondents. There was therefore a strong incentive to explore the issues in a nationally representative survey to ascertain whether – in a developing country such as South Africa where the wealthy lifestyle is visible in almost all parts of the country to a greater or lesser degree, but where most people are undeniably income poor – there was a shared view of the necessities in life.

Drawing from the focus group material, a list of items was included in the 2005 SASAS round, to obtain a nationally representative list of items, activities and services that the majority of people defined as essential for an acceptable standard of living. The next stage will involve measurement of who has and does not have access to these items, and this will be discussed briefly at the end of the chapter.

4 The high-, middle- and low-income thresholds were calculated separately for each population group.

5 See Ratcliffe et al. (2005) for further details about the qualitative stage of the project and Noble et al. (2004) for a brief summary of the focus group findings. In addition, Magasela et al. (2006) focus specifically on issues arising from the project in relation to housing, Cluver et al. (2006) provide findings in relation to health and a safe environment, Barnes et al. (2007) consider adults' views about necessities for children, and Barnes and Wright (2007) show findings relating to education.

Determining the socially perceived necessities

The IPSE module in SASAS 2005 comprised 56 questions: 37 about possessions, four about activities, nine about the neighbourhood and six about relationships with friends and family. The following analysis therefore focuses on 56 items.⁶

Respondents were asked whether, in their opinion, each item or activity was 'essential for everyone to have in order to enjoy an acceptable standard of living in South Africa today'. Four responses were possible: 'essential'; 'desirable' i.e. the item or activity fell short of 'essential' but was still 'desirable'; 'neither' i.e. neither essential nor desirable; or 'don't know'.

It was important to ensure that a range of different standards of living was represented in the IPSE module. So, for example, items were included that, though not necessary to meet basic needs, might be seen by some as essential in order to meet societal expectations. The final list of items (56) contained in the survey was less exhaustive than might have been possible in a dedicated survey as both resource availability and the possibility of respondent fatigue had to be taken into account. It was therefore important to make informed judgements of what to include and what to exclude. A good example is the issue of water. As a flush toilet and a bath or shower were included it was felt that it was not necessary to include a specific question about piped water in the dwelling as this would be implied by the other two items. It was also necessary not to repeat issues that were covered elsewhere in the survey and hence there was no question in the IPSE module as to whether having a job was a necessity, as this was already prominent in other parts of the survey.⁷

A key research question that arises is at what point public agreement can be said to exist on what necessities are. It could be based upon a 50 per cent overall majority, and yet this and any other threshold (such as a two-thirds majority) is unavoidably arbitrary. Another approach would be to consider how responses differ between different groups, and to select items that are defined as essential by a majority of all the subset groups. In other countries where this approach has been pursued, a simple majority is the norm. Furthermore, a 50 per cent majority resonates with usual voting systems within democratic government and since a 'democratic' definition of poverty is being pursued, this is the level of agreement which is applied in the analysis in this chapter.

In addition to the question of where one 'draws the line', there are a number of ways in which this approach to defining necessities is potentially problematic. In particular, it is important to consider the following key issues:

- *bounded realities* – 'felt need' may underestimate 'real need' because felt need can be limited by the perceptions of the individual (Bradshaw 1981; Walker 1987);
- *adaptive preferences* – people may be unwilling to classify items as essential if they believe they will never be able to afford them. The implication of this is that fewer items would be classified as necessities, thus artificially lowering the socially acceptable standard of living;
- *instrumental necessities* – most socially perceived necessities are not ends in themselves, but fulfil a certain function. It is difficult for researchers to treat items as equivalent on the grounds that they serve the same function, without making value judgements;
- *transitional necessities* – these are items that are necessities for someone's life as it stands, but which would not be necessary if other items became available; and
- *definitions of mainstream society* – while in the United Kingdom the majority of the population are members of 'mainstream society', it could be argued that in South Africa the majority of the

6 See the appendix to this chapter for details about the tests for robustness of the findings.

7 However, the IPSE module was repeated in SASAS 2006 and an additional question about 'employment for people of working age' was asked so that this important issue could be set alongside the other items in the module.

population continue to live in what one might describe as 'marginalised society'. It is therefore important to be particularly sensitive to issues relating to groups to which people compare themselves. However, this does not compromise the approach adopted in this chapter. As Veit-Wilson states in relation to similar work in the United Kingdom, those adopting this approach do not 'fall into the trap of believing that what is possessed or done by the majority, or even the average in society, somehow gives rise by this mere statistical fact to a conscious conception of these goods or experiences as necessities;... Thus one can conceive of a society which defines as necessities things which the majority do not have' (Veit-Wilson 1987: 201).

These issues are particularly important when looking at differences in response patterns between groups of South African society.⁸

The essential items

Sixty-eight per cent of items (38 out of 56) were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the respondents. These 38 items are shown in bold in Table 8.1.⁹ The five with the highest percentage of respondents regarding them as essential were 'someone to look after you if you are very ill' (91 per cent); 'a house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather, e.g. rain, wind, etc.' (91 per cent); 'street lighting' (90 per cent); 'mains electricity in the house' (90 per cent); and 'a fridge' (89 per cent). These five items are striking in terms of their common theme of security and safety: in terms of access to care, accommodation, safety in the local neighbourhood and the house, and safe food storage and hygiene.

At the other end of the spectrum, the items defined as least essential were, in ascending order, 'a domestic worker' (18 per cent); 'satellite television/DSTV' (19 per cent); 'money to buy a magazine' (20 per cent); 'a computer in the home' (28 per cent); and 'a DVD player' (29 per cent). These responses make intuitive sense in that they all represent more 'luxury' items that are most commonly associated with people with high levels of disposable income.

TABLE 8.1 *Percentage of people defining an item as essential*

Item	% saying essential
Someone to look after you if you are very ill	91
A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather, e.g. rain, wind, etc.	91
Street lighting	90
Mains electricity in the house	90
A fridge	89
Clothing sufficient to keep you warm and dry	85
Separate bedrooms for adults and children	85
Tarred roads close to the house	85
A flush toilet in the house	84
For parents or other carers to be able to buy complete school uniform for children without hardship	83



8 See Noble et al. (2007) for further details about these five theoretical issues.

9 All responses in this chapter are population weighted and all percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. See the appendix to this chapter for details about the robustness of the findings, including Cronbach's coefficient alpha test, confidence intervals for the essential items, and sample sizes for the subgroups that are considered.

Item	% saying essential
Having an adult from the household at home at all times when children under 10 from the household are at home	83
Ability to pay or contribute to funerals/funeral insurance/burial society	81
A place of worship (church/mosque/synagogue) in the local area	81
People who are sick are able to afford all medicines prescribed by their doctor	81
Somewhere for children to play safely outside of the house	78
A radio	77
Having police on the streets in the local area	77
Regular savings for emergencies	74
A neighbourhood without rubbish/refuse/garbage in the streets	74
Being able to visit friends and family in hospital or other institutions	74
Electric cooker	74
Television/TV	72
Someone to transport you in a vehicle if you needed to travel in an emergency	72
Someone to talk to if you are feeling upset or depressed	72
A fence or wall around the property	71
A bath or shower in the house	69
A large supermarket in the local area	67
A neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air	65
Burglar bars in the house	64
A landline phone	64
Some new (not second-hand or handed-down) clothes	63
A cell phone	63
Someone who you think could find you paid employment if you were without it	61
Someone to lend you money in an emergency	59
Meat or fish or vegetarian equivalent every day	59
A garden	56
A car	56
A sofa/lounge suite	52
Special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival	49
A lock-up garage for vehicles	47
A small amount of money to spend on yourself, not on your family, each week	46
Going to town/to a large supermarket for the day	45
For parents or other carers to be able to afford toys for children to play with	45
A burglar alarm system for the house	42
Having enough money to give presents on special occasions such as birthdays, weddings, funerals	42
A wheelbarrow	41
A washing machine	38
A family take-away or bring-home meal once a month	38
A holiday away from home for one week a year, not visiting relatives	37
An armed response service for the house	31
A cinema in the local area	30

Item	% saying essential
A DVD player	29
A computer in the home	28
Money to buy a magazine	20
Satellite television/DSTV	19
A domestic worker	18

Note: The 38 items that were defined as essential by more than half of the respondents are highlighted in bold.

Source: Noble et al. (2007: 125–127) reprinted by permission of the publisher, Taylor & Francis Ltd, <http://tandf.co.uk/journals>

How many essential items were there per person?

As noted, 38 items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population. It is, however, also interesting to explore how individual respondents replied to the selection of questions. Analysis shows that, on average, respondents defined 33 of the 56 items as essential (with a standard deviation of 10.8). Only one respondent defined all items as 'not essential' and at the other end of the spectrum, only one respondent defined all items as essential.

Essentials for different groups

Though it is usual to obtain a socially derived definition of necessities on the basis of the views of a nationally representative sample of the whole population, it is also interesting to explore how these socially derived essential items (the 38 'essential for all' items) are treated by different groups in society.

Though differences in response patterns are explored in this section, it should be remembered that respondents were asked whether the item 'is essential for everyone to have in order to enjoy an acceptable standard of living in South Africa today'. They were not asked whether the item was essential for the *respondent* to have, or whether it was essential *for people with whom the respondents identify themselves* to have. Rather, people were asked to say whether the items were essential for *everyone* to have.

Women and men

This section considers whether any differences occurred between women and men in the way that they responded to the questions about necessities.

Using the 50 per cent majority threshold, women defined all of the 38 'essential for all' items as essential – with an additional item also just exceeding the 50 per cent threshold: a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (51 per cent). For men, all 38 of the 'essential for all' items were defined as essential, with no additional items falling into this category. The percentage point differences between men and women for most items were mainly very small. Among the 38 'essential for all', items the greatest difference occurred for 'someone to lend you money in an emergency' (55 per cent for women and 64 per cent for men; $p < 0.05$).

Considering all 56 items, the responses from women about essential items correlated 0.989 with the male responses.¹⁰

¹⁰ Spearman's rank correlation, significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

TABLE 8.2 *Items defined as essential by a higher percentage of women than men*

Item	% of women saying essential	% of men saying essential
Special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival	51	47
A holiday away from home for one week a year, not visiting relatives	38	35
For parents or other carers to be able to buy complete school uniform for children without hardship	85	82
Burglar bars in the house	66	63
A fridge	90	87

Note: The five items with the greatest percentage point differences are shown.
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 8.3 *Items defined as essential by a higher percentage of men than women*

Item	% of women saying essential	% of men saying essential
A DVD player	23	34
Someone to lend you money in an emergency	55	64
A burglar alarm system for the house	39	46
A small amount of money to spend on yourself, not on your family, each week	43	50
A cell phone	60	66

Note: The five items with the greatest percentage point differences are shown.
Source: SASAS (2005)

Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the five greatest differences across all 56 items between women and men: first, where a greater percentage of women than men defined an item as essential (Table 8.2) and second, where a greater percentage of men than women defined an item as essential (Table 8.3). Overall, for the 56 items, a higher percentage of men than women classified items as essential for 31 of the 56 items. As seen in Table 8.3, the item with the greatest discrepancy is a DVD player, with 34 per cent of men classifying it as essential, compared to only 23 per cent of women ($p < 0.05$). This corresponds with findings internationally, that men are more likely than women to regard such items as essential (Payne & Pantazis 1997). The second greatest discrepancy is 'someone to lend you money in an emergency', with 64 per cent of men classifying it as essential, compared to 55 per cent of women ($p < 0.05$). However, all other items listed in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 are not significant (at $p < 0.05$).

Population groups

Having considered the differences between women and men, this section explores how responses compare by population group. In the population weighted survey, 76 per cent of people are African, 9 per cent coloured, 3 per cent Indian and 11 per cent white.

Of the 38 items that were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population, 28 of these items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of each of the population groups (including the 21 that ranked the highest overall – see Table 8.1). Table 8.4 shows the correlations between responses to the 56 items (in terms of percentages defining an item as essential) by population group. African responses

TABLE 8.4 Spearman's Rank Correlation for all respondents and the four main population groups

	All	African	Coloured	Indian	White
All	1	0.986	0.903	0.899	0.896
African	0.986	1	0.840	0.840	0.832
Coloured	0.903	0.840	1	0.913	0.923
Indian	0.899	0.840	0.913	1	0.931
White	0.896	0.832	0.923	0.931	1

Note: All correlations shown are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: SASAS (2005)

correlate highest to all responses (0.986), as would be expected given the profile of the country. The lowest correlation is between white and African respondents (0.832) and the highest is between Indian and white (0.931).

Fifty per cent or more of the African respondents identified all 38 'essential for all' items as essential (i.e. the items highlighted in bold in Table 8.1), with no items leaving or joining this category.

Only 33 items fell into the 50 per cent majority category for coloured respondents, all of which also exist in the list of 38 'essential for all' items. The items that fell from the list of 38 items were burglar bars in the house (46 per cent), a landline phone (49 per cent), some new (not second-hand or handed-down clothes) (49 per cent), a cell phone (a very low 23 per cent), someone who you think could find you paid employment if you were without it (43 per cent), a garden (41 per cent) and a car (37 per cent).

The Indian respondents had a 50 per cent majority for 37 items. Items that left the 'essential for all' list were a large supermarket in the local area (44 per cent), a garden (39 per cent) and a cell phone (27 per cent). The two items that entered the 50 per cent majority list were a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (57 per cent) and a burglar alarm system for the house (55 per cent).

For white respondents, 37 items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more. The three items that joined this list that are not on the list of 'essential for all' items are a washing machine (67 per cent), a lock-up garage for vehicles (57 per cent) and a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (55 per cent). The 'essential for all' items that were not defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of white respondents are some new (not second-hand or handed-down) clothes (just under 50 per cent), someone who you think could find you paid employment if you were without it (46 per cent), a television (45 per cent) and someone to lend you money in an emergency (44 per cent).

Though 50 per cent or more of the four main population groups defined a common set of 28 of the 38 'essential for all' items as essential, there are some noteworthy differences in responses between the groups. Table 8.5 shows the three greatest differences for each population group, comparing the population group in question with all *other* people. The three items with the greatest difference are shown, where people in the relevant population group defined an item as more essential than the combined other population groups. So, for example, 71 per cent of African people defined a cell phone as essential, compared with 37 per cent of non-African people.

Finally, it should be noted that the Indian respondents reached almost 100 per cent consensus on several items: a flush toilet in the house (99 per cent), a bath or shower in the house (99 per cent), a house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (99 per cent), a fridge (99 per cent), mains electricity (98 per cent) and separate bedrooms for adults and children (98 per cent).

TABLE 8.5 *The largest differences in views across population groups*

Group	Item with greatest percentage point difference	Item with second greatest percentage point difference	Item with third greatest percentage point difference
African	Cell phone (71% cp 37%)	Wheelbarrow (48% cp 17%)	Television (79% cp 50%)
Coloured	Washing machine (62% cp 36%)	Bath or shower in the house (86% cp 67%)	Meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent every day (75% cp 58%)
Indian	Bath or shower in the house (99% cp 68%)	Burglar bars in the house (86% cp 64%)	Sofa/lounge suite (71% cp 52%)
White	Washing machine (67% cp 34%)	Car (75% cp 53%)	Bath or shower in the house (88% cp 67%)

Note: Figures shown in brackets are the percentage of people in the relevant population group that define the item as essential, followed by the percentage of the combined other population groups (cp) that define the item as essential. The differences are significant (at $p < 0.01$).

Source: SASAS (2005)

The highest level of consensus that was reached for any given item for African people was 92 per cent (someone to look after you if you are very ill), 91 per cent for coloured people (mains electricity in the house) and 97 per cent for white people (a flush toilet in the house).

Younger and older people

As noted, 38 items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the total population (Table 8.1). However, for those aged 16 to 24, 42 items were defined as essential, using the 50 per cent majority cut-off, including all 38 'essential for all' items. The four additional essential items, using the 50 per cent cut-off, were: going to town/to a large supermarket for the day (54 per cent), for parents or other carers to be able to afford toys for children to play with (52 per cent), a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (51 per cent) and a small amount of money to spend on yourself, not on your family, each week (51 per cent).

It has been shown that overall the total population defines the most essential item as 'someone to look after you if you are very ill' (91 per cent). In fact, the same percentage of 16 to 24 year olds define this item as essential. However, the 16 to 24 year olds additionally define three items as slightly more essential, all at 92 per cent: a house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather, mains electricity and a fridge.

A striking 52 of the 56 items are defined as more essential by 16 to 24 year olds than by those aged 25 and over. The 10 greatest differences are shown in Table 8.6 (in descending order). The item with the greatest difference is a home computer, with 44 per cent of 16 to 24 year olds defining it as an essential item that everyone should have, compared with 23 per cent of people aged 25 and over.

In spite of these differences, the responses of 16 to 24 year olds regarding essentials correlate very highly (0.985) with all respondents.

It is also interesting to look at how the views of older people compare. Of the 38 items defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the whole population, all but two fell into this category for older people aged 65 and over. The two items that fell just outside this category were a cell phone (45 per cent) and a sofa/lounge suite (just under 50 per cent). When comparing all 56 items on the list, older people defined only

TABLE 8.6 *Items defined as essential by a higher percentage of respondents aged 16 to 24 than respondents aged 25+*

Item	% of respondents aged 16 to 24 saying essential	% of respondents aged 25+ saying essential
A computer in the home	44	23
A DVD player	41	24
A cinema in the local area	43	25
A family take-away or bring-home meal once a month	48	34
A car	65	52
Money to buy a magazine	29	17
Going to town/to a large supermarket for the day	54	42
Satellite television/DSTV	27	16
Someone who you think could find you paid employment if you were without it	69	59
A landline phone	71	61

Note: The 10 items with the greatest percentage point differences are shown. The differences shown are all significant (at $p < 0.05$).

Source: SASAS (2005)

six items as more essential than did those aged 16 to 64. The greatest difference in this respect was for a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (56 per cent for those aged 65 and over, compared with 48 per cent for those aged 16 to 64). One item scored the same for both age groups: someone to talk to if you are feeling upset or depressed – 72 per cent for 16 to 64 year olds, and for people aged 65 and over.

People in urban and rural areas

In addition to the comparisons made above, it is possible to look at the extent to which responses differed according to whether the respondent lived in an urban or a rural area. Though there are some notable differences, there are still many common items that are defined as essential, as this section will demonstrate.

Thirty-nine items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the urban respondents (those living in urban formal or urban informal areas). These comprised the 38 items that were 'essential for all', plus a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (51 per cent). In urban areas, issues of sanitation, refuse collection, air quality and security are more prominent than for rural respondents. Though the item that comes out as the most essential for all is 'someone to look after you if you are very ill', for urban respondents four items score the same or higher: street lighting (93 per cent), a house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (92 per cent), mains electricity in the house (91 per cent) and a fridge (90 per cent), with someone to look after you if you are very ill scoring 90 per cent.

Thirty-eight items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the rural respondents (those living in areas defined in the survey as 'rural informal' [communal areas in the former homelands] and 'rural formal' [commercial farmlands]). These comprise 37 of the 'essential for all' items. The additional item that entered this category was a wheelbarrow (63 per cent for people in rural areas, compared to 28 per cent for people in urban areas). A sofa/lounge suite fell just below the 50 per cent threshold at 46 per cent.

TABLE 8.7 *Items defined as essential by a higher percentage of urban than rural respondents*

Item	% of urban people saying essential	% of rural people saying essential
A bath or shower in the house	77	54
A neighbourhood without rubbish/refuse/garbage in the streets	79	65
A flush toilet in the house	89	75
A neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air	69	59
A sofa/lounge suite	55	46
Burglar bars in the house	67	59
Somewhere for children to play safely outside of the house	81	73
Electric cooker	76	69
A burglar alarm system for the house	45	38
Money to buy a magazine	23	16

Note: The 10 items with the greatest percentage point differences are shown. The differences shown are all significant (at $p < 0.05$).

Source: SASAS (2005)

Overall, of the 38 'essential for all' items, 37 have a 50 per cent majority for both urban and rural respondents. This indicates that the issue of bounded realities, mentioned above, need not be too prominent a concern for research in this field in relation to the urban/rural divide. In spite of this, it is still interesting to consider the items that differed the most in terms of the percentage of people in each category (urban/rural) defining an item as essential. Table 8.7 shows the 10 greatest differences for items where a higher percentage of urban than rural respondents defined the item as essential.

TABLE 8.8 *Items defined as essential by a higher percentage of rural than urban respondents*

Item	% of urban people saying essential	% of rural people saying essential
A wheelbarrow	28	63
A cell phone	58	71
Someone who you think could find you paid employment if you were without it	57	69
A radio	73	84
Television/TV	69	78
Someone to lend you money in an emergency	57	65
Some new (not second-hand or handed-down) clothes	61	68
For parents or other carers to be able to afford toys for children to play with	43	50
Someone to talk to if you are feeling upset or depressed	70	75
Someone to transport you in a vehicle if you needed to travel in an emergency	70	75

Note: The 10 items with the greatest percentage point differences are shown. The differences shown are all significant (at $p < 0.05$) apart from the items about new clothes, toys, and someone to talk to when upset or depressed.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Table 8.8 shows the 10 greatest differences for items where a higher percentage of rural than urban respondents defined an item as essential. The item with the greatest difference is the wheelbarrow, with 63 per cent of rural respondents defining it as essential, compared with only 28 per cent of urban respondents. The wheelbarrow is a good example of a transitional necessity. During the focus groups, it was quite common for rural participants to refer to the importance of wheelbarrows as these are used – in the absence of piped water and vehicles – as a method for transporting water for household use. The wheelbarrow is therefore important for people in the absence of certain other items, but would probably become less essential if those other items became available. The difference for cell phones is also striking and may partly reflect the absence of landline phone networks in some rural areas. The employment item makes sense in the context of the higher levels of unemployment in rural areas. And the radio and television also point to the high importance for rural respondents to be able to receive news and information.

People above and below the subjective poverty line

A subjective poverty line was calculated by comparing responses to two questions in the SASAS survey: first, the respondent's total monthly household income before tax and other deductions, and second, the monthly income level that the respondent considered to be minimal for their household, 'i.e. your household could not make ends meet with less' (sometimes referred to as a 'minimum income question'). For 75 per cent of the respondents it was possible to ascertain whether they were living above, on, or below this subjective poverty line. Out of all the respondents, 38 per cent were below the subjective poverty line (i.e. their household income was less than the amount required to make ends meet), 13 per cent were 'on' the subjective poverty line (i.e. their minimum income fell into the same band as their actual household income), 25 per cent were above the subjective poverty line (i.e. their household income was more than the amount required to make ends meet), leaving 25 per cent uncategorised.¹¹

Looking first at the people below the subjective poverty line, 35 of the 38 'essential for all' items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more. The items falling out of this category were the meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent every day (46 per cent), a car (44 per cent) and a sofa/lounge suite (43 per cent).

Fifty per cent or more of people above the subjective poverty line defined all 38 'essential for all' items as essential, plus a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (58 per cent).

Interestingly, 46 of the 56 items are defined as more essential by those who are located above the subjective poverty line than by those who fall beneath it. This may indicate the presence of adaptive preferences among those who are struggling to make ends meet, as mentioned above. The items with the greatest difference, where a higher percentage of people above the subjective poverty line define an item as essential than do people located below the subjective poverty line, are shown in Table 8.9.

The three items with the greatest difference, where items are defined as more essential by those below the subjective poverty line than by those above it, are satellite TV/DSTV (21 per cent for those below, compared with 14 per cent for those above), going to town or a large supermarket for the day (45 per cent for those below, compared with 38 per cent for those above) and a wheelbarrow (43 per cent for those below, compared with 37 per cent for those above).¹²

11 See the appendix to this chapter for details about responses to the household 'actual income' and 'minimum income' questions in the 2005 SASAS survey.

12 Of these three items, only the wheelbarrow is significant ($p < 0.01$) when comparing those below the subjective poverty line with all other respondents.

TABLE 8.9 Items defined as essential by a higher percentage of respondents above than below the subjective poverty line

Item	% of people above the subjective pov. line saying essential	% of people below the subjective pov. line saying essential
Meat or fish or vegetarian equivalent every day	67	46
A neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air	73	55
Burglar bars in the house	72	55
A neighbourhood without rubbish/refuse/garbage in the streets	81	64
Special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival	58	41
A bath or shower in the house	73	57
A car	60	44
A landline phone	71	55
A fridge	96	81
A sofa/lounge suite	56	43

Note: The 10 items with the greatest percentage point differences are shown. The differences shown for people above the subjective poverty line compared with all other people are significant (at $p < 0.05$), apart from the bath/shower, car and sofa/lounge suite. The differences for people below the subjective poverty line compared with all other people are all significant (at $p < 0.01$).

Source: SASAS (2005)

Concluding remarks

This chapter has considered responses by sex, population group, age, type of area and subjective income levels. Table 8.10 shows the three most essential items for all respondents and for each group. The final column shows the extent to which that group's responses correlate to the responses overall.

TABLE 8.10 The three most essential items for all respondents and each group

Group	Essential item 1	Essential item 2	Essential item 3	Correlation*
All	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (91%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (91%)	Street lighting (90%)	1
Women	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (92%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (91%)	Street lighting (90%)	0.996
Men	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (91%)	Street lighting (91%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (90%)	0.996
African	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (92%)	Street lighting (90%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (90%)	0.986
Coloured	Mains electricity in the house (91%)	A fridge (91%)	Clothing sufficient to keep you warm and dry (90%)	0.903

Group	Essential item 1	Essential item 2	Essential item 3	Correlation*
Indian	A flush toilet in the house (99%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (99%)	A bath or shower in the house (99%)	0.899
White	A flush toilet in the house (97%)	A fridge (97%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (96%)	0.896
16 to 24 year olds	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (92%)	Mains electricity in the house (92%)	A fridge (92%)	0.985
25 year olds and over	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (91%)	Street lighting (90%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (90%)	0.999
16 to 64 year olds	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (91%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (91%)	Street lighting (91%)	0.999
65 year olds and over	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (91%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (89%)	Street lighting (87%)	0.981
Urban	Street lighting (93%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (92%)	Mains electricity in the house (91%)	0.990
Rural	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (94%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (89%)	Mains electricity in the house (87%)	0.958
Above subjective pov. line	Street lighting (96%)	A fridge (96%)	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (94%)	0.988
Below subjective pov. line	Someone to look after you if you are very ill (88%)	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather (86%)	Mains electricity in the house (86%)	0.985

Note: * This column shows the correlation of the responses for the group with the overall responses, for all 56 items, in terms of the extent to which each item was defined as essential. The Spearman's correlations shown are all significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: SASAS (2005)

There is a surprisingly high degree of agreement between the overall responses and those of the groups, in terms of responses about essential items. Table 8.11 provides a list of the 26 items that have a 50 per cent majority across the board. If, instead, a tighter threshold of a two-thirds majority cut-off point was used (where 66.7 per cent or more of the total population and of each group that has been considered defined an item as essential), 16 items are still retained – highlighted in bold in Table 8.11.

TABLE 8.11 *Items defined as essential by 50% or more of all respondents as well as by 50% or more of respondents in each group**

Item	% of all saying essential
Someone to look after you if you are very ill	91
A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather, e.g. rain, wind, etc.	91
Street lighting	90
Mains electricity in the house	90
A fridge	89
Clothing sufficient to keep you warm and dry	85
Separate bedrooms for adults and children	85
Tarred roads close to the house	85
A flush toilet in the house	84
For parents or other carers to be able to buy complete school uniform for children without hardship	83
Having an adult from the household at home at all times when children under 10 from the household are at home	83
Ability to pay or contribute to funerals/funeral insurance/burial society	81
A place of worship (church/mosque/synagogue) in the local area	81
People who are sick are able to afford all medicines prescribed by their doctor	81
Somewhere for children to play safely outside of the house	78
Having police on the streets in the local area	77
A radio	77
Regular savings for emergencies	74
Being able to visit friends and family in hospital or other institutions	74
A neighbourhood without rubbish/refuse/garbage in the streets	74
Electric cooker	74
Someone to transport you in a vehicle if you needed to travel in an emergency	72
Someone to talk to if you are feeling upset or depressed	72
A fence or wall around the property	71
A bath or shower in the house	69
A neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air	65

Note: * 'Group' refers to women and men; people who are African, Indian, coloured and white; people aged 16–24, 25 and over, 16–64, and 65 and over; people in urban and rural areas; and people above and below the subjective poverty line. Items that have a two-thirds majority overall and for each of the groups considered in this chapter are shown in bold.

Source: SASAS (2005)

In summary, 26 of the 56 items were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population and also by 50 per cent of women, men, people who are African, coloured, Indian and white, young people aged 16 to 24, people aged 65 and over, people in urban and rural areas, and people above and below the subjective poverty line. It is important to note that 25 of these 26 items are also defined as essential by two-thirds or more of the total population – the only exception being a neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air (due to the relatively lower percentage of people in rural areas defining it as essential, at 59 per cent).

Conclusion

The list in Table 8.1 shows the 38 items that are identified as essential by the majority (50 per cent or more) of the population – an indicative set of socially perceived necessities for South Africa in 2005. It demonstrates that people do not define an acceptable standard of living simply in terms of items relating to mere survival or subsistence. Not only do the essential items reflect a lifestyle that exceeds mere survival, but they also represent the multidimensional nature of such a lifestyle in terms of aspects of poverty and social exclusion. An acceptable standard of living is defined not just in terms of *sufficient food and clothing*, but also in terms of:

- *adequate care for the sick* – having someone to look after you if you are very ill, sufficient money to pay for medical prescriptions, being able to visit sick relatives in institutions and, ultimately, being able to afford a funeral;
- *decent and secure housing* – a house that is weatherproof with a fence or wall around it, a flush toilet and a bath/shower in the house, mains electricity in the house with a working fridge, cooker and radio, and separate bedrooms for adults and children;
- *looking after children* – being able to afford their school uniforms, ensuring that all children under 10 at home are supervised by an adult, and having a safe place for the children to play outside of the house, as well as separate bedrooms for adults and children;
- *a decent neighbourhood* – street lighting, tarred roads close to the house, police on the streets in the local area, and a neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air and without rubbish/refuse/garbage in the streets;
- *supportive social relationships and religious networks* – someone to talk to if you are feeling upset or depressed, and access to a place of worship; and
- *resources to deal with emergency situations* – regular savings for emergencies, and someone to transport you in a vehicle if you needed to travel in an emergency.

It has also been demonstrated that from within this list there are a common set of 26 items (listed in Table 8.11) that are additionally defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of all of the groups considered in this chapter.

Recommendations

There are many ways in which these findings are relevant. Methodologically, the findings represent a socially derived definition of poverty and social exclusion and as such, there are many ways in which this research could be further developed.

It is recommended that the *measurement stage* should be undertaken, using a nationally representative survey, to see which items people do and do not have. This process can also be refined to distinguish between those who do not have an item and do not want it, and those who do not have an item and do want it, but cannot afford it (Pantazis, Gordon & Townsend 2006), though this brings with it further methodological challenges (Lister 2006).

An *appropriate cut-off* should be investigated, to distinguish between who is and is not poor on the basis of these socially perceived necessities (e.g. the percentage of people lacking three or more of the socially perceived necessities, as used by Gordon and Pantazis [1997]).

It would be important to explore *how this definition of poverty relates to other definitions of poverty* as there is not always a total overlap (Bradshaw & Finch 2003). It may be most useful to use more than one definition, such as lacking a certain number of socially perceived necessities and being income poor (e.g. Gordon 2006; Income and Material Deprivation Domain in Noble, Babita et al. 2006).

As has been demonstrated in other countries, *perceived necessities change over time* and so it would be good to gauge how perceptions change as time goes by in South Africa. This was found to be the case in the United Kingdom, where 30 out of 33 items were more essential in 1990 than in 1983 (Gordon & Pantazis 1997: 72–75). This is particularly relevant in the context of a country that is experiencing rapid change.

There are many ways in which this methodology could be developed and *applied to special groups* such as children (e.g. Lloyd [2006], where adults are asked about needs for children, and Noble, Wright et al. [2006], where a child-focused model of child poverty is developed that includes asking children about what they themselves consider to be necessities, in relation to certain appropriate issues).

Research has been undertaken elsewhere to look at *individual behaviour*, in terms of possessing 'luxuries' and lacking 'necessities', by comparing people's definitions of essentials with reported possessions (McKay 2004).

A *comparative analysis* of these South African findings could be undertaken to set them alongside those of other countries across the world, in both developed and developing countries (for a comparison of three European countries, see Böhnke 2001).

Of more immediate relevance, though, these findings represent the horizon on which South African people are setting their sights; the benchmark against which people measure their lives. As such, the findings offer a powerful message for the country's decision-makers about what South African people consider to be the essentials in life for an acceptable standard of living.

Appendix

How robust are the findings?

The IPSE questions were located in the Poverty and Social Exclusion (PSE) module within Version 1 of the 2005 SASAS round. A total of 2 850 interviews were successfully completed for Version 1 of SASAS 2005, which represents a response rate of 86.3 per cent. There were very few missing responses in the PSE module: (range: 0.1 per cent to 1.0 per cent; mean: 0.3 per cent). Similarly, there were very few 'do not know' values (range: 0–1.5 per cent; mean: 0.3 per cent).

Cronbach's coefficient alpha is a technique that can be used to test the reliability of the set of items that have been identified as essentials. For the 38 items that were defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the population, the scale reliability coefficient (alpha) was calculated to be 0.9045.¹³ This score measures the correlation of our set of 38 items with all other hypothetical 38-item sets of essentials. The square root of the coefficient (alpha) is the estimated correlation of our set of 38 questions with a set of errorless true scores: this was calculated to be 0.9510.

In terms of 95 per cent confidence intervals, Table 8.1 lists in bold the 38 items defined as essential by 50 per cent or more of the overall weighted population. All but one of these 38 items have a 95 per cent confidence interval lower bound that still falls above the 50 per cent threshold; the sole exception is a sofa/lounge suite (lower bound = 48.6; upper bound = 56.0). In terms of items that fall beneath the 50 per cent threshold, three items have a 95 per cent confidence upper bound that exceeds 50 per cent: a special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival (lower bound = 45.2 per cent; upper bound = 52.7 per cent); a lock-up garage for vehicles (lower bound = 42.9 per cent; upper bound = 50.5 per cent); and a small amount of money to spend on yourself, not on your family, each week (lower bound = 42.5 per cent; upper bound = 50.1 per cent).

Table 8A.1 provides the number of unweighted cases in each subgroup that are considered within the chapter.

The subjective poverty line referred to in this chapter was calculated by comparing responses to two questions in the SASAS survey: first, the respondent's total monthly household income before tax and other deductions, and second, the monthly income level that the respondent considered to be minimal for their household, that is, 'your household could not make ends meet with less' (sometimes referred to as a 'minimum income question'). In total, 25 per cent of the respondents could not be categorised by their subjective poverty level. For the household 'actual income' question, 9.8 per cent refused to reveal their household income and 13.5 per cent said they were uncertain of what it was, and so these people were excluded from the analysis. For the household 'minimum income' question, 10.4 per cent said they did not know what their minimum income would be and so these people were excluded. As the household actual income was banded, the minimum income figure was converted into the same bands.

13 The 38 items were first made into binary variables (where 1 = essential) and standardised.

TABLE 8A.1 Number of unweighted cases in each subgroup

Group	N
All	2 850
Female	1 768
Male	1 082
African	1 777
Coloured	416
Indian	324
White	333
16 to 24 year olds	513
65+ year olds	264
Rural	966
Urban	1 884
Above subjective poverty line	770
Below subjective poverty line	1 042

Source: SASAS (2005)

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Child poverty and social exclusion in South Africa

Jonathan Bradshaw and John Holmes

Background

Children are the future of South Africa. They also form a substantial minority of the population. Their importance was recognised in the National Programme for Action for Children (NPA) and the ratification by South Africa in 1995 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, as Bray and Dawes (2007) have pointed out, it has been very difficult to monitor progress towards meeting the aspirations of the NPA or the obligations of the Convention. The Child, Youth and Family Development arm of the Human Sciences Research Council did a child rights and well-being indicators study (Dawes et al. 2007) which included work on the conceptualisation of child poverty in South Africa (Noble et al. 2006; Noble et al. 2007), and in this regard Bray and Dawes (2007) have explored the indicators available on children. In her review of surveys that might be used to provide data on child poverty and well-being, Bray (2002) did not mention the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). SASAS, as the name implies, is a survey of social attitudes rather than of poverty. However, it contains a considerable number of questions useful for the investigation of poverty and has been the vehicle for testing the socially perceived necessities that were derived from the South African Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion project, funded by the Department for International Development. We therefore decided to explore SASAS to find out about the prevalence and characteristics of child poverty and social exclusion and how they have changed over time.

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, we explain how we constructed the measures of poverty and social exclusion that we used. In the second part, we analyse the characteristics of children who are poor and socially excluded, using data from the 2005 SASAS survey. Third, we explore how the prevalence of child poverty and social exclusion changed between 2003 and 2005.

Of the 5 734 households covered by the 2005 SASAS survey, we found that 56.3 per cent contained children – defined as a person aged less than 16. These households contained 6 968 children who became the unit of analysis. The same was done for the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys.

Measures of poverty and social exclusion

In industrialised countries child poverty is most commonly measured using data on household income, applying an equivalence scale and then relating it to a national threshold (Corak 2006; Förster & d’Ercole 2005; UNICEF 2005). We also use this method in this analysis. However, we have been critical of the reliance on income measures at national (Bradshaw & Finch 2003) and international level (Bradshaw 2007), on the grounds that:

- income data are difficult to collect reliably;
- it fails to take account of borrowing, savings and home production;
- the poverty thresholds used are arbitrary; and
- the equivalence scales have little basis in science.

For these reasons, this chapter complements child income poverty with two other measures derived from questions in the SASAS survey:¹ deprivation and social exclusion.

Income poverty

The 2005 SASAS survey asked respondents to choose one of 14 bands that best represented their household and personal monthly income before tax and other deductions, but including all sources of income. The income bands vary in size, but for producing an income variable we took the mid-point of each band, except for the highest band, where we took the bottom of the band: R30 000. However, only about 80 per cent of the 2005 sample provided income data and it was clear from preliminary analysis that there were differences in the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents to the income question. We imputed the income variable using a sequential regression multiple imputation (SRMI) technique. Put simply, SRMI uses the data on the characteristics and income of respondents to predict the incomes of non-respondents through a series of regression models. This is carried out n times (10 in this instance) to produce n (10) possible values for the income variable for each case. The imputed values for each variable may differ from imputation to imputation, and so any estimates produced using the data may differ from one imputation to another. Therefore, we averaged the n estimates to produce a final estimate. See Raghunathan et al. (2001) for further details on the SRMI technique.

We imputed all cases where the income was missing or where the respondent refused to answer or answered 'do not know'. For cases where the respondent claimed to have no income, yet was employed, we set the values to missing and then imputed. In total, we imputed 20.1 per cent of cases that had missing or 'implausible' income data.

The variables used to impute income in the 2005 sample were: race; type of dwelling; roof material; source of water; toilet facility; connection to mains electricity; fridge/freezer; domestic worker; M-Net/DSTV subscription; dishwasher; home security service; in the past year, members of household went hungry; number of people in household; environmental milieu; and province.² We used similar variables for the 2003 and 2004 data where possible.

Then we applied an equivalence scale to the data in order to adjust income to the needs of households of different sizes and compositions, and to take account of economies of scale. In the absence of an

- 1 We also tried a subjective measure based on a comparison of income with what respondents felt was minimal for their household – 'your household could not make ends meet with less'. However, the results produced did not give a reliable representation of poverty. Aspirations were bounded by the very different realities of respondents' lives. Only 35.2 per cent of children were defined as subjectively poor using this measure.
- 2 Multiple imputations are generally preferred to a single imputation and SRMI is preferred to other multiple imputation methods for several reasons. First, SRMI is a multiple imputation technique which allows estimation of the variance introduced in the imputations. Second, SRMI can handle very complex data structures (e.g. count, binary, continuous and categorical variables) that other imputation methods find problematic. Third, given that SRMI imputes values through a sequence of multiple regressions, covariates include all other variables observed and imputed from previous rounds. This sequence of imputing missing values builds interdependence among imputed values and exploits the correlation structure among covariates (Raghunathan et al. 2001). The software used in the imputation was IVEware (<http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/smp/ive/>), which was developed exclusively by Raghunathan et al. to perform SRMI. We are very grateful to Helen Barnes from CASASP at the University of Oxford who undertook this analysis for us.


equivalence scale derived for the South African context, we used the square root of the number of people in the household, which is the equivalence scale used most commonly in analyses of poverty, based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), and is similar to the modified Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) scale.

The application of an equivalence scale to the original distribution of 14 groups and the imputed income has the effect of expanding the distribution to a much more disaggregated distribution, shown in Figure 9.1. The distribution is negatively skewed with the median equivalent income (R511) well below the mean (R1 205).

The next task was to apply a poverty threshold in order to estimate a child poverty rate. There is no consensus in South Africa (or elsewhere) about what poverty threshold to use. In Europe, EUROSTAT – the statistical office of the European communities – has settled on a threshold of less than 60 per cent of equivalent median income, and OECD and most LIS analysis is based on less than 50 per cent of median equivalent income. However, because the 2005 SASAS survey income data derive from income bands, the distribution is effectively truncated at the lower threshold of the upper band. This means that the SASAS survey data cannot be effectively used to describe the income distribution, nor can it be used to derive thresholds based on the mean or median income. Accordingly, we decided that the threshold should be externally derived.

We tried the World Bank measure of US\$1 per person per day (R7 per person a day gave 51 per cent of children living in poverty). However, we were not happy with the threshold – not only is it entirely arbitrary, but because it already has its own (very generous) equivalence scale, it has to be applied to unequivalised income, which in the SASAS survey, means the 14 income bands post-imputation. This produces inconsistent and arbitrary results.

FIGURE 9.1 *Distribution of children by the equivalent income of the household**



Notes: * Rands per month.
 Cases weighted by BENCHWEIGHT.

No threshold is entirely satisfactory. Noble et al. (2006) derived a poverty threshold from the South African Income and Expenditure Survey for the Provincial Indices of Deprivation of 40 per cent of mean equivalent income (R10 189) per annum, which at the time coincided with a threshold of 40 per cent of the mean of the full income distribution, inflated to 2001, using the Cost Price Index. In our truncated distribution, this was almost exactly 70 per cent of the mean equivalent income. This is R843 per month or R27.7 per day per household – that would be \$1 per day per person in a four-person household. This gives 66.2 per cent of South African children living in households below this threshold in 2005.³

Deprivation

Deprivation is a more direct measure of poverty than low income. It seeks to identify what items (and activities) people are deprived of because of low income. The team at the Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy (CASASP) at the University of Oxford have been undertaking qualitative research to establish what items and activities every household should have in South Africa, and the 2005 SASAS survey included questions to establish what proportion of the population considered they were necessary (see Chapter 8 in this volume). However, the survey did not ask whether respondents lacked all these necessities (though the 2006 SASAS survey did). We therefore had to establish our own set of deprivation items. The 2005 survey had 21 items that might contribute to a deprivation scale and we reduced that to the 9 items listed in Table 9.1. Fridge-freezers and electric stoves were not included in 2003 and 2004. Noticeable are the very rapid increases in cell-phone ownership over the period and the increase in the proportion of households with connection to grid electricity.

TABLE 9.1 *Children in households having (not lacking) a deprivation item (percentage)*

Item	2003	2004	2005
Running hot water	19.3	23.1	21.9
Fridge-freezer	–	–	58.3
Cell phone	29.7	43.3	63.1
Electric stove	–	–	46.7
TV	61.2	65.2	64.7
Radio	69.5	67.2	68.0
Toilet	40.3	48.7	41.5
Landline telephone	19.0	20.7	16.3
Connection to grid electricity	65.4	73.0	76.4

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Table 9.2 gives the proportion of children living in households by the number of items lacking. In 2005, only 8.0 per cent lacked no items and only 4.2 per cent lacked all nine items. Generally, there has been an increase in ownership rates over time.

³ It was 67.4 per cent in 2004 and 67.9 per cent in 2003, using the same threshold.

TABLE 9.2 *Number of deprivation items lacking (percentage)*

Number of deprivation items lacking	2003	2004	2005	
			Comparable	Full List
0	6.1	6.7	8.0	8.0
1	7.6	11.0	12.0	11.4
2	10.4	12.7	10.4	8.6
3	13.5	15.6	18.1	10.9
4	20.2	20.8	18.5	12.1
5	18.0	16.8	16.3	10.3
6	18.7	12.2	12.3	10.5
7	5.6	4.1	4.3	12.4
8				11.6
9				4.2
Total*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: * Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Missing cells in 2003 and 2004 are because only seven deprivation items were included.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Social exclusion

There is debate in the literature (Bradshaw 2004; Gornick 2002; Levitas 1998; Micklewright 2002; Room 1995) as to whether social exclusion is a component or an elaboration of poverty, or something qualitatively different. There have been rather few attempts internationally to operationalise social exclusion as a survey instrument (but see Burchardt et al. 2002). In seeking to operationalise it with this survey, we were influenced by the experience of undertaking the Poverty and Social Exclusion (PSE) survey of Britain (Gordon et al. 2000), which dealt with social exclusion as a set of domains. One of these domains was employment exclusion. Unfortunately, the SASAS survey only asked whether the respondent or spouse was employed (or disabled) and that information is not sufficient to tell whether a child is living in a workless household (or with a disabled person), or the number of employed (or disabled) people in the household. The 2006 SASAS survey dealt with this problem by asking about employment and disability in the household grid. Another domain that we could not replicate using the 2005 SASAS survey data was exclusion from social relationships, including someone available to help in emergencies or to talk to about difficulties. However, the other domains in the PSE survey could be represented using questions in the SASAS survey.

There is some overlap in the items used to represent social exclusion and those used in the deprivation index, but it is worth reusing them because they seek to represent a different construct here. Following are the domains of social exclusion that were included.

Service exclusion

This covers problems with water, sanitation and electricity. The 2005 SASAS survey contained three useful questions on water, two of which had also been used in the 2003 and 2004 surveys (whether it is piped and reliably supplied). As Table 9.3 shows, 56.8 per cent of children in 2005 lived in households with some difficulties with their water supply. There is not much evidence here of a reduction in water exclusion over time.

TABLE 9.3 *Water exclusion, by household (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Has no piped water on site	46.9	40.8	45.2
Supply unreliable	23.2	30.1	24.9
Water unsafe to drink	–	–	10.6
Water excluded	–	–	56.8
Comparable water excluded	52.1	56.9	55.5

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

TABLE 9.4 *Sanitation exclusion, by household (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Doesn't have flush toilet	59.7	54.3	53.8
Toilet in poor condition	–	–	16.6
Unsatisfactory waste water disposal	–	–	41.5
Sanitation excluded	–	–	60.0
Comparable sanitation excluded	59.7	54.3	53.8

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

TABLE 9.5 *Electricity exclusion, by household (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Does not have access to an electricity supply	34.6	27.0	23.6

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

The 2005 SASAS survey included eight questions on aspects of sanitation and we selected three of these: flush toilets, the condition of toilets and whether the disposal of waste water was satisfactory. However, only one of these items was also asked in 2003 and 2004 – whether the household had a flush toilet. In 2005, 53.8 per cent of households with children lacked a flush toilet, though there is some evidence of that proportion falling over time (Table 9.4).

The SASAS surveys asked respondents whether their households had access to an electricity supply. As indicated in Table 9.5, 23.6 per cent of children in 2005 were living in households lacking a supply, but that proportion had declined by 11 percentage points since 2003.

Communications exclusion

There were questions in the SASAS surveys covering access to a landline phone, a cell phone and the internet. As only 5.2 per cent of households with children had the latter, we excluded it. As shown in Table 9.6, in 2005, only 12.3 per cent of children lived in households with both a landline and a cell phone.

TABLE 9.6 *Communication exclusion, by household (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Lacking landline phone in the home	81.0	79.3	83.7
Lacking access to a cell phone	70.3	56.7	46.1
Communication excluded	90.4	87.9	87.7

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Housing exclusion

The SASAS surveys asked two questions covering the weather resistance of the roof and the walls of the dwelling. Table 9.7 indicates that 11.7 per cent of children in 2005 were living in homes that were not weather resistant on at least one of these factors.

TABLE 9.7 *Housing exclusion, by household (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Roof not weather resistant	9.6	13.9	9.3
Walls not weather resistant	3.7	2.9	2.7
Housing excluded	12.9	15.7	11.7

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Excluded by fear

The 2005 SASAS survey asked five questions about feeling safe and fear of crime, of which we used three: whether respondents feel unsafe on most days, whether they have considered moving house due to fear of crime, and whether they worry about their family becoming victims of crime. As shown in Table 9.8, only 53.6 per cent of children in 2005 lived in households with no fear of crime and 4.8 per cent lived in households where fear of crime existed on all dimensions. These questions were not included in earlier surveys.

TABLE 9.8 *Fear exclusion, by household (percentage)*

	2005
Feels unsafe on most days	33.8
Considered moving house because of fear	11.6
Worry about family being a victim of crime	29.4
Fear excluded	46.4

Source: SASAS (2005)

Citizenship exclusion

Four questions in the surveys represented citizenship exclusion:

- whether voting makes a difference (in 2005, 26.0 per cent felt it didn't);
- whether politics is too complicated to understand (in 2005, 50.6 per cent felt it was);
- whether voted in last national election (in 2005, 15.3 per cent said they did not [excluding those too young]);
- whether will vote in next national election (in 2005, 7.1 per cent said they would not [excluding those too young]).

Sixty-three per cent held one or more of the above negative attitudes to their citizenship position in 2005 (Table 9.9).

TABLE 9.9 *Citizenship exclusion (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Voting makes no difference	37.1	19.1	26.0
Politics too complicated to understand	54.1	46.4	50.6
Did not vote in last general election	11.3	16.3	15.3
Will not vote in next general election	8.1	5.4	7.1
Citizenship excluded	63.8	56.1	63.0

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Establishing thresholds

In making comparisons between the characteristics of children living in income poverty, deprivation and social exclusion, it is helpful to aim to include roughly the same proportion of children so that differences between groups cannot be ascribed to differences in the size of the groups. This consideration guided us in setting thresholds. The level of the rates is arbitrary; what is important is the differences in the rates between groups and between measures.

We already have a threshold for the income poverty, with 66.2 per cent of children below it in 2005. On deprivation, lacking two or more items gives us 69.5 per cent. Social exclusion in two or more domains gives us 61.0 per cent (accepting that we only use the questions available for all three years).

Table 9.10 summarises the characteristics of poor children living below each of these thresholds in 2005. In the final three columns, we present the proportions that are classified as poor on any one of our dimensions, on two out of the three dimensions, and on all three dimensions. The proportion of children who are poor on any one of the measures is higher than those who are poor on the separate measures. That is because there are children who are poor on some dimensions and not on others. Indeed, about 12 per cent are poor on one of the measures, but not poor on either of the others. This is inevitably the case because the proportions that are poor on the separate measures are not equal. However, it may also arise for a variety of other reasons, including that the data are unreliable. The purpose of this 'overlaps analysis' is to increase the reliability of the measure of child poverty. Therefore, those who are poor on two or three measures are more likely to be poor. Those who are poor on all three measures (49.0 per cent) are also more likely to be poorer than those who are poor on one (79.9 per cent) or two (67.8 per cent) measures.

More specifically, the child poverty rate is:

- Highest for African children on all dimensions and more than half are poor on all three measures.
- The more children in the family, the higher the risk of income poverty and deprivation and social exclusion after the second child.
- The younger the child in the household, the more likely they are to be poor.
- If there is a pensioner in the household, then there is a higher risk of poverty.
- Children in one-adult families and families where there are six or more adults have the highest poverty risk.
- Children in the Eastern Cape have the highest income poverty rate, but deprivation and social exclusion are highest in Limpopo. Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal all have the highest rates of poverty and social exclusion on three out of three measures. These provinces include the former homelands.
- The highest child poverty rates across all domains are in areas designated urban informal and rural informal.

TABLE 9.10 *Child poverty and social exclusion rates, 2005 (percentage)*

	Income poor	Deprived	Socially excluded	1/3	2/3	3/3
All children						
	66.2	69.5	61.0	79.9	67.8	49.0
Number of children in the household						
1	52.3	59.0	53.5	71.8	55.4	37.5
2	53.6	61.0	50.8	70.3	56.8	38.2
3	67.4	72.7	64.3	82.8	72.1	49.6
4	72.9	73.4	63.9	79.0	73.2	57.9
5+	90.2	84.3	76.3	98.6	85.0	67.2
Age of youngest child						
0–4	71.0	73.8	65.8	82.3	74.0	54.3
5–8	67.6	67.6	58.9	81.1	65.5	47.5
9–12	51.3	62.6	52.7	74.2	53.9	38.5
13–15	50.5	53.8	47.4	65.4	51.2	35.2
Pensioner in the household						
No	62.9	65.8	57.5	76.5	64.5	45.2
Yes	77.0	81.6	72.0	91.0	78.2	61.3
Number of adults in the household						
1	84.8	86.2	77.3	94.2	85.2	68.8
2	60.7	64.7	58.6	73.8	63.9	46.3
3	61.8	67.5	58.3	77.3	64.5	45.7
4	68.3	69.3	58.1	82.9	67.5	45.3
5	67.3	63.1	53.7	77.3	61.1	45.7
6+	76.5	87.0	79.4	93.0	85.7	64.2
Population group						
African	72.0	76.8	66.5	85.7	74.2	55.3
Coloured	48.9	44.8	44.2	69.7	49.4	18.9
Indian	15.9	4.2	20.1	27.0	10.6	2.7
White	7.7	1.4	3.8	11.8	1.1	n.c.



	Income poor	Deprived	Socially excluded	1/3	2/3	3/3
Province						
Western Cape	38.4	34.4	39.2	59.3	38.5	14.2
Eastern Cape	84.9	87.0	80.0	92.8	87.0	72.0
Northern Cape	72.1	67.2	26.6	81.8	62.9	21.3
Free State	69.4	70.8	53.5	78.2	68.3	47.2
KwaZulu-Natal	70.2	77.0	77.4	86.2	75.5	62.8
North West	74.3	83.3	58.2	91.3	78.8	45.7
Gauteng	38.6	30.6	17.6	48.3	26.6	11.9
Mpumalanga	72.9	75.2	65.3	87.3	72.7	53.3
Limpopo	78.3	93.8	87.2	96.4	92.8	70.2
Environmental milieu						
Urban formal	41.7	34.1	23.5	54.5	31.6	13.3
Urban informal	85.7	93.3	86.2	98.7	91.5	74.9
Rural informal	85.1	97.2	90.6	99.4	96.2	77.3
Rural formal	73.5	84.5	74.0	90.4	83.2	58.4

Note: n.c. = number too small to calculate.
Source: SASAS (2005)

Table 9.11 compares the composition of poor children. Among the most interesting results for those poor on all dimensions are:

- More than half of poor children are in a household with a child under five.
- Nearly a third have a pensioner in the household.
- Ninety-seven per cent of children poor on all dimensions are African. Very few white or Indian children are poor on all dimensions.
- Two-thirds of these children live in rural informal areas.

TABLE 9.11 *Child poverty and social exclusion composition (percentage)*

	Income poor	Deprived	Socially excluded	1/3	2/3	3/3
All children						
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of children in the household						
1	12.1	13.0	13.4	13.7	12.5	11.7
2	22.8	24.7	23.5	24.8	23.6	22.0
3	23.3	24.0	24.2	23.7	24.4	23.2
4	16.8	16.1	16.0	15.1	16.5	18.0
5+	25.0	22.2	22.9	22.6	23.0	25.1
Age of youngest child						
0-4	58.0	57.5	58.3	55.8	59.2	59.7
5-8	27.5	26.2	25.9	27.3	26.0	25.9
9-12	10.4	12.1	11.6	12.5	10.7	10.5
13-15	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.1	3.9

	Income poor	Deprived	Socially excluded	1/3	2/3	3/3
Pensioner in the household						
No	72.5	72.2	72.1	73.1	72.7	70.4
Yes	27.5	27.8	27.9	26.9	27.3	29.6
Number of adults in the household						
1	7.2	7.0	7.2	6.7	7.1	7.9
2	24.8	25.2	26.0	25.0	25.5	25.6
3	24.1	25.1	24.7	25.0	24.6	24.1
4	17.6	17.0	16.3	17.7	17.0	15.8
5	14.2	12.7	12.3	13.5	12.6	13.0
6+	12.0	13.0	13.5	12.1	13.1	13.6
Race of respondent						
African	93.6	95.0	93.8	92.2	94.3	97.1
Coloured	5.5	4.8	5.4	6.4	5.4	2.8
Indian	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.1
White	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.1	n.c.
Province						
Western Cape	3.6	3.0	3.9	4.6	3.5	1.8
Eastern Cape	19.1	18.7	19.6	17.3	19.2	21.9
Northern Cape	2.0	1.8	0.8	1.9	1.7	0.8
Free State	5.6	5.5	4.7	5.2	5.4	5.2
KwaZulu-Natal	24.9	26.0	29.8	25.3	26.2	30.1
North West	9.8	10.4	8.3	9.9	10.1	8.1
Gauteng	10.9	8.2	5.4	11.3	7.3	4.5
Mpumalanga	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.2	7.3
Limpopo	16.8	19.2	20.3	17.1	19.4	20.3
Environmental milieu						
Urban formal	26.5	20.7	16.3	28.7	19.6	11.4
Urban informal	12.8	13.2	13.9	12.2	13.3	15.1
Rural informal	54.4	59.2	62.9	52.6	60.0	66.7
Rural formal	6.3	7.0	6.9	6.5	7.0	6.8

Note: n.c. = number too small to calculate.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Logistic regression of the odds of a child being poor

Because many of the individual characteristics overlap, we undertook a logistic regression analysis of the odds of a child being poor on each of our dimensions. Table 9.12 summarises the results. Having controlled for other factors:

- African children are much more likely than the other population groups to be poor. The only exception to this is that coloured children are no less likely than African children to be socially excluded.
- Children in 3+ child families are more likely to be income poor. The pattern for the other measures is more variable, but children in 4+ child families are more likely to be poor on all measures.
- If there is a child under five in the household, there are higher odds of child poverty on most measures.
- Children in households with one adult have a consistently higher child poverty rate. After that, child deprivation and social exclusion increase the more adults there are in the household.

- Children in pensioner households are more likely to be income poor, deprived and poor on all measures. There is little evidence here of the old age grant acting to reduce the odds of child poverty.
- Children in the Eastern Cape have higher odds of poverty on most measures, particularly on three out of three dimensions. Limpopo children also have higher odds, except for the income poverty dimension. Children in KwaZulu-Natal have higher odds of social exclusion and children in the Northern Cape, higher odds of deprivation. The odds of child poverty are higher than in the Western Cape in all provinces except Gauteng. Children in the Northern Cape, the Free State, North West and Mpumalanga have lower odds of social exclusion than children in the Western Cape.
- Children in urban informal settings have the highest odds of income poverty and social exclusion and of being poor in three out of three dimensions. Children in rural informal settings have the highest odds of being deprived.

TABLE 9.12 Logistic regression of the odds of being poor

	Income poor	Deprived	Socially excluded	1/3	2/3	3/3
Constant	1.11	1.55*	0.72	5.23***	1.39	0.15***
Nagelkerke R ²	0.45	0.65	0.53	0.60	0.63	0.54
Cox & Snell R ²	0.33	0.47	0.40	0.40	0.46	0.40
Number of children in the household						
1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
2	1.07	1.02	0.79**	0.84	0.94	1.04
3	1.39***	1.01	1.09	1.02	1.40***	1.19
4	2.14***	0.74**	1.08	0.96	1.21	1.66***
5+	3.39***	0.95	0.88	2.19***	1.83***	1.41***
Age of youngest child						
0–4	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
5–8	0.88	0.89	0.93	0.98	0.80**	0.88
9–12	0.72***	0.73***	0.84*	0.66***	0.64***	0.87
13–15	0.78*	0.61***	1.00	0.71*	0.73*	0.90
Pensioner in the household						
No	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yes	1.56***	1.21*	1.04	1.67***	1.11	1.27***
Number of adults in the household						
1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
2	0.43***	0.38***	0.59***	0.28***	0.40***	0.56***
3	0.41***	0.29***	0.57***	0.27***	0.33***	0.49***
4	0.56***	0.35***	0.66***	0.50***	0.38***	0.52***
5	0.50***	0.50***	0.70**	0.57**	0.43***	0.55***
6+	0.47***	0.60**	0.71*	0.62*	0.47***	0.56***
Race of respondent						
African	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Coloured	0.74***	0.63***	1.06	0.75***	0.91*	0.62***
Indian	0.19***	0.07***	0.32***	0.16***	0.16***	0.10***
White	0.04***	0.01***	0.08***	0.04***	0.01***	0.00*

	Income poor	Deprived	Socially excluded	1/3	2/3	3/3
Province						
Western Cape	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Eastern Cape	3.18***	2.67***	2.68***	2.70***	2.76***	5.95***
Northern Cape	3.85***	4.84***	0.51***	3.09***	2.80***	1.74***
Free State	1.88***	1.77***	0.74*	0.99	1.37*	2.24***
KwaZulu-Natal	1.06	1.03	1.69***	0.95	0.75*	2.99***
North West	1.87***	2.25***	0.89	1.85***	1.55**	2.08***
Gauteng	0.83	0.63***	0.46***	0.44***	0.46***	1.14
Mpumalanga	1.54***	1.18	0.86	1.40*	0.86	1.94***
Limpopo	1.25	2.36***	2.11***	1.23	1.73***	3.15***
Environmental milieu						
Urban formal	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Urban informal	7.41***	28.31***	14.44***	43.34***	23.75***	16.00***
Rural informal	4.27***	34.26***	14.22***	54.91***	30.62***	10.12***
Rural formal	4.34***	10.62***	7.43***	6.64***	10.50***	10.18***

Note: *= $p < 0.1$, **= $p < 0.05$, ***= $p < 0.01$.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Change over time

We replicated this analysis of the 2005 SASAS survey on the 2003 and 2004 surveys to observe what changes had occurred over time in the prevalence of child poverty. In order to do this, we used a fixed threshold for all the measures. Ideally, the thresholds should change over time to take account of changes in general living standards. As shown in Table 9.13, there was a slight reduction in the child income poverty rate, although this is not statistically significant. There was a statistically significant reduction in deprivation between 2003 and 2004, which can be mainly attributed to the increase in the proportion of children in households connected to grid electricity and having a cell phone. The reduction in social exclusion each year, especially between 2004 and 2005, can be attributed to improvements in housing and access to services. Our overlaps measure also shows quite a steady four to five percentage point reduction in severe child poverty.

TABLE 9.13 *Child poverty and social exclusion rates (percentage)*

	2003	2004	2005
Income poor	67.9	67.4	66.2
Deprived	75.9	69.5	69.5
Socially excluded	76.7	73.8	61.0
Poor on one dimension	86.0	84.0	79.9
Poor on two dimensions	76.0	72.0	67.8
Poor on three dimensions	58.5	54.7	49.0

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Table 9.14 takes those who were poor on all three measures and shows how their characteristics changed over the three years. Overall, child poverty using this measure declined by 9.5 percentage points or 16.2 per cent between 2003 and 2005. Most of the variations observed in the poverty rates in the table are due to sampling errors, but it appears there was much less reduction in child poverty in 5+ child families; in households with a pensioner; in one-adult and 6+ adult households; in KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo; and in urban informal and rural informal areas.

There was much more reduction in child poverty among coloured and Indian people; in the Northern Cape (very small numbers), Gauteng and North West; and in urban and rural formal areas.

TABLE 9.14 *Changes in the characteristics of children who are poor on three out of three of the measures (percentage)*

3/3	2003	2004	2005
All children			
	58.5	54.7	49.0
Number of children in the household			
1	42.7	46.1	37.5
2	48.2	48.9	38.2
3	60.8	55.2	49.6
4	73.0	66.4	57.9
5+	69.4	64.5	67.2
Age of youngest child			
0-4	65.7	59.7	54.3
5-8	56.3	50.1	47.5
9-12	45.7	47.0	38.5
13-15	42.3	44.4	35.2
Pensioner in the household			
No	56.0	51.5	45.2
Yes	65.8	64.4	61.3
Number of adults in the household			
1	76.7	77.2	68.8
2	56.6	48.5	46.3
3	54.0	53.3	45.7
4	56.7	52.0	45.3
5	58.4	61.5	45.7
6+	59.1	56.7	64.2
Race of respondent			
African	65.7	62.1	55.3
Coloured	27.5	27.2	18.9
Indian	5.5	3.1	2.7
White	n.c.	0.8	n.c.

3/3	2003	2004	2005
Province			
Western Cape	16.3	15.1	14.2
Eastern Cape	82.6	76.8	72.0
Northern Cape	44.4	40.9	21.3
Free State	57.6	50.8	47.2
KwaZulu-Natal	59.9	59.7	62.8
North West	76.1	65.2	45.7
Gauteng	27.8	32.8	11.9
Mpumalanga	65.1	56.8	53.3
Limpopo	76.0	71.8	70.2
Environmental milieu			
Urban formal	24.5	24.2	13.3
Urban informal	76.2	76.5	74.9
Rural informal	81.3	80.6	77.3
Rural formal	81.6	68.6	58.4

Note: n.c. = numbers too small to calculate.

Sources: SASAS (2003, 2004, 2005)

Conclusion

This chapter has been an exploratory attempt to use the 2005 SASAS survey to investigate the prevalence and characteristics of child poverty and social exclusion in South Africa, using the child as the unit of analysis. The fact that the income data were grouped into only 14 bands was a limitation, but we were able to use SRMI techniques and an equivalence scale to create an income distribution; we then applied a threshold to it to produce income poverty rates. Using this fixed threshold, there was no significant reduction in child income poverty between 2003 and 2005, although given the problems with the data, this needs to be checked using other sources. We were also able to produce an index of child deprivation. The 2005 survey had more items to include in this index than the 2003 and 2004 surveys; the 2006 survey, which includes the CASASP socially perceived necessities, will be even more useful for this purpose. Nevertheless, the analysis in this chapter suggests that child deprivation declined between 2003 and 2005. The measure of social exclusion we created was better for 2005 than for 2003 and 2004. However, the 2006 survey will be better still because it includes questions on employment exclusion and disability, which can be incorporated. The evidence from the measure that we used suggests that social exclusion is falling.

Despite their limitations, the SASAS surveys are useful vehicles for monitoring child poverty and social exclusion over time. They will improve. For policy-makers, there are some findings in this chapter to reflect on. Child poverty is high in South Africa. However, because the thresholds used are inevitably arbitrary, analysis of variations in the rates and composition and variations over time are more useful than the absolute level. Among the factors that may interest policy-makers are the strong associations between child poverty and one-adult households, the provincial variations, the concentration in rural informal areas and, of course, the very much higher prevalence among the African population.

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3

SOCIETAL VALUES

Christianity in South Africa: Theory and practice

Stephen Rule and Bongiwe Mncwango

Introduction

How closely aligned are the beliefs and practices of Christians with the prescriptions and requirements of the church and the Bible? Given that more than 80 per cent of South Africans call themselves Christians, this chapter interrogates the extent to which there are degrees of orthodoxy or liberalism in the interpretation of Christian precepts. Among the issues explored are beliefs about the Bible, prayer, astrology, obligations towards the state, the death penalty, sexuality and abortion. In the 2004 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a set of questions based on the International Social Survey Programme's module on religion, with some locally conceived additions, was administered to a sample of 2 191 adults.

In national surveys, there is a consistent over-reporting on issues such as frequency of attendance at religious meetings and voting in elections, respondents tending to give answers that they feel are socially acceptable or politically correct. In spite of what they say, there appears to be a growing chasm between Christians' religious ideals and their practical living. Other writers attribute this to the rise of the autonomous conscience, which is characterised by an 'increasing confinement of religion and moral choice to [the] private rather than public sphere' (Sullins 2003: 4). For Halman (1995), this increase in emphasis on the individual can be regarded as a threat to collectively shared moral views as it fosters a shift from traditional institutions (church, family) towards personal morality. Consequently, people are no longer relying on the prescriptions of traditional institutions such as churches on issues like abortion, the death penalty and sexual orientation; instead, decisions on such issues have become increasingly based on personal preferences (Halman 1995).

Ester et al. (1994: 1) refer to this as 'individualisation', a process whereby individuals develop norms and values autonomously, as part of their own self-actualisation and achievement of 'self-happiness'. Elaborating on the thesis of German political economist and sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), pertaining to the 'Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism', Bellah (2002) points out that economic prosperity, as well as successful democracy and environmentalism, are all positive outcomes of the Protestant Reformation. However, a negative impact in the United States, but arguably much more widely, is the contemporary fixation with self (Bellah et al. 1985; Putnam 2000). In the United States, even among churchgoers, Bellah (2002: 18) observes cynically that 'participation is less about loyalty and a strong conviction of membership and more about what one will get out of participating. Even evangelical churches that used to be able to count on their members now have to offer incentives, to "sell" their programs as adding value to the participants'. In response to this contention, Warren (2002) points out the irony of this, Christianity being theoretically fundamentally oriented towards 'others'.

Dogan (1995) points out that because of the lack of commonly accepted standards, each individual tends to become his or her own moral guide. There is simultaneously a popular assertion that most modern societies are experiencing moral decline. Some refer to this trend as secularisation, that is, 'gods' becoming demystified and losing their powers to guide choices (see Berger 1990; Turner 1991 cited in Sullins 2003). Individualisation and secularisation have led to changes in the religious domain, reflected in the declining importance of religious institutions, activities and consciousness (Ester et al. 1994). Secularisation thus impacts on individual behaviour (such as attending church services less frequently, if at all), resulting in the diminished influence of religion on daily life and a decrease in orthodox religious beliefs (Ester et al. 1994).¹ Parallel to the decrease in religious commitment is a concomitant tendency among religious believers to embrace contradictions and eclecticism. This chapter interrogates the tendency towards ambivalence, focusing on religious orthodoxy in relation to other social indicators.

The data collected in the 2004 SASAS survey include perceptions about the Bible, praying and horoscopes, and opinions regarding homosexuality, abortion and the death penalty. Respondents were also asked their views about tax compliance and fraudulence in applying for social grants. Some of these issues have sparked debates within Christendom. In the 2003 SASAS survey (Rule & Mncwango 2005), the traditionalism (social conservatism) of South Africans emerged clearly. Three-quarters (75 per cent) supported the death penalty, 78 per cent felt that sexual relations between adults of the same gender were 'always wrong' and 56 per cent that abortion, in the event that the family could not afford to support the child, was 'always wrong'. Pressure groups thus persist variously in i) either celebrating the abolition or calling for the return of capital punishment, ii) opposing or promoting the constitutional rights of homosexuals, and iii) discouraging or encouraging the practice of abortion. This chapter explores, inter alia, the extent to which such views correlate with values in relation to religious doctrinal orthodoxy and personal honesty in dealing with the state bureaucracy.

Religious affiliation

Studies internationally often find high proportions of people claiming to belong to a religion (Sinelina 2003). In the 2001 Census, 83.5 per cent of South Africans identified themselves with a religion, the vast majority of these being Christians. The plethora of groupings and denominations makes categorisation difficult, given that significant numbers opt for labels such as 'Christian', 'other Christian', 'Christian unspecified' and 'other'. However, there are broadly six groupings, as shown in Table 10.1. The largest are the African Independent Churches (AICs) (32 per cent), comprising mainly the Zionist Christian Church (ZCC), the Bandla Lama Nazaretha (Shembe) Church, the St Johns Apostolic Church and others. Second largest are the traditional mainline Protestants (25 per cent), primarily Methodist, Dutch Reformed (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk and Gereformeerde Kerk), Anglican, Lutheran and Baptist. Next are the large number of Pentecostal and Charismatic churches (15 per cent), including the older Apostolic Faith Mission, Assemblies of God and Full Gospel churches, as well as newer independent groupings such as Rhema, New Covenant, Pentecostal Holiness and many smaller independent churches. Large proportions of these simply refer to themselves as 'Christian'. Fourth largest are the Roman Catholics (7 per cent) ahead of 'other' religions (4 per cent), mainly Islam, Hinduism and Judaism. Finally, about one in six (16 per cent) report having no religion or not knowing or refusing to reveal their religious affiliations.

1 Recent work in sociology and political science, however, has reopened the conclusiveness about secularisation as an inevitable international trend (Berger 1999; Norris & Inglehart 2004). Western Europe and a few other wealthy countries (excluding the United States) emerge as exceptions to the international growth of religious commitment and fervour.

TABLE 10.1 *Identification with a religion, 2001*

Religious grouping	N	Percentage
African Independent	14 541 969	32.45
Mainline Protestant	11 195 785	24.98
Pentecostal/Charismatic	6 831 555	15.24
Roman Catholic	3 181 332	7.10
Other (Islam, Hinduism, Judaism)	1 690 994	3.77
None/refused/don't know	7 378 139	16.46
Total	44 819 774	100.00

Source: Census 2001, Republic of South Africa

In Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) surveys in 2000 and 2001 (see HSRC 2002; Rule 2000), when asked to state their religious affiliation, the proportions reporting no religion were 12 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. In the 2003 and 2004 SASAS surveys, however, respondents were explicitly asked whether they considered themselves as belonging to any religion and the proportions saying no were somewhat higher, at 17 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Thus, at least in terms of what they say, South Africans are a very religious people.

Beliefs about God

Dogan has argued that 'belief in the existence of God is an observable social artefact' (1995: 406). He stated that even though God might not be visible, sociologically it is possible to tell whether God is present or absent in someone's mind. He contends that a decline in belief in God is a decline in intensity of faith. Respondents in the 2004 SASAS survey were given a scale indicating various possible beliefs about God and asked which statement came closest to expressing what they believe about God. As shown in Table 10.2, an overwhelming 74 per cent selected the option that God exists and that they have no doubts about it. Seven per cent said that although they have doubts about God's existence, they still believe in Him, and 7 per cent believe in God sometimes but not all the time. A further 6 per cent do not believe in God, but in some other higher power, and 6 per cent do not know whether God exists and do not believe that there is any way of finding out.

Provincially, the proportions expressing no doubts about God's existence ranged from highs exceeding 80 per cent in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Free State, to lows of 66 per cent in the Eastern Cape and 58 per cent in Limpopo, the latter two provinces correlating with high proportions living in the former bantustan regions. The extremes reflected differences in levels of urbanisation, which was confirmed by a further cross-tabulation of beliefs about God with respondents' environmental milieu. Thus, the highest proportions of people without doubts about God live in urban formal areas (81 per cent), declining quite markedly to 71 per cent in commercial farming (formal rural) areas, 70 per cent in urban informal settlements and only 64 per cent in rural informal settings.

Another significant cleavage occurs in relation to gender, with 77 per cent of females having no doubts about God's existence, as opposed to only 71 per cent of males. In contrast, almost one-tenth (9 per cent) of males, but only 4 per cent of females, said that they believe in a higher power rather than in God. A linear relationship appears to hold between lack of doubt about God and level of education, from 61 per cent of those with no formal education and 70 per cent of those with primary level education, to 78 per cent of those with a matric pass and 80 per cent of those with post-matric qualifications. Similarly,

TABLE 10.2 *Beliefs about God, by province (percentage)*

Belief	GT	KZN	WC	NC	FS	NW	MP	LP	EC	RSA
I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it.	78	82	83	72	81	68	71	58	66	74
While I have doubts, I feel that I believe in God.	6	7	9	6	12	4	3	7	6	7
I find myself believing in God some times, but not at other times.	7	5	3	4	4	7	6	17	6	7
I don't believe in a personal god, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind.	6	4	5	6	1	8	13	11	8	6
I don't know whether there is God and I don't know if there is any way to find out.	3	2	0	12	2	13	7	7	14	6

Note: See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.

Source: SASAS (2004)

69 per cent of those with the lowest household incomes of below R1 500 per month have no doubts about God. This proportion rises to 73 per cent of the R1 501 to R7 500 per month category, 84 per cent of those with household incomes in excess of R7 500 and 84 per cent of those who did not divulge their income, the latter usually being wealthier rather than poorer. Examined in terms of race, belief in God is highest among white (90 per cent) and coloured South Africans (81 per cent), with Indians and Africans level at 71 per cent. In the case of Indians, this is attributable to high proportions being Hindu or Muslim. Africans are the majority residents of urban informal as well as rural formal and informal areas, thus corroborating earlier evidence.

When disaggregated by religion, Pentecostal Christians emerge with the highest proportional certainty of God's existence (85 per cent), marginally ahead of persons of other (non-Christian) religions (83 per cent), but significantly more so than adherents of the mainline Protestant denominations (76 per cent) and members of the ZCCs (73 per cent). An unexpectedly high 41 per cent of those who indicated that they have no religion, that they don't know what their religion is, or who refused to reveal this information, said that they have no doubts about God's existence.

South Africa emerges as strongest in its popular belief in God, even more than a decade after the same statements were put to nationally representative samples in 16 other countries, mainly in Europe, but including the relatively religious Philippines, Poland, United States, Northern Ireland and Ireland (Table 10.3).

According to Dogan (1995: 407), low levels of orthodoxy, especially in Europe, are indicative of the image of God having been 'relativised'. The trend appears to be absent except among a minority in South Africa.

TABLE 10.3 *Belief in God, by country (percentage)*

Country	A*	B	C	D	E	F
South Africa (2004)	**	6	6	7	7	74
Philippines	2	4	10	8	9	66
Poland	2	4	10	8	9	66
United States	2	5	7	5	18	63
Northern Ireland	2	4	4	8	21	61
Ireland	2	2	3	9	25	59
Italy	3	7	9	10	21	51
Israel	16	6	14	6	15	43
Hungary	13	16	8	14	20	30
New Zealand	8	12	18	9	24	29
Austria	4	8	25	10	24	28
West Germany	10	10	22	9	21	27
Netherlands	16	16	20	9	15	25
Britain	10	14	13	13	27	24
Slovenia	19	10	23	9	17	22
Norway	10	12	25	8	25	20
East Germany	49	14	10	9	9	9

Notes: * Respondents were asked, 'Which statement comes closest to expressing what you believe about God?' A: I don't believe in God; B: I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out; C: I don't believe in a personal god, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind; D: I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others; E: While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God; F: I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it.

** This option was inadvertently omitted from the survey in South Africa.

Sources: ISSP (1990) in Dogan (1995: 409, 411); SASAS (2004)

Attendance of religious meetings and services

Church attendance is another widely used religious measure, this being indicative of exposure to and involvement in corporate religious activity, a basic principle of Christian and other religious organisation. Referring to attendance at religious meetings or services, Acquaviva argued, 'it is the practice which first declines, then beliefs themselves begin to crumble' (cited in Dogan 1995: 406). To measure respondents' frequency of participation in religious activities, they were thus asked to indicate how often they attend religious services or meetings, apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals and baptisms. As indicated in Table 10.4, the 2004 SASAS data show that more than half (51 per cent) of respondents claimed to be attending church at least once a week. A further 25 per cent indicated that this occurred once a month and 4 per cent that they attended such meetings a few times per year. Ten per cent reported that they never or infrequently attended any religious meetings. One-tenth (10 per cent) indicated that the question was either not applicable to them or that they were not prepared to respond to the question. This resembles the trend that emerged in the HSRC's 2001 survey, when 45 per cent indicated that they attended church at least once per week (Rule 2002).

TABLE 10.4 Attendance at religious meetings or services (percentage)

Frequency	2001	2004
Once a week or more	45	51
At least once per month	24	25
A few times per year	6	4
Infrequently or never	3	10
NA/refuse to say	22	10
Total	100	100

Sources: HSRC (2002); SASAS (2004)

A number of studies indicate that people tend to over-report or under-report in the direction of social acceptability when questioned about some behaviour (Dogan 1995; Hadaway et al. 1993; Sullins 2003). Self-reporting in relation to church attendance is subject to this tendency. Hadaway et al. (1993: 748) argue that respondents are often inclined to over-report or under-report to be in line with traditionally accepted social or moral norms and attribute over-reporting to 'social desirability factors'. Vermeulen et al. (2000) estimate that no more than 20 per cent of South Africans attend church on a weekly basis, the implication being that most South Africans over-report church attendance. In an increasingly secularising and individualising society, it is interesting that so many apparently feel the need to say that they attend church when they do not.

In sum, the international literature points to a decline in the number of people attending religious services. Bruce (2002) argues that some writers subscribe to the secularisation paradigm, which sees the decline of people going to church as an indicator of decline in faith or interest in what churches represent. He then presents another possible explanation of the decline, namely, that people might not be willing to associate or take part in voluntary organisations (Davie 2001 in Bruce 2002). He argues that a decline in church attendance and church membership in Britain does not mean that Christian beliefs are no longer popular. It is merely part of a general trend: the decline of voluntary activity and civic engagement. Other voluntary organisations such as trade unions, political parties and educational associations have similarly lost membership in the twentieth century (Davie 2001 in Bruce 2002). Declining rates of church participation should thus be viewed in a wider context. An alternative to secularisation theory thus treats churches as voluntary organisations, along with women's and youth groups, political parties and civil defence movements. Disaffiliation from churches should be interpreted as 'reluctance to associate, rather than as a reluctance to associate in support of the Christian faith' (Bruce 2002: 327). At least in relation to non-religious voluntary association, South African empirical data bear this out, with membership of political parties having declined from 21 per cent to 11 per cent between 1994 and 2000 (Klandermans et al. 2001), the peak being at the time of the country's first universal franchise elections. By 2004, this proportion had further halved to 5 per cent, with more than half (54 per cent) of South African adults agreeing with the cynical contention that 'politicians are only in politics for personal gain'.

Prayer

Loveland et al. (2005), who explored the relationship between private prayer and civic life or individual civic participation, have noted the interconnectedness of religion and public life. They assert that while there is no link between private prayer and forms of civic association such as involvement in political associations and social activism, private prayer does tend to be related to social service associations

that address individual needs. Moreover, private religious behaviour is seen to contribute to civic culture by promoting the development of voluntary associations. About 6 out of 10 (63 per cent) respondents in the 2004 SASAS survey reported that they pray once or several times a day. One-sixth (16 per cent) pray every week or several times a week and 5 per cent nearly every week. A further 6 per cent pray once or more a month and 3 per cent pray once or twice a year. One in 14 (7 per cent) said that they never pray.

To elicit views on prayer and other Christian beliefs, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

- Praying a lot is a waste of time.
- Jesus is the solution to all the world's problems.
- When we die, we go to either heaven or hell.
- People with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others.

As a very high proportion identified with Christianity, it was expected that the majority would disapprove of the statement that praying a lot is a waste of time. This was the case, with 49 per cent 'disagreeing strongly' and a further 40 per cent 'disagreeing' with the statement. Only 5 per cent regarded praying as a waste of time, while 6 per cent were in the uncertain category.

With regard to Jesus being the solution to all the world's problems, nearly eight out of ten (77 per cent) agreed (37 per cent strongly), with only 10 per cent arguing otherwise. The fence sitters were the 13 per cent that neither agreed nor disagreed or couldn't choose. Almost two-thirds (64 per cent) believed that 'when we die, we go to either heaven or hell', while just 8 per cent disagreed with the statement. About two-fifths (42 per cent) agreed that 'people with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others', while 24 per cent disagreed and a quarter (25 per cent) of the respondents were unsure.

Perceptions of the Bible

To explore respondents' perceptions of and beliefs in the Bible, they were asked to select one of five options to explain their perception of the Holy Scripture underlying orthodox Christianity. As Table 10.5 shows, almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of South Africans believe that the Bible is the word of God and that it should be taken literally, while just over one-fifth (21 per cent) think it is the inspired word of God, but not every word should be taken literally. Only 4 per cent think that the Bible is merely an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral teachings recorded by men. Six per cent felt that the question was inapplicable to them, while 5 per cent were unsure.

Loveland et al. (2005) suggest that a positive response to the statement 'The Bible is the actual word of God and should be interpreted literally, word by word' is a valid indicator of conservative theology (Layman 1997; Manza & Brooks 1997; McKenzie 2001; Peterson 1992 in Loveland et al. 2005: 6). It is one of the ways to distinguish between 'conservative' and 'non-conservative' Christians.

As in the case with people's beliefs about God, there are distinct demographic and geographic variations in beliefs about the Bible. Whereas 67 per cent of residents of rural and urban informal areas believe that it is the literal word of God, this proportion is slightly lower (61 per cent) among people living in urban formal and rural formal environments. This reflects in the provincial distributions, with 'literalists' comprising almost three-quarters (74 per cent) in Mpumalanga and over two-thirds (70 per cent) in KwaZulu-Natal, two largely rural provinces. In contrast, the more urbanised Gauteng and Western Cape residents are, respectively, 62 per cent and 52 per cent literalist. The pattern is not uniform, however, with mainly rural Eastern Cape registering 60 per cent literalists and mainly rural formal Northern Cape a high 76 per cent. In relation to race, whites were marginally ahead (68 per

cent) of Africans (66 per cent), but significantly more literalist than coloureds (52 per cent) and Indians (29 per cent), only 30 per cent of whom are Christians. Belief in the Bible as the literal word of God is highest among members of AICs (79 per cent), Pentecostal or Charismatic churches (73 per cent) and 'other' Christians (70 per cent). In contrast, only 63 per cent of mainline Protestants and 59 per cent of Roman Catholics hold this belief. Almost one in three among the latter two groups say, 'The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything should be taken literally, word for word.'

Females (68 per cent) are more likely to be literalists than males (59 per cent). However, bimodal patterns emerge on this issue in relation to the age group, level of education and household income levels of respondents. Belief in the Bible as the literal word of God is highest among the 25–34 (67 per cent) and 45+ (67 per cent) age groups, with troughs of only 60 per cent among those aged 16–24 and 59 per cent among the 35–44-year age group. Around two-thirds or more of the most and the least educated (that is, those with no formal education and those with matric or post-matric qualifications) are literalists in respect of the Bible. The intermediate group is less convinced, the proportion declining to a low of 60 per cent among adults who have passed school examinations at Grade 8 or 9 level. A similar bimodal pattern emerges in relation to household income. The poorest households (with incomes of R0–R1 500 per month) are most likely (68 per cent) to believe in the literalness of the Bible as God's word, marginally ahead of the wealthiest R7 501+ group, but significantly more so than the intermediate R1 501–R7 500 monthly household income category.

TABLE 10.5 *Perceptions of the Bible, by province, household income and denomination (percentage)*

Belief about the Bible	Province			Household income			Denomination				RSA
	GT	KZN	WC	R0 to R1 500	R1 501 to R7 500	R7 501 to R30k+	AIC	PC	MP	RC	
A. The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word.	62	70	52	68	56	65	79	73	63	59	64
B. The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything should be taken literally, word for word.	23	12	36	19	25	22	14	19	29	29	21
C. The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral precepts recorded by man.	4	4	5	3	6	5	1	4	3	6	4
D. This does not apply to me.	7	9	2	5	6	7	3	1	3	4	6
E. Can't choose.	4	5	5	5	7	1	3	3	2	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: See list of acronyms for explanations of province and religion abbreviations.
Source: SASAS (2004)

TABLE 10.6 *Perceptions of the Bible, by country (percentage)*

Country	A*	B	C	D
South Africa (2004)	64	21	4	11
Philippines	54	27	17	2
Poland	37	36	23	4
United States	34	50	15	2
Northern Ireland	10	17	58	16
Ireland	33	48	17	2
Italy	27	54	15	3
Israel	27	28	41	4
Hungary	19	30	50	1
New Zealand	9	39	45	7
Austria	13	51	32	4
West Germany	13	45	34	8
Netherlands	8	37	34	20
Britain	7	38	47	8
Slovenia	22	35	33	9
Norway	25	53	20	2
East Germany	8	20	43	29

Notes: * See column 1 in Table 10.5 for explanations of the letters A to D. In some instances, the percentages do not total 100 owing to rounding off. Sources: South Africa: SASAS (2004); other countries: Dogan (1995: 409, 411)

As is the case in relation to belief in God, a higher proportion of South Africans (64 per cent) than any of the other 16 nationalities that were asked the same questions in the early 1990s believe that the Bible is the actual word of God and that it is to be taken literally. Closest among the international sample are the people of the Philippines at 54 per cent, with the countries of Europe and elsewhere having much lower proportions of believers in the Bible as God's literal word.

Astrology

Daily newspaper columns containing predictions of readers' life courses and experiences reflect a popular belief in astrology based on the particular alignment of stars at the time of an individual's birth. Varzanova (1997 in Sinelina 2003) conducted a survey in Moscow (1993–96), which indicated that religious commitment is accompanied by 'contradictions and eclecticism'. She argued that 'belief in the occult and witchcraft are some of the elements that often go together with people's ordinary religious world views' (in Sinelina 2003: 25). In her study, there were larger proportions of people who believed in witchcraft, spiritualism and astrology than those who claimed to be living by Christian tenets. She found that:

belief in witchcraft, horoscopes, and communication with ghosts is more prevalent than belief in the dogmas of Christianity, because each respondent was prepared to argue in favour of his/her belief, which is condemned by the Church as superstition and Devil worship, by providing examples from his or her own personal experience. At the same time, belief in Christianity appears to be something that is demanded of them... (in Sinelina 2003: 26)

The 2004 SASAS survey asked South Africans to indicate their response to the statement, 'A person's star sign at birth, or horoscope, can affect the course of his/her future.' Almost one in ten (9 per cent) said that this was 'definitely true' and a further 25 per cent that it was 'probably true'. Of the opposite view, 16 per cent said that the statement was 'probably false' and 31 per cent that it was 'definitely false'. Almost one in five (19 per cent) indicated that they could not choose between true or false in this instance. Denominationally, adherents of (non-Christian) 'other' religions emerged as most likely (22 per cent) to say that the statement was 'definitely true'. However, this was also the case with one in seven (14 per cent) Roman Catholics, one in ten (10 per cent) mainline Protestants, 9 per cent of members of AICs and 8 per cent of the 'other Christian' category. Least likely to believe in horoscopes were Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians, at 5 per cent.

Belief that horoscopes are definitely true was highest among Indian South Africans at 24 per cent, followed far behind by Africans (10 per cent), coloureds (8 per cent) and whites (3 per cent). Females (11 per cent) were marginally more likely than males (8 per cent) to believe in star signs, and this belief peaked at 13 per cent among adults who had achieved a Grade 10 or 11 education, with lows of 6 per cent among those with no formal education and, at the other extreme, 5 per cent among those with post-matric qualifications. Belief in horoscopes declined with age from 12 per cent among the 16–24-year group to 7 per cent in the 45–59-year group, rising slightly again to 8 per cent among the 60+ group. A negative correlation emerged between belief in star signs and monthly household income (R0–R1 500: 11 per cent; R1 501–R7 500: 9 per cent; R7 501–R30k+: 7 per cent).

Honesty in dealing with the state

Respondents in the 2004 SASAS survey were asked two questions to test their sense of right and wrong when dealing with the state bureaucracy, which could be thought of as their level of civic-mindedness. The questions related to tax compliance and honesty with respect to accessing a government social grant. As indicated in Table 10.7, only 49 per cent said that it was 'seriously wrong' if taxpayers did not report all of their income in order to pay less tax, most of the rest saying it was 'wrong' (36 per cent) or 'a bit wrong' (5 per cent). One in 25 (4 per cent) said that it was 'not wrong'. Similarly, 58 per cent indicated that it was 'seriously wrong' for a person to submit incorrect information in order to qualify for a social grant. One-third (33 per cent) said this was 'wrong', 3 per cent 'a bit wrong' and 2 per cent 'not wrong'. It emerges that many South Africans have a flexible attitude towards their tax obligations on the one hand, and the extent to which they can access cash benefits from the state on the other. The extent of this flexibility varies demographically in that persons of 'other' (non-Christian) religions were slightly more likely than the rest to say that not reporting all income in order to evade tax was 'not wrong'. This correlates with a slightly higher proportion of coloured and Indian respondents than either African or white respondents willing to admit a non-conformist perception in respect of tax. Most significant was the variation in relation to the household income of respondents. There was a linear relationship between monthly household income and the perception that it was 'seriously wrong' to evade tax (R0–R1 500: 44 per cent; R1 501–R7 500: 48 per cent; R7 501–R30k+: 50 per cent). People living in urban informal residential areas were more likely than others to say that not reporting all income was 'not wrong' (9 per cent) or that they could not choose (10 per cent) than were those living in other geographical area types. In contrast, the social category with the highest proportion (61 per cent) thinking that withholding income information in order to pay less tax was 'seriously wrong' was that with a post-matric level of education. This was the case with only 39 per cent of those without formal education and 49 per cent of those who had achieved matric as their highest educational qualification.

In respect of providing incorrect information in order to access a social grant, such as an old age, child support or disability grant, sentiments were overwhelmingly against the idea. Almost six out of ten

(58 per cent) said it was 'seriously wrong' and a further one-third (33 per cent) that it was 'wrong'. The less convinced numbered just less than one out of ten. Religious denomination was not a significant variable in this analysis, except that 'other Christians' were the most likely to say that the provision of incorrect information was 'seriously wrong' (66 per cent). In terms of race, there was minimal variation, the exception being that one in eight (12 per cent) coloured respondents (as opposed to 6 per cent or less among the other three races) placed themselves in the 'can't choose' category, unsure of whether it was wrong or not. As was the case with tax evasion, the higher the household income, the more likely the respondent was to express the view that defrauding government in order to access a social grant was 'seriously wrong'. More residents of urban informal settlements (9 per cent) than those living in other geotypes thought that such practice was 'not wrong'. A high proportion of people with a post-matric education (61 per cent) said that it was 'seriously wrong' (as opposed to 48 per cent among those with no formal education and 59 per cent of those with matric level education).

TABLE 10.7 Attitudes when dealing with state bureaucracy, by religion, race, income and geotype

	A taxpayer does not report all of his/her income in order to pay less income tax					A person gives the government incorrect information so that he/she can get a social grant				
	Not wrong	Can't choose	A bit wrong	Wrong	Seriously wrong	Not wrong	Can't choose	A bit wrong	Wrong	Seriously wrong
All	4	6	5	36	49	2	4	3	33	58
Religion										
AIC	3	5	7	39	47	2	3	3	37	56
PC	3	5	5	35	53	1	4	4	34	57
MP	4	4	6	43	43	3	3	3	35	57
RC	3	3	5	35	53	3	6	3	33	55
OC	4	8	5	26	58	1	6	2	25	66
Other	8	8	8	24	53	1	10	4	27	57
Race										
African	3	6	6	37	49	3	3	3	33	59
Coloured	7	11	8	36	38	1	12	3	41	43
Indian	7	4	9	22	59	1	6	6	22	66
White	3	5	2	35	55	1	5	2	36	57
Household income										
R0-R1 500	4	8	5	39	44	3	5	3	36	54
R1 501-R7 500	4	3	7	38	48	2	3	2	38	55
R7 501-R30k+	2	5	5	38	50	0	5	4	32	60
Refuse/don't know	3	6	6	25	60	1	5	4	22	68
Geotype										
Urban formal	4	5	5	33	54	2	5	3	29	62
Urban informal	9	10	8	39	35	5	5	4	37	50
Rural informal	1	8	6	40	45	2	3	4	37	55
Rural formal	5	4	7	44	40	1	4	4	47	45

Notes: See list of acronyms for explanations of religion abbreviations.
 In some instances, the percentages do not total 100 owing to rounding off.
 Source: SASAS (2004)

Discussion

The primary finding of this study of the religious beliefs and values of South Africans is that as a nation that claims 80 per cent adherence to Christian beliefs, in general we hold strongly orthodox views in relation to Christian doctrine. Such is the extent of this orthodoxy that we claim to believe in God (74 per cent) and in the Bible as the literal word of God (64 per cent) to a far greater extent even than populations of such countries as the Philippines, the United States and Ireland, where orthodox Christianity is widely believed and practised. This orthodoxy also emerges in the 76 per cent belief that 'Jesus is the solution to all the world's problems' and 64 per cent that 'when we die we go to either heaven or hell', with 89 per cent expressing the view that praying is not a waste of time. Secondly, this orthodoxy manifests itself in majority conservative or traditionalist perspectives with regard to issues such as support for capital punishment and opposition to abortion and extramarital or same-sex sexual relations. Thirdly, most South Africans say that it is wrong to cheat on their taxes or to provide fraudulent information in order to make themselves eligible to receive old age, child support or disability grants from the state.

That said, however, the extent and patterns of deviation from claimed devout Christian orthodoxy, social conservatism and civic-mindedness are illustrative of the nuances in value differences that exist in South African society in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Within a social environment that conforms, at least in terms of what most people say, to what might be expected in a predominantly Christian country, there are significant exceptions among small subsectors of the population.

The provinces in which atheism (an absence of belief in God) or agnosticism (uncertainty about God's existence) is highest (over 10 per cent) are the Eastern Cape, the Northern Cape and North West. The minority with unorthodox views of this sort comprises more Africans and Indians than whites or coloureds, more with little or no education than the better educated, and more among those living in low-income rather than in middle- or high-income households. Similarly, a lack of Christian religious orthodoxy is more common among the following groups than among their counterparts: people who have never been married or who are divorced, residents of informal settlements, people aged less than 24 years, those whose home language is English, and students. Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians are most likely to have no doubts about God's existence, as opposed to people who claim affiliation to mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics or AICs, where this view is less common. Conversely, belief that the Bible is inspired by God, but that it should not be taken too literally, is more likely among mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics than among members of African Independent or Pentecostal churches.

In relation to support for the right to abortion and same-sex sexual relationships, the minorities among which these views are held are most common among non-Christians and mainline Protestants, Indians, people who attend religious meetings infrequently, divorced people, people with post-matriculation qualifications, the self-employed, home language speakers of English or isiXhosa, residents of the Western Cape or Eastern Cape, residents of urban formal areas and people living in middle- or high-income households.

Not many admit a lack of civic-mindedness, measured in terms of proportions that do not think it is wrong to under-report taxable income or to make false claims in order to access social grants. Where it is admitted, it is most likely among people with education levels of less than Grade 9, the unemployed, residents of informal settlements, low-income people, people with no religious beliefs and people living in the Eastern Cape.

We therefore cannot assume that the high level of Christian affiliation among South Africans precludes pockets of religiously unorthodox views. A substantial minority of non-Christians as well as Christians do not believe in God, the literal authenticity of the Bible or the utility of prayer. Similarly, favourable attitudes towards the right to abortion and homosexual relationships occur among a minority, in spite

of a pervasive 'Christian' culture. A further deviation from the expected Christian perspective is the minority position held by some that it is not wrong to be economical with the truth in order to reduce obligations towards or increase access to benefits from the state. Nevertheless, most South Africans lay claim to orthodox Christian beliefs, socially conservative attitudes and civic-mindedness in respect of taxes and the accessing of social grants.

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South Africans' attitudes towards the environment

Jaré Struwig

Introduction

Since the 1950s, the level of concern for the natural environment has steadily increased. This increase in concern is evident from the rise in international treaties, the number of national environmental ministries, the rise of international non-governmental organisations and the increasing number of surveys concerned with the environment (Franzen 2003). Globally, policy campaigns and media drives are being launched to get people to think of the environment as an end value, to convince people to buy environmentally friendly products, to recycle and to preserve. More and more studies are being conducted in an attempt to understand the intricate relationship between environmental attitudes and values and environmental concern.

According to Heberlein (1991), environmental attitudes are fundamentally important, widely discussed, frequently measured and poorly understood. This, he argues, is partly due to the environmental concept being different from other topics researched. The environment as an object is constantly present and has multiple sub-objects which do not, as individual objects, represent the totality. Various theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain the relationship between the possession of environmental knowledge, environmental awareness and the display of pro-environmental behaviour. Although hundreds of studies have been done, no definitive answers have been found. This chapter looks at some of the factors that have been found in literature to have some influence, positive or negative, on pro-environmental behaviour – such as demographic factors, internal factors (for example, environmental knowledge, awareness, values, attitudes, locus of control, responsibilities and priorities) and external factors (for example, institutional, economic, social and cultural factors) (Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002).

Inglehart (1990, 1997) found that the way people view the environment is at least in part dependent on the material resources available to the society's members. If people's lives are characterised by a struggle for material goods, values are held that reflect scarcity. Individuals who are preoccupied with their material survival are much less concerned about environmental protection and view nature as a resource to be utilised. Individuals living in a situation of poverty and deprivation are likely to regard food and jobs in a more important light than nature or environmental issues. However, if people's basic material needs are satisfied, they are more likely to embrace 'post-materialistic' values, striving for abstract principles of humanitarianism, enhanced quality of life, liberalisation and environmental aestheticism. This thesis is similar to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, which states that basic needs (food and security) are fulfilled first before spiritual and intellectual self-actualisation can take place. This hypothesis thus predicts that members of relatively affluent societies are concerned about and favour environmental protection more than members of economically deprived societies.

Many authors have criticised Inglehart's thesis. Dunlap et al. (1993) presented evidence from 24 countries that participated in the Health of the Planet (HOP) survey and found that most items in the HOP instrument that measure environmental concern were negatively correlated with the nation's Gross National Product (GNP). Dunlap and Mertig (1997) thereafter concluded that environmentalism is a global phenomenon and in many instances negatively related to GNP per capita. When analysing the World Value Survey data, Brechin and Kempton (1994) found that support for environmental protection did not systematically vary between high- and low-income countries. They conclude that post-materialism or affluence is not a prerequisite for support for environmental protection. More strongly, Schultz and Zelezny proposed that 'clearly the traditional wisdom that environmental concern is a luxury afforded by only the wealthy is unfounded cross-culturally' (1999: 258).

The principal alternative to the hierarchy of needs theory is the environmental deprivation theory. This theory maintains that day-to-day survival may result in a hierarchy of needs which discounts environmental protection, but asks what happens when the dirty environment becomes a survival concern in itself. The centre of the theory proposes that the more someone is exposed to pollution, or whatever form of environmental degradation, the greater the concern for the environment and the greater the uproar. A rival theory, the relative deprivation theory, suggests that people living in polluted and degraded areas get used to the situation and that the outcry is likely to come from people living in cleaner areas who become exposed to the dirty side (Whittaker et al. 2003).

Environmental attitudes are part of a larger set of values and not simply determined by material wealth (Grafton & Knowles 2004). Social values are always embedded in a larger cultural context. Values differ in the extent to which they are 'focal' within a culture, that is, whether values are widely shared among and perceived as important by members of a society and whether they are reflected in institutions and practices. Social capital – the social institutions and networks at household, local and national level that influence how people interact and how these interactions influence social and economic outcomes – is studied in relation to environmental issues. Grafton and Knowles (2004) examined the effects of social capital on broad national measures of environmental quality. Their study empirically tested if a range of national measures of civic and public social capital, social divergence and social capacity influenced national environmental performance. Their findings suggest that the mere existence of social capital is not sufficient to improve national environmental outcomes. A study by Walker (1999) on democracy and the environment in southern Africa also concluded that there is no necessary relationship between environment and democratisation. In contrast, a study by Barrett and Graddy (2000) provided support that civil and political liberties improve environmental quality.

The intention of this chapter is to test if demographic factors, internal factors or external factors affect environmental concern, as well as to test which other social values or disparities impact on South Africans' environmental perceptions.

Conservation in South Africa

Historically, Africans have had a high regard for the environment. Traditional conservation practices suggest that African agricultural, harvesting, forestry and hunting practices were designed in a way to conserve. Examples of this are 'slash and burn' practices where pieces of land were slashed, burned and harvested for a particular period. Before the soil became infertile, local people would leave this particular area and soil to rest and recoup, only returning once the soil had fully recovered. Clearly this practice became unsustainable and impacted negatively on the environment as population numbers grew and land became scarce. Another example is the Thonga fishermen in Kosi Bay in northern Natal, who have been fishing by means of fish kraals in the mouth of the estuary for 700 years. Fish swim in on the rising tide and are trapped as the tide falls. These ancient fishing kraals allow for sustainable

catches that do not deplete the fish population.¹ Traditional conservation practices are therefore well known but not always well documented.

During the apartheid era, strict environmental policies, fences and patrols characterised nature conservation. Only the white communities were privy to these protected areas, which were often out of bounds for the other race groups in South Africa. Apart from not benefiting as tourists in these protected areas, the majority of the population (African) were excluded from decision-making on the use and allocation of resources and services. Nature conservation areas developed at the expense of local communities. The system led to forced removals and exclusion of communities from the management and benefits of conservation. This resulted in people feeling alienated and many regarding issues of conservation negatively (De Beer & Marais 2005). A large proportion of South Africans came to view environmental issues with misgiving and to regard it as a 'white middle class issue' (Cock & Fig 2001)

Generally, early conservation practices have been critiqued on a number of grounds (Fisher et al. 2005):

- They were ethnocentric, favouring western ideas of nature.
- They were elitist, failing to consider the land rights and sophisticated resource management of indigenous inhabitants.
- They were based on outmoded ecological models that 'freeze' the ecological status quo and ignore the dynamics of the wider and human-influenced landscapes of which ecosystems are ultimately a part.
- They were self-defeating – removing people from parks caused ecological simplification, and outside pressures eventually impinged on protected areas.

In many cases, the establishment of protected areas failed to consider the social costs, including gross violations of human rights and the economic and political marginalisation of thousands of rural people (Fisher et al. 2005). Several analysts have recognised that the very language of these early conservation efforts affects the way we think about people living in or around protected areas. Local people were – and often still are – labelled as 'poachers' or 'squatters' rather than 'hunters' or 'settlers' (Brown 1991; Colchester 1994).

Globally, since the 1970s, and in South Africa specifically since 1994, the authoritarian approach to nature conservation was changed to embrace a more liberal people-centred approach – a change from nature conservation to natural resource management (De Beer & Marais 2005). This approach was not unique or merely due to the new democracy, but rather in line with the international debates around sustainable development, eco-politics and eco-tourism. The intention of this approach is to embrace people as part of the environment and not as passive onlookers. It also encompasses social, economic and political realities, realising that sustainability can only be ensured if the benefits are tangible. This alternative approach views environmental issues as intensely political in that it realises that they are entrenched in access to power and resources in society. This approach draws on concepts of environmental justice and emphasises the importance of linking the struggle against human and social injustice and the exploitation of humans with the struggle against the mistreatment of the environment. This holistic approach strives to protect threatened environments, while also striving for the betterment of neglected human needs. Despite these commitments to building sustainable communities and embracing the human rights approach when embarking on environmental issues, collective action in the name of environmentalism in South Africa is lacking. Environmentalism in South Africa is still extremely diverse and to a large extent still reflects the social division of race, geographical

1 See <http://sacoast.wcape.gov.za>.

location, class, ideology and gender (Cock & Fig 2001). There is no uniform, coordinated alliance based on mass participation, which has a unified vision with an agreed set of objectives. The reality is rather an informal, ad hoc and fragmented network of environmental initiatives with various ideologies. The following sections of the chapter will attempt to unravel South Africans' perceptions regarding various issues around environmentalism and to what extent these issues remain polarised among citizens.

Environmental versus economic imperatives

A range of questions was asked in the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) to determine the attitudes of South Africans to the environment, particularly testing the issue that 'too much fuss' is made about the environment and that economic imperatives should take precedence. Interviewees were asked whether people generally worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about jobs. Almost half (49.3 per cent) of South Africans agreed with this statement. This was not entirely unexpected, given the high unemployment rate in South Africa and the notion that unemployment is one of the most important challenges facing South Africa today. As shown in Table 11.1, interesting dynamics emerged when this statement was disaggregated by race, gender, age, income, education and geotype.

Notably, coloured people were most likely to agree that we make too much fuss about the environment (66.7 per cent), followed by Indian (50.0 per cent), African (47.5 per cent) and white (46.8 per cent) respondents. Females were also more likely than males to agree that we worry too much about the environment and not enough about jobs, as was the case with the 25–34-year age group.

According to the hierarchy of needs theory, one would expect higher-income earners and those with higher levels of education to be more sympathetic towards the environment than their counterparts. This was, however, not confirmed – the relatively high-income earners (R5 001–R10 000 per household per month) agreed most with the statement that we worry too much about the environment and not enough about jobs. Surprisingly, people with higher levels of education were also more inclined to agree. People with lower income or educational levels did not necessarily prioritise jobs when stated in opposition to the environment. These results seem to suggest a relatively well-off and educated cohort of South Africans who are more interested in economic imperatives (when compared to environmental imperatives) than are other relatively poorer and less educated groupings within society.

People residing in urban informal areas were much more likely than people living in other areas to agree that we worry too much about the environment and not enough about jobs. This was not surprising given that the quality of life in informal settlements is poor and there is a dire need for social services in these areas, which were neglected in the past. Informal areas have been expanding rapidly, due to urbanisation and the migration of people from rural areas in search of employment and a better quality of life. The resulting over-expansion tends to lead to more socio-economic problems. The day-to-day struggle for survival therefore seems to take precedence over environmental concern. Although people in rural formal and informal areas also often live in extreme poverty and taxing situations, they were less likely to agree that too much emphasis is placed on the environment. This might suggest that environmental assets (such as crops and cattle) make up a larger share of the wealth of the poor in rural areas, suggesting a greater dependency on and awareness of the importance of the environment.

Testing perceptions regarding the interdependence of economic growth and the environment, just over half of South Africans (54.5 per cent) agreed that economic progress would slow down unless the environment was looked after better (Table 11.2). This view was mostly held by Indian respondents (71 per cent), followed by white (63 per cent), coloured (57 per cent) and African (53 per cent).

TABLE 11.1 *We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about jobs today (percentage)*

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Race					
African	47.5	7.8	39	5.6	100
Coloured	66.7	13.1	13.1	7.1	100
Indian	50.0	6.3	37.6	6.3	100
White	46.8	17.1	31.6	4.3	100
Gender					
Male	48.1	8.9	38.8	4.2	100
Female	50.3	9.7	33.2	6.9	100
Age					
16–24 years	49.5	7.8	36.2	6.6	100
25–34 years	51.3	10.0	37.1	1.6	100
35–49 years	47.5	9.9	35.5	7.1	100
50+ years	49.2	9.6	33.9	7.2	100
Income					
R1–R750	48.6	7.1	42.1	2.3	100
R751–R1 000	47.1	6.5	41.2	5.2	100
R1 001–R2 000	46.8	8.2	37.6	7.4	100
R2 001–R5 000	47.4	9.5	41.4	1.6	100
R5 001–R10 000	58.5	4.5	31.5	5.5	100
R10 000+	41.4	15.2	29	14.5	100
Education					
None–Grade 2	45.2	8.5	37.2	9.0	100
Grades 3–7	40.2	8.9	43.3	7.6	100
Grades 8–9	53.1	10.3	31	5.5	100
Grades 10–12	51.5	9.3	34	5.2	100
Post-Grade 12	50.2	8.2	39.6	2.1	100
Geotype					
Urban formal	51.4	10.4	32.8	5.4	100
Urban informal	57.9	7.9	31.5	2.8	100
Rural informal	43.3	7.1	43.5	6.1	100
Rural formal	46.8	11.7	32.2	9.4	100
Total	49.3	9.3	35.8	5.6	100

Note: Percentage totals may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 11.2 *Economic progress in South Africa will slow down unless we look after the environment better (percentage)*

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
14.5	40.0	19.0	9.6	2.2	14.1

Note: Percentage totals do not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

Source: SASAS (2005)

This question was also fielded in 27 other countries in 2001 (four years prior to being fielded in South Africa) as part of the International Social Survey Programme² (ISSP) environmental module. Evidence suggests that people from developing countries are more likely to record that economic progress will slow down unless the environment is looked after, while people in developed countries depend less on the environment for economic progress. In the Philippines, 67.0 per cent of people said economic progress would slow down if they did not look after the environment, followed by Mexico (65.8 per cent), Chile (58.2 per cent) and Portugal (56.2 per cent). On the other hand, only 18.3 per cent of people in the Netherlands, 29.1 per cent in Switzerland, 31.6 per cent in Norway, 34.2 per cent in Finland, 35.7 per cent in West Germany and 36.7 per cent in Japan believed that economic progress in their countries would slow down if the environment was not protected. Less developed countries (including South Africa) indicated a greater dependency on environmental conditions for economic growth, while developed countries assumed much less reliance on the environment for economic prosperity.

When South Africans were asked whether they would accept a job which would be bad for their health and in a dangerously polluted area, 61.4 per cent stated that it was 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely' that they would accept such a job and 14.8 per cent stated that it was 'likely' or 'very likely' that they would accept such a job. The rest, 23.8 per cent, did not know or were unsure about the issue. One in five coloured respondents (21.0 per cent) indicated that they were 'very likely' or 'likely' to accept a job in a dangerously polluted area, followed by African (15.2 per cent), white (9.0 per cent) and Indian (8.9 per cent) respondents. People in the 25–34 age category were also more likely to accept a job in a highly polluted area than respondents in other age categories. It was also evident that people in urban informal areas and rural formal areas were more likely to accept these types of jobs than people in rural informal and urban formal areas. Males (15.9 per cent) were more likely to accept jobs in dangerously polluted areas than females (13.9 per cent). Thus it seems likely that those for whom it is hardest to obtain jobs are more likely than those with more choice to accept occupational hazards. Inevitably, it is the poor who tend to accept the higher risks.


The relative importance of environmental issues

In order to determine the importance of the environment relative to other issues, people were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: 'There are more important things to do in life than protect the environment.' A third of the South African population agreed with this statement (32.2 per cent), with 18.2 per cent being uncertain and 45.4 per cent disagreeing. Coloured respondents, at 40.1 per cent, were far more inclined than the other race groups to believe that there were more important things to do than protect the environment, followed by African (32.3 per cent), Indian (31.6 per cent) and white (25.3 per cent) people. Males (35.9 per cent) were also more likely than females (29.0 per cent) to agree with this statement. Variation was also found for geographic location, with respondents in rural formal areas agreeing most with the statement (43.3 per cent), followed by urban informal (41.7 per cent), rural informal (28.5 per cent) and urban formal (31.2 per cent) areas. Older respondents tended to agree more with the statement than younger respondents. Better educated respondents, however, tended to disagree with the statement.

Responses to this question were put into a global context, comparing data from South Africa with data from 27 other countries that fielded the question in 2001 as part of the ISSP survey. As Figure 11.1 shows, people in economically well-established, democratically governed countries with strong social welfare systems were less likely to believe that there were more important things to do than to protect the environment. Respondents in countries experiencing low economic growth or political transition and turmoil were more likely to state that there were more important things to do than to protect the environment.

2 See www.issp.org.

FIGURE 11.1 *There are more important things to do than to protect the environment**



Note: * Percentage that agree.

Source: ISSP (2001)

The variation in the importance of environmental issues in the different countries and in the different sub-populations in South Africa suggests that environmental perceptions, and the importance of environmental protection, are shaped by social and physical location and therefore shaped and embedded in a socio-economic and political culture.

Conservation parks and perceived benefits

In order to test responses to the relatively new people-centred environmental management approach, which should allow benefits for all people, respondents were asked to respond to this statement: 'Nature conservation parks only benefit wealthy people.' Overall, 39.6 per cent of respondents 'strongly agreed' or 'agreed' with the statement, 17.8 per cent 'neither agreed nor disagreed', 30.2 per cent 'strongly disagreed' or 'disagreed' and 12.4 per cent were unsure. When the statement was disaggregated by race, it was found that African respondents in general agreed most (41.8 per cent), followed by white (35.5 per cent), coloured (30.8 per cent) and Indian (26.3 per cent) respondents. People living in urban informal areas were far more pessimistic in terms of the benefits of nature conservation parks. More than half (56.0 per cent) agreed that nature conservation parks only benefit wealthy people, followed by rural informal (39.4 per cent), rural formal (39.1 per cent) and urban formal (36.9 per cent). People with lower income and educational status tended to agree more than others that nature conservation areas only benefit wealthy people. As Table 11.3 shows, when this statement was disaggregated by province, interesting variations emerged.

Respondents in the Western Cape were less likely than respondents from the other provinces to agree that benefits from conservation parks only benefit the wealthy. Respondents from the Western Cape tended rather to disagree with this statement (44.7 per cent), a sign that the economic benefits of conservation parks have reached a wider audience. In contrast, 58.3 per cent of respondents in Mpumalanga agreed that nature conservation parks only benefit wealthy people. Despite the fact that Mpumalanga is one of South Africa's top tourist destinations, boasting the world-famous Kruger National Park and many other nature conservation areas, perceptions are that these parks offer limited benefits to locals.

The statement 'Nature conservation parks only benefit wealthy people' was correlated with the statement 'Land earmarked for conservation should rather be given to poorer communities', and a correlation of 0.396³ was found. This talks directly to the issue that if people do not perceive benefits from conservation efforts, they will be less supportive of those efforts.

TABLE 11.3 *Nature conservation parks only benefit wealthy people, by province (percentage)*

	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	Total
Agree	24.1	28.0	30.1	44.5	33.4	42.4	47.4	58.3	50.4	39.6
Neither/nor	23.2	15.7	24.5	7.5	33.6	16.6	13.0	13.9	3.4	17.8
Disagree	44.7	34.3	22.6	33.5	18.1	24.0	31.5	20.3	41.4	30.2
Don't know	7.9	22.0	22.6	14.5	15.0	17.0	8.2	7.5	4.8	12.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.
 Percentage totals may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.
 Source: SASAS (2005)

3 The two ranked variables were correlated using the Spearman's rank correlation.

The results suggest that if South Africans are not convinced of the benefits of conservation, they may not subscribe to issues of conservation. Local communities' participation in the development of environmental policy is crucial. An overemphasis on protected areas (especially strictly protected areas) as the only credible conservation tool has not always been a good strategy. Under certain conditions it has even increased poverty. Although the percentage of the earth's surface devoted to protected areas has steadily increased, conservation agencies readily admit that many protected areas are protected in name only and that they suffer from widespread illegal use, which in some cases is leading to loss of biodiversity (Carey et al. 2000). Recent studies have shown that in some instances communities spend more per hectare on conservation than national governments do (Molnar et al. 2004).

The fifth International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources World Parks Congress in 2003 affirmed that biological diversity should be conserved for its local value as much as for its national and global value (Fisher et al. 2005). This is an important shift in thinking. It reinforces the idea that successful conservation can no longer be confined to protected areas and that conservationists need to turn their attention to the wider landscapes in which protected areas are found. Protected areas will benefit if they can be managed as part of an integrated approach to both human well-being and biodiversity conservation within the broader landscape.

De Beer and Marais (2005) criticise South Africa's community development in terms of environmental issues and caution that in many instances it is but a public relations exercise. According to them, many government departments, parastatals and private funding initiatives claim to support community development and community involvement. Government and institutions tend to establish sections or directorates and appoint people with designations such as community workers, extension officers and field staff. These officials are then tasked with implementing community development projects and programmes. Often, these structures and well-intended functions merely perform a window-dressing function in the guise of a politically correct partnership between the community and the institution. The view held by many officials and experts that poor communities are passive, without any initiative and waiting for an outsider to develop them, is a dangerous assumption. Many poor communities have survived for decades without development and development agencies, and government and other institutions would be better off if they assumed a strategy of environmental sustainability through social commitment and progress. Sustainable development relies on accountable partnerships between government, industries, businesses and communities as equal partners.

Concern for the environment

Nearly half (45.0 per cent) of the respondents in the 2005 SASAS survey were of the opinion that even if the environment is not protected, people will find ways to survive. This view was most common among coloured people, with 61.8 per cent agreeing with the statement, followed by African (49.5 per cent), white (48.5 per cent) and Indian (44.7 per cent) people. When analysed by education, it was interesting to note that people with higher education levels tended to agree more with the statement. 'Don't know' responses increased as education decreased (Table 11.4).

Results presented in Table 11.4 contradict findings by Danielson et al. (1995), who state that informed citizens who know about environmental problems might be more caring towards the environment since they are more aware of the possible damage. Rather, the findings suggest that people with higher levels of education might be more nonchalant about environmental problems since they believe modern science and society will be able to counteract environmental disasters. This finding suggests that people, especially those who are more highly educated, believe that nature's ability to recover and the ingenuity of humans will lead to new technologies and solutions that are able to address emerging problems (Todes et al. 2003).

TABLE 11.4 *Even if the environment is not protected, people will always find ways to survive, by education (percentage)*


Level of education	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
None–Grade 2	39.9	18.6	14.4	27.1	100.0
Grades 3–7	38.8	18.9	19.9	22.5	100.0
Grades 8–9	40.8	24.2	17.4	17.6	100.0
Grades 10–12	48.7	19.1	16.7	15.5	100.0
Post-Grade 12	49.0	17.3	28.0	5.8	100.0
All	45.0	19.8	18.2	17.0	100.0

Note: Percentage totals may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2005)

Concern for specific issues

An opinion poll conducted by Markinor⁴ in November 2005 showed that only 9 per cent of South Africans believed there had been an improvement in the last two years in cleaning up the environment (Figure 11.2). The poll also indicated that 41 per cent of South Africans believed that it was the job of local government to clean up the environment, followed by national government (32 per cent) and provincial government (27 per cent).

FIGURE 11.2 *Improvement of service delivery in South Africa, 2004/05*



Source: Markinor (2005)

4 See http://www.markinor.co.za/press_31.html.

TABLE 11.5 *Concern for environmental issues at national and local levels (percentage)*

	Which environmental issue worries you most in South Africa?	Which environmental issue worries you most in your area?
Unclean water	20.3	19.4
Wasting of water	14.1	14.4
Unclean air (air pollution)	16.1	9.9
Littering	17.6	27.7

Source: SASAS (2005)

Asked about an environmental issue that is most worrying in South Africa, Table 11.5 shows that 20.3 per cent of respondents cited unclean water, followed by littering (17.6 per cent), unclean air (16.1 per cent) and the wasting of water (14.1 per cent). In terms of provincial distribution, the Eastern Cape, the Free State and Mpumalanga were most concerned about unclean water. The Western Cape, the Northern Cape and Limpopo expressed most concern about wasting water. KwaZulu-Natal residents were most concerned about air pollution, while Gauteng and the North West province expressed most concern for the issue of littering.

When asked which environmental issue was most worrying in their own areas, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal expressed concern in terms of unclean water, while the Free State and Mpumalanga cited the wasting of water as their biggest local concern. The other provinces all regarded littering as the biggest worry.

South Africans were generally more concerned about using up the earth's remaining water resources, at 45.6 per cent, than about using up the earth's remaining coal, oil and gas resources (28.9 per cent). In terms of race, white people were generally most concerned about these issues, with 39.2 per cent stating that they felt very concerned about the earth's remaining coal, oil and gas resources and 59.0 per cent stating that they were very concerned about the water resources. Almost one in four (24.1 per cent) coloured respondents did not know whether they should be concerned about the earth's remaining coal, oil and gas resources and one in five (19.0 per cent) were uncertain about the water resources. Concern for these environmental issues was more prominent among people of higher educational and income levels.


Half of the respondents were also of the opinion that using pesticides or chemicals in farming was either 'extremely dangerous' or 'very dangerous' for the environment. Almost two-fifths (38.0 per cent) also agreed that genetic modification was either 'extremely dangerous' or 'very dangerous' to the environment.

A statement about whether or not the earth can continue to support population growth evoked different responses from different race groups. Almost three-quarters (71.3 per cent) of white respondents stated that the earth could not support current population growth, followed by Indian (64.6 per cent), coloured (45.5 per cent) and African (40.2 per cent) respondents.

Whose responsibility is it after all?

According to Schwegker and Cornwell (1991), attitudes towards pollution and locus of control are superior to demographics in describing environmentally concerned consumers. Externally controlled individuals believe in luck and fate, but internally controlled people perceive themselves as being in control, capable of change. An internally controlled person is generally more ecologically concerned.

FIGURE 11.3 *It is just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment**



Note: * Percentage that agree.

Source: ISSP (2001)

We posed the statement, 'It is just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment.' A positive response to this statement indicates a person whose locus of control is external, while a negative response assumes a person with an internal locus of control. More than half (54.8 per cent) were in agreement that it was too difficult for them to do much about the environment, thereby assuming an external locus of control. Thus, more than half of the South African population did not perceive themselves to be in control when it came to environmental issues and therefore felt they were not capable of changing them. These positive responses were most prevalent among African respondents (58.6 per cent), followed by Indian (53.2 per cent), coloured (46.9 per cent) and white (36.1 per cent). When analysed further, it was clear that respondents who typically perceived an external locus of control had lower than average incomes and lower education levels than their counterparts.

When this statement was analysed for the 2001 ISSP participating countries, South Africa scored very low in terms of the percentage that believed they could make a difference. The Finnish nation portrayed an internal locus of control, with only 11.9 per cent agreeing with the statement. As Figure 11.3 indicates, people from politically and socio-economically stable countries believed that their actions could make a difference, while people from less developed countries tended to believe that they did not have the power to change much.


As noted, responses to this statement suggest that, as individuals, South Africans do not feel that they have much power to make a difference when it comes to environmental issues. This lack of an internal locus of control assumes that someone or something else should be responsible for the environment.

Asked to indicate who made the most effort to look after the environment, about a third (33.3 per cent) agreed that it was the government. A quarter agreed that business, industry, government and communities made equal effort to look after the environment. More than half (57.6 per cent) of South Africans agreed that South Africa and other countries should follow international treaties and agreements when it comes to environmental problems.

A third of South Africans (33.4 per cent) were of the opinion that poorer countries should be expected to make less effort than richer ones to protect the environment, suggesting that the majority felt that poorer countries (including South Africa) should not be exempt from environmental responsibilities based on a lower Gross Domestic Product. This finding was in contrast to the general trend found in the ISSP 2001 results, which suggested that developing countries believed poorer countries should be expected to make less effort than richer countries to protect the environment. South Africans portrayed opinions of responsibility towards the environment similar to those of respondents from developed countries (Figure 11.4).

On a micro level, South Africans tended to think that their actions could not make a difference in terms of environmental issues, but on a macro level, they did not feel that poorer countries (including South Africa) should be exempt from environmental responsibilities.

FIGURE 11.4 *Poorer countries should be expected to make less effort than richer countries to protect the environment**



Note: * Percentage that agree.

Source: ISSP (2001)

Environmental concern index

The intention of this chapter is to improve understanding of the factors that shape environmental perceptions in South Africa. In order to achieve this, an environmental concern index was created using statements and questions from the 2005 SASAS survey. Environmental concern has been described as a composite of environmental attitudes and environmental behaviours (Parker & McDonough 1999). Minton and Rose (1997) define environmental concern as strong positive attitudes towards preserving the environment. For this study, statements reflecting on individuals' attitudes towards the environment as well as their behaviour regarding the environment were taken from the SASAS questionnaire. In an attempt to understand the underlying environmental concepts that were tested by the questions, a factor analysis was done. This factor analysis did not, however, clearly reveal specific factors, but did reveal which questions were correlated. Using this and eliminating the questions that had a high non-response, the author selected the statements below to form part of the environmental index. These statements are varied and did not try to test one specific principle. Rather, they tested environmental versus economic imperatives, the environment and its relationship to other social issues, human interventions and their effects on the natural environment, and commitment towards environmental protection. While this index is not comprehensive enough to measure all facets and components of environmental concern, it does broadly reflect intent and commitment to the environment.

The following statements were used to construct the index:

- We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about jobs today.
- Economic progress in South Africa will slow down unless we look after the environment better.
- Even if we do not protect the environment, people will always find ways to survive.
- I always try to tell people we should protect the environment.
- There are more important things to do in life than to protect the environment.
- Nature conservation parks only benefit wealthy people.
- Land earmarked for conservation should rather be given to poorer communities.
- Concern about using up the earth's remaining coal, oil and gas resources.
- Concern about using up the earth's remaining water resources.

Response categories to all the items were scaled in such a way that a high score presented a pro-environment stance and a low score an anti-environment stance. Responses to the statements were calculated from 'strongly agree' (5), 'agree' (4), 'neither agree nor disagree' (3), to 'disagree' (2) and 'strongly disagree' (1). We created a concern index for each respondent using these computations.

In the next sections, key demographic characteristics and other issues are analysed against the index in an attempt to understand and decipher environmental concern in the South African context. All tables and analyses are based on 2005 SASAS survey data.

Environmental concern and race

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, researchers in the United States undertook a series of studies that sought to correlate concern for protecting the environment with racial identity or income level. Hershey and Hill's (1977/78) widely cited analysis of student opinion found a 'concern gap' between white and African American survey respondents. Whites were significantly more concerned about protecting the environment than were African Americans, even after controlling for a variety of socio-economic factors. By contrast, later work by Dunlap and Jones (1987) and Mohai (1990) used the results from a 1980 national survey (Fischer et al. 1980) to study the opinions of African Americans and whites on a range of environmental problems. They found little or no difference between the two groups on most issues. Work by Jones (1998) focused on a single trend variable over a period of two decades, and found

TABLE 11.6 *Concern for the environment, by race*

	African	Coloured	Indian	White	P value	Eta Squared	Total
Concern index	3.06	3.10	3.13	3.42	0.00	0.049	3.12
Base N	1 143	229	195	243			1 810

Source: SASAS (2005)

fluctuations in the level of concern for the environment between African Americans and whites over the 1970s and 1980s. These fluctuations were not consistent across time and did not offer much support for a concern gap, since at times whites were significantly more concerned than African Americans, while at other times African Americans were more concerned than whites. A later analysis, using the 1993 General Social Survey's environment module, revealed that poor respondents and African American respondents were actually more likely to be pro-environment (Uyeki & Holland 2000). According to this analysis, race showed poor consistency and poor conclusiveness as a predictor of environmental attitudes.

Although there are limited data on race differences in environmental concern in South Africa (Fiedelday et al. 1998), studies by Craffert and Willers (1994) indicate that race has been significantly related to people's views on environmental degradation. Most of these studies do, however, caution against unidirectional causal interpretations and assert that other interacting factors, such as socio-economic status and place of residence, should be considered when interpreting differences in environmental perceptions.

When the environmental concern index was measured for the different race groups in South Africa, significant differences between races were found. African respondents were least concerned about the environment, followed by coloured, Indian and white respondents (Table 11.6).

Given South Africa's history of exclusivity in terms of environmental assets, as well as socio-economic variations for the different race groups, it is not surprising that the African, Indian and coloured populations are less concerned about environmental issues than the white population. Given the Eta squared value, race has the biggest size effect on the concern index.

Environmental concern and income

Lyons and Breakwell's (1994) studies indicate that the middle and upper classes are more concerned about the environment than are the lower classes. Learners from higher socio-economic backgrounds are more environmentally concerned than their counterparts from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In this study, lower-income groups scored lower on the environmental concern index (Table 11.7).

TABLE 11.7 *Concern for the environment, by income*

	R0-R500	R501-R1 000	R1 001-R2 000	R2 001-R5 000	R5 001+	P value	Eta Squared	Total
Concern index	3.06	3.04	3.13	3.26	3.49	0.00	0.045	3.11
Base N	861	343	106	137	102			1 549

Source: SASAS (2005)

Groups with the highest income show most concern for the environment, in accordance with the hierarchy of needs theory or postmodernist approach.

Environmental concern and education

Although Willers (1996) suggests that the most consistent finding in the literature proposes a link between environmental attitudes and level of education, the correlation between level of education and concern for the environment is decidedly mixed. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) and Kanagy et al. (1994) found that higher levels of education were related to greater concern for the environment. Later work by Mohai and Bryant (1998) and Uyeki and Holland (2000) found instead that lower levels of education related to greater environmental concern, while Guth et al. (1995) found little correlation between education and environmental concern. Intuitively, education is an important contributor to the formation of personal opinions, but there appears to be little reason to expect education to work in a systematic and independent way to influence a person’s concern for the environment (Whittaker et al. 2003).

TABLE 11.8 *Concern for the environment, by education*

	No school–Grade 2	Grades 3–7	Grades 8–10	Grades 11–12	Post-Grade 12	P value	Eta Squared	Total
Concern index	2.98	3.01	3.08	3.14	3.39	0.00	0.036	3.12
Base N	145	317	311	855	165			1 793

Source: SASAS (2005)

As shown in Table 11.8, in this study, there were significant differences in concern for the environment based on educational level. A linear association existed, with those with the lowest education being least concerned compared to the most highly educated cohort.

Environmental concern and province of residence

When the environmental concern index was evaluated by province, it was found that people from Mpumalanga were least committed to and concerned about the environment (Table 11.9). According to the State of the Environment (SOE) report for Mpumalanga, this province’s high biodiversity makes it a favourable destination for tourism and the contribution of the tourism sector of the economy is increasing on an annual basis. South Africa’s top 20 attractions include four of Mpumalanga’s tourism assets, namely, the Kruger National Park, the Blyde River Canyon, Pilgrim’s Rest and private game parks in the province. These benefits, however, do not seem to reach the local people of Mpumalanga. This is acknowledged in the SOE report, where it is mentioned that there are certain issues that require urgent attention and action. First on the list is poverty, especially in rural areas. A systematic and coordinated process should be developed to monitor, evaluate and report on sustainable development within the province, and also to report and focus on benefits for the local residents.

TABLE 11.9 *Concern for the environment, by province*

	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	P value	Eta Squared	Total
Concern index	3.23	3.11	3.09	3.29	3.04	3.07	3.22	2.96	3.11	0.00	0.034	3.12
Base N	180	160	118	191	310	124	251	233	244			1 811

Note: See list of acronyms for explanations of province abbreviations.
Source: SASAS (2005)

Environmental concern and geographic location

Danielson et al. (1995) maintain that the rural–urban character of the place where the household is located can influence environmental perceptions. In general, however, the relationship is not clear. On the one hand, small towns are more ‘rural’, which may lead to higher environmental dependency and therefore values. On the other hand, medium-sized and big cities are more active in implementing environmental policies.

When looking at southern Africa, urbanisation, the environment and public participation are among the most important planning issues of the decade (Rousseau & Venter 2001). The population explosion and the resulting urbanisation have created great pressure on the environment, while the public demand to influence decisions suggests that the community can no longer be excluded from planning and decision-making (Kok 1995).

In South Africa, a large part of the population resides in urban informal areas where the quality of life is poor. Pollution, littering and waste are serious threats in these areas. It is therefore not surprising that place of residence emerged as one of the highest predictors of environmental attitudes or concern.

As Table 11.10 shows, respondents living in urban informal areas cared much less about the environment than respondents residing in urban formal, rural informal and rural formal areas. The relative deprivation theory suggests that people living in polluted and degraded areas get used to the situation and that the outcry is likely to come from people living in cleaner areas who become exposed to the polluted side (Whittaker et al. 2003). However, there is also a danger that constant exposure to pollution and environmentally hazardous situations would start to take precedence over less concrete issues, such as civil rights issues. However, once the issue of civil rights and human dignity is connected to environmental deprivation, it can become a major issue, capable of influencing opinion and creating unrest and dissatisfaction. The 2007 riots related to inadequate service delivery in several areas in South Africa would appear to support this.

TABLE 11.10 *Concern for the environment, by environmental milieu*

	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal	P value	Eta Squared	Total
Concern index	3.17	2.98	3.06	3.14	0.00	0.015	3.12
Base N	1 000	227	360	224			1 811

Source: SASAS (2005)

Environmental concern and gender

Uyeki and Holland (2000) found no evidence of a gender effect for the issue of environmental concern, while Mohai and Bryant (1998) found some differences. Davidson and Freudenberg (1996) and Blocker and Eckberg (1997) found that females tended to be more concerned about general environmental issues than males. Females tended to have greater concern for health and safety issues, were more concerned about pollution and were more 'green' in their personal lifestyles. Other researchers skipped a control for gender entirely (e.g. Mohai 1990). There were no gender differences on the environmental concern index.

Environmental concern and religiosity

There is research evidence that a respondent's religious affiliation is correlated with their concerns for environmental protection. In general, Judaeo-Christians have been found to be less concerned about environmental protection than non-Judaeo-Christians, with some variance by denomination (Hand & Van Liere 1984). The more fundamentalist/orthodox branches of various religions are less supportive of environmental protection than less fundamentalist branches (Guth et al. 1995). Politically, a liberal or democrat self-identification has consistently been correlated with support for environmental protection (Kanagy et al. 1994; Van Liere & Dunlap 1980).

To check for any association between religious commitment and environmental concern, the question about the number of hours people spent praying (arguably an index for religious commitment) was tested against the environmental concern index. No significant differences were found for the number of hours a respondent spends praying and concern for the environment.

Environmental concern and age

The stereotypical environmentalist is a young adult and some evidence exists to support this image (Whittaker et al. 2003). Kanagy et al. (1994) found that the younger age groups are more pro-environment. The authors seem to believe that overall concern for the environment has grown as younger cohorts replace older, less environmentally concerned cohorts in the population. This finding was challenged by Ebreo et al. (1999), who found that age was positively correlated with environmental concern. However, Mohai and Bryant (1998) suggested that age was not a factor that predicted concern. When analysing the index using age, no significant differences were found between the various age groups.

Environmental concern and trust in government

Social capital may be measured by such variables as norms of behaviour, participation in voluntary associations and, especially, trust – an explanatory variable that has been used as a proxy for social capital in other contexts (Knack & Keefer 1997).

We computed a trust index using responses to the questions on how much the respondents trust national government, the courts, the Independent Electoral Commission, their provincial governments, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Parliament, the police, the defence force, big business, their local government and churches. There were no significant differences between trust for the government and environmental concern.

Environmental concern and satisfaction with service delivery

When an index of satisfaction with service delivery from government (supply of water and sanitation, provision of electricity, removal of refuse, affordable housing, access to healthcare, treatment

of sexually transmitted diseases, cutting crime, creating jobs and land reform) was created, no significant differences were found between people's satisfaction with services and their concern for the environment.

Discussion

The variation in the perceived importance of environmental issues in the different countries suggests that environmental attitudes and the importance of environmental protection are shaped by social and physical location and are therefore embedded in a socio-economic and political culture. Environmental perceptions and issues in South Africa are embedded and shaped by history as much as any other socio-political issues. Perceptions of the environment differ by race, geographic location, locus of control and various other variables, not least because of past policies and legislation. Past policies and approaches to conservation created public and private conservation areas that allowed only restricted entrance to surrounding communities; certain privileged individuals had less limited access. It is therefore no wonder that common rules, norms and sanctions about environmental issues could not be found for the different groupings, especially among the different race groups in South Africa.

South Africa experienced its democratic liberation in 1994, and with it came a liberal Constitution, a bill of human rights and a government that professes to be people-centred in performing its governing functions. The change was also noticeable in the realm of conservation, where the emphasis changed from nature conservation to natural resource management. Natural resource management has at its core the management of natural resources to ensure sustainability. This new approach poses a challenge in terms of making people part of conservation and allowing them to share in the benefits. Findings presented in this chapter strongly suggest that after a decade of the natural resource management approach, the majority of people still seem to perceive the benefits as limited. Results also indicate that if people do not perceive benefits from conservation, they will not support conservation efforts. If any conservation effort reeks of a public relations exercise, no goodwill can or will be created among communities and no inroads will be made towards sustainable development.

With the first democratic election, economic liberation also took place. Business and economic opportunities opened up for the majority of South Africans. It is therefore not surprising that we find a cohort of South Africans who regard economic imperatives as more important than environmental ones. Findings also clearly indicate that residents from Mpumalanga are less concerned and care less for the environment than do people residing in other provinces.

When the opinions of South Africans were compared to those of respondents in 27 other countries (using similar statements), South Africans' responses typified those of developing countries with the exception of the statement 'Poorer countries should be expected to make less effort than richer countries to protect the environment'. A third of South Africans agreed with this statement, similar to proportions in developed countries such as Switzerland (31.5 per cent) and Ireland (31.1 per cent). Results such as this suggest that South Africans have a heightened sense of responsibility towards the environment and would not shy away from responsible environmental practices because of an economic disposition.

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What do South Africans think about work, their jobs and organisations?

Carly Steyn

Introduction

Since democratisation in 1994, the South African workplace has undergone a number of dramatic transformations. The introduction of the Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995), the Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998) and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (No. 75 of 1997) substantially reduced what has been referred to as 'racial despotism' and 'racial fordism' in the South African workplace (Webster 1999: 28), and increased the participation of women and previously excluded racial groupings in the South African economy. More recently, we witnessed the implementation of the Skills Development Act (No. 97 of 1998) and the Skills Development Amendment Act (No. 5 of 2001) that led to the establishment of a National Skills Fund and numerous Sector Education and Training Authorities. But despite these policy changes, the deracialisation of the South African workforce has been slow. Data from the 2004 *Employment Equity Report* released by the Department of Labour show that whites still dominate the skilled end of the occupational ladder, and that women are still overlooked when it comes to promotions (DoL 2005).

The problem is further fuelled by the high levels of unemployment in the country. Despite the implementation of a number of job-creation strategies, including the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative, the Special Development Initiatives, the Unsombuvu Fund and the small, micro and medium enterprises development institutions, the employment intensity of economic growth remains low. Between September 2004 and September 2005 the official unemployment rate¹ rose slightly from 26.2 per cent to 26.7 per cent, rendering it even more unlikely that the national target of halving unemployment by 2014 will be reached at the current employment growth rate. South African employment rates also remain highly differentiated in terms of race, gender, age and occupational (skill) level. According to *Quarterly Employment Statistics*, released by Statistics South Africa in June 2006, unemployment was found to be highest among African women and economically active persons between the ages of 15 and 34 (Stats SA 2006b).

Despite the obvious economic ramifications resultant from such high levels of unemployment, prolonged unemployment can have a number of negative individual and social effects. At the

- 1 According to the strict definition, the unemployed are those in the economically active population who:
 - have not worked during the last seven days prior to the Statistics South Africa interview;
 - want to work and are available to start work within a week of the interview;
 - have taken active steps to look for work or to provide themselves with self-employment in the four weeks preceding the Statistics South Africa interview.

The expanded definition of employment excludes the third criterion above, that is, it includes those individuals that did not actively seek employment.

individual level, prolonged unemployment results in disillusionment and the erosion of self-esteem and human dignity. At the social level, it contributes to climbing levels of crime, poverty, political unrest and instability (Mahadea 2003). Increasing levels of unemployment have also been linked to rising levels of perceived job insecurity, which in turn has been shown to translate into negative work attitudes and reduced levels of job satisfaction and organisational commitment (Ashford et al. 1989; De Witte 2005; Hellgren et al. 1999; Lim 1996).

Little research has been done to determine the attitudes of South Africans towards the labour market, their jobs and organisations. Those studies that do exist have been limited to certain sectors of the economy (Hipkin 2000; Keeley 1999; Lee & Mohamed 2006) or have focused on employee preferences in the workplace rather than on current perceptions of the employment context (Steyn & Kotze 2004). This chapter will attempt to address this gap in the literature by examining the nature of these attitudes as measured by the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). As noted, the South African labour market remains largely differentiated in terms of race, gender and sectoral grouping. It is probable, then, that attitudes towards work may be differentiated along similar lines. As a result, the analyses presented in the chapter will take these variables (and others) into consideration.

The rest of the chapter starts by examining the current state of the South African labour market, with particular reference to gender, population group and occupational level. It then moves on to an examination of South Africans' work values, based on a sample of 2 870 respondents. Next, the chapter looks at the attitudes of employed South Africans to their current jobs and organisations. Reference is made to issues of job security, satisfaction and organisational pride. The chapter closes with an examination of the attitudes of unemployed respondents and includes an analysis of the strategies used by the unemployed to find work.

The data on which this chapter is based are primarily drawn from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) module on work orientation, which has been employed in over 30 countries. In the South African case, the module was added to the SASAS survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The data thus provide a good basis for international comparison. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, international data were not yet available.


The South African labour market

Although the South African workplace is becoming more diverse, the legacy of apartheid continues to glance back at us from the pages of employment equity reports and labour market statistics. Whites continue to dominate skilled occupations and women remain under-represented across most occupational levels. To further complicate matters, South Africa suffers from a high unemployment rate, which until very recently showed no signs of decreasing. As mentioned, it is probable that attitudes towards work will reflect the economic, social and political realities faced by South African citizens. In the paragraphs that follow, this reality will be discussed with particular reference to the nature of unemployment and employment equity in South Africa.

Unemployment

Unemployment rates in South Africa have increased at a rate of 31.0 per cent since 1996 and continue to reflect racial and gender disparities. As Figure 12.1 shows, Africans still display the highest unemployment rate (31.6 per cent), followed by coloureds (19.8 per cent), Indians (18.0 per cent) and whites (5.1 per cent). The female unemployment rate is significantly higher than that of males across all racial groupings, with African women bearing the brunt of unemployment in the country (Table 12.1).

FIGURE 12.1 *Unemployment rate, by race, 2001–05**



Note: * Strict definition.
Source: Dimant et al. (2006)

Using data from the October Household Survey and the September Labour Force Survey, a study by Brooks and Hinks (2004) set out to determine whether the probability of an employment gap between white, African, coloured and Indian labour force participants had changed between 1995 and 2002. The study concluded that the upper-limit estimate of white–African employment discrimination had increased absolutely from 12.0 per cent to 17.4 per cent for the period; white–coloured and white–Indian discrimination increased from 4.7 per cent to 9.5 per cent and 0.9 per cent to 5.5 per cent respectively. These findings suggest that although the likelihood of finding employment declined across all population groups between 1995 and 2002, African, coloured and Indian labour force participants’ likelihood of being employed worsened relative to that of white labour force participants. The reasons given for white employment advantage include nepotistic hiring practices and qualitative differences in terms of schooling, tertiary education and labour market information. Bhorat (2004: 951) confirms this trend. According to his analysis, employment was generated for only about 28 per cent of all new African entrants into the labour market between 1995 and 2002, while 55 per cent of all new white entrants found employment.

In a study conducted for the International Labour Organisation, Standing and Weeks (1996) demonstrate that female participation in the labour force is growing at a much faster rate than that of their male counterparts. In 1960, for instance, women made up 23 per cent of the South African labour force. This figure rose to 36 per cent in 1985 and by 1991 it had reached 41 per cent. Recent figures suggest that females’ share of total employment rose from only 9.1 per cent in 1995 to 41.8 per cent in 2004 (Oosthuizen 2006: 22). The increase in female labour supply has, however, not been matched by a similar increase in employment. Female unemployment rates are significantly higher than male unemployment rates, with African women displaying the highest levels of unemployment (Table 12.1). It is no surprise then that the number of discouraged work seekers is substantially higher for females than it is for males. By September 2005, the number of female discouraged work seekers, as a percentage of the working-age population, stood at 13.9 per cent, as opposed to 8.2 per cent for males (Stats SA 2006a: xx).

TABLE 12.1 *Unemployment rate, by gender, 2005*

	Strict definition	
	Male	Female
African	26.7	37.6
Coloured	18.6	21.2
Indian	15.4	22.6
White	4.4	5.9
Total	22.4	31.4

Source: Dimant et al. (2006)

According to Oosthuizen (2006: 19), employment absorption rates are similarly skewed across race groups. The employment absorption rates stand at 31.3 per cent and 82.5 per cent for African females and white females respectively. This suggests that the expanding labour force has far exceeded the number of jobs available, resulting in low labour absorption rates, specifically for African females.

According to Borat (2004), economic growth has created employment for more educated individuals, which to some extent explains the gender and race disparities discussed above. For instance, between 1995 and 2002, 64 out of every 100 tertiary educated individuals found employment, while only 35 out of 100 individuals with matric and 14 out of 100 individuals with incomplete secondary education managed to find employment. Although the South African labour force is becoming more educated, with the percentage of individuals with completed secondary education rising from 20.9 per cent in 1995 to 26.2 per cent in 2004, the increase in the number of tertiary educated members has been unable to keep pace with the rate of total labour force growth (Oosthuizen 2006: 12). As a result, the largest percentage growth in unemployment occurred among individuals with a matric or a tertiary² education. Unemployment levels for individuals with a matric increased by almost 50.0 per cent between 1995 and 2004, while unemployment levels for individuals with a tertiary education rose from 6.6 per cent in 1995 to 10.4 per cent in 2004. According to Borat (2004), this trend can be explained through reference to tertiary unemployment rates broken down by race, where African individuals with a tertiary education bear the brunt of unemployment. In 1995, the unemployment rate among African graduates was four times that of whites. In 2004, it was more than six times that of white graduates. The unemployment rates among coloured and Indian graduates declined slightly for the period (Oosthuizen 2006: 41). When considering the employment rates among matriculants, white matriculants are once again more likely to find employment when compared with other population groups.

Employment equity

Apartheid education policy and employment legislation, which prohibited black South Africans from accessing trade and skilled work, created a racially polarised skills base in the country. Despite the implementation of employment equity legislation and affirmative action programmes, the movement of African employees into skilled management positions has been slow. In 2003, for instance, 76 per cent of top management positions were occupied by whites, 15 per cent by Africans and 4 and 5 per cent by coloureds and Indians respectively (DoL 2003: 36). The most recent *Employment Equity Analysis Report* released by the Department of Labour (DoL 2004: 35) shows that 67.8 per cent of top

2 In this instance, 'tertiary educated' refers to individuals with a variety of qualifications, including diplomas.

management positions are filled by white males, 10.7 per cent by African males and 9.2 per cent by white females. Senior management positions are again dominated by white males (58.2 per cent), followed by white females (15.6 per cent) and African males (10.1 per cent). The situation becomes slightly more equitable as one moves down the occupation ladder. White males comprise 31.9 per cent of middle-management positions, while African males constitute 21.8 per cent of such positions. According to the same report, 77 per cent of top and senior management promotions and 81 per cent of top management recruits were men. It remains unclear as to whether the slow deracialisation of the South African labour market is due primarily to demand-side factors such as discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, or supply-side factors characterised by a lack of necessary skills among the designated groups (Moleke 2006).

Work values


Work values can generally be described as the expression of goals, rewards and outcomes within the work context. These end-states or goals are then used as standards by which certain work conditions, activities and outcomes are evaluated, and ultimately enable individuals to make choices among a variety of different work alternatives (Ros et al. 1999). The most popular measurement of work values requires respondents to state the importance of a number of work outcomes or preferences, such as good pay, opportunities for advancement, likeable co-workers, etc. A person who places higher emphasis on extrinsic work values, for instance, will evaluate work situations that enable the attainment of extrinsic goals as more favourable than work situations that enable the attainment of intrinsic work goals.

According to numerous studies on work values, advanced industrial societies are showing a distinct shift away from more traditional secular work values such as income and security, towards more individualised or intrinsic work values that emphasise the value and autonomy of the human being (Ester & Roe 1999; Halman & De Moor 1993; Harding & Hiksloops 1995). Through his 'individualisation thesis', Ronald Inglehart (1990) argues that this shift towards individualisation is a direct result of the improved economic conditions of the younger birth cohorts, who have consequently been liberated from an overemphasis on material needs. Instead, these individuals are free to pursue the gratification of higher-order needs, such as personal development and self-actualisation. Work characteristics or preferences consistent with individualised values include autonomy, opportunities for growth, change and stimulation. Extrinsic work values, on the other hand, are associated with job security, income and opportunities for advancement.

From the mean scores presented in Figure 12.2, it comes as no surprise that South Africans value extrinsic work outcomes such as job security, a high income and good opportunities for advancement above intrinsic work values.

Table 12.2 compares the mean scores associated with job preferences across the various population groups in South Africa. Consistent with the findings of the general survey population, all population groups regarded job security as the most important job characteristic. African respondents regarded income as the second most important job characteristic, while white, coloured and Indian respondents regarded good opportunities for advancement as the second most important job characteristic.

FIGURE 12.2 *Work preferences of South African citizens (mean scores*)*



Note: * 1 = Very important, 5 = Not at all important
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 12.2 *Work preferences, by race (mean scores*)*

	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Job security	1.30	1.46	1.31	1.34	1.33
High income	1.45	1.71	1.55	1.77	1.54
Good opportunities for advancement	1.56	1.70	1.41	1.55	1.56
An interesting job	1.58	1.78	1.64	1.63	1.62
Job that allows me to work independently	1.87	2.21	1.98	1.86	1.93
Job that allows me to help other people	1.61	2.06	1.85	1.83	1.73
Job that is useful to society	1.67	2.08	1.84	1.84	1.77
Job that allows me to decide times/days of work	2.19	2.61	2.47	2.32	2.30

Note: * 1 = Very important, 5 = Not at all important
Source: SASAS (2005)

The importance placed on extrinsic work values such as job security, income and opportunities for advancement is understandable when one considers the high levels of unemployment and poverty in the country. The majority of South Africans are much more likely to value a job that offers long-term security and financial stability over one that is interesting or that allows a high degree of independence or autonomy. However, an overemphasis on extrinsic work values could be detrimental to the development of intrinsic work values such as autonomy and personal development. Work values have a direct impact on the behaviour of individuals in organisations. An individual who values job security and advancement above autonomy and personal development, for instance, is unlikely to take risks at work or question the behaviour and decisions of management, for fear of losing out on opportunities for further advancement. Unfortunately, though, the knowledge economy demands that employees exercise a certain degree of freedom and autonomy through their work, thereby

improving organisational decision-making and enhancing organisational competitiveness. In a study examining the nature of work-value change in South Africa between 1990 and 2001, Steyn and Kotze (2004) showed that South African work values are becoming increasingly traditional, as greater emphasis is placed on extrinsic work values such as job security. Such a trend does not bode well for the development of employees who are able to compete in a global marketplace. Unfortunately, until the economic and social realities of the vast majority of South Africans improve considerably, it is unlikely that increased emphasis will be placed on intrinsic work values which seek to promote personal growth and development.

Employed South Africans' attitudes to work

Due to the nature of the constructs measured in this section, they were only applicable to persons who were engaged in an employment relationship in South Africa at the time of the study. As a result, it was necessary to extract groups for further analysis. A sample defined as 'currently employed' was created by eliminating respondents who identified themselves as either unemployed or self-employed. The number of respondents characterised as 'currently employed' stood at 763 employees. Attitudes towards work were further broken down in terms of gender, population group, type of employer (private enterprise, government or government-owned enterprise) and occupational level.³

Job characteristics

In order to measure the extent to which respondents evaluated the various job characteristics associated with their work as favourable or unfavourable, they were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements. The statements are listed in Table 12.3 and include both intrinsic and extrinsic work-related and outcome characteristics.

TABLE 12.3 *Perceptions of job characteristics**

	Gender		Population group				Employer			Occupational level			Total
	Male	Female	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Government	Government-owned	Private	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	
My job is secure.	66.9	58.2	57.7	76.9	69.2	76.4	86.3	88.6	55.9	79.1	58.8	56.7	64.7
My income is high.	27.1	22.4	21.5	17.9	51.2	42.3	26.9	63.9	23.3	41.2	27.8	11.8	24.2
My opportunities for advancement are high.	41.3	32.8	33.9	43.1	59.2	47.3	50.3	65.3	32.8	61.6	39.9	24.9	38.8

3 The classification of occupations into skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled was done in accordance with the methodology used by the Development Policy Research Unit, where: skilled = legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals; semi-skilled = clerks, sales and service workers, craft and related trade workers; unskilled = skilled agricultural and fishery workers, plant and machinery operators and assemblers, elementary occupations and domestic workers.

	Gender		Population group				Employer			Occupational level			Total
	Male	Female	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Government	Government-owned	Private	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	
My job is interesting.	66.3	56.9	55.3	74.6	81	80.4	79.2	90.6	54.2	78	64.7	51.3	62.0
I can work independently.	55.9	54.9	48.7	59.9	86.8	74.6	57.3	77.9	51.6	71.7	54.2	48.9	54.7
In my job I can help other people.	67.6	72	70.6	53	85.4	73.7	87.3	89.5	61.5	83.1	73.5	59.3	68.8
My job is useful to society.	75.1	69.4	74.4	62.1	92.3	71.1	89.4	89.9	65.8	94.8	73.9	60.3	72.4
My job gives me a chance to improve my skills.	64.2	51.8	55	64.4	79.8	70.2	77.4	90.4	52.7	75.2	65.4	46.7	60.5
N	397	354	445	118	69	119	127	55	504	137	260	316	763

Notes: Gender chi-square= $p < 0.001$; Population group chi-square= $p < 0.001$; Employer chi-square= $p < 0.001$; Occupational level chi-square= $p < 0.001$

* Percentage that 'strongly agree' and 'agree'.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Income

In a highly unionised environment like South Africa, perceptions of job characteristics can provide a valuable indication of areas in which employee grievances are likely to emerge. In the South African context, it is not surprising that attitudes towards income levels were regarded as the most unfavourable. As expected, women, African and coloured people and unskilled employees displayed the highest levels of disagreement with the statement 'My income is high', reflecting, most likely, the differentiated nature of monthly earnings in South Africa. Between 1995 and 2003, average earnings in nominal terms increased from R2 182 to R2 881 a month. In real terms, however, using 2000 as the base year, monthly earnings declined from R3 014 to R2 360. Although average real earnings for both whites and Africans dropped between 1995 and 2003, the drop for Africans (25.0 per cent) was far greater than for whites (7.2 per cent) (Stats SA 2005b: 4). While acknowledging that females still earn less than their male counterparts in most areas of work, Altman (2005) shows how females have gained considerably since the 1990s. Female managers have shown a definite increase in earnings, while semi-skilled female workers appear to be earning more than their male counterparts.

These findings are consistent with the findings of a recent Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) survey (Naledi 2006). When asked what workers wanted most from employers, the majority of respondents across all population groups wanted wage increases. This sentiment was strongest among African employees, where over 80 per cent sought a wage increase.

When comparing perceptions of income across the various population groups, by controlling for occupational level (Table 12.4), African and coloured respondents continue to display the highest levels of dissatisfaction with employment earnings. This carries important implications for organisational

TABLE 12.4 *Perceptions of employment earnings, by race and occupational level (mean scores*)*

Occupational level	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Skilled	3.14	3.25	2.79	2.66
Semi-skilled	3.60	3.34	3.00	2.89
Unskilled	3.82	3.80	3.29	3.17
Total	3.66	3.58	2.97	2.80
Base	422	109	67	109

Notes: Levene's Statistic significant at the 0.05 level.

* Respondents were asked to respond to the statement 'My income is high', where 1 = Strongly agree, 5 = Strongly disagree.

Source: SASAS (2005)

retention strategies when one considers that income was regarded as an important job outcome by the majority of respondents under the section on values. Numerous studies measuring the impact of work values on organisational behaviour have shown that when espoused values are not met through organisational settings, organisational commitment and job satisfaction decline, resulting in higher levels of employee turnover (Elizur 1996; Knoop 1994).

These high levels of income dissatisfaction can be clearly seen when one considers the number of work days lost as a result of strikes in South Africa. In 2004, over a million work days were lost due to strikes, representing a 57.1 per cent increase in the number of days lost in 2003 (Andrew Levy Employment Publications 2004 as cited in Dimant et al. 2006: 221).

It appears, however, as though the challenges surrounding wages in South Africa are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. During 2005, the statutory Employment Conditions Commission promulgated nine determinations to regulate working hours and minimum wages in line with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. The minimum wage policies have, however, not been without fair criticism and resistance. The South African Council for Business has warned that the wage increases in the wholesale and retail sectors will be detrimental to the viability of small businesses (*Business Day* 3 February 2005), and research carried out by Efficient Research found that South Africa's unit labour cost has risen by 250 per cent since 1990, resulting in massive workforce reductions (Dimant et al. 2006: 244). Unfortunately, in a country with such high levels of unemployment, issues concerning wage levels are likely to remain a conundrum for researchers and policy-makers alike.

Job security

Contrary to expectations, the majority of respondents regarded their current jobs as secure, with almost 65 per cent agreeing with the statement (Table 12.3). As noted, unemployment levels in South Africa are largely differentiated in terms of race, gender and skills level. One would therefore expect perceptions of job insecurity in South Africa to be differentiated along similar variables. As expected, female respondents displayed higher levels of job insecurity than male respondents, while African respondents reported significantly higher levels of job insecurity than their white and coloured counterparts. Respondents employed in the private sector displayed higher levels of insecurity than public sector employees, while skilled respondents enjoyed significantly more job security than semi-skilled and unskilled employees. These findings therefore conform to a reality where women, Africans and the unskilled continue to bear the brunt of labour insecurity.

Opportunities for advancement

Although the majority of respondents felt that their jobs were interesting (62.0 per cent) and that they could work independently (54.7 per cent), only 38.8 per cent believed that their opportunities for advancement were high (Table 12.3). Once again, the data are skewed in favour of male, Indian, white and skilled respondents. The results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)⁴ tests show a particularly significant difference between the perceptions of males and females, and between occupational levels, with regard to opportunities for advancement. Table 12.5 shows the differences in mean scores between gender and population groups by controlling for occupational level. Females show significantly higher mean scores across all occupational levels when compared to their male counterparts, suggesting that females perceive significantly fewer opportunities for advancement than do their male co-workers. Males continue to dominate across all occupational levels, a trend which undoubtedly hinders females' prospects for advancement.

According to the Women in Business Census of 2004, conducted by the South African Business Woman's Association, only 7.1 per cent of directors and 14.7 per cent of executive directors of companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange were women (*Business Day* 30 June 2004). According to the 2004 employment equity report released by the Department of Labour, almost 60.0 per cent of promotions in 2004 went to males (DoL 2005). Of all top and senior management promotions, 77.0 per cent went to males. Research on work values in South Africa has shown that male dominance in the workplace can inhibit the career development of female employees, especially in occupations situated towards the top of the occupational ladder (Steyn & Kotze 2004). Between 1995 and 2001, females (especially those situated towards the top of the occupational ladder) displayed a significant shift towards traditional values associated with authority in the workplace, that is, they were less inclined than men to question supervisors' instructions. This may be explained by the fact that as females move up the occupational ladder in South Africa, they are exposed to even stronger patriarchal tendencies which, if not properly managed, can inhibit the development of individualised work values among females.

Interestingly, when comparing the mean scores associated with opportunities for advancement among the population groupings, skilled white employees display higher mean scores than their skilled African, coloured and Indian counterparts, suggesting that white employees occupying skilled positions perceive significantly fewer opportunities for advancement than do employees from the other groups (Table 12.5). Post-hoc ANOVA tests show that this difference is particularly significant between skilled Africans and skilled whites ($p < 0.005$), suggesting perhaps that movement towards employment equity targets

TABLE 12.5 *Opportunities for advancement, by race, gender and occupational level (mean scores*)*

Occupational level	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Male	Female	Total
Skilled	2.57	2.58	2.16	2.69	2.40	2.67	2.56
Semi-skilled	3.04	3.03	2.90	2.70	2.92	2.97	2.95
Unskilled	3.60	3.55	2.14	2.83	3.42	3.69	3.55
Total	3.30	3.25	2.61	2.70	3.07	3.21	3.14
Base	423	106	67	108	366	337	704

Note: * Respondents were asked to respond to the statement 'My opportunities for advancement are high', where 1 = Strongly agree, 5 = Strongly disagree.

Source: SASAS (2005)

4 The One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test is used to determine whether or not the differences between two or more group means are significant. Once it is determined that differences among the means exist, Post-hoc range tests are used to determine which means differ.

is occurring at a faster rate towards the top of the occupational structure, and that white employees at these levels are therefore more likely to feel the pinch of affirmative action programmes in the workplace.

Despite big improvements in the representation of previously disadvantaged groups across the South African workforce, the Department of Labour reported that more than half of the companies inspected between September 2003 and August 2004 were not compliant with the Employment Equity Act. As a result, to enforce compliance, the department has proposed a strategy which could include the imposition of employment equity compliance ratings (Dimant et al. 2006).

Training and skills development

The South African labour force remains polarised in terms of a racial divide between skilled white workers and unskilled and/or semi-skilled African workers. Although data do show the relative advancement of Africans into semi-skilled and skilled positions, there is still a high concentration of whites at skilled levels, especially in the skill-intensive sectors (Moleke 2006). The scope of this chapter does not allow for an examination of the numerous reasons for the slow deracialisation of the South African labour market. However, of primary concern is the general shortage of skilled Africans, which to some extent hinders the attainment of equity targets. In recognition of this impediment to employment equity, the importance of skills development in South Africa has been significantly elevated through the implementation of a number of financial and institutional mechanisms. But to what extent have these measures been successful in improving the skills situation in South Africa?

In a review of five large studies examining enterprise training in South Africa, Badroodien (2003: 445) concluded that South Africa has a mean annual training rate of between 20 and 30 per cent of the employed workforce. Furthermore, Kraak (2004: 42) reveals that only 10.4 per cent of levy-paying firms were effectively participating in the levy-grant system in 2002. The situation becomes increasingly problematic when one considers employee training rates among small firms. A study examining the state of skills training in very small and micro enterprises showed that the uptake of grants remained low and participation in learnerships minimal (Martins 2005). If one considers that in 2003 micro and very small businesses contributed 33 and 23 per cent respectively to the proportion of total employment in the country (DTI 2003: 48), this trend becomes even more problematic.

Research conducted by the HSRC on the nature and prevalence of workplace skills training in the public sector has shown that training tends to be focused on those occupational categories situated towards the top of the occupational ladder, and is largely dominated by whites (Moleke 2006). Nevertheless, government training expenditure increased by 76 per cent between 2000/01 and 2003/04, suggesting that, at least within government, the resolve to improve skills levels in the country does exist. The National Skills Survey conducted by the HSRC in 2003 (Paterson et al. 2004) showed that 81 per cent of large organisations reported participation in training, while service and sales workers received training on a one-in-three ratio. The study also revealed that the training rate in South Africa is roughly comparable to that of some economies in southern Europe, despite the fact that we started off with a lower skills base, due to the legacy of apartheid.

Data from the 2005 SASAS survey, however, suggest that the majority of employed South Africans do not receive workplace training. When asked whether they had received training to improve their job skills in the last 12 months, 62.9 per cent of respondents asserted that they had not received any training during the period. Stark differences are evident among skills levels, where only 17.4 per cent of unskilled employees had received training, compared with 56.4 per cent of skilled employees (Table 12.6). Interestingly, both skilled and unskilled white employees received significantly less training than African and coloured employees, suggesting perhaps that skills training is provided with equity targets in mind. The data also seem to suggest that the private sector invests more in the training of skilled

TABLE 12.6 Respondents who received job skills training in the last 12 months (percentage)

Occupational level	Gender		Population group				Employer			Total
	Male	Female	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Government	Government owned	Privately owned	
Skilled	59.8	51.1	65.6	62.7	48.4	38.2	50.8	50.8	62.9	56.4
Semi-skilled	43.1	58.9	51.9	26.4	41.9	52.2	65.9	69.4	41.7	48.4
Unskilled	21.9	10.5	12.9	33.9	48.7	6.6	57.0	26.8	14.6	17.4
Base	356	321	408	106	66	97	119	48	460	677

Note: Gender chi-square= $p < 0.001$; Population group chi-square= $p < 0.001$; Employer chi-square= $p < 0.001$
Source: SASAS (2005)

individuals, while the public sector invests significantly more in the training of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

Job insecurity

Although job insecurity largely refers to individuals' negative reactions to the changes concerning their jobs, the literature on the topic is divided in terms of the more precise definition of the concept. Davy, Kinicki and Scheck (1997: 323) have referred to job insecurity as an individual's 'expectations about continuity in a job situation', while Rosenblatt and Ruvio (1999: 587) define it as the 'overall concern about the future existence of the job'. Heaney, Isreal and House (1994: 1431) define job insecurity as the 'perception of a potential threat to continuity in his/her current job' and Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984: 440) regard it as an individual's feeling of 'powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation'. Job security does not, however, refer exclusively to the threat of impending job loss, but also to the loss of valued job features and career security. In this regard, Sverke and Hellgren (2002) argue in favour of a distinction between quantitative and qualitative job insecurity. Quantitative job insecurity refers to the threat of job loss, while qualitative insecurity refers to the threat of losing important job features, such as career development, working conditions, etc. Numerous theorists have explored the negative consequences of job insecurity. Barling and Kelloway (1996) have shown that perceived job insecurity can result in impaired physical and mental well-being, while Ashford et al. (1989) have shown that high levels of job insecurity translate into lower levels of job satisfaction.

The survey module on which this chapter is based made use of a Likert-type scale to measure quantitative job insecurity. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent, if at all, they worry about the possibility of losing their jobs. According to the results, 23 per cent of respondents reported that they worried a great deal about the possibility of losing their jobs, while almost 27 per cent stated that they did not worry at all. Mean scores by gender, population group, occupational level and employer are presented in Table 12.7.

One-Way ANOVA Post-hoc tests were conducted to determine whether the differences between group means are significant. The tests showed a significant difference between the gender groupings, suggesting that South African females worry less about losing their jobs than their male counterparts do. This may be due to the fact that many working women in South Africa are not the primary breadwinners. A significant difference was also detected between the African and coloured, and African and white

TABLE 12.7 *Concern over the possibility of losing your job (mean scores*)*

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Gender			
Male	2.45	399	1.06
Female	2.73	356	1.16
Population group			
African	2.37	448	1.10
Coloured	2.93	119	0.95
Indian	2.64	69	1.27
White	2.99	119	1.05
Occupational level			
Skilled	2.97	137	1.10
Semi-skilled	2.59	258	1.12
Unskilled	2.40	314	1.10
Employer			
Government	2.88	127	1.01
Government-owned enterprise	2.71	55	1.08
Privately owned company	2.46	508	1.11
Total	2.58	755	1.12

Note: * 1 = Worry a great deal, 4 = Don't worry at all
Source: SASAS (2005)

respondents ($p < 0.05$). Both white and coloured respondents worry less about losing their jobs than do African respondents. Skilled employees worried significantly less than their semi-skilled and unskilled counterparts, while private sector employees displayed significantly higher levels of job insecurity than respondents in the public sector. It is clear from the above data that perceptions of job insecurity reflect the differentiated nature of employment in the country. Terms of employment duration are undoubtedly more permanent within skilled-level occupations, resulting in lower levels of perceived job insecurity. Since the majority of Africans are still situated within the semi-skilled and unskilled occupational levels, they would tend to display higher levels of insecurity than their white counterparts.

Relationships at work

The literature on employee relations in South Africa is rampant with widespread concerns that the South African workplace is characterised by low levels of trust, a lack of employee commitment and organisational pride, accompanied by high levels of employee turnover (Christie 1996; Roodt 1997; Thomas 2002). These concerns are largely based on extrapolations of the apartheid workplace regime into the present. The workplace during the apartheid era was characterised by the racial domination of a white minority, adversarial industrial relations and a management style that was largely authoritarian and paternalistic. Although we are by no means suggesting that workplace relations in the present day and age do not contain remnants of the country's apartheid history, many of these assertions – that is, low levels of trust, organisational pride and commitment – are largely based on anecdotal evidence.

According to Buhlungu and Webster (2006: 252), the South African workplace has succumbed to a number of new pressures that have resulted in a unique set of tensions, including 'reduction of

autonomy in the context of an increasingly cost-conscious domestic and international market', and the 'differentiation of the world of work into three zones comprising a core, non-core and periphery'. Little research has been done to determine the impact of these changes on industrial relations in the country, although Buhlungu and Webster cite a number of examples where a 'negotiated reconstruction' of the workplace has resulted in a reduction of racial tension and improved attitudes towards work.

However, when one considers that the proportion of strikes that can be attributed to grievance issues has increased over the past few years, one could conclude that industrial relations in South Africa may be showing signs of erosion. As mentioned, most strike activity in the country since 1994 has been triggered by wage issues. In 2000, however, grievance issues (which include issues over conditions of employment and discrimination) accounted for 20.5 per cent of strikes, and in 2003, this figure rose to 23.5 per cent (Andrew Levy Employment Publications 2004 as cited in SAIRR 2006: 222). Despite this trend, data from the 2005 SASAS survey seem to suggest a generally favourable industrial relations climate in the country. When asked to describe relations between employees and management, 77 per cent of respondents described the relationship as good. This finding corresponds with the finding of the Cosatu survey, which revealed that the majority of members across all sectors believed that it has become easier to work with management over the last five years (Naledi 2006). When comparing group means (Table 12.8), Post-hoc One-Way ANOVA tests reveal significant differences between male and female respondents, indicating that female respondents regard relationships between management and employees as more favourable than do their male counterparts. Significant differences could also be detected between African and white respondents, with African respondents displaying less favourable attitudes towards management–employee relations. This is most likely due to the significant difference between the mean scores of skilled and unskilled respondents. Unskilled employees regard management–employee relations as less favourable than skilled employees do. Since the majority of African respondents occupy unskilled positions, the differences in mean scores among population groups become insignificant.

TABLE 12.8 *Relations at work (mean scores)*

In general, how would you describe relations at your workplace between management and employees?*			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Gender			
Male	2.15	1.09	391
Female	1.98	0.95	345
Population group			
African	2.17	1.13	435
Coloured	1.96	0.81	117
Indian	1.88	0.92	69
White	1.92	0.83	115
Employer			
Government	2.07	1.03	126
Government-owned	1.87	0.85	54
Private	2.11	1.06	496
Occupational category			
Skilled	1.81	0.89	134
Semi-skilled	2.04	0.99	254
Unskilled	2.24	1.14	303



In general, how would you describe relations at your workplace between workmates/colleagues?*			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Gender			
Male	1.74	0.74	388
Female	1.78	0.80	323
Population group			
African	1.72	0.80	414
Coloured	1.81	0.70	113
Indian	1.75	0.74	69
White	1.83	0.71	115
Employer			
Government	1.88	0.77	127
Government-owned	1.74	0.76	54
Private	1.73	0.76	477
Occupational category			
Skilled	1.76	0.71	135
Semi-skilled	1.72	0.78	250
Unskilled	1.79	0.80	283

Note: * 1 = Very good, 5 = Very bad

Source: SASAS (2005)

Relationships between colleagues were generally perceived as better than relationships between management and employees, with 85.7 per cent of respondents regarding relationships between colleagues as good. Interestingly, no significant differences exist between the group means presented in Table 12.8.

It is clear from the data presented here that relationships within the South African workplace can generally be described as good, despite the plethora of research that seems to argue otherwise. Of concern, however, is the percentage of unskilled respondents that regard relationships with management as bad or quite bad, when compared with skilled and semi-skilled employees. This trend may be explained by the fact that the employment conditions of the unskilled are poor, when compared with those of other occupational levels.

Job satisfaction and organisational pride

The data presented in the previous section seem to suggest that employed persons in South Africa are generally more satisfied with their employment conditions than one would have guessed, given the differentiated nature of the labour force and the legacy of apartheid. Despite low levels of workplace training, general dissatisfaction with income levels and little opportunities for advancement, the majority of respondents feel secure in their jobs, find their work interesting and experience positive employee–management and employee–co-worker relations. But do these perceptions translate into job satisfaction and organisational pride? If they do, which factors play the most important role in establishing job satisfaction and organisational pride in South Africa?

Job satisfaction can be described as 'a function of the perceived relationship between what one wants from one's job and what one perceives it as offering' (Locke 1969: 316). According to the literature

on job satisfaction, there are a number of high organisational costs associated with low levels of job satisfaction. These include low performance quality, high rates of absenteeism and higher turnover rates. Although the majority of respondents included in the survey were satisfied with their work (76.7 per cent), One-Way ANOVA Post-hoc tests reveal significant differences between the job satisfaction of African employees, when compared with all other population groups. According to the data presented in Table 12.9, African respondents are significantly less satisfied with work than their coloured, white and Indian counterparts. Similarly, skilled employees are significantly more satisfied than semi-skilled and unskilled employees.

One-Way ANOVA Post-hoc tests reveal that the mean differences between Africans and the other population groups are significant despite controlling for occupational level. According to the data presented in Figure 12.3, African semi-skilled and unskilled respondents show significantly lower levels of job satisfaction than the other population groups, while Indians show the highest levels of job satisfaction across all occupational levels.


Various theories have attempted to explain how the dimensions of a job can intrinsically motivate individuals and increase levels of job satisfaction and job performance. Although not exhaustive, satisfaction with the various job characteristics discussed earlier could contribute to overall levels of job satisfaction. Table 12.10 presents the analysis of bivariate correlations between perceptions of characteristics and overall job satisfaction, broken down by occupational level. 'Good opportunities for advancement' and 'chance to improve skills' display the strongest significant correlations with job satisfaction among skilled respondents, while 'my income is high', followed by 'my job is interesting', correlates significantly with job satisfaction among semi-skilled employees. Among the unskilled, 'an interesting job' displayed the strongest correlate with job satisfaction, followed by 'job security'.

TABLE 12.9 *How satisfied are you in your main job? (mean scores*)*

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Gender			
Male	2.84	1.39	388
Female	2.68	1.29	345
Population group			
African	3.06	1.42	437
Coloured	2.50	1.10	116
Indian	2.03	1.07	69
White	2.35	1.03	111
Employer			
Government	2.66	1.07	124
Government-owned	1.96	1.14	53
Private	2.90	1.37	496
Occupational category			
Skilled	2.19	1.01	133
Semi-skilled	2.58	1.22	252
Unskilled	3.20	1.47	303

Note: * 1 = Completely satisfied, 6 = Completely dissatisfied
Source: SASAS (2005)

FIGURE 12.3 Job satisfaction, by race and occupational level (mean scores*)



Note: * 1 = Very satisfied, 6 = Not at all satisfied
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 12.10 Significant correlations between job satisfaction and job characteristics, by occupational level

	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled
My job is secure.	.164	.275*	.447*
My income is high.	.249*	.326*	.367*
My opportunities for advancement are high.	.309*	.255*	.414*
My job is interesting.	.246*	.301*	.461*
I can work independently.	.253*	.169*	.350*
In my job I can help other people.	.255*	.206*	.403*
My job is useful to society.	.052	.184*	.281*
My job gives me a chance to improve my skills.	.274*	.295*	.407*

Note: * $p < .001$
Source: SASAS (2005)

An index measuring organisational pride was constructed with the use of two items⁵ included in the survey. The index presented a Cronbach Alpha Score of 0.761, and measured organisational pride on a 10-point scale. From the data presented in Table 12.11, one can conclude that the majority of respondents are relatively proud of the organisations for which they work. Post-hoc One-Way ANOVA Analysis reveals significant differences between the mean scores of African and Indian, and African and white respondents, suggesting that white and Indian respondents are generally prouder of the organisations for which they work than their African counterparts. A significant difference also exists

5 I am proud to be working for my firm or organisation; I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help my firm or organisation succeed.

between the mean scores of skilled and unskilled employees and semi-skilled and unskilled employees, suggesting that more skilled employees display higher levels of organisational pride than unskilled employees. However, the differences in scores between the population groups lose their significance when occupational level is taken into account, suggesting that Africans differ from white and Indian respondents because they are most likely situated in lower-skilled positions. A significant difference was also detected between the mean scores of government employees and employees working for the private sector. Private sector employees displayed significantly lower levels of organisational pride than their public sector counterparts.

Despite the high levels of unemployment and a largely differentiated labour force, South African employees are generally satisfied with work and proud of the organisations for which they work. Of concern, however, are the significant differences that exist between the attitudes of skilled and unskilled workers. Unskilled workers (who constitute the majority of respondents surveyed) generally display less favourable attitudes towards their jobs and organisations than the more skilled respondents. This trend seems to suggest that the employment conditions faced by unskilled employees in South Africa are perhaps less than favourable. The high levels of strike activity in the country are testament to this fact. Data from the survey also seem to suggest that respondents employed in private sector organisations display less favourable attitudes towards work than do public sector employees. This is especially true when one compares levels of organisational pride across the sectors. Private sector organisations can certainly do more to improve the workplace training rates of unskilled employees in the country.

TABLE 12.11 *Organisational pride (mean scores*)*

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Gender			
Male	4.24	390	1.80
Female	4.41	351	1.88
Total	4.32	741	1.84
Population group			
African	4.53	442	1.95
Coloured	4.29	114	1.58
Indian	3.83	69	1.88
White	3.85	116	1.46
Occupational level			
Skilled	3.72	137	1.57
Semi-skilled	4.00	253	1.63
Unskilled	4.84	308	1.97
Employer			
Government	3.74	127	1.59
Government-owned enterprise	3.93	54	1.70
Privately owned company	4.53	496	1.86

Note: * 1 = Very proud, 10 = Not at all proud
Source: SASAS (2005)


Perceptions of the unemployed

This section focuses on the perceptions of unemployed persons regarding the South African labour market. Particular attention will be paid to reasons for unemployment and to employment-finding strategies. Of the 2 884 respondents surveyed, 860 classified themselves as unemployed. Of these, 788 were looking for a job at the time of the interview.

Unemployment levels in South Africa remain above 25 per cent and are strongly differentiated in terms of age, education, gender and race. When asked to provide the main reason as to why their jobs ended, the majority of respondents (29 per cent) reported that it was due to the expiration of employment contracts – a trend which is unsurprising in an economy led by a neo-liberal export strategy that has left many industries unprotected and able to offer only short-term employment. Twenty-one per cent reported that their place of work had shut down, and 15 per cent were dismissed (Figure 12.4). The high number of respondents that are unemployed following the expiration of employment contracts will undoubtedly initiate a debate regarding a possible over-reliance on contract labour by South African employers. Many reasons have been put forward to explain this trend, the most notable, of course, being the stringent labour laws that compel employers to make use of contract employment.

Although the South African government has attempted to address the unemployment situation in the country, most notably through the expanded Public Works Programme which provides temporary jobs for largely unskilled persons, more could be done to provide entrepreneurial training and financial assistance to unemployed persons wishing to start their own businesses.


FIGURE 12.4 *What was the main reason your job ended?*



Note: N=382
Source: SASAS (2005)

Of further concern is the length of unemployment experienced by job seekers. According to the 2005 Labour Force Survey (Stats SA 2005a), the majority of unemployed persons that have worked before (35.4 per cent) have been trying to find employment for longer than 36 months. Of those that have never worked before, 25.8 per cent have been looking for employment for between one year and 36 months. Furthermore, the total number of discouraged work seekers increased from almost 1.7 million in 1994 to just over 3.8 million in 2005 (Dimant et al. 2006: 183). It appears that the high levels of unemployment, coupled with the difficulty associated with trying to find a job, have resulted in a largely pessimistic pool of work seekers in South Africa. When asked to indicate the likelihood of finding a job, 60.3 per cent of unemployed respondents felt that it was unlikely that they would find a job. Male respondents appeared more optimistic about the likelihood of finding future employment than did female respondents, while white respondents were considerably less optimistic about finding employment than were the other population groups. As expected, respondents with postgraduate qualifications were of the opinion that the likelihood of finding a job was high (Figure 12.5).

FIGURE 12.5 Perceptions of likelihood of finding a job among unemployed persons looking for work, by gender, race and educational level*




Notes: N=788

* Percentage saying 'very likely' and 'likely'.

Source: SASAS (2005)

FIGURE 12.6 *Employment search strategies used by unemployed respondents*



Note: N=785
Source: SASAS (2005)

Despite the high levels of unemployment in South Africa, and the associated pessimism surrounding the likelihood of finding a job, the data presented in Figure 12.6 suggest that South Africans are not engaging in employment-finding activities to the extent that they perhaps should be. Only 12 per cent of respondents had registered at a private employment agency, while only 16 per cent had registered at a public labour office in an attempt to find employment. Slightly over 35 per cent of unemployed respondents had responded to job advertisements, while approximately 50 per cent had applied directly to employers. The vast majority had asked friends, relatives or colleagues to assist them in finding a job. A number of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses were conducted to determine the likelihood of utilising a specific employment-finding strategy. The results of the regressions are presented in the appendix at the end of this chapter. Level of education emerged as a primary predictor of the likelihood of engaging in a number of more formal job search activities. The higher the level of education, the higher the likelihood of answering job advertisements and registering at a private employment agency or labour office. The likelihood of finding a job emerged as a significant predictor of whether someone would register at a public labour office. Lastly, whites are more likely than any of the other population groups to register at a private employment agency or answer job advertisements. It seems, then, that engagement in job-finding activities is to a large extent determined by level of education and may to some extent be culturally defined. It is clear from the data presented in this section that government may need to expand its employment creation strategies beyond the provision of skills training and temporary employment, and engage with the unemployed through educational programmes aimed at teaching them about the labour market, how to find jobs and how to market themselves. In a country where unemployment is largely differentiated in terms of education and population group, it is unfortunate that the cohorts most in need of employment are not in a position to fully utilise the employment-finding strategies that are available to them.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide data on the attitudes of South Africans towards work, their jobs and organisations. Despite the high levels of unemployment and the legacy of apartheid that created a divided labour force and workplace characterised by racial tension and autocratic leadership, South Africans generally seem satisfied with work and proud of the organisations for which they work. Areas of dissatisfaction that need to be addressed include income levels and opportunities for training and advancement. These issues are of particular importance in a country where primary emphasis is still placed on extrinsic work values. This overemphasis on extrinsic work values can be detrimental to the development of values which stress personal development, self-actualisation and growth. Until the material needs of the large majority of South Africans are met, the development of intrinsic work values will remain inhibited.

Despite the general levels of satisfaction with work in South Africa, the chapter has highlighted that the attitudes of South Africans towards work remain differentiated in terms of race and occupational level. Of particular concern are the high levels of dissatisfaction among unskilled workers, when compared with their skilled and semi-skilled counterparts. Because the South African labour market remains polarised in terms of race, with whites continuing to occupy the majority of skilled positions in the country, these attitudes become racially differentiated. The data included in this chapter have also shown that in many instances private sector employees display less favourable attitudes towards work than employees in the public sector. This seems to suggest that the private sector is lagging behind the public sector in terms of a number of transformational targets, such as employment equity and skills training.

The final section of the chapter dealt with employment issues as they relate to the unemployed in South Africa. From the data we concluded that the majority of job losses occur due to the expiration of employment contracts, suggesting a possible over-reliance on short-term contracts by South African employers. It is hoped that this finding will initiate debate surrounding the possible reasons for this trend. Of further concern is the high number of discouraged work seekers in the country that hold little or no hope of finding a job. The general malaise associated with employment seeking is reflected in respondents' low engagement with the numerous employment-finding strategies, suggesting a need for the expansion of employment creation strategies to include training programmes aimed at educating the unemployed about the South African labour market, strategies for employment and entrepreneurship.

Appendix Technical detail

TABLE 12A.1 *Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of registering at a public labour centre*

Method: Enter

Application used: SPSS

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	SE	Wald	Odds ratio Exp(B)	Sig.
Educational attainment (No schooling)			23.606		.001*
Postgraduate degree or diploma	2.429	1.256	3.739	11.344	.053
Degree	3.258	1.439	5.130	26.003	.024*
Diploma	2.291	.880	6.786	9.888	.009*
Matric	1.279	.755	2.872	3.594	.090
Secondary schooling	1.140	.748	2.326	3.127	.127
Primary schooling	-.059	.819	.005	.942	.942
Likelihood of finding a job (Very unlikely)			9.618		.022*
Very Likely	.669	.313	4.561	1.952	.033*
Likely	.549	.263	4.373	1.732	.037*
Unlikely	-.120	.306	.153	.887	.696
Population group (White)			.970		.809
African	.583	.773	.569	1.791	.451
Coloured	.584	.813	.515	1.793	.473
Indian	.810	.843	.922	2.247	.337
Constant	-3.541	1.063	11.097	.029	.001

Notes: *p<.05

Number of cases in model: 761

TABLE 12A.2 *Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of registering at an employment agency*

Method: Enter

Application used: SPSS

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	SE	Wald	Odds ratio Exp(B)	Sig.
Educational attainment (No schooling)			22.962		.001*
Postgraduate degree or diploma	3.921	1.558	6.330	50.429	.012*
Degree	2.594	1.603	2.618	13.386	.106
Diploma	2.449	1.138	4.633	11.582	.031*
Matric	1.533	1.039	2.176	4.631	.140
Secondary schooling	1.310	1.034	1.606	3.708	.205
Primary schooling	-.277	1.141	.059	.758	.808
Likelihood of finding a job (Very unlikely)			7.270		.064
Very likely	.642	.355	3.280	1.901	.070
Likely	.530	.299	3.149	1.699	.076
Unlikely	-.156	.340	.210	.856	.647
Population group (White)			20.906		.000**
African	-1.836	.505	13.218	.159	.000**
Coloured	-1.179	.557	4.488	.308	.034*
Indian	-.726	.584	1.547	.484	.214
Constant	-1.856	1.134	2.678	.156	.102

Notes: *p<.05

**p<.001

Number of cases in model: 762

TABLE 12A.3 *Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of answering advertisements*

Method: Enter

Application used: SPSS

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	SE	Wald	Odds ratio Exp(B)	Sig.
Educational attainment (No schooling)			65.395		.000**
Postgraduate degree or diploma	3.481	1.387	6.302	32.495	.012*
Degree	3.250	1.437	5.112	25.786	.024*
Diploma	3.327	.890	13.977	27.854	.000**
Matric	2.470	.746	10.976	11.827	.001*
Secondary schooling	1.481	.743	3.975	4.398	.046*
Primary schooling	.662	.775	.729	1.938	.393
Likelihood of finding a job (Very unlikely)			1.615		.656
Very likely	.262	.277	.891	1.299	.345
Likely	.255	.223	1.311	1.291	.252
Unlikely	.188	.233	.650	1.207	.420
Population group (White)			12.764		.005*
African	-1.301	.497	6.855	.272	.009*
Coloured	-.682	.532	1.642	.506	.200
Indian	-.942	.574	2.692	.390	.101
Gender (Female)	.274	.183	2.242	1.315	.134
Constant	-1.700	.883	3.703	.183	.054

Notes: * p<.05

** p<.001

Number of cases in model: 761

TABLE 12A.4 *Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of advertising for a job*

Method: Enter

Application used: SPSS

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	SE	Wald	Odds ratio Exp(B)	Sig.
Educational attainment (No schooling)			60.368		.000**
Postgraduate degree or diploma	1.444	1.389	1.081	4.238	.299
Degree	1.934	1.432	1.824	6.919	.177
Diploma	2.629	.873	9.070	13.859	.003*
Matric	2.399	.747	10.322	11.014	.001*
Secondary schooling	1.108	.747	2.199	3.028	.138
Primary schooling	.762	.777	.962	2.142	.327
Likelihood of finding a job (Very unlikely)			7.505		.057
Very likely	.362	.281	1.666	1.436	.197
Likely	-.014	.235	.004	.986	.952
Unlikely	-.481	.265	3.294	.618	.070
Population group (White)			1.873		.599
African	-.286	.533	.287	.752	.592
Coloured	-.026	.573	.002	.974	.963
Indian	-.548	.637	.741	.578	.389
Constant	-2.463	.902	7.455	.085	.006

Notes: * $p < .05$

** $p < .001$

Number of cases in model: 761

TABLE 12A.5 *Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of applying directly to employers*

Method: Enter
Application used: SPSS

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	SE	Wald	Odds ration Exp(B)	Sig.
Educational attainment (No schooling)			27.935		.000**
Postgraduate degree or diploma	22.419	19634.324	.000	5.5E+009	.999
Degree	1.865	1.310	2.026	6.454	.155
Diploma	2.574	.683	14.200	13.114	.000**
Matric	1.753	.452	15.043	5.773	.000**
Secondary schooling	1.147	.441	6.758	3.149	.009*
Primary schooling	1.084	.459	5.567	2.955	.018*
Likelihood of finding a job (Very unlikely)			3.314		.346
Very likely	-.449	.252	3.174	.639	.075
Likely	-.192	.195	.969	.825	.325
Unlikely	-.117	.199	.349	.889	.555
Population group (White)			.6235		.101
African	.116	.476	.059	1.123	.808
Coloured	.632	.511	1.530	1.881	.216
Indian	.422	.553	.583	1.525	.445
Gender (Female)	.496	.165	9.050	1.642	.003*
Constant	-1.564	.638	6.006	.209	.014

Notes: * p<.05

** p<.001

Number of cases in model: 761

TABLE 12A.6 *Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of asking friends and relatives to assist in finding a job*

Method: Enter

Application used: SPSS

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	SE	Wald	Odds ratiion Exp(B)	Sig.
Educational attainment (No schooling)			12.145		.059
Postgraduate degree or diploma	20.628	20025.183	.000	9.1E+008	.999
Degree	20.585	23203.883	.000	8.7E+008	.999
Diploma	1.350	.730	3.423	3.858	.064
Matric	1.319	.401	10.788	3.739	.001
Secondary schooling	.885	.373	5.623	2.422	.018
Primary schooling	.733	.399	3.373	2.082	.066
Likelihood of finding a job (Very unlikely)			3.194		.363
Very likely	.066	.304	.048	1.069	.827
Likely	.047	.231	.042	1.048	.838
Unlikely	.424	.248	2.913	1.528	.088
Population group (White)			1.015		.798
African	.417	.542	.593	1.518	.441
Coloured	.560	.588	.905	1.750	.341
Indian	.537	.656	.671	1.712	.413
Gender (Female)	.402	.213	3.583	1.495	.058
Constant	-.239	.641	.139	.787	.709

Note: Number of cases in model: 761

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Fear factor: Perceptions of safety in South Africa

Benjamin Roberts

Have no doubt it is fear in the land.
For what can men do when so many have grown lawless?
Who can enjoy the lovely land, who can enjoy seventy years,
and the sun that pours down on the earth, when there is fear in the heart?
Who can walk quietly in the shadow of the jacarandas, when their beauty is grown
in danger? Who can lie peacefully abed, while the darkness holds some secret?
(Paton 1948: 75)

The most destructive characteristic of crime is the fear it places in our souls. The greater part of that fear arises from the fact that crime is an amorphous presence, its sources only dimly imagined. The fear sits on our shoulders and follows us everywhere. (*Business Day* 3 December 2006)

Introduction

Few issues in South Africa today provoke as emotive a response as that of crime. Since the release of official crime statistics in late 2006, the country has witnessed a vigorous and intensifying public debate about the credibility of the emerging trends and the efficacy of the policy and programmatic responses. Crime persistently features as a pressing national priority among citizens in public opinion surveys. In addition, media images of violent criminal acts and mounting public disaffection abound. This chapter is concerned not with the actual levels of victimisation in South Africa, but rather with an important and often neglected related social phenomenon, namely, the fear of crime.

Why is it important to focus on people's anxieties relating to their personal safety? Should we not rather concentrate exclusively on the hard numbers relating to changing levels of violent and property crimes? The answers to such questions lie fundamentally in the complex and detrimental effects that fear of criminal violence imparts on quality of life at the individual, community and societal levels. These include a reliance on racial stereotypes in discussions on crime, constraints on people's mobility and ability to socialise, a hastening retreat from public space and the proliferation of gated communities, high walls and fences and an array of private security measures (the so-called 'architecture of fear') (Lemanski 2004; Louw 1997). Such anxieties may also diminish the sense of trust and cohesion within communities, lead to mounting appeals for the reinstatement of the death penalty and lend credibility to vigilante violence (Jackson 2006; Møller 2005). As Valji et al. (2004) reflect, these forms of behaviour pose a threat in terms of fuelling cycles of violence, challenging the entrenchment of a culture of human rights and, ultimately, acting as an impediment to further progress in reconciliation.

Concern about personal safety can clearly exert an influence at the policy level too. For example, in a situation where a sizeable proportion of the public views migrants and political refugees from other countries as a threat in respect of criminal activity, then public fears could impose pressure for the adoption of rather protectionist immigration policy. Public demands for the government and the South African Police Services to better manage the crime situation, coupled with the seeming refusal of many people to accept the official message that crime rates are not rising, may be seen as indicative of the relative influence of the public's views about safety and security (Jackson 2006).

For many of the reasons articulated, the fear of crime has become a prominent social and political problem in international circles. This is especially true of Britain, the United States and Europe, where it is seen as a public concern that is at least as pressing as crime itself (Gilchrist et al. 1998). Since the 1960s, the fear of crime in its own right has been the focus of increasing attention from researchers and policy-makers. Countless studies have been conducted with the aim of understanding, monitoring and evaluating fear of crime, with many concluding that 'such fear continues to impinge upon the well-being of a proportion of the population' (Gilchrist et al. 1998: 283). This body of work has additionally pointed to an unequal distribution of both crime and the fear of crime, with some people demonstrating increased risk of victimisation, while others are more acutely and regularly fearful (Farrall & Gadd 2004). This finding, and recognition of the harm that fear can cause to individuals and communities, has led some governments to respond by establishing the reduction of the fear of crime as a social objective – distinct from reducing actual crime – warranting specific government interventions (see for example Home Office 2004).

This chapter begins by briefly and critically reflecting on the limitations associated with measuring fear of crime and describing the data and principal measures available for the analysis. It then focuses on charting the evolution of fear of crime at the national level since the early 1990s. This is followed by an attempt to discern significant demographic, social and spatial differentials in these perceptions and, by so doing, make a modest contribution to the evidence base about the nature of fear of crime in the country.

On measuring fear of crime

With the swift growth, complexity and sophistry of research on fear of crime in recent years, there has naturally been increasing methodological reflection on the adequacy of the predominant instruments traditionally used to measure this phenomenon. Out of this endeavour, a literature has developed that proposes various refinements to the early tools used in the field of study. According to a review by Farrall et al. (1997), the principal methodological objections that have been raised in relation to quantitative examinations of fear pertain to the static nature of surveys and their capacity to capture complex social processes, *conceptual* ambiguity of what is meant by 'fear of crime', and operational concerns about the design and phrasing of survey questions. Cumulatively, these problems have sowed doubts about the extent to which estimates of the incidence of fear of crime serve as valid representations of a social event or, alternatively, whether they are distorted by shortcomings in the measurement instruments and techniques (Farrall et al. 1997).

One of the earliest and most common questions used by researchers to gauge fear of crime enquires about how safe an individual feels in their local area, and surveys have typically included variants on the following form: 'How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?' Ferraro and LaGrange (1988) have classified this line of questioning as measuring 'formless' fears that relate to a vague threat to personal security, and distinguish it from measures aimed at capturing 'concrete' fears that refer to a particular crime (for example, types of property crime or individual/personal crime). This distinction has been dubbed as being between 'global' and 'crime-specific' measures. Some of the criticisms levelled at the global questions include that they:

- fail to make direct reference to crime at all;
- use imprecise geographical references – the ‘neighbourhood’ or ‘local area’;
- ask about activities which many people may rarely do (‘walking alone after dark’), either out of preference or due to physical limitations (especially for the elderly);
- refer neither to a specific time nor to the frequency of fearful experiences (for example, number of times in the past year that the person felt unsafe) (Farrall & Gadd 2004: 494–495; Ferraro & LaGrange 1987; Hale 1996).

One common response to such criticisms of the global measure of fear of crime has been to make mere phrase changes to include words that more explicitly refer to fear (for example, asking about how *afraid* or *fearful* rather than how *unsafe*). Another has been for surveys to ask respondents a broader range of questions, some of which have involved technical innovations, such as asking directly about concern over becoming a victim of a type of crime rather than about crime in general (that is, concrete or crime-specific fears), or referring to general feelings of unsafety when at home alone at night (Pantazis 2000). There does, however, remain scepticism about whether such refinements as these have in fact done much to overcome the methodological limitations of the global measures (Farrall et al. 1997). There has been some recent experimental research aimed at improving the validity of the measurement tools. A full review is not possible here, but one example is Farrall and Ditton’s (1999) reconceptualisation of fear of crime as a multidimensional construct consisting of three elements (thinking/being aware of crime; fearing, being afraid, or feeling anxious about crime; and feeling anger, outrage or annoyance about crime).

Returning to the data available for the present analysis, the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) does not purport to be a national victimisation survey that can include a broad range of questions on the experiences and perceptions of crime. In an attempt to include a suitably broad set of social attitudes, the space available for an exhaustive attitudinal investigation of fear of crime specifically is quite constrained. Therefore, the survey included these global measures:

- How safe or unsafe do you feel personally on most days?
- How safe or unsafe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?
- How safe or unsafe do you feel walking alone in this area during the day?

The rationale for including the first measure was due to its inclusion in earlier annual Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) attitudinal surveys. From 1991 to 1997, the phrasing of the question was ‘How safe do you feel in South Africa today?’, but the current form was introduced in 1998. The other two measures were included in previous national Victims of Crime surveys.

While the SASAS measures of crime are limited to the narrow set of global measures listed here, which in turn imposes obvious constraints on the scope of the analysis possible, they do nonetheless allow us to explore trends since the early 1990s, and at least add to an expanding body of evidence on the nature and dynamics of fear of crime in the South African context. In future rounds of the survey series, there are plans to address some of these concerns by supplementing the global questions with other more fear- and crime-specific questions that should permit a detailed investigation of the broad conclusions that this chapter draws.

Recent national trends in fear of crime

Before delving into the trajectory that fear of crime has taken since the early 1990s, it is useful to remind ourselves of what official crime statistics have shown over the same period, as it is fair to assume that these will have an influence on fear of crime. Although the reliability of these crime rates is influenced

by the under-reporting of certain types of crime and the questionable accuracy of pre-1994 figures from the former bantustans, analysts have managed to draw some broad conclusions on the direction of crime rates over the last two decades. There is general agreement that crime levels in South Africa have ranked and continue to rank among the highest in the world, especially in relation to violent crimes such as murder and rape, and that for most parts of the country, rates increased from at least the mid-1980s until the early part of this decade (Leggett 2005; Louw 1997; Schönteich & Louw 2001). Thus, although people perceived crime to have risen dramatically with the transition to democracy, the reality is that crime pre-dates the landmark elections of 1994 (Møller 2005).

The reported overall level of crime nonetheless continued to show an upward trend during the 1990s. Violent crimes such as attempted murder, aggravated robbery, serious and common assault and violence against women and children followed this pattern. The murder rate has steadily declined since 1994, which can be attributed to changing levels of political violence in the country, but it remains among the world's highest rates. The numbers of reported property crimes, including housebreaking, also increased over the period, though under-reporting makes the determination of this pattern less certain. Despite this trend during the 1990s, there have been some signs of a reversal since 2003, with the incidence of a number of crimes falling consistently. Of concern, though, is the fact that the reduction in the rates for murder, rape and aggravated robbery has been rather limited.

Part of the problem with interpreting official crime rates in South Africa is the reality that reporting of crimes is likely to have improved since 1994. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the rising crime rates of the 1990s were real or at least partly a reflection of better reporting. Other data sources do, however, provide some confirmatory evidence that there have been slight improvements in recent times. For instance, between the Victims of Crime surveys of 1998 and 2003, housebreaking was the only crime category to have increased, with the others showing either stable trends or modest declines (Mistry 2004).


Having determined the broad patterns of actual crime, it is of interest to understand how emotional responses to crime have changed over the same period. Examining the pattern of responses to fear of crime questions since 1991, several distinct trends begin to emerge (Figure 13.1). There appears to have been a reduction in concern over personal safety in the lead-up to the first democratic elections. Yet, following this 'euphoric moment', there was a quick reversal to pre-election levels. The public's fear of crime remained relatively constant until the late 1990s, after which time it began to exhibit signs of slowly declining.

From the results presented in Figure 13.1, general feelings of being personally unsafe do appear to mirror, at least to some extent, the trend that has been observed with regard to victimisation: the discernible upward swing following the democratic transition, followed by stabilisation and the early signs of improvement in recent years. However, will the same apply with respect to the public's attitude towards safety in their local environment?

As Mistry (2004) reports and as indicated in Figures 13.2 and 13.3, according to national Victims of Crime surveys, South Africans felt less safe in 2003 compared to 1998, in terms of walking alone in their area during the day and at night. Yet, what has changed since the 2003 assessment? Based on data from the 2005 SASAS survey, 67 per cent of South Africans indicated that they felt safe walking alone in their area during the day, while a mere 31 per cent felt safe walking alone at night. These figures represent a slight improvement in the percentage feeling unsafe during the night, though a worsening in the percentage feeling unsafe during the day. Despite a decline in those feeling 'very unsafe' walking in their area after dark between 2003 and 2005 (from 58 per cent to 49 per cent of respondents), it is important to qualify this modest gain by recognising that the 2005 figure is still approximately double the proportion observed in 1998. More worrying are the public's feelings of safety about walking alone

during the day, with the proportion of South Africans specifying that they felt either 'very unsafe' or 'a bit unsafe' more than doubling from 15 per cent in both 1998 and 2003 to 33 per cent in 2005, while the percentage that felt 'very unsafe' trebled from 5 per cent in 2003 to 15 per cent in 2005.

FIGURE 13.1 *Concern over personal safety, 1991–2004**




Notes: From 1991–97, the question was phrased 'How safe do you feel in South Africa today?' but since 1998 the phrasing has been 'How safe or unsafe do you feel personally on most days?'

* Percentage feeling 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe'.


Sources: HSRC Omnibus (1991, 1994–1997); HSRC EPOP Surveys (1998–2000); SASAS (2005)

FIGURE 13.2 *Feelings of safety when walking alone in own area after dark*



Sources: Burton et al. (2004); SASAS (2005); Stats SA (1999)

FIGURE 13.3 *Feelings of safety when walking alone in own area during the day*



Sources: Burton et al. (2004); SASAS (2005); Stats SA (1999)

In order to situate the South African results against those from other developing and industrialised countries, use can be made of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS) series. However, extreme care needs to be taken in making direct comparisons between ICVS results and those from national surveys, since the former are conducted in one city per country (Johannesburg in the case of South Africa), in contrast with the nationally representative samples drawn for Victims of Crime and SASAS surveys (Burton et al. 2004). Nonetheless, the results can provide an indicative sense of how feelings of safety in South Africa relate to those in other countries or regions. From a comparative perspective, the 2005 SASAS survey results suggest that South Africans aged 16 years and older remain relatively and resolutely insecure about their personal safety (Table 13.1). Insecurity about the safety of walking alone in one's residential area at night in South Africa is notably higher than the averages for cities in transition countries, Latin America, Africa and Asia, even if one takes into account the improvement since 2003.

TABLE 13.1 *Feelings of safety when walking alone in own area after dark, by country (percentage)*

	Very safe/fairly safe	A bit unsafe/very unsafe	Uncertain
Western Europe	70	29	0
New World	68	32	0
Asia	79	21	0
Africa	58	41	0
Latin America	51	48	0
Countries in transition	47	53	0
South Africa (1998)	56	44	0
South Africa (2003)	23	77	0
South Africa (2005)	32	68	1

Sources: Burton et al. (2004); Del Frate (1998); SASAS (2005); Stats SA (1999)

The national picture that emerges is therefore characterised by some gains and some losses. From a temporal and cross-country perspective, though, fear of crime persists as a phenomenon that affects a sizeable proportion of the South African population and, as such, warrants more serious policy attention.

Who is more fearful?

Having discussed fear of crime at the national level and the broad trends that have been observed over the past 15 or so years, this section examines important disparities in perceptions of safety among various groups in the population. Central to most attempts at explaining such observed subgroup differences in fear of crime has been the concept of vulnerability. The basic premise is that fear of victimisation is likely to be more salient for those who feel incapable of adequately protecting themselves. This may be due to physical limitations such as an inability to run fast or the lack of physical prowess to fend off attackers, or to social factors such as not having the financial means to protect one's property, or living alone. It has been suggested that three dimensions of vulnerability interact to promote fear of crime, namely, exposure to risk (of victimisation), the anticipation of serious consequences, and the loss of control, which translates into the lack of effective defence, protective measures or prospects of escape (Hale 1996; Killias 1990). Key variables in the research literature that have been identified as fulfilling the aforementioned conditions, and which are extensively used to explain fear of crime, are gender, age, race and socio-economic factors. They are explored next.

Real men do not cry: Gender differentials in fear of crime


A sizeable number of international studies have demonstrated that females tend to report higher levels of fear relative to males, to the extent that gender is seen as the foremost social divider on fear of crime (Gilchrist et al. 1998). This observation is surprising, as males have been shown to be considerably more likely to become victims of crime (Hale 1996). This gender differential in fear of crime has been attributed to factors such as vulnerability, environmental cues, victimisation, an inability of males to accurately assess the risks confronting them and, perhaps most critically, to males' relative reluctance to admit their fears¹ (Sutton & Farrall 2005).

Figure 13.4 presents the gendered responses to the question on personal safety in general. The results of the trend analysis reveal a pattern that seems to suggest that adult South African males may in fact be almost as *afraid* as adult females. On a couple of occasions over the period, the concerns expressed by males have even been marginally higher than for females. Since this result tends to stand somewhat at odds with mainstream thinking on the matter, it is important to probe further by looking at all three questions together to see if they all point to the same conclusion.

Tables 13.2 and 13.3 provide percentages and mean scores for each of the three global measures of fear of crime in 2005, for both males and females in general as well as broken down by age group. At the aggregate level, the disparities observed appear negligible to very modest, with the largest differential relating to concerns over walking alone in the local environment after dark. Even if the results are broken down further by age group, the disparities between males and females seem surprisingly small. Tests were conducted to determine whether the gender differences in mean scores for the three questions in Table 13.3 are statistically significant or not.² In almost all instances, the

- 1 This is due to males being socialised that it is not socially acceptable to display emotions and vulnerability, and for this reason they are likely to be less inclined than females to express their fears.
- 2 More specifically, a One-Way ANOVA test was conducted with post-hoc Scheffé tests isolating which of the means significantly differ.

FIGURE 13.4 *Concern over personal safety, by gender, 1991–2005*



Sources: HSRC Omnibus (1991, 1994–1997); HSRC EPOP Surveys (1998–2000); SASAS (2005)

observed differences between males and females are not significant. Within age categories, there are no significant differences between the genders. As for feelings of safety in their local environment, no significant differences exist for concern over walking alone during the day. The only exceptions were for females aged 16–34 years, who feel significantly more unsafe about their personal safety than males aged 50–64 years and significantly more unsafe compared to males aged 50 and above, about walking alone in their area after dark. Looking exclusively at males, those aged 16–34 years are significantly more concerned than males aged 50–64 years with regard to feelings of personal safety on most days. Similarly, females aged 16–34 years are also significantly more concerned than females aged 50–64 years in response to the general personal safety question.

TABLE 13.2 *Concern over personal safety, by gender and age, 2005**

Age	How safe/unsafe do you feel personally on most days?		How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area during day?		How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area after dark?	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
16–34	38	40	33	33	67	73
35–49	31	35	31	38	63	69
50–64	27	30	34	31	63	66
65+	27	25	28	28	69	75
Total	34	36	33	33	66	71

Note: * Percentage feeling unsafe.
Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 13.3 *Concern over personal safety, by gender and age, 2005 (mean scores)*

Age	How safe/unsafe do you feel personally on most days?		How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area during day?		How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area after dark?	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
16–34	2.81	2.83	2.23	2.22	3.04	3.18
35–49	2.61	2.80	2.22	2.35	2.92	3.08
50–64	2.50	2.57	2.14	2.16	2.88	3.02
65+	2.51	2.50	2.12	2.20	2.96	3.14
Total	2.70	2.75	2.21	2.24	2.99	3.13

Source: SASAS (2005)

What can we deduce from these rather atypical results, which reveal, over a 15-year period, a relatively consistent pattern of *both* fearful males and females in South Africa? They imply that the vulnerabilities experienced by males can no longer be dismissed, nor can we portray anxieties about crime as an issue pertaining predominantly to females (Gilchrist et al. 1998). The results are thus also notable in that they help address the all too common image of men and adolescent boys as delinquents and criminal offenders, by recognising the male experience of vulnerability and fear (Goodey 1997). In their detailed analysis of Scottish data, Sutton and Farrall (2005) found that when males leave aside the bravado and respond truthfully to survey questions on their worries about personal safety, they might actually report equivalent or *higher* levels of fear of crime than females. In the South African context, the absence of considerable differences between males and females may therefore suggest that many males are setting aside the brave face and opening up about their anxieties. Another interpretation could be that many males are still suppressing their fear and that, if this were accounted for, males may actually be more fearful of victimisation than females.

There is clearly a need for future research to unpack the various reasons why a significant proportion of the country's adult men are fearful. In addition, while a considerable share of males and females fear for their personal safety in general, it is not known whether the underlying meaning of this is the same. The 2003 Victims of Crime survey results showed that there were important differences between males and females with respect to the types of crime that they feared the most. Females were most fearful of being raped and sexually assaulted, while males were most afraid of being murdered (Burton et al. 2004). This would seem to indicate that while both males and females are generally concerned about crime, there are different underlying causes to these fears. Again, this is something that warrants further attention.

Fear and the role of age

Age is another individual characteristic that has featured extensively in relation to fear of crime research. More specifically, there has been interest in fear of crime among the elderly and the associated impact it may have upon their quality of life, with the assumption being that as people grow older, they become more vulnerable and hence more fearful – that is, there is a strong positive relationship between age and fear (Hale 1996). This focus on the elderly was prompted by concerns (especially in the United States) that the fear of victimisation may induce behaviour modification, with older persons becoming afraid of leaving their homes. This was described as self-imposed 'house arrest' or confinement in which the elderly essentially become 'prisoners in their home' (Chadee & Ditton 2003). Attention has also been devoted to the appearance that fear of crime among the elderly exceeds that among other age cohorts, while the opposite holds true for their objective risk of victimisation (Fattah & Sacco 1989).

In practice, however, evidence of the professed relationship between age and fear of crime remains inconsistent and contested. For instance, while there is a body of research that suggests that there exists a positive relationship between the two (Baldassare 1986; Braungart et al. 1980; Clemente & Kleiman 1976; Warr 1984), an increasing number of studies have demonstrated that one's age is of negligible or limited significance in explaining overall fear of crime (Chadee & Ditton 2003; Ferraro & LaGrange 1988, 1992; Sutton & Farrall 2005). The evidence supporting the weak-association argument appears especially stark when crime-specific rather than global measures are used to gauge fear of crime (Hale 1996).

In the South African context, the pattern of responses provides support for the international finding of the absence of a strongly positive linear association between fear of crime and age (Tables 13.4 and 13.5). Over the 1991–2005 period, the elderly (older than 65 years) did not appear to be more likely to express fear for their personal safety in comparison to younger generations, with the exception of 1994. While over time there has been a substantial amount of churning in the relative ranking of fear among different age groups, older South Africans actually seem in general less likely to express concern over their personal safety.

One reason why this may be the case is that there exists a reasonably strong correlation between objective risk and fear in the country, though unfortunately this cannot be statistically proven in this chapter, given the limitations of the crime variables included in the survey round. Nonetheless, there is available evidence to suggest that younger persons in South Africa are indeed more vulnerable to victimisation. For instance, the 1998 Victims of Crime survey indicated that those aged 16–35 are more greatly predisposed than older cohorts to have experienced an individual crime in the year prior to being surveyed (Figure 13.5). This is true in relation to both violent individual crimes, which include robbery involving force, sexual offences and assault/threat of assault, as well as for non-violent individual crimes, which include theft of personal property (excluding robbery) involving force, fraud and corruption.

TABLE 13.4 *Concern over personal safety, by age, 1991–2005 (percentage)*

	16–34	35–49	50–64	65+	Total
October 1991	52	48	42	48	49
October 1994	28	26	30	33	28
September 1995	42	43	47	38	43
October 1996	46	46	52	46	47
September 1997	50	46	46	43	48
November 1998	48	50	52	46	49
September 1999	49	50	42	42	47
August 2000	44	47	43	43	44
August 2005	39	33	29	26	35
Avg. 1991–2005	44	43	43	41	43
Avg. 1991–97	43	42	43	42	43
Avg. 1998–2005	45	45	41	39	44

Notes: The percentages reported include those that indicated that they felt either personally 'very unsafe' or 'unsafe' on most days. In each year, the percentages reported are from frequency tables where the 'do not know' values have been included as valid cases.

The percentages in bold represent figures that are higher than the national average for that given year.

Sources: HSRC Omnibus (1991, 1994–1997); HSRC EPOP Surveys (1998–2000); SASAS (2005)

TABLE 13.5 *Concern over personal safety, by age, 1991–2005 (mean scores)*


	16–34	35–49	50–64	65+	Total
October 1991	3.33	3.18	3.03	3.15	3.22
October 1994	2.51	2.51	2.70	2.68	2.55
September 1995	2.93	3.01	3.03	2.90	2.96
October 1996	3.24	3.23	3.42	3.29	3.27
September 1997	3.27	3.24	3.22	3.11	3.24
November 1998	3.03	3.13	3.23	3.06	3.10
September 1999	3.11	3.16	2.94	2.97	3.08
August 2000	3.00	3.11	2.95	2.94	3.02
August 2005	2.82	2.71	2.54	2.51	2.73

Notes: The mean scores are based on a 5-point scale, where 1 = 'very safe', 2 = 'safe', 3 = 'neither safe not unsafe', 4 = 'unsafe' and 5 = 'very unsafe'.

The percentages in bold represent figures that are higher than the national average for that given year.

Sources: HSRC Omnibus (1991, 1994–1997); HSRC EPOP Surveys (1998–2000); SASAS (2005)

FIGURE 13.5 *Individuals experiencing at least one crime in 1997, by age of victim*



Source: Adapted from Stats SA (1999)

TABLE 13.6 *Concern over personal safety, by age, 2005 (mean scores)*

	16–34	35–49	50–64	65+	Total
How safe/unsafe do you feel personally on most days?	2.82	2.71	2.54	2.51	2.73
How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area during day?	2.22	2.29	2.15	2.16	2.22
How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area after dark?	3.11	3.01	2.96	3.05	3.06

Source: SASAS (2005)

Conducting a One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test on the 2005 data reveals that a significant difference exists between the means for the different age groups with respect to concerns over personal safety. It is important to isolate which means significantly differ, so Scheffé tests were undertaken. The results show that those aged between 16 and 34 years are significantly more likely to voice concern for their personal safety ($p < 0.001$) than those aged 50–64 and older than 65 years. Similarly, those aged 35–49 years are also significantly more fearful for their own safety, relative to older cohorts ($p < 0.05$), though the strength of this association is weaker than for the 16–34 group. The mean score for 35–49 year olds is not significantly different from that of 16–34 year olds. Finally, South Africans aged 50–64 years or older than 65 years emerge as significantly less fearful than the younger cohorts ($p < 0.001$ for 16–34 year olds and $p < 0.05$ for 35–49 year olds), but they are not significantly different from each other in their professed concern for their safety. As for the significance in the differences between the mean scores for the global measures of safety in the local environment (Table 13.6), 35–49 year olds are more fearful of walking alone in the daytime than 50–64 year olds ($p < 0.05$), while 16–34 year olds are more fearful of walking alone at night than those aged 35–64 years ($p < 0.05$).

In summary, then, while South African youth appear more fearful for their safety than the elderly when asked general questions about personal safety, this relationship is inconsistent over time, weak in nature and sensitive to the type of question asked. Future research on fear of crime in South Africa will need to probe the age relationship further by asking about fears and perceived risks of specific types of crimes, over and above the global questions on fear. Additional multivariate analysis could be done to take account of the mediating role of factors such as population group, levels of income, marital status, household size and location. By so doing, we should be able to achieve a deeper understanding of the complex age–fear relationship.

Population group differentials in fear of crime

Race has featured prominently in the debate on crime and fear of crime in South Africa. The legacy of apartheid policies in terms of interracial, socio-economic inequalities means that ethnicity still represents an important factor influencing the risk of being a victim of crime (ODC 2002). Previous victim surveys have tended to demonstrate that African and coloured South Africans have a greater likelihood of being victims of crime, especially of individual violent crimes, while other population groups have a higher risk for property-related household crimes (Møller 2005). Racial segregation effectively served to insulate white South Africans from the political violence and high crime rates experienced by township dwellers during apartheid. After the transition, the location of crime shifted, resulting in white people experiencing higher victimisation than before 1994. This, in turn, fostered the view that they are the primary targets of criminal activity (Leggett 2005; Møller 2005). The concern is that such a ‘racialised discourse of crime not only misrepresents whites as the predominant victims, but conversely portrays Africans as the primary perpetrators’, which in turn perpetuates suspicion and ‘stranger danger’ and disrupts social cohesion (Valji et al. 2004: 3).

At the political level, there also appear to be signs of frustration with the persisting public perception of the country as an especially violent place and with fears over safety, especially in light of the previously discussed improvements in official crime statistics (*Economist* 3 August 2006). For instance, at both the 1997 and 2002 ANC national conferences, fear among segments of the population was explicitly mentioned, especially the contrast between the hope and aspirations of the majority of South Africans and the ambivalence and fear of minority communities (ANC 2002a, 2002b; Mbeki 2007). In 2006, the minister of safety and security made the controversial statement that people who whinge about crime should leave the country, which sparked parliamentary and public interest. In addition, former President Mbeki included strong pronouncements in several editions of the weekly online newsletter, *ANC Today*, raising concerns over 'white fears', crime as a justification for racism, and fear-mongering (Mbeki 2004a, 2004b, 2007).

In this situation, what do the data suggest about the changing nature of worries about crime among different population groups? Figure 13.6 shows that, according to the 2005 SASAS survey, Indian and African respondents expressed more fear for personal safety than did coloured and white respondents. This pattern holds true for the three global fear of crime measures used.

In terms of the significance of the differences of the mean scores (Table 13.7), on the general personal safety question Indian respondents are more likely to be fearful than African respondents, who in turn are significantly more fearful than white and coloured respondents. There is no significant difference between the levels of concern over personal safety for white and coloured respondents. As for views of safety in the local environment, Indians are more likely to express fear of walking alone in the daytime than all other respondents. African respondents are more likely to express fear of walking alone in the daytime than coloured respondents, but they are not significantly different from white respondents. White respondents are not significantly more fearful than coloured respondents. Finally, with regard to fear of walking alone in the local area at night, African and Indian respondents are more likely to express fear than white and coloured respondents, but they are not significantly different from each other.

FIGURE 13.6 *Concern over personal safety, by race, 2005**





TABLE 13.7 *Concern over personal safety, by race, 2005 (mean scores)*

	How safe/unsafe do you feel personally on most days?	How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area during day?	How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area after dark?
African	2.78	2.25	3.11
Coloured	2.40	2.00	2.75
Indian	3.14	2.67	3.32
White	2.52	2.15	2.89
Total	2.73	2.22	3.06

Source: SASAS (2005)

Since these results pose a challenge to the popular notion of fear of crime in South Africa as predominantly ‘white fear’, it is important to contextualise this finding in relation to longer-term developments. This racial gradient has changed somewhat over the last two decades (Figure 13.7). In the early 1990s, there was a significant improvement in feelings of safety among Africans, which was attributed to a decline in fear of political violence (Louw 2001). For Indian and white South Africans, the transition period of the mid-to-late 1990s proved to be one of escalating fear of criminal violence. To a lesser extent, the same pattern can be observed among coloured and African respondents. The post-1998 period was characterised by improvements in perceptions of personal safety for all population groups except Africans, who experienced mounting fear of crime until 2000, after which there appears to have been a slight decline. Given these subgroup differences, the gap between the proportion of white and black South Africans who felt unsafe closed substantially in the late 1990s, and by 2005, a relative reversal of positions appears to have occurred.

FIGURE 13.7 *Concern over personal safety, by race, 1991–2005**



Notes: From 1991–97, the question was phrased ‘How safe do you feel in South Africa today?’, but since 1998 the phrasing has been ‘How safe or unsafe do you feel personally on most days?’

* Percentage feeling ‘unsafe’ and ‘very unsafe’.

Sources: HSRC Omnibus (1991, 1994–1997); HSRC EPOP Surveys (1998–2000); SASAS (2005)

In the midst of vigorous public debate, protest and the tireless reporting of violent crimes in the media, it is easy to draw false conclusions about the nature of fear in the country. Yet, as the data show, there has been a reduction in anxieties over general personal safety over the last few years among all population groups, which is encouraging, though it does admittedly require confirmation through future rounds of surveying. In terms of safety of the local environment, the only available trend data compare views on safety with respect to walking alone in the local area during the day for 2003 and 2005. The figures point towards increasing fear for African and coloured respondents, a slight improvement for Indian respondents and virtually no change to the perceptions of white respondents.

Socio-economic factors

Evidence primarily from the United States has suggested that race, employment, income and educational attainment are notable elements in explaining fear. In this research, the excluded, poor and less educated have emerged as relatively more fearful of victimisation. Given the country's apartheid history and persisting poverty and inequality, one would expect that a similar set of factors indelibly shape fear of crime in South Africa. There is some existing evidence that confirms this. In a recent study conducted in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (NMMM), victimisation and fear of crime were found to be associated with socio-economic status. White, wealthier households with a significantly higher likelihood of experiencing household crime reported less fear of crime and misfortune and higher life satisfaction. Conversely, fear of crime and dissatisfaction with personal safety emerged as more prominent among African respondents and those with lower living standards (Møller 2005).

In the preceding section, the 2005 SASAS survey results confirmed at the national level the ties between fear of crime and race, and validated the NMMM findings about the relative ranking of fear among the different population groups. However, it remains to be seen whether relationships to other aspects of vulnerability and socio-economic status exist. Surprisingly, concern over personal safety in general and with the local environment does not differ substantially by household income (Table 13.8). A number of reasons could speculatively explain this. Firstly, 23 per cent of reported household incomes were refusals and uncertain responses (9 per cent and 14 per cent respectively), many of which appear to be disproportionately from households with higher standards of living, and this is likely to affect the variable's reliability. If we assume that the non-responses are distributed evenly across the socio-economic spectrum, then the absence of a relationship between fear of crime and income may be because crime concern affects the poor and wealthy alike. Another explanation could be that the categories are not sufficiently differentiated, though regenerating the analysis of fear based on five rather than on two income bands also proved to be insignificant.

To provide some resolution to this matter, use was made of the living standards measure, which is in effect a form of index of the different assets that households possess. The results showed that those with low living standards are less likely than those with medium and high living standards to worry about their personal safety, and are less likely to feel unsafe in walking alone in their area during the day. Those with medium living standards were significantly more fearful of walking alone in their area after dark than those with low and high living standards. This seems to point to the particular vulnerabilities of middle-class households, which have managed to build up a stock of assets which they fear may render them vulnerable to crime.

In relation to main employment status, those formally employed on a part-time basis, students and unemployed work seekers appeared most likely to express concern over personal safety in general. Post-hoc ANOVA tests further confirm that those formally employed on a part-time basis are significantly more fearful for their general safety than the unemployed, pensioners, full-time employees, housewives and students, while pensioners emerge as significantly less concerned over their safety than part-time employees, students and unemployed work seekers. The temporarily sick and disabled, those

TABLE 13.8 *Concern over personal safety, by socio-economic categories, 2005 (mean scores)*

	How safe/unsafe do you feel personally on most days?	How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area during day?	How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area after dark?
Household income			
Less than R1 000	2.73	2.24	3.03
More than R1 000	2.73	2.24	3.10
Living standards measure			
Low	2.62	2.15	2.96
Medium	2.82	2.26	3.18
High	2.73	2.28	3.00
Employment status			
Unemployed, not looking for work	2.53	2.17	3.11
Unemployed, looking for work	2.75	2.21	3.09
Pensioner	2.49	2.19	3.08
Temporarily sick/disabled	2.66	2.35	3.04
Housewife	2.62	2.31	3.16
Student	2.82	2.26	3.13
Employed full time	2.68	2.20	2.86
Employed part time	3.16	2.35	3.19
Educational attainment			
No schooling	2.67	2.22	3.01
Less than Grade 7	2.52	2.09	2.98
Between Grades 7–11	2.73	2.28	3.13
Grade 12/matric	2.75	2.22	2.99
Matric and some further study	3.01	2.10	3.15
Degree	2.64	2.10	2.90
Overall life satisfaction			
Satisfied	2.64	2.18	3.06
Dissatisfied	2.93	2.28	3.11
Total	2.73	2.22	3.06

Source: SASAS (2005)

employed part time, homemakers and students seem more afraid than average of walking alone in their neighbourhood during the day. However, tests reveal that none of the differences in the mean scores for fear over walking alone in the local area during the day is significant. As for concerns about walking alone in the area at night, part-time employees, unemployed work seekers, the discouraged unemployed, students and pensioners are all significantly more fearful than are full-time employees.

Employment status therefore does seem like a key factor in understanding fears over crime. Many writers on modernity have stressed that fear of crime may not reflect fear of victimisation per se but could be related to other insecurities associated with changing social and economic life, including the fear of being jobless in the context of a competitive global labour market and a high domestic

unemployment rate (Dammer & Malone 2003; Pantazis 2000). The general economic vulnerabilities of, in particular, those without full-time employment suggests that fear of crime is capturing aspects of the fear of being unemployed. The fact that today's students, unemployed work seekers and part-time workers are more fearful than pensioners may also similarly suggest the role of economic insecurity. That these groups of people also emerge as more afraid of their safety in their area at night than full-time employees is further suggestive of their lower ability to safeguard their property and person, due to their relatively lower economic position than the materially better off.

With regard to educational attainment, there does not appear to be a linear relationship with the fear of crime measures. Regarding personal feelings of safety on most days, some of the observed differences are statistically significant. For example, those with some primary schooling are less fearful than those with secondary schooling, a matric pass and post-matric education. However, those with a tertiary education are not significantly different, in terms of fear of crime, from less educated South Africans, including those with no schooling at all. Those who have matriculated but have not studied further are also not significantly more fearful for their personal safety than those with no schooling. As for the two environmental fear questions, almost all of the observed differences are not statistically significant. The only exceptions are between those with some primary schooling and those with some secondary schooling, with regard to walking alone in one's area of residence during the daytime, and between those with some secondary schooling and those who have finished matric, in respect of walking alone in one's area of residence after dark. In common with household income, these findings seem to suggest that South Africans across the socio-economic divide are fearful.

Fear of crime impacts negatively on personal well-being, as indicated by overall life satisfaction. Respondents who are satisfied with their life in general are significantly less concerned about their personal safety than those expressing dissatisfaction with life. The same conclusion is found with regard to feelings of safety about the neighbourhood during the day, though the levels of fear about walking alone after dark are not significantly different for those that are satisfied or dissatisfied with life in general.

Defensible spaces: The geography of fear

The transition to democracy in South Africa has had an indelible effect on the social and spatial fabric of the country, characterised by the dismantling of the apartheid city through the redrawing or removal of boundaries and the adoption of a vision of an inclusive, non-racial city form (Boraine et al. 2006; Bremner 2004). As a result, metropolitan areas are displaying increased diversity in spatial patterns, though evidence of residential integration has remained rather ambiguous. In an era of market-led growth, residential integration is occurring principally through individual rather than state initiative, meaning that the better off have managed to move into former white areas, while income inequality continues to reinforce patterns of separation for most (Beall et al. 2002; Christopher 2005). The upgrading of infrastructure in former African areas by municipalities has, however, reduced demands for integration. The shifting of socio-spatial boundaries in the post-1994 period may also, in common with other transition countries, have fostered social uncertainty and reinforced a fear of the 'other' or 'stranger'. This has resulted in citizens attempting to reduce this perceived threat by creating enclosed spaces protected by walls, guards, gates and other measures, which further perpetuates and even exaggerates social exclusion and a sense of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'.


Despite the increased crime levels in former white areas after 1994 and this barricading of residential space, statistical evidence indicates that violent crime in former township areas far exceeds that in the more prosperous suburbs (Bremner 2004; Hamber 1999). Yet, where does fear of crime tend to reside? A 2006 survey undertaken by the Bureau of Market Research in Johannesburg, for example, indicated

that township dwellers and suburbanites shared an equal concern over crime (*Business Day* 19 March 2007). There has also been recent discussion of how, qualitatively, rural villagers seem as concerned about crime as suburbanites (*Business Day* 20 September 2006).

The 2005 SASAS survey results confirm that the type of area in which one resides does influence feelings of safety in general, as well as during the day and at night. It is immediately apparent that rural residents are less concerned about their personal safety than are their urban counterparts (Figure 13.8). Those living on commercial farms (rural formal) were most likely to feel safe personally on most days and walking alone in their area during the day and after nightfall. Those in traditional rural areas (rural informal) display slightly more fear than those on farms, though the levels of fear are still below those of the average South African. Shifting attention to the urban environment, fear for personal safety among residents in formal urban areas approximates the national average for each of the measures employed. However, it is in the country's informal settlements that fear seems most deeply entrenched. More than half of the residents of these locales indicate that they feel unsafe on most days and fear walking alone during the daytime (54 per cent and 53 per cent respectively); an alarming 85 per cent voice concerns about the safety of their living environment after dark.

The fact that expressions of concern over personal safety among South Africa's rural residents are less evident than among urban dwellers is expected. People in rural communities are more geographically dispersed than urban residents, and previous international research has found there to be a positive relationship between community size and fear of crime (Clemente & Kleiman 1976). Some of the contending explanatory theories for this relationship include the notion that heightened fear in urban areas signifies a response to a higher crime rate and risk of victimisation; that the higher population densities and social diversity of the urban existence propagate isolation and antisocial behaviour, in which case fear of crime becomes effectively fear of strangers; and that residents in areas undergoing rapid growth and change are likely to be more fearful, due to a sense of uncertainty and a weakening of social ties (Hale 1996).

FIGURE 13.8 *Concern over personal safety, by environmental milieu, 2005**



Notes: 'Rural formal' areas are commercial farms, while 'rural informal' are communal areas in the former homelands.

* Percentage feeling unsafe.

Source: SASAS (2005)

While the broad urban–rural dichotomy does not present any surprises, what is important to stress is the prominence of fear in informal settlements. This finding is noteworthy, not necessarily in that the result is counter-intuitive or profoundly original, but rather that it is iconoclastic, given the conventional portrayal (even caricature) of the threat posed by criminal elements in the suburbs, of ‘swart gevaar’, and the edifices that frightened residents have erected in response. The sobering reality is that it is those who cannot afford to adorn their properties with razor wire, electric fencing, burglar bars or state-of-the-art alarm systems, or hire private security to supplement police services, that are more vulnerable to fear of crime. In addition, residents of informal settlements often tend to live in environments lacking street lighting or ready access for police and other emergency services, which may further be conducive to heightened concerns about safety.

In addition, the relative cost of crime to residents of informal settlements is likely to be substantively higher than for middle- and upper-class residents in the suburbs. This is because they are less likely to be able to replace lost assets, and the impact of physical injury is likely to be more debilitating, due to a greater reliance on their ability to perform manual, unskilled labour as a primary livelihood strategy (May 2000). There is also a certain irony in the observation that residents of informal settlements are the most fearful. Previous research has found that concern over crime can readily become a manifestation of generalised fear of squatters, alongside other facets of urban change, and that rising crime levels reinforce negative views of squatters (Ballard 2004).

Social integration

One salient dimension of fear of crime research has been the attempt to examine the role of the physical and social environment in which a person resides in explaining variations in fear. More specifically, the relationship between social integration or neighbourhood cohesion and fear of crime has received growing attention. Indeed, it is hypothesised that people who express a sense of attachment to their neighbours are also likely to perceive their neighbourhood or living environment as safer. A number of reasons are advanced for this relationship. Having a strong sense of belonging to one’s street, neighbourhood or community may provide a sense that neighbours could be relied upon for assistance should one be victimised. It may also promote awareness of the comings and goings in one’s residential area and of the groups, individuals and dangerous localities to be avoided. This informal knowledge of a community and its features may improve the sense of control over the environment by allowing risks to be managed. It may further enable people to better distinguish between those from their neighbourhoods and outsiders (Hunter & Baumer 1982; Skogan & Maxfield 1981). It has even been proposed that having social ties and a common bond with neighbours may serve to counter at least some of the negative effects that signs of disorder at the neighbourhood level may have in relation to fear and mistrust (Ross & Jang 2000).

Evidence that supports the notion that social integration is inversely related to fear of crime has steadily been amassing over the last couple of decades (Adams & Serpe 2000; Borooah & Carcach 1997; Hunter & Baumer 1982; Riger et al. 1981). While social isolation may engender fear, it may also be argued that fear of crime in turn erodes levels of community integration, solidarity and trust as people withdraw behind fences and closed doors, or move to safer residential areas (Skogan 1986). In view of the apparent relevance of levels of social integration as both determinants and consequences of fear of crime, the 2005 SASAS survey included a question on perceived degree of neighbourhood cohesion: ‘To what extent do you feel attached to those who live in your neighbourhood?’ Possible responses on a four-point scale ranged from ‘very attached’ to ‘not at all attached’. By examining the intersection between this question and the global fear of crime questions, we will begin to answer whether people with a stronger emotional attachment to their neighbours are less fearful and if fear of crime in South Africa has begun to fray community ties.

TABLE 13.9 *Concern over personal safety, by perceived neighbourhood cohesion, 2005 (mean scores)*

Attached to those who live in your neighbourhood	How safe/unsafe do you feel personally on most days?	How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area during day?	How safe/unsafe do you feel walking alone in area after dark?
Very attached	2.69	2.17	3.07
Slightly attached	2.66	2.29	3.06
Not very attached	3.07	2.47	3.10
Not at all attached	3.25	2.22	2.80
Total	2.73	2.22	3.06

Note: The mean scores are based on a 5-point scale, where 1 = 'very safe', 2 = 'safe', 3 = 'neither safe not unsafe', 4 = 'unsafe' and 5 = 'very unsafe'.

Source: SASAS (2005)

In terms of personal safety, there does appear to be a link between levels of social cohesion and fear of crime, with those feeling isolated from their neighbours expressing higher levels of fear of victimisation (Table 13.9). Those who feel 'very attached' or 'slightly attached' to those living in their neighbourhood have significantly higher reported levels of personal safety than those who are 'not very attached' or 'not at all attached'. The trend with the other two fear of crime questions is, however, more ambiguous. In terms of perceived safety walking alone during the day, feelings of neighbourhood cohesion do, for the most part, decrease significantly as fear of crime increases. However, those who responded that they were not attached to their neighbours paradoxically are not more fearful. As for walking alone in the area after dark, most of the differences in the mean scores are virtually indistinguishable and statistically insignificant. Again, the exception is for those reporting the lowest levels of perceived neighbourhood integration. In this case, the level of fear is significantly lower than for those with a higher sense of neighbourhood attachment.

In sum, there is an indication that fear of crime in South Africa is related to social solidarity and cohesiveness. The precise nature of this relationship, however, requires further investigation in order to explain some of the contradictions and paradoxes between and within different global fear questions, and to understand more fully the strength and direction of the interactions between fear and social integration. For instance, at this stage it is not possible to specify whether cohesiveness inhibits fear, whether being fearful of crime is isolating rather than bringing people together, or if it is a combination of both effects. Regardless of such causal ambiguity, what can be stated is that fear of crime in South Africa should not be viewed exclusively through the lens of the individual and his or her traits. The neighbourhood or community context seems equally vital, since it is in this domain that fears are shaped and their impact felt.

Demand for public safety

Protection against crime

Drawing on Chapter 8 in this volume, it is possible to examine how essential South Africans believe certain community and household protective measures are for all members of society to have in order to enjoy what is considered an acceptable standard of living. As Table 13.10 shows, more than half of the population deemed four of the seven measures included as necessities. Two of these are community-level items – street lighting and local police presence – and were considered essential by more than three-quarters of the respondents. In fact, street lighting ranks as a necessity at least as important as many other basic household services, such as water and electricity.

TABLE 13.10 *Items defined as essential for an acceptable standard of living (percentage)*

Item	Percentage saying item is essential						
	Total	Safe on most days	Unsafe on most days	Safe walking alone in area during day	Unsafe walking alone in area during day	Safe walking alone in area after dark	Unsafe walking alone in area after dark
Street lighting	91	89	92	88	95	85	93
Having police on the streets in local area	77	76	80	75	81	71	80
A fence or wall around the property	71	68	76	70	72	64	74
Burglar bars in the house	64	62	67	63	68	59	67
A lock-up garage for vehicles	47	44	50	47	47	45	48
A burglar alarm system for the house	43	40	46	43	43	42	43
An armed response service for the house	31	29	32	30	33	30	31

Note: The category 'safe' is a combination of those that reported they felt 'safe' and 'very safe', while the category 'unsafe' is similarly a combination of those indicating that they felt 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe'. For the general personal safety question, the 'neither safe nor unsafe' category was dropped.
Source: SASAS (2005)

Table 13.10 also breaks the results down by those feeling safe or unsafe according to the three global fear of crime measures. The same four protective measures (street lighting, local police patrols, fence/wall around property and burglar bars) were deemed essential by a majority of 50 per cent or more, irrespective of whether the respondent felt safe or unsafe. However, for each of these four items and across all three fear measures, those feeling unsafe appear more likely than those feeling safe to consider these protective actions as essential for all South Africans to have. The largest observable percentage differences were found between those feeling safe and unsafe about walking alone in their area after dark on all four of these items. The three remaining household protective measures, namely, a lock-up garage, investing in a burglar alarm system, and having armed response, do not receive majority support as necessities, with the exception of a lock-up garage for those feeling personally unsafe on most days. One of the probable reasons why these measures receive lower support than the other four is economic. The reality is that many South Africans do not have and cannot afford these measures, especially relative to other demands on their incomes, so they are likely to consider them as luxury items that are desirable rather than essential.

Public evaluations of police performance

Previous work on feelings of safety and fear of crime in South Africa has highlighted the relationship with attitudes towards the police and the courts (Louw 2007). The 2005 SASAS survey results demonstrate that public confidence in the police diminishes as fear of victimisation rises (Table 13.11). For those who feel safe, the majority express trust in the police, while the majority of those fearing for their safety tend to report low levels of confidence in the work of the police. The difference in levels of distrust is largest between those that feel safe and those that feel personally unsafe on most days. There is some

glimmer of hope, in that levels of trust in the police rose from 41 per cent to 45 per cent between 2000 and 2005, although levels of distrust remained constant at 41 per cent.

Previous SASAS surveys, and indeed other nationally representative surveys, have indicated that the police remain one of the least trustworthy institutions in the country (Daniel et al. 2006; Mattes 2006). The Afrobarometer survey series has provided evidence to suggest that difficulty in getting help from the police in times of need and perceptions of corruption among police officials may be contributing to these low levels of trust (Mattes 2006). Certainly, in an environment of fear over safety for one's person and possessions, a perceived lack of police responsiveness and visibility is likely to exacerbate one's sense of vulnerability and further perpetuate the cycle of fear. It is thus unsurprising when we find worryingly low levels of satisfaction with the way government is reducing crime at a neighbourhood level, with substantial differences in levels of dissatisfaction reported between those feeling safe and those feeling unsafe (Table 13.12).

TABLE 13.11 *Levels of public trust in the police, by perceived feelings of safety (percentage)*

Trust in South African Police Services	Total	Safe on most days	Unsafe on most days	Safe walking alone in area during day	Unsafe walking alone in area during day	Safe walking alone in area after dark	Unsafe walking alone in area after dark
Trust	45	53	35	48	40	53	42
Neither trust nor distrust	13	12	14	12	15	12	14
Distrust	41	35	51	40	45	35	44
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SASAS (2005)

TABLE 13.12 *Levels of satisfaction with government's efforts at reducing crime, by perceived feelings of safety (percentage)*

Satisfaction with the way government is handling the cutting of crime in your neighbourhood	Total	Safe on most days	Unsafe on most days	Safe walking alone in area during day	Unsafe walking alone in area during day	Safe walking alone in area after dark	Unsafe walking alone in area after dark
Satisfied	22	31	11	26	14	34	17
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	11	13	7	13	8	13	10
Dissatisfied	67	55	82	61	78	53	73
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: Columns may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding off.

Source: SASAS (2005)

Conclusion: An age of hope or anxiety?

Surveys conducted by the HSRC since the early 1990s reveal that general perceptions of personal safety have been showing signs of improvement since the late 1990s. However, the same cannot be said for feelings of neighbourhood or community safety. The August–October 2005 SASAS survey found that people are substantially more fearful of walking alone in their residential areas during the day and after dark, compared to in 1998. Of particular concern has been the worsening level of fear of walking alone in one's area during the day between 2003 and 2005. From a comparative perspective, South Africans emerge as significantly more fearful than a majority of their counterparts in other parts of the world. This is true whether one holds up the developed countries of Western Europe or other African, Latin American or transition countries as the basis of comparison.

In terms of understanding the personal attributes associated with fear of crime, the survey results pose critical challenges to some of the prevailing archetypal images of who the fearful in the country are, and provide further support for other national and sub-national surveys that have arrived at similar conclusions. Firstly, over the last decade and a half, the level of fear of crime experienced by males has virtually matched, and in a couple of instances surpassed, that of females. This finding was consistent, regardless of the fear of crime measure used. It is noteworthy in that it draws attention to the vulnerabilities experienced by males rather than portraying them solely as the aggressors and perpetrators. Fear of victimisation is no longer seen to possess a predominantly female face. Secondly, South African youth appear more fearful than the elderly, though the relationship is weak and inconsistent over time. This confronts the view that the decline in physical resilience associated with ageing renders the elderly more fearful of crime than younger people. Thirdly, Indian and African respondents exhibited greater fear of crime than coloured and white respondents in 2005. This racial gradient has changed somewhat since the late 1990s, due to improvements in perceptions of personal safety for all population groups except Africans, whose fear levels have remained virtually unchanged since 2000. The gap between the proportion of white and black South Africans who felt unsafe therefore narrowed substantially in the late 1990s, and by 2005, a relative reversal of positions appears to have occurred. Thus, while former President Mbeki (2007) noted that 'the fear factor has long been a feature of white politics in South Africa', the reality is that the scope of fear extends beyond a specific minority of the population. The popular notion of fear of crime in the country as predominantly 'white fear' is lamentable in that it is misleading and neglects the needs of a majority who cannot voice their concerns. Finally, although there was some ambiguity with regard to fear and socio-economic status, the results did provide evidence that fear of crime is higher among middle-class households, is related to employment status and adversely influences individuals' overall sense of personal well-being.

The data provide support for the relationship between fear and the broader social environment. The character of the place where one resides clearly exerts an influence over perceptions of safety and fear of crime. While it was unsurprising to find that people residing in rural areas tend to experience less fear of victimisation than their urban counterparts, a significant finding is that it is in the country's informal settlements that fear seems most pervasive. This is probably related to a lack of basic policing, services and infrastructure in such areas, which increases the risk of victimisation (Richards et al. 2007). The level of social integration in one's neighbourhood or community was relevant to understanding fear of crime in South Africa.

As for attitudinal responses to such fear, the survey enabled the examination of several indicators of the demand for public safety and satisfaction with police effectiveness in cutting crime. Concerns over crime have resulted in a situation where both publicly provided protective measures, such as street lighting and street policing, and a number of private security measures, are considered critical by a majority of South Africans and as essential for all to have in order to secure a decent standard of living.

The fear of crime is also related to a sizeable erosion of confidence in the police and dissatisfaction with crime reduction efforts at the neighbourhood level.

In his 2006 State of the Nation address, then President Mbeki suggested that the country had entered an 'age of hope'. This was based on the widespread optimism expressed by South Africans with regard to the future of the country in a number of opinion polls. The findings of this chapter raise the obvious question as to whether fear of crime represents a notable threat to this vision of a bright future. Mattes (2006) concludes that perceptions of crime and policing have a nominal effect on South Africans' support for democracy. He nonetheless finds that citizens who feel safer from violence and crime than in the past, who are positive about government's crime reduction efforts, and who believe that the police are user-friendly and trustworthy, are more likely to express satisfaction with democracy and the future of the democratic system in the country. Initial analysis of the 2005 SASAS survey results similarly points towards the steadfast nature of the optimism regarding the future of the nation. In late 2005, 69 per cent believed that life would improve for most people in South Africa over the next five years, and 63 per cent said that life would improve for them personally. Those that said they felt personally 'very unsafe' or 'unsafe' on most days were not significantly less positive in their outlook than those who felt 'very safe' or 'safe' (results not shown). The same applies to the other two fear of crime measures. In contrast, being fearful of victimisation does have a modest dampening effect on levels of satisfaction with the way democracy is working.

In conclusion, despite some signs of improvement with regard to feelings of safety and security, the study has confirmed that deep-seated fears about personal and community safety continue to be shared by a sizeable contingent of South Africans across the socio-economic and demographic spectrum. These insecurities have not tempered the resolute optimism regarding future prospects for the country and its people. Yet, the fact that such fears exert an influence on police confidence, the demand for public safety, social cohesion, personal well-being and, to a limited extent, satisfaction with the democratic system, signifies that the fear equation remains of considerable importance for policy discussion. Identifying, testing out and evaluating strategies for reducing the fear of crime should be a priority alongside that of reducing crime itself. While this task is likely to be rendered difficult by the social, economic and political insecurity that tends to underscore fear of crime, it is only by doing so that we can expect to dislodge the shadow of anxiety that looms over the 'age of hope'.

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Appendix 1 Technical details of the survey

In 2005, as in the previous two rounds, two versions of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) questionnaire were fielded. Each module of questions was asked either of the full sample (5 734 respondents) or of a half sample. The structures of the two versions of the questionnaire are shown in Appendix 3.

Sample design

The SASAS survey has been designed to yield a representative sample of adults aged 16 and older. The sampling frame for the survey is the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) Master Sample, which was designed in 2002 and consists of 1 000 primary sampling units (PSUs). The 2001 population Census enumerator areas (EAs) were used as PSUs. These PSUs were drawn, with probability proportional to size, from a pre-Census 2001 list of EAs provided by Statistics South Africa. The Master Sample excludes special institutions (such as hospitals, military camps, old age homes, school and university hostels), recreational areas, industrial areas and vacant EAs. It therefore focuses on dwelling units or visiting points as secondary sampling units, which have been defined as separate (non-vacant) residential stands, addresses, structures, flats, homesteads, etc. As the basis of the 2005 SASAS round of interviewing, a subsample of 500 PSUs was drawn from the HSRC's Master Sample. Three explicit stratification variables were used, namely, province, geography type and majority population group. Table A1.1 gives the numbers of PSUs allocated to the categories of the explicit strata.

TABLE A1.1 *The design of the SASAS sample*

Province	Number of PSUs	Geography type	Number of PSUs
Western Cape	55	Urban formal	285
Eastern Cape	55	Urban informal	55
Northern Cape	50	Rural formal	66
Free State	50	Rural informal	94
KwaZulu-Natal	70		
North West	50	Race	Number of PSUs
Gauteng	65	African	288
Mpumalanga	50	Coloured	79
Limpopo	55	Indian	50
Total	500	White	83

Within each stratum, the allocated number of PSUs was drawn using proportional to size probability sampling. In each of these drawn PSUs, clusters of 14 dwelling units each were drawn.

Selection of individuals

Interviewers called at each visiting point selected from the HSRC Master Sample and listed all those eligible for inclusion in the sample – that is, all persons currently aged 16 or over and resident at the selected visiting point. The interviewer then selected one respondent, using a random selection procedure based on a Kish grid.

Weighting

The data were weighted to take account of the fact that not all the units covered in the survey had the same probability of selection. The weighting reflected the relative selection probabilities of the individual at the three main stages of selection: visiting point (address), household and individual.

Visiting points in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were oversampled, due to the small population size in the former and a desire to ensure a decent Indian sample in the latter. Because of this, weights had to be applied to compensate for the greater probability of being selected. The resulting weight is called 'benchwtg' in the half samples and 'combiwtg' in the full sample. The weights were then scaled down to make the number of weighted productive cases exactly equal to the number of unweighted productive cases (n=5 734). All the percentages presented in this book are based on weighted data.

Fieldwork

Survey pilot

Prior to going to the field, the questionnaire was piloted among 40 urban and 20 rural residents. Interviews were held with the supervisor and the fieldworkers who undertook the pilot study. After analysing the data from the pilot and considering recommendations from the field, a final questionnaire was produced.

Final interviewing and response rates

Interviewing was carried out between August and October 2005. Fieldwork was conducted by interviewers using conventional face-to-face interviewing techniques. The majority of the interviewers had been involved in the previous rounds of SASAS, which meant that there was a broad-based knowledge of the survey design and instruments. Nonetheless, interviewers attended training workshops to familiarise them with the selection procedures and questionnaires.

TABLE A1.2 *Response rates for SASAS, 2003–05*

	2003	2004	2005
Addresses issued (n)	6 917	6 907	6 930
Vacant, derelict and other out of scope (n)	558	303	295
In scope (n)	6 359	6 604	6 635
In scope (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Interview achieved (%)	78.3	84.5	86.4
Interview not achieved (%)	21.7	15.5	13.6
Refused* (%)	11.7	9.3	8.1
Non-contacted** (%)	10.0	6.2	5.5

Notes: * 'Refused' comprises refusals before selection of an individual at the visiting point, refusal by the selected person, and 'proxy' refusals (on behalf of the selected respondent).

** 'Non-contacted' comprises households where no one was contacted and those where the selected respondent could not be contacted.

The mean interview length was 59.1 minutes for version 1 of the questionnaire and 58.5 minutes for version 2. Interviewers achieved an overall response rate of 86.4 per cent. Details are shown in Table A1.2. Version 1 of the questionnaire was completed by 86.3 per cent of respondents in the face-to-face interview and version 2 by 86.5 per cent.

In designing SASAS, a core minimum target response rate of 70.0 per cent was adopted, this being the threshold that is internationally considered as being very good (Babbie 1990). As Table A1.2 clearly demonstrates, this target has been consistently surpassed, with the response rates remaining robustly high. From a comparative perspective, SASAS has one of the highest response rates relative to other national social attitude surveys.

Quality control

The HSRC employs various ways of quality controlling the fieldwork. For this project, the HSRC conducted telephonic and physical back checks and quality control field visits. Full-time HSRC employees also undertook quality control field checks in all provinces. Four research assistants (able to speak most South African languages between them) were employed to do telephonic back checks. Telephonic call backs were made for a total of 2 375 (41.4 per cent) out of the 5 734 achieved interviews. This figure suggests quality control well above the industry standard, which normally ranges between 15 and 20 per cent.

Immediately following the inception of the fieldwork process, field visits were undertaken to assist fieldworkers with potential problems, to ensure that fieldwork was being conducted in a standardised manner in all provinces, and to ensure that fieldworkers adhered to strict methodological and ethical standards. Specific issues tested during the quality control field checks included:

- correct identification of areas to be visited;
- assessing the quality of the maps;
- correct usage of intervals;
- correct selection of respondents (using the Kish grid);
- correctness of details of visits and revisits; and
- correctness of contact details of the respondent/visited point.

General observations were also made regarding research protocol. These entailed checking whether fieldworkers were correctly displaying name tags, whether the police or local authorities had been contacted in the various areas, as well as checking on the supervision and interview skills of the supervisors and interviewers.

Through telephonic calls and some physical visits, reliability was checked by repeating some of the questions with selected respondents. This was done to determine whether interviewers actually had asked respondents the questions, and to verify whether respondents understood the questions in the same way the first and the second time around.

In addition, teleconferences were held with all the supervisors to provide feedback on some of the common errors that interviewers were making during the early stages of fieldwork, as well as to get periodic updates on progress in the field.

Translation

Since South Africa is a heterogeneous, multilingual society with 11 official languages, it is important that respondents are interviewed and answer questions in a language with which they feel comfortable. Ideally, this implies that questionnaires require translation into each of the major languages. In respect of the SASAS translations, in Round 1 (2003), the survey instruments were fielded in six languages and

in five languages in Round 2 (2004). In the current round, the final English version of the questionnaire was translated into seven other official languages (isiZulu, isiXhosa, Setswana, Xitsonga, Sepedi, Tshivenda and Afrikaans), representing an improvement on previous years (see Table A1.3). The translation was carefully checked by means of 'back translation'.

Securing linguistic equivalence in a multilingual environment is extremely challenging. The diversity of cultures means that attempts at finding shared meanings for concepts such as 'family', 'household', 'married' and 'employed' are fraught with difficulty. This difficulty does not only emerge along linguistic lines. There are also notable locational determinants, for example, 'armed security force' and 'burglar alarm system' are common in urban but not rural localities. Furthermore, translations may not always easily be able to match English scale properties, with distinctions such as 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' sometimes getting blurred, so requiring fieldworkers to probe. There thus exists a potential risk of misrepresentation, due to misunderstanding.

Given these issues, time and resources need to be devoted to translation procedures. Based upon this understanding, the human and fiscal resources devoted to translation have been improving with successive rounds of SASAS. The HSRC also remains committed to ensuring ongoing refinements in future rounds to ensure a rigorous translation process.

TABLE A1.3 *Number of languages fielded in 2003–05 SASAS surveys and breakdown of South African population, by home language, 2001*

Home language	2003	2004	2005	South Africa
West Germanic subgroup				21.5
Afrikaans	X	X	X	13.3
English	X	X	X	8.2
Nguni subgroup				45.7
IsiZulu	X	X	X	23.8
IsiXhosa			X	17.6
SiSwati				2.7
IsiNdebele				1.6
Sotho subgroup				25.5
Sepedi			X	9.4
Setswana	X	X	X	8.2
Sesotho				7.9
No subgroup				6.7
Tshivenda	X	X	X	2.3
Xitsonga	X		X	4.4
Other				0.5
Total	6	5	8	100.0

Source: Stats SA (2003)

Ethics protocol

As is now standard practice at the HSRC, we submitted the 2005 SASAS proposal to the organisation's Ethics Committee for ethical clearance. This was secured following minor amendments recommended by the Committee.

In accordance with the Ethics Committee's specifications, SASAS uses consent forms. These help ensure that the participant understands the objectives of the survey and agrees to participate, while assuring the respondent that the HSRC will treat the responses provided as strictly confidential. Two versions of the consent form were employed in the 2005 survey round. The first was a standard Adult Consent Form for respondents aged 18 years and older, while the second was an Adolescent Consent Form. If the selected respondent was 16 or 17 years old, the interviewer sought the consent of a parent/carer in addition to the consent of the respondent.

With regard to conducting interviews on farms, use was made of AgriSA's Protocol for Access to Farms. Therefore, when a farm EA needed to be visited, permission was sought from the farm owner. The protocol involved in securing this permission was to first approach the local farmers' association in the area. The association was informed of the study, after which they assisted in identifying the farms and setting up appointments with the relevant farmers.

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Appendix 2 Notes on the tabulations in chapters

- 1 Figures in the tables are mostly from the 2004 and 2005 South African Social Attitudes Surveys, unless otherwise indicated.
- 2 Tables are percentaged as indicated.

Appendix 3 The 2005 SASAS questionnaires

SASAS Questionnaire Version 1:	SASAS Questionnaire Version 2:
Cover & respondent selection	
Household roster	
Democracy and Governance [41 items]	Democracy and Governance (long) [46 items]
National identity [9 items]	
Public services (Education) [22 items]	Inter-group Relations [19 items]
Public services (Health) [8 items]	
Family Life [24 items]	Soccer World Cup [17 items]
Moral issues [6 items]	
Poverty and Social Exclusion [71 items]	Work Orientation (ISSP Module) [72 items]
Crime [5 items]	
Voting [12 items]	
DWAF Client Water and Sanitation Questions [64 items]	
Demographics and other classificatory variables [52 items]	Demographics and other classificatory variables (incl. ISSP BVs) [64 items]
TOTAL: [314 items]	TOTAL: [314 items]

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY
Questionnaire 1: July 2005



RESPONDENTS AGED 16 YEARS +

Good (morning/afternoon/evening), I'm _____ and we are conducting a survey for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC regularly conducts surveys of opinion amongst the South African population. Topics include a wide range of social matters such as communications, politics, education, unemployment, the problems of the aged and inter-group relations. As a follow-up to this earlier work, we would like to ask you questions on a variety of subjects that are of national importance. To obtain reliable, scientific information we request that you answer the questions that follow as honestly as possible. Your opinion is important in this research. The area in which you live and you yourself have been selected randomly for the purpose of this survey. The fact that you have been chosen is thus quite coincidental. The information you give to us will be kept confidential. You and your household members will not be identified by name or address in any of the reports we plan to write.

PARTICULARS OF VISITS

	DAY	MONTH	TIME STARTED		TIME COMPLETED		**RESPONSE
			HR	MIN	HR	MIN	
First visit	/	/	2005				
Second visit	/	/	2005				
Third visit	/	/	2005				

**RESPONSE CODES	
Completed questionnaire	= 01
Partially completed questionnaire (specify reason)	= 02
<u>Revisit</u>	
Appointment made	= 03
Selected respondent not at home	= 04
No one home	= 05
<u>Do not qualify</u>	
Vacant house/flat/stand/not a house or flat/demolished	= 06
No person qualifies according to the survey specifications	= 07
Respondent cannot communicate with interviewer because of language	= 08
Respondent is physically/mentally not fit to be interviewed	= 09
<u>Refusals</u>	
Contact person refused	= 10
Interview refused by selected respondent	= 11
Interview refused by parent	= 12
Interview refused by other household member	= 13
<u>OFFICE USE</u>	= 14

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Name of interviewer

Number of interviewer

Checked by

Signature of supervisor _____

FIELDWORK CONTROL

CONTROL	YES	NO	REMARKS
Personal	1	2	
Telephonic	1	2	
Name	SIGNATURE		
.....	DATE/...../.....2005		

RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCEDURE

Number of households at visiting point

--	--

Number of persons 16 years and older at visiting point

--	--

Please list all persons at the visiting point/on the stand who are 16 years and older and were resident 15 out of the past 30 days. Once this is completed, use the Kish grid on the next page to determine which person is to be interviewed.

Names of Persons Aged 16 and Older	
	01
	02
	03
	04
	05
	06
	07
	08
	09
	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24
	25

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:
.....
.....
TEL NO.:

GRID TO SELECT RESPONDENT

NUMBER OF QUESTION-NAIRE				NUMBER OF PERSONS FROM WHICH RESPONDENT MUST BE DRAWN																								
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	26	51	76	1	1	1	3	2	4	1	3	5	8	6	5	12	10	1	6	8	7	19	19	13	21	13	24	25
2	27	52	77	1	2	3	4	3	1	2	2	3	4	8	3	7	2	5	14	4	15	4	8	6	16	14	22	19
3	28	53	78	1	1	2	1	4	2	7	6	9	3	5	11	2	1	3	11	7	10	16	16	10	5	2	2	3
4	29	54	79	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	8	6	2	4	2	4	8	11	10	16	6	9	10	15	11	12	11	18
5	30	55	80	1	1	1	4	5	6	3	5	7	5	9	8	14	3	2	13	5	18	1	4	1	20	11	5	24
6	31	56	81	1	2	2	2	3	5	7	7	8	7	1	4	9	14	8	2	17	17	14	12	14	22	10	3	14
7	32	57	82	1	2	1	1	4	1	4	1	4	6	3	6	5	7	13	9	2	3	13	14	8	2	7	20	4
8	33	58	83	1	1	2	3	2	5	1	4	2	1	7	10	6	5	4	15	10	5	2	13	4	17	5	17	8
9	34	59	84	1	1	3	2	5	6	2	2	1	9	10	1	10	4	6	6	1	9	10	1	5	6	9	1	12
10	35	60	85	1	2	2	4	1	3	3	6	9	10	11	12	3	9	15	7	8	11	6	3	9	4	3	10	1
11	36	61	86	1	1	1	3	1	4	5	3	1	6	2	9	13	11	14	4	11	4	15	15	17	1	1	23	2
12	37	62	87	1	2	3	1	3	2	7	5	6	5	7	7	8	6	10	3	3	1	12	20	7	13	22	12	16
13	38	63	88	1	1	2	1	5	3	6	4	3	4	6	2	11	13	12	1	15	8	7	2	12	15	21	13	7
14	39	64	89	1	2	3	2	4	1	4	7	8	2	5	6	11	12	9	16	13	16	11	18	18	14	16	18	23
15	40	65	90	1	2	1	4	2	4	3	8	7	7	11	1	3	5	7	12	14	13	8	17	20	19	20	19	11
16	41	66	91	1	1	3	3	1	6	5	1	5	9	10	3	2	11	13	8	12	12	5	6	21	8	8	4	15
17	42	67	92	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	6	2	3	2	12	5	2	10	13	5	8	18	9	16	10	17	16	20
18	43	68	93	1	2	1	4	2	6	4	1	4	8	9	10	7	9	3	12	12	9	7	20	19	9	19	21	13
19	44	69	94	1	2	2	1	3	5	2	8	9	10	4	9	8	13	1	1	14	10	19	10	11	18	15	7	6
20	45	70	95	1	1	3	2	5	4	1	3	8	1	3	8	6	6	9	5	7	13	4	15	1	7	22	15	21
21	46	71	96	1	1	1	2	5	1	7	2	3	2	1	11	4	7	5	3	2	1	3	12	18	5	19	14	9
22	47	72	97	1	2	1	3	1	3	2	6	2	1	8	7	1	4	2	11	8	2	17	4	17	21	16	3	5
23	48	73	98	1	2	3	4	2	2	6	7	7	8	3	4	9	3	6	2	11	11	16	2	8	11	23	6	22
24	49	74	99	1	1	2	1	4	6	3	5	5	3	1	5	13	1	14	8	14	6	15	9	14	3	6	9	17
25	50	75	100	1	1	2	3	3	2	4	6	4	7	5	3	12	12	12	4	6	2	17	11	2	12	4	8	10

SASAS QUESTIONNAIRE 1: 2005

Number of persons in this household
 Number of persons 16 years and older in this household

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE CIRCLE APPROPRIATE CODES

Household schedule	Write in from oldest (top) to youngest (bottom)	Age in completed years	Sex M=1 F=2	Race group	Relationship to respondent
<p><i>Please list all persons in the household who eat from the same cooking pot and who were resident 15 out of the past 30 days.</i></p> <p><i>Note: Circle the number next to the name of the household head.</i></p>	01				
	02				
	03				
	04				
	05				
	06				
	07				
	08				
	09				
	10				
	11				
	12				
	13				
	14				
	15				
	16				
	17				
	18				
	19				
	20				
	21				
	22				
	23				
	24				
	25				

Race group codes
1 = African/Black
2 = Coloured
3 = Indian/Asian
4 = White
5 = Other

Relationship to respondent codes
1 = Respondent
2 = Wife or husband or partner
3 = Son or daughter
4 = Father or mother
5 = Brother or sister
6 = Grandchild
7 = Grandparent
8 = Mother- or father-in-law
9 = Son- or daughter-in-law
10 = Brother- or sister-in-law
11 = Other relation
12 = Non-relation

DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE

1. Please tell me what you think are the 3 most important challenges facing South Africa today.

[Fieldworker: Do NOT read out.]

HIV/AIDS	01
Unemployment	02
Racism	03
Xenophobia	04
Crime and safety	05
Service provision/delivery	06
Affordable housing	07
Land reform issues	08
Human rights	09
Education	10
Economic and financial issues	11
Work-related issues	12
Family and youth issues	13
Religion and culture issues	14
Environmental issues	15
Political issues	16
Corruption	17
Poverty	18
Other (specify)	19
(Do not know)	98

In the last 5 years, has life improved, stayed the same or gotten worse for...?

	Improved	Stayed the same	Gotten worse	(Do not know)
2. Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	8
3. People like you	1	2	3	8

Do you think that life will improve, stay the same or get worse in the next 5 years for...?

	Improve	Stay the same	Get worse	(Do not know)
4. Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	8
5. People like you	1	2	3	8

6. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy is working in South Africa?
[Showcard 1]

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
Neither nor	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
(Do not know)	8

Indicate the extent to which you trust or distrust the following institutions in South Africa at present. [*Showcard 2*]

	Institutions	Strongly trust	Trust	Neither trust nor distrust	Distrust	Strongly distrust	(Do not know)
7.	National government	1	2	3	4	5	8
8.	Courts	1	2	3	4	5	8
9.	The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)	1	2	3	4	5	8
10.	Your provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	8
11.	The SABC	1	2	3	4	5	8
12.	Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	8
13.	The police	1	2	3	4	5	8
14.	Defence force	1	2	3	4	5	8
15.	Big business	1	2	3	4	5	8
16.	Your local government	1	2	3	4	5	8
17.	Churches	1	2	3	4	5	8
18.	Traditional authorities/leaders	1	2	3	4	5	8
19.	Political parties	1	2	3	4	5	8

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood? [*Showcard 1*]

		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	(Do not know)
20.	Supply of water and sanitation	1	2	3	4	5	8
21.	Providing electricity	1	2	3	4	5	8
22.	Removal of refuse	1	2	3	4	5	8
23.	Affordable housing	1	2	3	4	5	8
24.	Access to healthcare	1	2	3	4	5	8
25.	Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS	1	2	3	4	5	8
26.	Cutting crime	1	2	3	4	5	8
27.	Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	5	8
28.	Land reform	1	2	3	4	5	8
29.	Providing social grants (e.g. child support grant, old age pension, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	8

30. How often do you talk about politics?

Very often	1
Often	2
Occasionally	3
Very seldom	4
Never	5

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
[Showcard 3]**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
31. Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	1	2	3	4	5	8
32. After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless.	1	2	3	4	5	8
33. It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	1	2	3	4	5	8
34. Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	8
35. Politics is too complicated these days for people like me to understand.	1	2	3	4	5	8

The next few questions are about your views on how the country is governed. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
36. Politicians found guilty of bribery or corruption should resign from public office immediately.	1	2	3	4	5	8
37. Elected politicians should resign from office when they change to another political party.	1	2	3	4	5	8
38. The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it.	1	2	3	4	5	8
39. Citizens should have the right to form or join organisations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.	1	2	3	4	5	8
40. The government should be in control of what information is given to the public.	1	2	3	4	5	8
41. Mass action is an acceptable way for people to express their views in a democracy.	1	2	3	4	5	8

NATIONAL IDENTITY

To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? [Showcard 4]

	Very attached	Slightly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	(Do not know)
42. Those who speak the same language as you.	1	2	3	4	8
43. Those who belong to the same race group as you.	1	2	3	4	8
44. Those who are in the same financial position as you.	1	2	3	4	8
45. Those who live in your neighbourhood.	1	2	3	4	8

To what extent are the following statements true for you? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
46. It makes me feel proud to be called a South African.	1	2	3	4	5	8
47. Being a South African is an important part of how I see myself.	1	2	3	4	5	8

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
48. I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world.	1	2	3	4	5	8
49. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the South Africans.	1	2	3	4	5	8
50. Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries.	1	2	3	4	5	8

PUBLIC SERVICES

Education

51. Up to what level do you believe it should be compulsory for all learners to attend school?

[Fieldworker: Please circle ONE box only.]

Up to and including grade 3 (Std. 1)	1
Up to and including grade 7 (Std. 5)	2
Up to and including grade 9 (Std. 7)	3
Up to and including grade 12 (Matric)	4
School attendance should not be made compulsory at any level	5
(Do not know)	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
52. All schools should contain children of different races.	1	2	3	4	5	8
53. All schools should contain children of different languages.	1	2	3	4	5	8
54. Children of different religions, or of no religion, should be educated separately.	1	2	3	4	5	8
55. Girls and boys should be educated separately.	1	2	3	4	5	8
56. The children of the economically well off and the poor should be educated together.	1	2	3	4	5	8

57. How often do you or did you participate in the activities of your children's schools?

Very often	1
Often	2
Sometimes	3
Almost never	4
Never	5
(Do not know)	8
(Not applicable – no children/children not yet of school-going age)	9

58. Is or was there a School Governing Body (SGB) in your children's school?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	8
(Not applicable – no children/children not yet of school-going age)	9

59. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: School Governing Bodies do a good job in making schools work better. [Showcard 3]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
(Do not know)	8

What do you think should be the main language of instruction in...?

	English	Home language of the learner	Afrikaans	(Do not know)
60. Grades 1 to 3 (Grade 1 – Std. 1)	1	2	3	8
61. Grades 4 to 9 (Std. 2 – Std. 7)	1	2	3	8
62. Grades 10 to 12 (Std. 8 – Matric)	1	2	3	8
63. Higher education (university, college, technikon)	1	2	3	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following methods of keeping discipline in schools? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
64. Reasoning and discussion with learner.	1	2	3	4	5	8
65. Corporal punishment by the teacher in class.	1	2	3	4	5	8
66. Corporal punishment by the principal only.	1	2	3	4	5	8
67. Physical labour like digging holes or sweeping.	1	2	3	4	5	8
68. Keeping learner in school after official hours.	1	2	3	4	5	8
69. Additional learning tasks like doing extra homework or writing essays.	1	2	3	4	5	8

70. Compulsory religious sessions/meetings have no place in school. [Showcard 3]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
(Do not know)	8

71. People have different views regarding the importance of education to boys as compared to girls. How much would you agree or disagree with the following statement? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
Girls should be educated so that they can operate on equal terms with boys in the modern world.	1	2	3	4	5	8

72. If a child completes matric successfully there is a wide range of paths he/she can take. Which one of these statements comes closest to your view about the path a child should be encouraged to take.

[Fieldworker: Read out options. Only one response.]

Try to continue studies at university.	1
Try to continue studies at technikon.	2
Try to do other short courses.	3
Try and get a job.	4
Take time off to travel, do voluntary work or other activity before committing to a job or further study.	5

HEALTH STATUS AND BEHAVIOUR**73. How would you rate your health at present?**

Very poor	1
Poor	2
Average	3
Good	4
Excellent	5

74. Do you personally know someone who you think or know has died of AIDS?

Yes	1
No	2

75. In the past year, have you attended a funeral of a person who is said to have died from AIDS?

Yes	1
No	2

QUALITY OF HEALTH SERVICES**How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of government health services in your area? [*Showcard 1*]**

	Aspect	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	(Do not know)
76.	The amount of time patients wait before getting served.	1	2	3	4	5	8
77.	The way patients are treated by doctors.	1	2	3	4	5	8
78.	The way patients are treated by nurses.	1	2	3	4	5	8
79.	The availability of medicines at the hospital or clinic for both in- and outpatients.	1	2	3	4	5	8
80.	Availability of emergency services such as ambulances and emergency departments at hospitals.	1	2	3	4	5	8

FAMILY LIFE

I am going to read a few statements to you about family life. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements... [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
81. It is a good thing for a man to have more than one wife if he wants to.	1	2	3	4	5	8
82. It is a good thing for a man to stay with the same woman for his whole adult life.	1	2	3	4	5	8
83. Women in South Africa should feel free to remain unmarried and to get interesting jobs, as is common in America and Europe.	1	2	3	4	5	8
84. People should marry someone of the same race group.	1	2	3	4	5	8
85. People should marry someone of the same language group.	1	2	3	4	5	8
86. People should be allowed to marry someone of the same sex.	1	2	3	4	5	8
87. People should first get an education and start a working career before getting married.	1	2	3	4	5	8
88. People must have enough resources to establish their own independent household before marrying.	1	2	3	4	5	8
89. It is a good idea for a couple who intends to get married to live together first.	1	2	3	4	5	8
90. It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married.	1	2	3	4	5	8
91. The payment of lobola is the main reason why many people do not get married these days.	1	2	3	4	5	8
92. A person should be married before having a child.	1	2	3	4	5	8
93. It is necessary for women to have several children to ensure that at least some of them reach adulthood.	1	2	3	4	5	8

94. If you are not currently married: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? I would like to get married (or remarried) someday.

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
(Do not know)	8
(Not applicable – married)	9

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
95. Married people are generally happier than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
96. Married people have a better standard of living than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
97. Married people have more financial security than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
98. Married people have more financial independence than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
99. Married people have less freedom to do what they want than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
100. Married people are more emotionally secure than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
101. Married people have a better sex life than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
102. Married people are able to have fewer friendships with others than unmarried people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
103. The only satisfying role for a woman is as a wife and mother.	1	2	3	4	5	8
104. It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have a career herself.	1	2	3	4	5	8

MORAL ISSUES

	Not wrong at all	Wrong only sometimes	Almost always wrong	Always wrong	(Do not know)
105. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage?	1	2	3	4	8
106. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for a married person to have sexual relations with someone to whom he or she is not married?	1	2	3	4	8
107. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations?	1	2	3	4	8

108. People convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty. Do you...? [Showcard 3]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
(Do not know)	8

Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion...

	Not wrong at all	Wrong only sometimes	Almost always wrong	Always wrong	(Do not know)
109. If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?	1	2	3	4	8
110. If the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children?	1	2	3	4	8

POVERTY

111. Would you say that you and your family are...?

[Fieldworker: Read out options.]

Wealthy	1
Very comfortable	2
Reasonably comfortable	3
Just getting along	4
Poor	5
Very poor	6

How satisfied are you about the following? [Showcard 1]

	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither nor	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	(Do not know)
112. The income of your household	1	2	3	4	5	8
113. How much work you can get	1	2	3	4	5	8
114. Your life as a whole these days	1	2	3	4	5	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
115. My household is able to get enough food for its needs.	1	2	3	4	5	8
116. My household's income is adequate for our needs.	1	2	3	4	5	8
117. In South Africa incomes are too unequal.	1	2	3	4	5	8
118. Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.	1	2	3	4	5	8

119. When you compare your, or your household's, income with others, who do you compare mostly with? [Circle one option only.]

[Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.]

Neighbours	01
Brothers or sisters	02
Parents	03
Other relatives	04
Others in the village	05
People in the township	06
People in rural areas	07
People in the cities	08
People in South Africa as a whole	09
Work colleagues	10
(Do not know)	98

120. How does your household income compare with other households in your village/neighbourhood?

[Fieldworker: Read out options.]

Much above average income	1
Above average income	2
Average income	3
Below average income	4
Much below average income	5
(Do not know)	8

DEFINITIONS OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Please say whether you think each of the following is essential for everyone to have in order to enjoy an acceptable standard of living in South Africa today. If you think it is essential, please say 'ESSENTIAL'. If you think it is desirable but not essential, please say 'DESIRABLE'. If you think it is not essential and not desirable, please say 'NEITHER'. So the three possible answers are 'ESSENTIAL', 'DESIRABLE' or 'NEITHER'.

Item	Essential	Desirable	Neither	(Do not know)
121. A fridge	1	2	3	8
122. Having enough money to give presents on special occasions such as birthdays, weddings, funerals	1	2	3	8
123. Meat or fish or vegetarian equivalent every day	1	2	3	8
124. A landline phone	1	2	3	8
125. Special meal at Christmas or equivalent festival	1	2	3	8
126. Washing machine	1	2	3	8
127. Clothing sufficient to keep you warm and dry	1	2	3	8
128. For parents or other carers to be able to afford toys for children to play with	1	2	3	8
129. Money to buy a magazine	1	2	3	8
130. Satellite television/DSTV	1	2	3	8
131. Some new (not second-hand or handed down) clothes	1	2	3	8
132. Regular savings for emergencies	1	2	3	8
133. A small amount of money to spend on yourself, not on your family, each week	1	2	3	8
134. Ability to pay or contribute to funerals/funeral insurance/burial society	1	2	3	8
135. A cell phone	1	2	3	8
136. A wheelbarrow	1	2	3	8
137. Television/TV	1	2	3	8
138. A car	1	2	3	8
139. People who are sick are able to afford all medicines prescribed by their doctor	1	2	3	8
140. A domestic worker	1	2	3	8
141. A sofa/lounge suite	1	2	3	8
142. A computer in the home	1	2	3	8
143. An armed response service for the house	1	2	3	8
144. A DVD player	1	2	3	8
145. For parents or other carers to be able to buy complete school uniform for children without hardship	1	2	3	8
146. Electric cooker	1	2	3	8
147. A radio	1	2	3	8
148. Burglar bars in the house	1	2	3	8
149. Mains electricity in the house	1	2	3	8
150. A flush toilet in the house	1	2	3	8

151.	Separate bedrooms for adults and children	1	2	3	8
152.	A fence or wall around the property	1	2	3	8
153.	A garden	1	2	3	8
154.	A house that is strong enough to stand up to the weather, e.g. rain, winds, etc.	1	2	3	8
155.	A bath or shower in the house	1	2	3	8
156.	A burglar alarm system for the house	1	2	3	8
157.	A lock-up garage for vehicles	1	2	3	8

Please say whether you think each of the following activities are essential for everyone to be able to do in South Africa today. If you think they are essential, please say 'ESSENTIAL'. If you think they are desirable but not essential, please say 'DESIRABLE'. If you think they are not essential and not desirable, please say 'NEITHER'.

	Activity	Essential	Desirable	Neither	(Do not know)
158.	A holiday away from home for one week a year, not visiting relatives.	1	2	3	8
159.	Being able to visit friends and family in hospital or other institutions.	1	2	3	8
160.	A family take-away or bring-home meal once a month.	1	2	3	8
161.	Going to town/to a large supermarket for the day.	1	2	3	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [*Showcard 3*]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
162.	People should not have to regularly travel for more than an hour to get to their place of work.	1	2	3	4	5	8
163.	Parents should not have to live away from their young children in order to find work or earn a living.	1	2	3	4	5	8
164.	People should not have to work for more than 40 hours a week.	1	2	3	4	5	8
165.	Paid work should include a pension scheme.	1	2	3	4	5	8
166.	Paid work should include a health insurance scheme.	1	2	3	4	5	8

I am now going to read you a list of features relating to neighbourhoods. Please say whether you think each of the following are essential for everyone to have in South Africa today. If you think it is essential, please say 'ESSENTIAL'. If you think it is desirable but not essential, please say 'DESIRABLE'. If you think it is not essential and not desirable, please say 'NEITHER'

	Item	Essential	Desirable	Neither	(Do not know)
167.	Tarred roads close to the house	1	2	3	8
168.	Street lighting	1	2	3	8
169.	A place of worship (church/mosque/synagogue) in the local area	1	2	3	8
170.	A neighbourhood without smoke or smog in the air	1	2	3	8
171.	A neighbourhood without rubbish/refuse/garbage in the streets	1	2	3	8
172.	A cinema in the local area	1	2	3	8
173.	Having police on the streets in the local area	1	2	3	8
174.	A large supermarket in the local area	1	2	3	8
175.	Somewhere for children to play safely outside of the house	1	2	3	8

I am now going to ask you some questions about people's relationships with their friends and family. Please say whether you think each of the following are essential for everyone to have in South Africa today. If you think it is essential, please say 'ESSENTIAL'. If you think it is desirable but not essential, please say 'DESIRABLE'. If you think it is not essential and not desirable, please say 'NEITHER'.

	Item	Essential	Desirable	Neither	(Do not know)
176.	Someone to look after you if you are very ill.	1	2	3	8
177.	Having an adult from the household at home at all times when children under ten from the household are at home.	1	2	3	8
178.	Someone to lend you money in an emergency.	1	2	3	8
179.	Someone who you think could find you paid employment if you were without it.	1	2	3	8
180.	Someone to transport you in a vehicle if you needed to travel in an emergency.	1	2	3	8
181.	Someone to talk to if you are feeling upset or depressed.	1	2	3	8

CRIME AND SAFETY

182. How safe or unsafe do you feel personally on most days?

Very safe	1
Safe	2
Neither safe nor unsafe	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
(Do not know)	8

183. How safe or unsafe do you feel walking alone in this area during the day?

Very safe	1
Fairly safe	2
A bit unsafe	3
Very unsafe	4
(Do not know)	8

184. How safe or unsafe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?

Very safe	1
Fairly safe	2
A bit unsafe	3
Very unsafe	4
(Do not know)	8

185. Have you ever moved house or thought about moving house because you or your family were worried about crime?

Yes, moved house	1
Yes, thought about moving house	2
No	3
(Do not know)	8

186. How often do you worry about the possibility that you or someone else who lives with you might be the victim of crime?

Very often	1
Often	2
Sometimes	3
Almost never	4
Never	5
(Do not know)	8

VOTING

187. For which party did you vote in the last municipal elections, which were held in 2000?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC; incl. SACP and COSATU)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Skip to Q. 189	06
Minority Front (MF)		07
New National Party (NNP)		08
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		09
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Did not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Don't know)		98

188. If you did not vote in the 2000 municipal elections, please state the main reason for your not voting.

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

189. If there were a municipal election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC; incl. SACP and COSATU)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Independent Democrats (ID)		06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Skip to Q. 191	07
Minority Front (MF)		08
New National Party (NNP)		09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		10
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Will not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Do not know)		98

190. If answered 14 in Q. 189: What is your main reason for thinking that you would not vote if a municipal election were held tomorrow?FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

191. If 1 to 13 in Q. 189: To which other party do you feel close?FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.
NOTE: THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE SAME PARTY AS MENTIONED IN Q. 189.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

192. If 14 to 98 in Q. 189: To which party do you feel most close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

193. For which party did you vote in the last national election, which was held in 2004?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	}	01
African National Congress (ANC; incl. SACP and COSATU)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Independent Democrats (ID)		06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)		Skip to Q. 195
Minority Front (MF)		07
New National Party (NNP)		08
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		09
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		10
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		11
Other (specify)		12
Did not vote	13	
Uncertain	14	
(Refuse to answer)	15	
(Do not know)	97	
	98	

194. If you did not vote in the 2004 election, please state the main reason for your not voting.

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

195. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Independent Democrats (ID)		06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Skip to Q. 197	07
Minority Front (MF)		08
New National Party (NNP)		09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		10
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Will not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Do not know)		98

196. If answered 14 in Q. 195: What is your main reason for thinking that you would not vote if a national election were held tomorrow?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

197. If 1 to 13 in Q. 195: To which other party do you feel close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.
NOTE: THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE SAME PARTY AS MENTIONED IN Q. 195.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

198. If 14 to 98 in Q. 195: To which party do you feel most close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

WATER

199. Where did your household get water from yesterday?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Piped tap water in dwelling – metered	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site/yard – meter	03
Piped tap water on site/yard – pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site/yard – no meter	05
Public/communal tap – Free	06
Public/communal tap – Paid	07
Neighbour – Free	08
Neighbour – Paid for	09
Water carrier/tanker on site	10
Water carrier/tanker off site/communal	11
Borehole on site	12
Borehole off site/communal	13
Rainwater tank on site	14
Flowing river/stream	15
Dam/pool	16
Stagnant pond	17
Well	18
Spring	19
Other (specify)	20

200. What is the most often used source of water by this household?
[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Piped tap water in dwelling – metered	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site/yard – meter	03
Piped tap water on site/yard – pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site/yard – no meter	05
Public/communal tap – Free	06
Public/communal tap – Paid	07
Neighbour – Free	08
Neighbour – Paid for	09
Water carrier/tanker	10
Water carrier/tanker on site/communal	11
Borehole on site	12
Borehole off site/communal	13
Rainwater tank on site	14
Flowing river/stream	15
Dam/pool	16
Stagnant pond	17
Well	18
Spring	19
Other (specify)	20

201. Does the household get water from a source less than 200m away?
[Interviewer: 200 metres is about equal to the length of two football fields.
Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in the house or on the household's site.]

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	9

202. How much water does your household use each day for all purposes?
[Interviewer: Ask only for those who do not have a tap in house or on household's site AND circle "not applicable" if the household has access to a tap in house or on household's site.]

Less than 25 litres (one container)	1
25 to 100 litres (1 to 4 containers)	2
101 to 200 litres (4 to 8 containers/½ to 1 drum)	3
201 to 400 litres (8 to 16 containers/1 to 2 drums)	4
401 to 600 litres (16 to 24 containers/2 to 3 drums)	5
More than 600 litres/more than 3 drums	6
Do not know	8
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

203. How long does it take members of this household to get to the water source?
[Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in house or on household's site.]

0 to 5 minutes	1
6 to 14 minutes	2
15 to 29 minutes	3
30 to 44 minutes	4
45 to 59 minutes	5
More than 60 minutes	6
Don't know	8
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

204. How long does the household member have to queue at the water source?
 [Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in house or on household's site.]

0 to 5 minutes	1
6 to 10 minutes	2
11 to 15 minutes	3
16 minutes or more	4
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

205. Who normally fetches the water? (Who did it most of the time this week?)
 [Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in house or on household's site AND choose only one option.]

Adult female 65 years or older	1
Adult female younger than 65 years	2
Adult male 65 year or older	3
Adult male younger than 65 years	4
Child female (less than 16 years old)	5
Child male (less than 16 years old)	6
All fetch water, not one person more often than another	7
Not a member of the household	8
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

PAYMENT

206. Does the household pay for the water it uses?

Yes	1
No → Skip to Q. 210	2

207. When do you pay for the water that the household uses?

Daily	1
Weekly	2
Monthly	3
Per container	4
Flat monthly rate	5
Water cost is included in rent	6
Other (specify)	7

208. If you pay for buckets or containers of water, how much does a bucket or container of water cost? [Interviewer: This question is not about mineral water bought in shops.]

Do not pay	1
Less than 10 cents	2
10–20 cents	3
More than 20 cents	4

209. If you pay for water monthly or weekly, how much do you pay for water every month?
 [Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]

Less than R20	1
R21–R50	2
R51–R99	3
R100–R200	4
R201–R500	5
More than R500	6
Do not know	8
Not applicable (Do not pay)	9

210. If you get water from the municipality, how often do you receive a bill?*[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]*

More often than once a month	1
Once every month	2
Less often than once every month	3
Never → Skip to Q. 213	4
Do not know → Skip to Q. 213	8
Do not get water from municipality → Skip to Q. 213	9

211. In what language is the bill?

English plus an African language	01
Afrikaans plus an African language	02
Sesotho	03
Setswana	04
Sepedi	05
Siswati	06
IsiNdebele	07
IsiXhosa	08
IsiZulu	09
Xitsonga	10
Tshivenda/Lemba	11
Afrikaans	12
English	13
Other (specify)	14
Do not know	98

212. Do you understand the bill?

Yes	1
No	2

213. Do you receive a basic amount of water free every month?*[Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]*

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	8

214. Do you pay for sanitation/waste water removal?*[Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]*

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	8

215. Do you receive a bill for sanitation/waste water removal?*[Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]*

Yes	1
No	2

INTERRUPTION OF SERVICES**216. In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of longer than one day to your water service?***[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]*

Never	1
Once or twice a year	2
Monthly	3
More often than monthly	4

217. In the past 12 months, what was the longest interruption you experienced?
[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Few hours or less	1
Few hours to 1 day	2
1 day to 2 days	3
3 to 6 days	4
1 week (7 days)	5
More than one week	6
Cannot remember	7

218. If you experienced water interruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water interruptions?
[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Burst pipes	01
Pump not working	02
General maintenance/repairs to the supply system	03
Not enough water (demand too high)	04
Water only available at certain times	05
Drought	06
Vandalism	07
Cut off – Due to non payment for service	08
Other (specify)	09
Don't know	98

219. If your household does not pay for water, what is the main reason for not paying?
[Interviewer: Ask this question only for those who indicated "non-payment for services" in Q. 206.]
Interviewer: Do not read out the options.]

Source of water is free (there is no billing system)	01
Billing is irregular	02
Bill is incorrect	03
Can't afford to pay for water	04
Unhappy with the source of water provided	05
Unhappy with the quality of service provided	06
The government should supply free water	07
Others do not pay	08
The household only uses the free basic amount	09
The cost of water is included in the rent/levy	10
Other (specify)	11

Have you experienced the following as a consequence of non-payment for water services in the last 12 months?
[Interviewer: Ask this question only for those who indicated "non-payment for services" in Q. 206.]

	Yes	No
220. Threats of legal action by the municipality	1	2
221. Legal action by the municipality	1	2
222. Cut off	1	2
223. Eviction from your home	1	2
224. Attachment of goods (sheriff)	1	2
225. Other (specify)	1	2

CURRENT QUALITY AND SAFETY OF WATER SERVICES AND HYGIENE

226. Do you treat (sterilise or clean) the water you use for drinking and food preparation?

Yes, always	1
Yes, sometimes	2
No, never – it has already been treated → Skip Q. 228	3
No, never – it has not been treated → Skip to Q. 228	4

227. Which method do you use to treat (sterilise or clean) the water?

Boiling	1
Filtering	2
Chemical (bleach, chlorine)	3
Other (specify)	4

Is the water you use:

	Yes	No
228. Safe to drink?	1	2
229. Clear?	1	2
230. Good in taste?	1	2
231. Free from odours?	1	2

SANITATION

232. What type of toilet facility is available for this household?

[Interviewer: Mark only one, the main toilet.]

Flush toilet connected to a municipal sewage system	01
Flush toilet connected to a septic tank	02
Chemical toilet	03
Pit latrine with ventilation pipe (long drop)	04
Pit latrine without ventilation pipe (long drop)	05
Bucket toilet	06
Other (specify)	07
None → Skip to Q. 238	08
Do not know	98

233. If the household has a bucket system, how often is the waste removed?

[Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the household does not use a bucket toilet.]

Once a week	1
About every two weeks	2
Once a month	3
Less often than once a month	4
Do not know	8
Not applicable, no bucket toilet	9

234. Where is this toilet facility located?

In dwelling	1
On site (in yard)	2
Off site (outside yard)	3

235. Is the toilet facility shared with other households or people from outside your household?

Yes	1
No	2

236. How safe do you think it is for children to use the toilet facility?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Very safe	1
Safe	2
Neither safe nor unsafe	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
Don't know	8

237. How safe do you think it is for the elderly to use the toilet facility?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Very safe	1
Safe	2
Neither safe nor unsafe	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
Don't know	8

238. If the household does not have access to a toilet, what alternative method is used?

[Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the household does have access to a toilet facility.]

Veld	1
Plastic bags	2
Chamber pot (potty)	3
Alternative facilities (Place of work, school)	4
Other (specify)	5
Not applicable, do have access to toilet	9

239. After using the toilet (or alternative method), what do you use to clean yourself?

Toilet paper	1
Newspaper	2
Grass/leaves	3
Stones/corn cobs	4
Other (specify)	5

240. After using the toilet (or alternative method), do you clean your hands?

Yes	1
No → Skip to Q. 243	2

241. If yes, how?

Water from a source near the toilet	1
Water from a nearby communal standpipe	2
Water from a nearby stream, pond or dam	3
No water but some cleaning material → Skip to Q. 243	4
Nothing → Skip to Q. 243	5

242. When you wash your hands, do you use soap?

Yes	1
No	2

243. Have you received any hygiene education?

Yes	1
No	2
Cannot remember	3

244. How would you rate the condition of your toilet?

Good (clean, no leaks or smell)	1
Acceptable (fairly clean, sometimes smelly)	2
Poor (dirty, leaking, overflows)	3
Very poor (out of order)	4
Not applicable, do not have access to toilet	9

245. Do you pay for using the toilet facility?

Yes	1
No → Skip to Q. 247	2

246. If yes, whom do you pay? (Choose only one option.)

Municipality	1
Business	2
Landlord	3
Employer	4
Neighbour	5
Other (specify)	6

COMMUNICATION AND PARTICIPATION, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION

247. Do you know what or whom to contact if you have a water and/or sanitation service problem?

Yes	1
No	2

248. If you wanted general information about water and sanitation, what would you do?
[Interviewer: Do not read out the answer options AND circle only one option.]

Visit your municipality	1
Call your municipality	2
Visit the website of the municipality	3
Ask your local councillor	4
Ask your local traditional leader	5
Ask a neighbourhood/civic/ratepayers' organisation	6
Ask the corporate body of the building/flat	7
Ask a landlord	8
Ask my employer	9
Ask a family member or friend	10
Other (specify)	11
Do not know	98

249. When was the last time you contacted a municipal office about water and/or sanitation?

Within past 3 months	1
Within past year	2
Longer than 1 year ago	3
Never	4
Cannot remember	5

250. Have you attended a public meeting during the last year where water or sanitation issues have been discussed?

Yes	1
No	2

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following?
[Interviewer: ASK ALL, even if services are not available to household.]

	Satis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dis- satis- fied	Do not know
251. The access to municipal officials	1	2	3	8
252. The helpfulness of municipal officials	1	2	3	8
253. The ability of the municipality to respond to complaints	1	2	3	8
254. The ability of the municipality to rectify problems	1	2	3	8
255. The quantity/amount of the water available to your household	1	2	3	8
256. The safeness of the water for drinking	1	2	3	8
257. The billing system that is in place	1	2	3	8
258. The cost of water and sanitation services	1	2	3	8
259. The provision of Free Basic Services	1	2	3	8
260. The type of toilet facility provided by the municipality	1	2	3	8
261. The safety/health risk of the toilet available to your household	1	2	3	8
262. The way that the municipality provides for disposal of waste water	1	2	3	8

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

263. Sex of respondent [copy from contact sheet]

Male	1
Female	2

264. Race of respondent [copy from contact sheet]

African/Black	1
Coloured	2
Indian/Asian	3
White	4
Other	5

265. Age of respondent in completed years [copy from contact sheet]

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	years
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266. What is your current marital status?

Married	1	→ Skip to Q. 268
Widower/widow	2	
Divorced	3	
Separated	4	
Never married	5	

267. Do you live together with a partner?

Yes	1
No	2
(Not applicable – living together with spouse)	9

268. What is the highest level of education that you have ever completed?

No schooling	00
Grade 0/Grade R	01
Sub A/Grade 1	02
Sub B/Grade 2	03
Grade 3/Standard 1	04
Grade 4/Standard 2	05
Grade 5/Standard 3	06
Grade 6/Standard 4	07
Grade 7/Standard 5	08
Grade 8/Standard 6/Form 1	09
Grade 9/Standard 7/Form 2	10
Grade 10/Standard 8/Form 3	11
Grade 11/Standard 9/Form 4	12
Grade 12/Standard 10/Form 5/Matric	13
NTC I	14
NTC II	15
NTC III	16
Diploma/certificate with less than Grade 12/Std 10	17
Diploma/certificate with Grade 12/Std 10	18
Degree	19
Postgraduate degree or diploma	20
Other (specify)	21
(Do not know)	98

269. Are you a citizen of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2

270. Are you registered as a voter of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	8

271. What language do you speak mostly at home?

272. What is your mother tongue?

	271. Mostly spoken at home	272. Mother tongue
Sesotho	01	01
Setswana	02	02
Sepedi	03	03
Siswati	04	04
IsiNdebele	05	05
IsiXhosa	06	06
IsiZulu	07	07
Xitsonga	08	08
Tshivenda/Lemba	09	09
Afrikaans	10	10
English	11	11
Other African language	12	12
European language	13	13
Indian language	14	14
Other (specify)	15	15

273. What is your current employment status? (WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR PRESENT WORK SITUATION?)

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full time	09
Self-employed – part time	10
Employed part time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full time	12
Other (specify)	13

274. If you are married or have a partner, what is his/her employment status?

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full time	09
Self-employed – part time	10
Employed part time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full time	12
Other (specify)	13

275. What is your current occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

276. Do you consider yourself as belonging to any religion?

Yes	1
No	2

→ **Skip to Q. 279**

277. If answer is yes, which one? Please specify denomination.

Christian (without specification)	01
African Evangelical Church	02
Anglican	03
Assemblies of God	04
Apostle Twelve	05
Baptist	06
Dutch Reformed	07
Full Gospel Church of God	08
Faith Mission	09
Church of God and Saints of Christ	10
Jehovah's Witness	11
Lutheran	12
Methodist	13
Pentecostal Holiness Church	14
Roman Catholic	15
Salvation Army	16
Seventh Day Adventist	17
St John's Apostolic	18
United Congregation Church	19
Universal Church of God	20
Nazareth	21
Zionist Christian Church	22
Other Christian	23
Islam/Muslim	24
Judaism/Jewish	25
Hinduism/Hindu	26
Buddhism/Buddhist	27
Other (specify)	28
(Refused to answer)	97
(Do not know)	98

278. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?

Several times a week	01
Once a week	02
2 or 3 times a month	03
Once a month	04
Several times a year	05
Once a year	06
Less often	07
Never	08
(Refused to answer)	97
(Do not know)	98

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

279. Indicate the type of main dwelling that the household occupies.

Dwelling/House or brick structure on a separate stand or yard or on farm	01
Traditional dwelling/Hut/Structure made of traditional materials	02
Flat or apartment in a block of flats	03
Town/cluster/semi-detached house (simplex, duplex or triplex)	04
Unit in retirement village	05
Dwelling/House/Flat/Room in backyard	06
Informal dwelling/Shack in backyard	07
Informal dwelling/Shack not in backyard, e.g. in an informal/squatter settlement or on farm	08
Room/Flatlet	09
Caravan/Tent	10
Other (specify)	11

[Interviewer: Record one main material used for the roof and walls of the dwelling.] [PERSONAL OBSERVATION]

Type of material	280. Roof	281. Walls
Bricks	01	01
Cement block/concrete	02	02
Corrugated iron/zinc	03	03
Wood	04	04
Plastic	05	05
Cardboard	06	06
Mixture of mud and cement	07	07
Wattle and daub	08	08
Tile	09	09
Mud	10	10
Thatching	11	11
Asbestos	12	12

282. Does this household have a connection to the MAINS electricity supply?

Yes	1
No	2

283. Do you have a working landline telephone in your dwelling?

Yes	1
No	2

284. Do you have access to a computer?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work/educational institution	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
None	4

285. Do you have access to the Internet?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work/educational institution	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
Yes, at an internet cafe	4
Yes, at a community centre	5
None	6

→ Skip to Q. 287

286. If you have access to the Internet, what do you use it for? [Multiple response]

Entertainment	Business	Banking	Information	Other	All of the above
1	2	3	4	5	6

287. Do you personally have a cell phone for personal or business use?

Personal use	Business use	Both	None
1	2	3	4

Which of the following does your household have?**[Fieldworker: Appliances should be in working order.]**

	Yes	No
288. Hot running water	1	2
289. Fridge/freezer	1	2
290. Microwave oven	1	2
291. Full-time domestic worker	1	2
292. VCR/DVD in household	1	2
293. Vacuum cleaner/floor polisher	1	2
294. Cell phone in household	1	2
295. A washing machine	1	2
296. An electric stove	1	2
297. A television	1	2
298. A tumble dryer	1	2
299. A radio	1	2
300. More than one radio	1	2
301. Hi-fi or music centre (radio excluded)	1	2
302. Built-in kitchen sink	1	2
303. Home security service	1	2
304. A deep freezer	1	2
305. M-Net and/or DStv subscription	1	2
306. A dishwashing machine	1	2
307. A sewing machine	1	2
308. One or more motor vehicles	1	2

309. In the past year, was there ever a time when children under 7 years of age in your household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	98
(Not applicable – no children under 7 years of age)	99

310. In the past year, was there ever a time when other members of the household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	98
(Not applicable – no other household members)	99

PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Showcard G2

- 311. Please give me the letter that best describes the TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME of all the people in your household before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.**
- 312. Please give me the letter that best describes your PERSONAL TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.**

		311. Household	312. Personal
	No income	01	01
K	R1– R500	02	02
L	R501–R750	03	03
M	R751–R1 000	04	04
N	R1 001–R1 500	05	05
O	R1 501–R2 000	06	06
P	R2 001–R3 000	07	07
Q	R3 001–R5 000	08	08
R	R5 001–R7 500	09	09
S	R7 501–R10 000	10	10
T	R10 001–R15 000	11	11
U	R15 001–R20 000	12	12
V	R20 001–R30 000	13	13
W	R30 000 +	14	14
	(Refuse to answer)	97	97
	(Uncertain/Don't know)	98	98

- 313. What monthly income level do you consider to be minimal for your household, i.e. your household could not make ends meet with less?**

R _____

(Do not know = 98)

- 314. Now consider today and the last few days. Would you say that you are...?**

In a better mood than usual	1
Normal	2
In a worse mood than usual	3
(Do not know)	8

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY
Questionnaire 2: July 2005



RESPONDENTS AGED 16 YEARS +

Good (morning/afternoon/evening), I'm _____ and we are conducting a survey for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC regularly conducts surveys of opinion amongst the South African population. Topics include a wide range of social matters such as communications, politics, education, unemployment, the problems of the aged and inter-group relations. As a follow-up to this earlier work, we would like to ask you questions on a variety of subjects that are of national importance. To obtain reliable, scientific information we request that you answer the questions that follow as honestly as possible. Your opinion is important in this research. The area in which you live and you yourself have been selected randomly for the purpose of this survey. The fact that you have been chosen is thus quite coincidental. The information you give to us will be kept confidential. You and your household members will not be identified by name or address in any of the reports we plan to write.

PARTICULARS OF VISITS

	DAY	MONTH	TIME STARTED		TIME COMPLETED		**RESPONSE	
			HR	MIN	HR	MIN		
First visit	/	/ 2005						
Second visit	/	/ 2005						
Third visit	/	/ 2005						

**RESPONSE CODES	
Completed questionnaire	= 01
Partially completed questionnaire (specify reason)	= 02
<u>Revisit</u>	
Appointment made	= 03
Selected respondent not at home	= 04
No one home	= 05
<u>Do not qualify</u>	
Vacant house/flat/stand/not a house or flat/demolished	= 06
No person qualifies according to the survey specifications	= 07
Respondent cannot communicate with interviewer because of language	= 08
Respondent is physically/mentally not fit to be interviewed	= 09
<u>Refusals</u>	
Contact person refused	= 10
Interview refused by selected respondent	= 11
Interview refused by parent	= 12
Interview refused by other household member	= 13
<u>OFFICE USE</u>	= 14

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Name of interviewer

Number of interviewer

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 Checked by

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Signature of supervisor _____

FIELDWORK CONTROL

CONTROL	YES	NO	REMARKS
Personal	1	2	
Telephonic	1	2	
Name	SIGNATURE		
.....	DATE/...../.....2005		

RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCEDURE

Number of households at visiting point

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Number of persons 16 years and older at visiting point

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Please list all persons at the visiting point/on the stand who are 16 years and older and were resident 15 out of the past 30 days. Once this is completed, use the Kish grid on the next page to determine which person is to be interviewed.

Names of Persons Aged 16 and Older	
	01
	02
	03
	04
	05
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	21
	22
	23
	24
	25

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
 ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:

 TEL NO.:

GRID TO SELECT RESPONDENT

NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRE	NUMBER OF PERSONS FROM WHICH RESPONDENT MUST BE DRAWN																											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25			
1	26	51	76	1	1	1	3	2	4	1	3	5	8	6	5	12	10	1	6	8	7	19	19	13	21	13	24	25
2	27	52	77	1	2	3	4	3	1	2	2	3	4	8	3	7	2	5	14	4	15	4	8	6	16	14	22	19
3	28	53	78	1	1	2	1	4	2	7	6	9	3	5	11	2	1	3	11	7	10	16	16	10	5	2	2	3
4	29	54	79	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	8	6	2	4	2	4	8	11	10	16	6	9	10	15	11	12	11	18
5	30	55	80	1	1	1	4	5	6	3	5	7	5	9	8	14	3	2	13	5	18	1	4	1	20	11	5	24
6	31	56	81	1	2	2	2	3	5	7	7	8	7	1	4	9	14	8	2	17	17	14	12	14	22	10	3	14
7	32	57	82	1	2	1	1	4	1	4	1	4	6	3	6	5	7	13	9	2	3	13	14	8	2	7	20	4
8	33	58	83	1	1	2	3	2	5	1	4	2	1	7	10	6	5	4	15	10	5	2	13	4	17	5	17	8
9	34	59	84	1	1	3	2	5	6	2	2	1	9	10	1	10	4	6	6	1	9	10	1	5	6	9	1	12
10	35	60	85	1	2	2	4	1	3	3	6	9	10	11	12	3	9	15	7	8	11	6	3	9	4	3	10	1
11	36	61	86	1	1	1	3	1	4	5	3	1	6	2	9	13	11	14	4	11	4	15	15	17	1	1	23	2
12	37	62	87	1	2	3	1	3	2	7	5	6	5	7	7	8	6	10	3	3	1	12	20	7	13	22	12	16
13	38	63	88	1	1	2	1	5	3	6	4	3	4	6	2	11	13	12	1	15	8	7	2	12	15	21	13	7
14	39	64	89	1	2	3	2	4	1	4	7	8	2	5	6	11	12	9	16	13	16	11	18	18	14	16	18	23
15	40	65	90	1	2	1	4	2	4	3	8	7	7	11	1	3	5	7	12	14	13	8	17	20	19	20	19	11
16	41	66	91	1	1	3	3	1	6	5	1	5	9	10	3	2	11	13	8	12	12	5	6	21	8	8	4	15
17	42	67	92	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	6	2	3	2	12	5	2	10	13	5	8	18	9	16	10	17	16	20
18	43	68	93	1	2	1	4	2	6	4	1	4	8	9	10	7	9	3	12	12	9	7	20	19	9	19	21	13
19	44	69	94	1	2	2	1	3	5	2	8	9	10	4	9	8	13	1	1	14	10	19	10	11	18	15	7	6
20	45	70	95	1	1	3	2	5	4	1	3	8	1	3	8	6	6	9	5	7	13	4	15	1	7	22	15	21
21	46	71	96	1	1	1	2	5	1	7	2	3	2	1	11	4	7	5	3	2	1	3	12	18	5	19	14	9
22	47	72	97	1	2	1	3	1	3	2	6	2	1	8	7	1	4	2	11	8	2	17	4	17	21	16	3	5
23	48	73	98	1	2	3	4	2	2	6	7	7	8	3	4	9	3	6	2	11	11	16	2	8	11	23	6	22
24	49	74	99	1	1	2	1	4	6	3	5	5	3	1	5	13	1	14	8	14	6	15	9	14	3	6	9	17
25	50	75	100	1	1	2	3	3	2	4	6	4	7	5	3	12	12	12	4	6	2	17	11	2	12	4	8	10

SASAS QUESTIONNAIRE 2: 2005

Number of persons in this household

Number of persons 16 years and older in this household

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE CIRCLE APPROPRIATE CODES

Household schedule	Write in from oldest (top) to youngest (bottom)		Age in completed years	Sex M=1 F=2	Race group	Relationship to respondent
	<p><i>Please list all persons in the household who eat from the same cooking pot and who were resident 15 out of the past 30 days.</i></p> <p><i>Note: Circle the number next to the name of the household head.</i></p>		01			
		02				
		03				
		04				
		05				
		06				
		07				
		08				
		09				
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		18				
		19				
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		21				
		22				
		23				
		24				
		25				

Race group codes
1 = African/Black
2 = Coloured
3 = Indian/Asian
4 = White
5 = Other

Relationship to respondent codes
1 = Respondent
2 = Wife or husband or partner
3 = Son or daughter
4 = Father or mother
5 = Brother or sister
6 = Grandchild
7 = Grandparent
8 = Mother- or father-in-law
9 = Son- or daughter-in-law
10 = Brother- or sister-in-law
11 = Other relation
12 = Non-relation

DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE

1. Please tell me what you think are the 3 most important challenges facing South Africa today.

[Fieldworker: Do NOT read out.]

HIV/AIDS	01
Unemployment	02
Racism	03
Xenophobia	04
Crime and safety	05
Service provision/delivery	06
Affordable housing	07
Land reform issues	08
Human rights	09
Education	10
Economic and financial issues	11
Work-related issues	12
Family and youth issues	13
Religion and culture issues	14
Environmental issues	15
Political issues	16
Corruption	17
Poverty	18
Other (specify)	19
(Do not know)	98

In the last 5 years, has life improved, stayed the same or gotten worse for...?

	Improved	Stayed the same	Gotten worse	(Do not know)
2. Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	8
3. People like you	1	2	3	8

Do you think that life will improve, stay the same or get worse in the next 5 years for...?

	Improve	Stay the same	Get worse	(Do not know)
4. Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	8
5. People like you	1	2	3	8

6. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy is working in South Africa? [*Showcard 1*]

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
Neither nor	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
(Do not know)	8

Indicate the extent to which you trust or distrust the following institutions in South Africa at present. [Showcard 2]

	Institutions	Strongly trust	Trust	Neither trust nor distrust	Distrust	Strongly distrust	(Do not know)
7.	National government	1	2	3	4	5	8
8.	Courts	1	2	3	4	5	8
9.	The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)	1	2	3	4	5	8
10.	Your provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	8
11.	The SABC	1	2	3	4	5	8
12.	Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	8
13.	The police	1	2	3	4	5	8
14.	Defence force	1	2	3	4	5	8
15.	Big business	1	2	3	4	5	8
16.	Your local government	1	2	3	4	5	8
17.	Churches	1	2	3	4	5	8
18.	Traditional authorities/leaders	1	2	3	4	5	8
19.	Political parties	1	2	3	4	5	8

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood? [Showcard 1]

		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	(Do not know)
20.	Supply of water and sanitation	1	2	3	4	5	8
21.	Providing electricity	1	2	3	4	5	8
22.	Removal of refuse	1	2	3	4	5	8
23.	Affordable housing	1	2	3	4	5	8
24.	Access to healthcare	1	2	3	4	5	8
25.	Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS	1	2	3	4	5	8
26.	Cutting crime	1	2	3	4	5	8
27.	Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	5	8
28.	Land reform	1	2	3	4	5	8
29.	Providing social grants (e.g. child support grant, old age pension, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	8

30. How often do you talk about politics?

Very often	1
Often	2
Occasionally	3
Very seldom	4
Never	5

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
[Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
31. Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	1	2	3	4	5	8
32. After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless.	1	2	3	4	5	8
33. It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	1	2	3	4	5	8
34. Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	8
35. Politics is too complicated these days for people like me to understand.	1	2	3	4	5	8

The next few questions are about your views on how the country is governed.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
[Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
36. Politicians found guilty of bribery or corruption should resign from public office immediately.	1	2	3	4	5	8
37. Elected politicians should resign from office when they change to another political party.	1	2	3	4	5	8
38. The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it.	1	2	3	4	5	8
39. Citizens should have the right to form or join organisations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.	1	2	3	4	5	8
40. The government should be in control of what information is given to the public.	1	2	3	4	5	8
41. Mass action is an acceptable way for people to express their views in a democracy.	1	2	3	4	5	8

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

42. Do you know of an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) for your municipal area?

Yes	1
No	2

43. Do you know a councillor in your local municipality/council?

Yes	1
No	2

44. Did you participate in the formulation of the IDP for your municipal area in any way?

Yes	1
No	2

45. Do you agree or disagree that your local municipality/council takes too many decisions in secret? [*Showcard 3*]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
(Do not know)	8

46. Do you have a ward committee in your neighbourhood? [*Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.*]

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	8
(Never heard of a ward committee)	9

NATIONAL IDENTITY

To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people?
[*Showcard 4*]

	Very attached	Slightly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	(Do not know)
47. Those who speak the same language as you.	1	2	3	4	8
48. Those who belong to the same race group as you.	1	2	3	4	8
49. Those who are in the same financial position as you.	1	2	3	4	8
50. Those who live in your neighbourhood.	1	2	3	4	8

To what extent are the following statements true for you? [*Showcard 3*]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
51. It makes me feel proud to be called a South African.	1	2	3	4	5	8
52. Being a South African is an important part of how I see myself.	1	2	3	4	5	8

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
53. I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world.	1	2	3	4	5	8
54. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the South Africans.	1	2	3	4	5	8
55. Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries.	1	2	3	4	5	8

INTER-GROUP RELATIONS

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
56. People of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other.	1	2	3	4	5	8
57. People of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other.	1	2	3	4	5	8

58. **How about you? Are there any racial groups in South Africa that you do not trust or like? [Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.]**

Yes	1
No	2
(Refused to answer)	7
(Do not know)	8

59. **Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country? [Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.]**

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 62
(Do not know)	8	→ Skip to Q. 62

**On what grounds is your group discriminated against? PROBE: 'What other grounds?'
(Circle two options – one per column.) [Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.]**

	60. Option 1	61. Option 2
Colour or race	01	01
Nationality	02	02
Religion	03	03
Language	04	04
Age	05	05
Gender	06	06
Sexual preference	07	07
Education	08	08
Disability	09	09
Unemployed	10	10
Region or province	11	11
Other (specify)	12	12
(Do not know)	98	98

- 62. South Africa used to have apartheid by law between white, African, coloured and Indian. Since 1994, do you think that race relations in the country have improved, remained the same, or deteriorated?**

Improved	1
Stayed the same	2
Got worse	3
(Do not know)	8

- 63. How often do you feel racially discriminated against?**

[Fieldworker: Read out options.]

Always	1
Often	2
Sometimes	3
Not at all	4
(Do not know)	8

→ **Skip to
Q. 65**
→ **Skip to
Q. 65**

- 64. Where has this racial discrimination happened to you most recently? (Only 1 answer)
[Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.]**

At work	01
At an educational institution	02
In shops	03
On the roads or on the streets	04
When applying for a job	05
In a government department	06
In social clubs	07
In theatres	08
In restaurants	09
In sport	10
Elsewhere	11
Everywhere	12
(Not applicable)	99

Here are some statements about racism in South Africa. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each. [*Showcard 3*]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
65.	1	2	3	4	5	8
66.	1	2	3	4	5	8
67.	1	2	3	4	5	8
68.	1	2	3	4	5	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should... [*Showcard 3*]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
69.	1	2	3	4	5	8
70.	1	2	3	4	5	8
71.	1	2	3	4	5	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree that there should be... [*Showcard 3*]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
72.	1	2	3	4	5	8
73.	1	2	3	4	5	8
74.	1	2	3	4	5	8

SOCCER WORLD CUP

75. Have you heard that South Africa is going to host the FIFA Soccer World Cup?

Yes	1
No	2

→ Skip to Q. 92

76. In which year will the FIFA Soccer World Cup take place in South Africa?

Correct answer	1
Incorrect answer	2
(Do not know)	8

77. 391. What do you think will be the main benefit for South Africa of hosting the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup?

78. And for your city or area, what do you think will be the main benefit of South Africa hosting the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup?

79. And for your neighbourhood, what do you think will be the main benefit of South Africa hosting the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup?

80. And for you, what do you think will be the main benefit of South Africa hosting the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup?

[Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.]

Benefits	77. For South Africa	78. Your city or area	79. Your neighbourhood	80. For you
Putting South Africa/city or area on the international map	1	1	1	1
Job creation/job opportunities	2	2	2	2
Economic growth	3	3	3	3
National unity	4	4	4	4
Sports development	5	5	5	5
Increased business opportunities	6	6	6	6
Improved service delivery – for example water, electricity (better services and facilities)	7	7	7	7
Improved roads	8	8	8	8
Improvements in public transport	9	9	9	9
Crime reduction/improved policing	10	10	10	10
Increased tourism	11	11	11	11
Upgrading of run-down areas and buildings	12	12	12	12
New entertainment and recreation facilities	13	13	13	13
Increased investment in property	14	14	14	14
Improve the image of my area	15	15	15	15
Improved urban environment (more trees, better signposting, buildings and cleaner streets)	16	16	16	16
Improved property value	17	17	17	17
More vibrant and exciting city	18	18	18	18
Other (specify)	19	19	19	19
None	20	20	20	20

81. Will these benefits be lasting or short term?

Lasting	1
Short term	2
(Do not know)	8

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
[Showcard 3]**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	(Do not know)
82. South Africa will be ready to host the FIFA World Cup in 2010.	1	2	3	4	5	8
83. The local government in this area will be able to meet the needs of the FIFA World Cup in 2010.	1	2	3	4	5	8
84. The FIFA World Cup will delay the provision of necessary basic services to poor areas in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	8
85. Small businesses will benefit from the FIFA World Cup.	1	2	3	4	5	8
86. The FIFA World Cup will improve black economic empowerment (BEE).	1	2	3	4	5	8
87. The hosting of the World Cup in South Africa will help upgrade run-down parts of this area .	1	2	3	4	5	8
88. The hosting of the World Cup in South Africa will make our cities more competitive internationally.	1	2	3	4	5	8

89. Which area in South Africa do you think will benefit the most from the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup? [Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options. Please circle one option only.]

Gauteng	1
Johannesburg	2
Pretoria (Tshwane)	3
Cape Town	4
Durban (eThekweni)	5
Tourist areas	6
None	7
Other (specify)	8

90. Which one of the following do you think will benefit the most from the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup? [*Fieldworker: Please circle one option only.*]

Poor and disadvantaged	1
The wealthy/rich in society	2
Businesses	3
People living in towns and cities	4
People living in the rural areas	5
Other (specify)	6
None	7

91. What do you think will be the main disadvantage of South Africa hosting the 2010 Soccer World Cup? [*Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.*]

Increase in prices	1
Congestion/blocking of the roads	2
Increase in crime	3
Pollution	4
Cost of hosting the event	5
Limited long-term benefits	6
Expense of maintaining new infrastructure and facilities	7
Neglect of the needs of the poor	8
Neglect of South Africa's priorities	9
Other (specify)	10
None	11
(Refused to answer)	97
(Do not know)	98

MORAL ISSUES

	Not wrong at all	Wrong only sometimes	Almost always wrong	Always wrong	(Do not know)
92. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage?	1	2	3	4	8
93. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for a married person to have sexual relations with someone to whom he or she is not married?	1	2	3	4	8
94. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations?	1	2	3	4	8

95. People convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty. Do you...? [*Showcard 3*]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
(Do not know)	8

Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion...

	Not wrong at all	Wrong only sometimes	Almost always wrong	Always wrong	(Do not know)
96. If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?	1	2	3	4	8
97. If the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children?	1	2	3	4	8

ISSP 2005 – WORK ORIENTATION

Suppose you could change the way you spend your time, spending more time on some things and less time on others. Which of the things on the following list would you like to spend more time on, which would you like to spend less time on and which would you like to spend the same amount of time on as now?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	Much more time	A bit more time	Same time as now	A bit less time	Much less time	Can't choose	Doesn't apply
98. Time in a paid job	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
99. Time doing household work	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
100. Time with your family	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
101. Time with your friends	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
102. Time in leisure activities	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements, thinking of work in general? [Showcard 3]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't Choose
103. A job is just a way of earning money – nothing else.	1	2	3	4	5	8
104. I would enjoy having a paid job even if I did not need the money.	1	2	3	4	5	8

How important do you personally think each of the following is in a job? [Showcard 5]

How important is...?	Very important	Important	Neither important nor unimportant	Not Important	Not important at all	Can't Choose
105. Job security	1	2	3	4	5	8
106. High income	1	2	3	4	5	8
107. Good opportunities for advancement	1	2	3	4	5	8
108. An interesting job	1	2	3	4	5	8
109. A job that allows someone to work independently	1	2	3	4	5	8

110.	A job that allows someone to help other people	1	2	3	4	5	8
111.	A job that is useful to society	1	2	3	4	5	8
112.	A job that allows someone to decide their times or days of work	1	2	3	4	5	8

113. Suppose you were working and could choose between different kinds of jobs. Which of the following would you personally choose?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

a. I would choose...

Being an employee	1
Being self-employed	2
Can't choose	8

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

b. I would choose...

Working in a small firm	1
Working in a large firm	2
Can't choose	8

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

c. I would choose...

Working in a private business	1
Working for the government/civil service	2
Can't choose	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

[Showcard 3]

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't Choose
114. Employees have more job security than the self-employed.	1	2	3	4	5	8
115. Being an employee interferes more with family life than self-employment does.	1	2	3	4	5	8

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
[Showcard 3]**

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't Choose
116.	Trade unions are very important for the job security of employees.	1	2	3	4	5	8
117.	Without trade unions the working conditions of employees would be much worse than they are.	1	2	3	4	5	8

118. Suppose you could decide on your work situation at present. Which of the following would you prefer?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

A full time job [40 hours or more per week]	1
A part-time job [10–39 hours per week]	2
A job with less than [10] hours a week	3
No paid job at all	4
Can't choose	8

119. Are you currently working for pay?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Yes	1
No	2

**Please answer Q. 120–155
Please go to Q. 156**

**IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY WORKING FOR PAY:
PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 120–155 ABOUT YOUR MAIN JOB.**

120. Think of the number of hours you work and the money you earn in your main job, including any regular overtime. If you had only one of these three choices, which of the following would you prefer?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Work longer hours and earn more money	1
Work the same number of hours and earn the same money	2
Work fewer hours and earn less money	3
Can't choose	8

For each of these statements about your (main) job, please tick one box to show how much you agree or disagree that it applies to **your job**. [Showcard 3]

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.
NOTE: THE QUESTION REFERS TO ONE'S MAIN JOB IF HE OR SHE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't Choose
121.	My job is secure.	1	2	3	4	5	8
122.	My income is high.	1	2	3	4	5	8
123.	My opportunities for advancement are high.	1	2	3	4	5	8
124.	My job is interesting.	1	2	3	4	5	8
125.	I can work independently.	1	2	3	4	5	8
126.	In my job I can help other people.	1	2	3	4	5	8
127.	My job is useful to society.	1	2	3	4	5	8
128.	My job gives me a chance to improve my skills.	1	2	3	4	5	8

Now some more questions about your working conditions.

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	How often...	Always	Often	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never	Can't Choose
129.	Do you come home from work exhausted?	1	2	3	4	5	8
130.	Do you have to do hard physical work?	1	2	3	4	5	8
131.	Do you find your work stressful?	1	2	3	4	5	8
132.	Do you work in dangerous conditions?	1	2	3	4	5	8

133. Which of the following statements **best** describes how your working hours are decided? (By working hours we mean here the times you **start** and **finish** work, and **not** the total hours you work per week or month.)

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Starting and finishing times are decided by my employer and I cannot change them on my own.	1
I can decide the time I start and finish work, within certain limits .	2
I am entirely free to decide when I start and finish work.	3

134. Which of the following statements **best** describes how your daily work is organised?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

I am free to decide how my daily work is organised.	1
I can decide how my daily work is organised, within certain limits .	2
I am not free to decide how my daily work is organised.	3
Can't choose	8

135. How difficult would it be for you to take an hour or two off during working hours, to take care of personal or family matters?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Not difficult at all	1
Not too difficult	2
Somewhat difficult	3
Very difficult	4
Can't choose	8

How often do you feel that...

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	Always	Often	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never	Can't Choose
136. The demands of your job interfere with your family life?	1	2	3	4	5	8
137. The demands of your family life interfere with your job?	1	2	3	4	5	8

138. How much of your past work experience and/or job skills can you make use of in your present job?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Almost none	1
A little	2
A lot	3
Almost all	4
Can't choose	8

139. If you were to look for a new job, how helpful would your present work experience and/or job skills be?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Very helpful	1
Quite helpful	2
Not so helpful	3
Not helpful at all	4
Can't choose	8

140. Over the past 12 months, have you had any training to improve your job skills, either at the workplace or somewhere else?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Yes	1
No	2
Can't choose	8

In general, how would you describe relations at your workplace...

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	Very good	Quite good	Neither good nor bad	Quite bad	Very bad	Can't Choose
141. Between management and employees?	1	2	3	4	5	8
142. Between workmates/colleagues?	1	2	3	4	5	8

143. How satisfied are you in your (main) job?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.
NOTE: THE QUESTION REFERS TO ONE'S MAIN JOB IF HE OR SHE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS.

Completely satisfied	1
Very satisfied	2
Fairly satisfied	3
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
Completely dissatisfied	6
Can't choose	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

[Showcard 3]

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't Choose
144. I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organisation I work for succeed.	1	2	3	4	5	8
145. I am proud to be working for my firm or organisation.	1	2	3	4	5	8
146. I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this organisation.	1	2	3	4	5	8

147. How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at least as good as your current one?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Very easy	1
Fairly easy	2
Neither easy nor difficult	3
Fairly difficult	4
Very difficult	5
Can't choose	8

148. How difficult or easy do you think it would be for your firm or organisation to replace you if you left?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Very easy	1
Fairly easy	2
Neither easy nor difficult	3
Fairly difficult	4
Very difficult	5
Can't choose	8

149. All in all, how likely is it that you will try to find a job with another firm or organisation within the next 12 months?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Very likely	1
Likely	2
Unlikely	3
Very unlikely	4
Can't choose	8

150. To what extent, if at all, do you worry about the possibility of losing your job?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

I worry a great deal.	1
I worry to some extent.	2
I worry a little.	3
I don't worry at all.	8

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 3]

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

In order to avoid unemployment I would be willing...	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't Choose
151. To accept a job that requires new skills.	1	2	3	4	5	8
152. To accept a position with lower pay.	1	2	3	4	5	8
153. To accept temporary employment.	1	2	3	4	5	8
154. To travel longer to get to work.	1	2	3	4	5	8

155. In addition to your main job, do you do any other work for additional income?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

No	1
Yes, mostly as an employee for another organisation	2
Yes, mostly on a self-employed basis	3
Yes, other	4

FIELDWORKER: SKIP TO Q. 170 FOR THOSE THAT ANSWERED Q. 120–155

PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 156–169 IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY WORKING FOR PAY.

156. Have you ever had a paid job for one year or more?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Yes	1	→	Answer Q. 157 to Q. 169 Skip to Q. 159
No	2	→	

157. When did your last paid job end?

In _____(year)

158. What was the main reason that your job ended?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

I reached retirement age.	1
I retired early, by choice.	2
I retired early, not by choice.	3
I became (permanently) disabled.	4
My place of work shut down.	5
I was dismissed.	6
My term of employment/contract ended.	7
Family responsibilities.	8
I got married.	9
Other	10

159. Would you like to have a paid job, either now or in the future?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Yes	1
No	2

160. How likely do you think it is that you would find a job?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Very likely	1
Likely	2
Unlikely	3
Very unlikely	4
Can't choose	8

161. Are you currently looking for a job?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Yes	1
No	2

Thinking about the last 12 months, have you done any of the following in order to find a job?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE.

	No	Yes, once or twice	Yes, more than once
162. Registered at a public labour centre	1	2	3
163. Registered at a private employment agency	1	2	3
164. Answered advertisements for jobs	1	2	3
165. Advertised for a job in newspapers or journals	1	2	3
166. Applied directly to employers	1	2	3
167. Asked relatives, friends or colleagues to help you find a job	1	2	3

168. Over the past 12 months, have you had any training to improve your job skills?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Yes	1
No	2
Can't choose	8

169. What is your main source of economic support?

FIELDWORKER: PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.
NOTE: "ECONOMIC SUPPORT" IS NOT JUST FINANCIAL SUPPORT. IT INCLUDES SUCH THINGS AS FOOD, CLOTHING AND ACCOMMODATION.

Pension (private or state)	1
Unemployment benefits (Unemployment Insurance Fund)	2
Spouse/partner	3
Other family members	4
Social grant(s) [i.e. child support, care dependency, foster care, disability, old age, war veterans or grant in aid]	5
Occasional work	6
Other	7

CRIME AND SAFETY

170. How safe or unsafe do you feel personally on most days?

Very safe	1
Safe	2
Neither safe nor unsafe	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
(Do not know)	8

171. How safe or unsafe do you feel walking alone in this area during the day?

Very safe	1
Fairly safe	2
A bit unsafe	3
Very unsafe	4
(Do not know)	8

172. How safe or unsafe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?

Very safe	1
Fairly safe	2
A bit unsafe	3
Very unsafe	4
(Do not know)	8

173. Have you ever moved house or thought about moving house because you or your family were worried about crime?

Yes, moved house	1
Yes, thought about moving house	2
No	3
(Do not know)	8

174. How often do you worry about the possibility that you or someone else who lives with you might be the victim of crime?

Very often	1
Often	2
Sometimes	3
Almost never	4
Never	5
(Do not know)	8

VOTING

175. For which party did you vote in the last municipal elections, which were held in 2000?

FIELDWORKER: DO **NOT** READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC; incl. SACP and COSATU)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Skip to Q. 177	06
Minority Front (MF)		07
New National Party (NNP)		08
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		09
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Did not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Don't know)		98

176. If you did not vote in the 2000 municipal elections, please state the main reason for your not voting.

FIELDWORKER: DO **NOT** READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

177. If there were a municipal election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC; incl. SACP and COSATU)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Independent Democrats (ID)		06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Skip to Q. 179	07
Minority Front (MF)		08
New National Party (NNP)		09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		10
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Will not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Do not know)		98

178. If answered 14 in Q. 177: What is your main reason for thinking that you would not vote if a municipal election were held tomorrow?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

179. If 1 to 13 in Q. 177: To which other party do you feel close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.
NOTE: THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE SAME PARTY AS MENTIONED IN Q. 177.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

180. If 14 to 98 in Q. 177: To which party do you feel most close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

181. For which party did you vote in the last national election, which was held in 2004?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC; incl. SACP and COSATU)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Independent Democrats (ID)	Skip to Q. 183	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)		07
Minority Front (MF)		08
New National Party (NNP)		09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		10
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Did not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Do not know)		98

182. If you did not vote in the 2004 election, please state the main reason for your not voting.

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

183. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		01
African National Congress (ANC)		02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)		04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)		05
Independent Democrats (ID)		06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Skip to Q. 185	07
Minority Front (MF)		08
New National Party (NNP)		09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		10
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)		11
United Democratic Movement (UDM)		12
Other (specify)		13
Will not vote		14
Uncertain		15
(Refuse to answer)		97
(Do not know)		98

184. If answered 14 in Q. 183: What is your main reason for thinking that you would not vote if a national election were held tomorrow?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

185. If 1 to 13 in Q. 183: To which other party do you feel close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.
NOTE: THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE SAME PARTY AS MENTIONED IN Q. 183.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07

Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

186. If 14 to 98 in Q. 183: To which party do you feel most close?

FIELDWORKER: DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Azania People's Organisation (AZAPO)	03
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	04
Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus (FF+/VF+)	05
Independent Democrats (ID)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
No other party	15
(Refuse to answer)	97

WATER

187. Where did your household get water from yesterday?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Piped tap water in dwelling – metered	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site/yard – meter	03
Piped tap water on site/yard – pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site/yard – no meter	05
Public/communal tap – Free	06
Public/communal tap – Paid	07
Neighbour – Free	08
Neighbour – Paid for	09
Water carrier/tanker	10
Water carrier/tanker off site/communal	11
Borehole on site	12
Borehole off site/communal	13
Rainwater tank on site	14



Flowing river/stream	15
Dam/pool	16
Stagnant pond	17
Well	18
Spring	19
Other (specify)	20

188. What is the most often used source of water by this household?
[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Piped tap water in dwelling – metered	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site/yard – meter	03
Piped tap water on site/yard – pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site/yard – no meter	05
Public/communal tap – Free	06
Public/communal tap – Paid	07
Neighbour – Free	08
Neighbour – Paid for	09
Water carrier/tanker on site	10
Water carrier/tanker off site/communal	11
Borehole on site	12
Borehole off site/communal	13
Rainwater tank on site	14
Flowing river/stream	15
Dam/pool	16
Stagnant pond	17
Well	18
Spring	19
Other (specify)	20

189. Does the household get water from a source less than 200m away?
[Interviewer: 200 metres is about equal to the length of two football fields.
Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in the house or on the household's site.]

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	9

190. How much water does your household use each day for all purposes?
[Interviewer: Ask only for those who do not have a tap in house or on household's site AND circle "not applicable" if the household does have a tap in house or on household's site.]

Less than 25 litres (one container)	1
25 to 100 litres (1 to 4 containers)	2
101 to 200 litres (4 to 8 containers/½ to 1 drum)	3
201 to 400 litres (8 to 16 containers/1 to 2 drums)	4
401 to 600 litres (16 to 24 containers/2 to 3 drums)	5
More than 600 litres/more than 3 drums	6
Do not know	8
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

- 191. How long does it take members of this household to get to the water source?**
 [Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in house or on household's site.]

0 to 5 minutes	1
6 to 14 minutes	2
15 to 29 minutes	3
30 to 44 minutes	4
45 to 59 minutes	5
More than 60 minutes	6
Don't know	8
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

- 192. How long does the household member have to queue at the water source?**
 [Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in house or on household's site.]

0 to 5 minutes	1
6 to 10 minutes	2
11 to 15 minutes	3
16 minutes or more	4
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

- 193. Who normally fetches the water? (Who did it most of the time this week?)**
 [Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the respondent has a tap in house or on household's site AND choose only one option.]

Adult female 65 years or older	1
Adult female younger than 65 years	2
Adult male 65 year or older	3
Adult male younger than 65 years	4
Child female (less than 16 years old)	5
Child male (less than 16 years old)	6
All fetch water, not one person more often than another	7
Not a member of the household	8
Not applicable, household does have a tap in house or on its site	9

PAYMENT

- 194. Does the household pay for the water it uses?**

Yes	1
No → Skip to Q. 198	2

195. When do you pay for the water that the household uses?

Daily	1
Weekly	2
Monthly	3
Per container	4
Flat monthly rate	5
Water cost is included in rent	6
Other (specify)	7

196. If you pay for buckets or containers of water, how much does a bucket or container of water cost?

[Interviewer: This question is not about mineral water bought in shops.]

Do not pay	1
Less than 10 cents	2
10–20 cents	3
More than 20 cents	4

197. If you pay for water monthly or weekly, how much do you pay for water every month? [Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]

Less than R20	1
R21–R50	2
R51–R99	3
R100–R200	4
R201–R500	5
More than R500	6
Do not know	8
Not applicable (Do not pay)	9

198. If you get water from the municipality, how often do you receive a bill?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

More often than once a month	1
Once every month	2
Less often than once every month	3
Never → Skip to Q. 201	4
Do not know → Skip to Q. 201	8
Do not get water from municipality → Skip to Q. 201	9

199. In what language is the bill?

English plus an African language	01
Afrikaans plus an African language	02
Sesotho	03
Setswana	04
Sepedi	05
Siswati	06
IsiNdebele	07
IsiXhosa	08
IsiZulu	09
Xitsonga	10
Tshivenda/Lemba	11

Afrikaans	12
English	13
Other (specify)	14
Do not know	98

200. Do you understand the bill?

Yes	1
No	2

201. Do you receive a basic amount of water free every month?

[Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	8

202. Do you pay for sanitation/waste water removal?

[Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	8

203. Do you receive a bill for sanitation/waste water removal?

[Interviewer: If available, check the monthly water account.]

Yes	1
No	2

INTERRUPTION OF SERVICES

204. In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of longer than one day to your water service?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Never	1
Once or twice this past year	2
Monthly	3
More often than monthly	4

205. In the past 12 months, what was the longest interruption you experienced?

[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Few hours or less	1
Few hours to 1 day	2
1 day to 2 days	3
3 to 6 days	4
1 week (7 days)	5
More than one week	6
Cannot remember	7

206. If you experienced water interruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water interruptions? [Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Burst pipes	01
Pump not working	02
General maintenance/repairs to the supply system	03
Not enough water (demand too high)	04
Water only available at certain times	05
Drought	06
Vandalism	07
Cut off – Due to non-payment for service	08
Other (specify)	09
Don't know	98

**207. If your household does not pay for water, what is the main reason for not paying?
[Interviewer: Ask this question only for those who indicated "non-payment for services" in Q. 194.
Interviewer: Do not read out the options.]**

Source of water is free (there is no billing system)	01
Billing is irregular	02
Bill is incorrect	03
Can't afford to pay for water	04
Unhappy with the source of water provided	05
Unhappy with the quality of service provided	06
The government should supply free water	07
Others do not pay	08
The household only uses the free basic amount	09
The cost of water is included in the rent/levy	10
Other (specify)	11

**Have you experienced the following as a consequence of non-payment for water services in the last 12 months?
[Interviewer: Ask this question only for those who indicated "non-payment for services" in Q. 194.]**

	Yes	No
208. Threats of legal action by the municipality	1	2
209. Legal action by the municipality	1	2
210. Cut off	1	2
211. Eviction from your home	1	2
212. Attachment of goods (sheriff)	1	2
213. Other (specify)	1	2

CURRENT QUALITY AND SAFETY OF WATER SERVICES AND HYGIENE

214. Do you treat (sterilise or clean) the water you use for drinking and food preparation?

Yes, always	1
Yes, sometimes	2
No, never – it has already been treated → Skip Q. 216	3
No, never – it has not been treated → Skip to Q. 216	4

215. Which method do you use to treat (sterilise or clean) the water?

Boiling	1
Filtering	2
Chemical (bleach, chlorine)	3
Other (specify)	4

Is the water you use:

	Yes	No
216. Safe to drink?	1	2
217. Clear?	1	2
218. Good in taste?	1	2
219. Free from odours?	1	2

SANITATION

220. What type of toilet facility is available for this household?

[Interviewer: Mark only one, the main toilet.]

Flush toilet connected to a municipal sewage system	01
Flush toilet connected to a septic tank	02
Chemical toilet	03
Pit latrine with ventilation pipe (long drop)	04
Pit latrine without ventilation pipe (long drop)	05
Bucket toilet	06
Other (specify)	07
None → Skip to Q. 226	08
Do not know	98

221. If the household has a bucket system, how often is the waste removed?

[Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the household does not use a bucket toilet.]

Once a week	1
About every two weeks	2
Once a month	3
Less often than once a month	4
Do not know	8
Not applicable, no bucket toilet	9

222. Where is this toilet facility located?

In dwelling	1
On site (in yard)	2
Off site (outside yard)	3

223. Is the toilet facility shared with other households or people from outside your household?

Yes	1
No	2

224. How safe do you think is it for children to use the toilet facility?
[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Very safe	1
Safe	2
Neither safe nor unsafe	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
Don't know	8

225. How safe do you think is it for the elderly to use the toilet facility?
[Interviewer: Choose only one option.]

Very safe	1
Safe	2
Neither safe nor unsafe	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
Don't know	8

226. If the household does not have access to a toilet, what alternative method is used?
[Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the household does have access to a toilet facility.]

Veld	1
Plastic bags	2
Chamber pot (potty)	3
Alternative facilities (place of work, school)	4
Other (specify)	5
Not applicable, do have access to toilet	9

227. After using the toilet (or alternative method), what do you use to clean yourself?

Toilet paper	1
Newspaper	2
Grass/leaves	3
Stones/corn cobs	4
Other (specify)	5

228. After using the toilet (or alternative method), do you clean your hands?

Yes	1
No → Skip to Q. 231	2

229. If yes, how?

Water from a source near the toilet	1
Water from a nearby communal standpipe	2
Water from a nearby stream, pond or dam	3
No water but some cleaning material → Skip to Q. 231	4
Nothing → Skip to Q. 231	5

230. When you wash your hands, do you use soap?

Yes	1
No	2

231. Have you received any hygiene education?

Yes	1
No	2
Cannot remember	3

232. How would you rate the condition of your toilet?

[Interviewer: Circle "not applicable" if the household does not have access to a toilet facility.]

Good (clean, no leaks or smell)	1
Acceptable (fairly clean, sometimes smelly)	2
Poor (dirty, leaking, overflows)	3
Very poor (out of order)	4
Not applicable, do not have access to toilet	9

233. Do you pay for using the toilet facility?

Yes	1
No → Skip to Q. 235	2

234. If yes, whom do you pay? (Choose only one option.)

Municipality	1
Business	2
Landlord	3
Employer	4
Neighbour	5
Other (specify)	6

COMMUNICATION AND PARTICIPATION, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION

235. Do you know what or whom to contact if you have a water and/or sanitation service problem?

Yes	1
No	2

236. If you wanted general information about water and sanitation, what would you do?

[Interviewer: Do not read out the answer options AND circle only one option.]

Visit your municipality	1
Call your municipality	2
Visit the website of the municipality	3
Ask your local councillor	4
Ask your local traditional leader	5
Ask a neighbourhood/civic/ratepayers' organisation	6
Ask the corporate body of the building/flat	7
Ask a landlord	8
Ask my employer	9
Ask a family member or friend	10
Other (specify)	11
Do not know	98

237. When was the last time you contacted a municipal office about water and/or sanitation?

Within past 3 months	1
Within past year	2
Longer than 1 year ago	3
Never	4
Cannot remember	5

238. Have you attended a public meeting during the last year where water or sanitation issues have been discussed?

Yes	1
No	2

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following?

[Interviewer: ASK ALL, even if services are not available to household.]

	Satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Do not know
239. The access to municipal officials	1	2	3	8
240. The helpfulness of municipal officials	1	2	3	8
241. The ability of the municipality to respond to complaints	1	2	3	8
242. The ability of the municipality to rectify problems	1	2	3	8
243. The quantity/amount of the water available to your household	1	2	3	8
244. The safeness of the water for drinking	1	2	3	8
245. The billing system that is in place	1	2	3	8
246. The cost of water and sanitation services	1	2	3	8

247.	The provision of Free Basic Services	1	2	3	8
248.	The type of toilet facility provided by the municipality	1	2	3	8
249.	The safety/health risk of the toilet available to your household	1	2	3	8
250.	The way that the municipality provides for disposal of waste water	1	2	3	8

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

251. Sex of respondent [*copy from contact sheet*]

Male	1
Female	2

252. Race of respondent [*copy from contact sheet*]

African/Black	1
Coloured	2
Indian/Asian	3
White	4
Other	5

253. Age of respondent in completed years [*copy from contact sheet*]

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	years
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254. What is your current marital status?

Married	1
Widower/widow	2
Divorced	3
Separated	4
Never married	5

→ **Skip to Q. 256**

255. Do you live together with a partner?

Yes	1
No	2
(Not applicable – living together with spouse)	9

256. What is the highest level of education that you have ever completed?

No schooling	00
Grade 0/Grade R	01
Sub A/Grade 1	02
Sub B/Grade 2	03
Grade 3/Standard 1	04
Grade 4/Standard 2	05
Grade 5/Standard 3	06
Grade 6/Standard 4	07
Grade 7/Standard 5	08
Grade 8/Standard 6/Form 1	09
Grade 9/Standard 7/Form 2	10



Grade 10/Standard 8/Form 3	11
Grade 11/Standard 9/Form 4	12
Grade 12/Standard 10/Form 5/Matric	13
NTC I	14
NTC II	15
NTC III	16
Diploma/certificate with less than Grade 12/Std 10	17
Diploma/certificate with Grade 12/Std 10	18
Degree	19
Postgraduate degree or diploma	20
Other (specify)	21
(Do not know)	98

257. How many years of full-time schooling have you completed?

years

258. Are you a citizen of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2

259. Are you registered as a voter of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	8

260. What language do you speak mostly at home?

261. What is your mother tongue?

	260. Mostly spoken at home	261. Mother tongue
Sesotho	01	01
Setswana	02	02
Sepedi	03	03
Siswati	04	04
IsiNdebele	05	05
IsiXhosa	06	06
IsiZulu	07	07
Xitsonga	08	08
Tshivenda/Lemba	09	09
Afrikaans	10	10
English	11	11
Other African language	12	12
European language	13	13
Indian language	14	14
Other (specify)	15	15

262. What is your current employment status? (WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR PRESENT WORK SITUATION?)

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full time	09
Self-employed – part time	10
Employed part time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full time	12
Other (specify)	13

263. If you are married or have a partner, what is his/her employment status?

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full time	09
Self-employed – part time	10
Employed part time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full time	12
Other (specify)	13

264. What is your current occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

265. If your spouse or partner is employed, what is his/her current occupation?
[WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

266. Who is your employer for this work?

267. Who is your spouse or partner's employer?

[Fieldworker: Read out options.]

[CIRCLE ONE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT JOB.]

	266. Respondent	267. Spouse/ partner
The government, public sector or army	1	1
A government-owned enterprise	2	2
A private company, enterprise or cooperative	3	3
Self employed	4	4
Other (specify)	5	5

268. If self-employed, how many employees do you have working for you?

employees

Not applicable (not currently in labour force)	99
--	----

269. How many hours do/did you normally work a week (in your main job)?

hours

(Refused to answer)	97
(Do not know)	98
(Not applicable – not currently in labour force)	99

270. Do you supervise the work of any other people?

[IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT JOB.]

Yes	1
No	2
(Refused to answer)	7
(Don't know)	8
(Not applicable – never had a job)	9

271. Are you a paid-up member of a trade union?

Yes, I am currently a member	1
Was once a member, but not now	2
Never a member	3

272. Do you consider yourself as belonging to any religion?

Yes	1
No	2

→ **Skip to Q. 275**

273. If the answer is yes, which one? Please specify denomination.

Christian (without specification)	01
African Evangelical Church	02
Anglican	03
Assemblies of God	04
Apostle Twelve	05
Baptist	06
Dutch Reformed	07
Full Gospel Church of God	08
Faith Mission	09
Church of God and Saints of Christ	10
Jehovah's Witness	11
Lutheran	12
Methodist	13
Pentecostal Holiness Church	14
Roman Catholic	15
Salvation Army	16
Seventh Day Adventist	17
St John's Apostolic	18

United Congregation Church	19
Universal Church of God	20
Nazareth	21
Zionist Christian Church	22
Other Christian	23
Islam/Muslim	24
Judaism/Jewish	25
Hinduism/Hindu	26
Buddhism/Buddhist	27
Other (specify)	28
Refused	29
Don't know	30

274. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?

Several times a week	01
Once a week	02
2 or 3 times a month	03
Once a month	04
Several times a year	05
Once a year	06
Less often	07
Never	08
(Refused)	97
(Do not know)	98
(No answer)	99

275. In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Where would you put yourself on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the top and 1 the bottom?

Highest	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Lowest	1

276. How would you rate your health at present?

Very poor	1
Poor	2
Average	3
Good	4
Excellent	5

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

277. Indicate the type of main dwelling that the household occupies.

Dwelling/House or brick structure on a separate stand or yard or on farm	01
Traditional dwelling/Hut/Structure made of traditional materials	02
Flat or apartment in a block of flats	03
Town/cluster/semi-detached house (simplex, duplex or triplex)	04
Unit in retirement village	05
Dwelling/House/Flat/Room in backyard	06
Informal dwelling/Shack in backyard	07
Informal dwelling/Shack not in backyard, e.g. in an informal/squatter settlement or on farm	08
Room/Flatlet	09
Caravan/Tent	10
Other (specify)	11

[Interviewer: Record one main material used for the roof and walls of the dwelling.]
 [PERSONAL OBSERVATION]

Type of material	278. Roof	279. Walls
Bricks	01	01
Cement block/concrete	02	02
Corrugated iron/zinc	03	03
Wood	04	04
Plastic	05	05
Cardboard	06	06
Mixture of mud and cement	07	07
Wattle and daub	08	08
Tile	09	09
Mud	10	10
Thatching	11	11
Asbestos	12	12

280. Does this household have a connection to the MAINS electricity supply?

Yes	1
No	2

281. Do you have a working landline telephone in your dwelling?

Yes	1
No	2

282. Do you have access to a computer?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work/educational institution	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
None	4

283. Do you have access to the Internet?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work/educational institution	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
Yes, at an internet cafe	4
Yes, at a community centre	5
None	6

→ **Skip to Q. 285**

284. If you have access to the Internet, what do you use it for? [Multiple response]

Entertainment	Business	Banking	Information	Other	All of the above
1	2	3	4	5	6

285. Do you personally have a cell phone for personal or business use?

Personal use	Business use	Both	None
1	2	3	4

Which of the following does your household have?

[Fieldworker: Appliances should be in working order.]

	Yes	No
286. Hot running water	1	2
287. Fridge/freezer	1	2
288. Microwave oven	1	2
289. Full-time domestic worker	1	2
290. VCR/DVD in household	1	2
291. Vacuum cleaner/floor polisher	1	2
292. Cell phone in household	1	2
293. A washing machine	1	2
294. An electric stove	1	2
295. A television	1	2
296. A tumble dryer	1	2
297. A radio	1	2
298. More than one radio	1	2
299. Hi-fi or music centre (radio excluded)	1	2
300. Built-in kitchen sink	1	2
301. Home security service	1	2
302. A deep freezer	1	2
303. M-Net and/or DSTv subscription	1	2
304. A dishwashing machine	1	2
305. A sewing machine	1	2
306. One or more motor vehicles	1	2

307. In the past year, was there ever a time when children under 7 years of age in your household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	8
(Not applicable – no children under 7 years of age)	9

308. In the past year, was there ever a time when other members of the household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
(Do not know)	8
(Not applicable – no other household members)	9

PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Showcard G2

309. Please give me the letter that best describes the **TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME of all the people in your household before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.**

310. Please give me the letter that best describes your **PERSONAL TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.**

		309. Household	310. Personal
	No income	01	01
K	R1–R500	02	02
L	R501–R750	03	03
M	R751–R1 000	04	04
N	R1 001–R1 500	05	05
O	R1 501–R2 000	06	06
P	R2 001–R3 000	07	07
Q	R3 001–R5 000	08	08
R	R5 001–R7 500	09	09
S	R7 501–R10 000	10	10
T	R10 001–R15 000	11	11
U	R15 001–R20 000	12	12
V	R20 001–R30 000	13	13
W	R30 000 +	14	14
	(Refuse to answer)	97	97
	(Uncertain/Don't know)	98	98

311. What monthly income level do you consider to be minimal for your household, i.e. your household could not make ends meet with less?

R _____

(Don't know = 98)

312. Would you say that you and your family are...
[Fieldworker: Read out options.]

Wealthy	1
Very comfortable	2
Reasonably comfortable	3
Just getting along	4
Poor	5
Very poor	6

313. How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? [Showcard 3]

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
Neither nor	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
(Do not know)	8

314. Now consider today and the last few days. Would you say that you are...?

In a better mood than usual	1
Normal	2
In a worse mood than usual	3
(Do not know)	8

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

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