Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence From Village Economies 2009
The survey data accompanies the paper, "Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence From Village Economies," published in the Review of Economic Studies, (2016) 83 (1): 231-268. The paper measures the economic impacts of social pressures to share income with relatives and neighbors in rural African villages within a controlled laboratory environment. The researchers conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of positive income shocks resulting from risky investments. In some treatments, they allow participants to pay a price to avoid announcing anything about their income in the game. They vary the price offered to participants, and find that 28 percent of participants choose to pay to avoid the announcement, at a price that is on average 16 percent of their gross earnings in the game. Further, the researchers find that 10 percent of women forced to announce a portion of their income shock adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment, though that strategy reduces their expected earnings. Both findings are suggestive of the economic drag that social pressures may create on investment in SubSaharan Africa.
Kind of data
Sample survey data [ssd]
Experiments were conducted in 26 rural, predominantly agricultural communities in western Kenya.
Unit of analysis
Rural, predominantly agricultural communities in western Kenya.
Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 85. In terms of educational attainment,10 percent of subjects had no formal schooling, while 11.6 percent had finished secondary school
Producers and sponsors
University of Maryland
World Bank DECRG
Center for Research in Economics and Strategy (Washington University - St Louis)
Before beginning subject recruitment, research assistants met with community leaders - head teachers and local headmen - in selected villages to introduce the project. Villages were selected to be at least five kilometers apart from one another, to prevent overlap in subject populations. One day prior to each experimental session, the survey team conducted a door-to-door recruitment campaign, visiting as many households within the village as possible. All households within each village were invited to send members to participate in the experimental economic game session the following day.
80.1 percent of individuals surveyed prior to the sessions chose to participate.
Dates of collection
Mode of data collection
Use of the dataset must be acknowledged using a citation which would include:
- the Identification of the Primary Investigator
- the title of the survey (including country, acronym and year of implementation)
- the survey reference number
- the source and date of download
Jakiela, Pamela and Owen Ozier. 2009. Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies Review of Economic Studies (2016) 83 (1): 231-268. Ref. KEN_2009_RKT_v01_M. Dataset downloaded from [url] on [date]