| Author(s) |
Jessica Goldberg, Mario Macisy, and Pradeep Chintaguntaz |
| Country |
India |
| Language |
English |
| Description |
This paper studies the role of peer networks in sharing information about tuberculosis based on referral strategies that are well understood in labor market contexts and more recently applied to technology diffusion but less commonly used in public health settings. |
| Abstract |
We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested. |
| Table of contents |
I. Context and Experimental Design
A. Context
B. Experiment Setup
C. Experimental Variation: Incentive Conditions
D. Experimental Variation: Outreach Conditions
E. Incentivized Elicitation of Outreach Effort
II. Data and Results
A. Data
B. Patient Characteristics and Balance Tests
C. Overview of Aggregate Outcomes
D. Analysis
E. Cost Analysis
III. Conclusion |
| Download |
https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6070/download/65004 |
